





AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY OF
BEIRUT
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT
UT VITAM HABEANT ABUNDANTIUS HABEANT
1866
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY



كتاب اللمع

في الرد على أهل الزيغ والبدع

تأليف

الشيخ الإمام

أبي الحسن علي بن اسمعيل الأشعري

عني بنشره وتصحيحه

الاب رتشرد يوسف مكارثي اليسوعي

المطبعة الكاثوليكية

بيروت

١٩٥٢

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

وبه استعين

3 **1** **الحمد لله** ذي الجود والثناء. والمجد والسناء. والعز والكبرياء. أحمده على
سوابغ النعماء. وجزيل العطاء. وأشهد ان لا اله الا الله وحده لا شريك له
5 عنده[1] اللقاء. وأشهد ان محمدًا عبده ورسوله خاتم الأنبياء.

2 **اما بعد** فانك سألتني ان أصنف لك كتاباً مختصرًا أبين فيه جملًا
7 توضح الحق وتدمغ البا[طل[2] الناطق بالظلوف] فرأيت اسعافك بذلك
[رحمك[3] وأغدق عليك] الله الخيرات وأعانك على الخير [ماله] طلوبات.

---

(1) M has عده للقا

(2) There is a jagged hole in the page of the manuscript. I have supplied the words in these brackets and in the next two sets of brackets. There are a few slight indications to support my readings, but in any case the gap, coming in this short khuṭba, is not of great importance.

(3) In my translation: « direct you aright » — because I first read وفقك; but closer examination of M has led me to think that the first letter is *rā*ʾ, and the second *ḥā*ʾ.

[الباب الاول]

[باب الكلام في وجود الصانع وصفاته]

مسئلة

3 ان سأل سائل فقال ما الدليل على ان للخلق صانعاً صنعه ومدبّرًا
5 دبّره قيل الدليل على ذلك ان الانسان الذى هو في (ص ٢) غاية الكمال
والتمام كان نطفةً ثم علقة ثم مضغة ثم لحماً وعظماً ودماً وقد علمنا انه لم ينقل
7 نفسه من حال الى حال لانّا نراه في حال كمال قوته وتمام عقله لا يقدر أن
يُحدث لنفسه سمعاً ولا بصرًا ولا ان يخلق لنفسه جارحة يدل ذلك على انه في
9 حال ضعفه ونقصانه عن فعل ذلك أعجز لان ما قدر عليه في حال النقصان فهو
في حال الكمال عليه أقدر وما عجز عنه في حال الكمال فهو في حال النقصان
11 عنه أعجز . ورأيناه طفلاً ثم شاباً ثم كهلاً ثم شيخاً وقد علمنا انه لم ينقل نفسه
من حال الشباب الى حال الكبر والهرم لان الانسان لو جهد ان يزيل عن نفسه
13 الكبر والهرم ويردها الى حال الشباب لم يمكنه ذلك فدل ما وصفنا على انه
ليس هو الذي ينقل نفسه (ص ٣) في هذه الاحوال وان له ناقلاً نقله من حال
15 الى حال ودبّره على ما هو عليه لانه لا يجوز انتقاله من حال الى حال بغير
ناقل ولا مدبّر .

17 4 ممّا يبين ذلك ان القطن لا يجوز أن يتحوّل غزلًا مفتولًا ثم ثوباً
منسوجاً بغير ناسج ولا صانع ولا مدبر ومن اتّخذ قطناً ثم انتظر أن يصير غزلًا
19 مفتولًا ثم ثوباً منسوجاً بغير صانع ولا ناسج كان عن معقول خارجاً وفي الجهل
والجاً . وكذلك من قصد الى برية لم يجد فيها قصرًا مبنياً فانتظر أن يتحول
21 الطين الى حالة الآجرّ وينتضد بعضه على بعض بغير صانع ولا بانٍ كان جاهلاً .

1 واذا كان تحوُّل النطفة علقةً ثم مضغة ثم لحماً ودماً وعظماً أعظم في الاعجوبة
(ص ٤) كان اولى أن يدل على صانع صنع النطفة ونقلها من حال الى حال.

3 **5 وقد قال** الله تعالى(1) «أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تُمْنُونَ [أ] أَنْتُمْ تَخْلُقُونَهُ أَمْ
نَحْنُ ٱلْخَالِقُونَ» فما استطاعوا أن يقولوا بحجة انهم يخلقون ما يمنون مع
5 [تَمَنِّيهم](2) الولد فلا يكون ومع كراهتهم له فيكون . وقد قال الله
تعالى منبها لخلقه على وحدانيته(3) « وَفِي أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَفَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ » يُبين لهم
7 عجزهم وفقرهم الى صانع صنعهم ومدبر دبّرهم .

6 فإن قالوا فما يُؤمنكم ان تكون النطفة لم تَزَلْ قديمةً قيل(4) لهم
9 لو كان ذلك كما ادّعيتم لم يجز أن يلحقها الاعتمال والتأثير ولا الانقلاب والتغيير
لان القديم لا يجوز انتقاله وتغيّره وأن يجري عليه سِمات الحدث لان ما جرى
11 ذلك عليه ولزمته الضعة لم ينفكّ من سمات الحدث وما لم يسبق المحدَث
(ص ٥) كان محدَثاً مصنوعاً فبطل بذلك قدم النطفة وغيرها من الاجسام .

مسئلة

7 فإن قال قائل لِمَ زعمتم ان الباري سبحانه لا يُشبه المخلوقات قيل
15 لانه لو أشبهها لكان حُكمه في الحدث حكمها ولو اشبهها لم يَخلُ من ان
يُشبهها من كل الجهات او من بعضها فان اشبهها من جميع الجهات كان محدَثاً
17 مثلها من جميع الجهات وان أشبهها من بعضها كان محدَثاً من حيث اشبهها
ويستحيل أن يكون المحدَث لم يَزَلْ قديماً وقد قال الله تعالى(5) « ليس كَمِثْلِهِ

(1) 56.58-59.

(2) This reading seems to be correct, although a worm hole has made the word practically illegible. Cf. *Risāla* (Arabic) Nº 17.

(3) 51.21.

(4) M has قيل له. This confusion of numbers occurs several times in M, and hereafter it is corrected tacitly.

(5) 42.11/9.

1 شيء » وقال تعالى(6) « لَمْ يكن له كُفُوًا أحدٌ » .

مسئلة

3 **8 فإن قال قائل** لِمَ قلتم ان صانع الاشياء واحد قيل له لان الاثنين لا يجري (ص ٦) تدبيرهما على نظام ولا يتّسِق على احكام ولا بد أن
5 يلحقهما العجز او واحدًا منهما لان أحدهما اذا أراد أن يُحيي إنسانًا وأراد الآخر ان يُميته لم يَخلُ أن يتم مُرادهما جميعاً او لا يتم مرادهما او يتم [(7) مراد
7 أحدهما دون الآخر . ويستحيل أن يتم] مرادهما جميعاً لانه يستحيل ان يكون الجسم حيًا ميتاً في حال واحدة و إن لم يتم مرادهما جميعاً وجب عجزهما والعاجز
9 لا يكون إلهًا ولا قديمًا . وان تم مراد أحدهما دون الآخر وجب العجز(8) [لـ]من لم يتمّ مراده منهما والعاجز لا يكون إلهًا ولا قديمًا . فدل ما قلناه على
11 ان صانع الاشياء واحد وقد قال تعالى(9) « لو كان فيهما آلهة إلّا الله لَفَسَدَتَا » فهذا معنى احتجاجنا آنفاً .

مسئلة

9 فإن قال قائل ما الدليل على جواز إعادة الخلق قيل له الدليل على
15 ذلك (ص ٧) ان الله سبحانه خلقه أولًا لا على مثال سبق فاذا خلقه أولًا لم يُعْيِهِ أن يخلقه خلقاً آخر وقد قال الله عز وجل(10) « وَضَرَبَ لَنَا مَثَلًا
17 وَنَسِيَ خَلْقَهُ قَالَ مَنْ يُحْيِي ٱلْعِظَامَ وَهِيَ رَمِيمٌ قُلْ يُحْيِيهَا ٱلَّذِي أَنْشَأَهَا أَوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ خَلْقٍ عَلِيمٌ » فجعل النشأة الاولى دليلًا على جواز النشأة الآخرة
19 لانها في معناها ثم قال(11) « ٱلَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمْ مِنَ ٱلشَّجَرِ ٱلْأَخْضَرِ نَارًا فَإِذَا

(6) 112.4.
(7) The words supplied in the brackets are clearly required. It is easy to see how the copyist became confused.
(8) Perhaps it would be better to read : وَجَبَ عَجْزُ مَنْ
(9) 21.22.
(10) 36.78-79.
(11) 36.80

1 أَنتُمْ مِنهُ تُوقِدُونَ » فجعل ظهور النار على حرّها ويبسها من الشجر الأخضر على نداوته ورطوبته دليلًا على جواز خلقه الحيـاة في الرمّة البالية والعظام 3 النخرة وعلى قدرته على خلق مثله ثم قال[12] « أَوَلَيسَ الذي خلق السماوات والأرض بقادر على أن يخلق مِثلَهُمْ » وهذا هو المعوّل عليه في الحجاج في 5 جواز إعادة الخلق .

10 وهذا هو الدليل أيضاً على صحّة الحجاج والنظر لان الله تعالى حكم 7 في الشيء بحكم مثله وجعل سبيل النظير ومجراه مجرى نظيره وقد قال (ص ٨) تعالى[13] « اللهُ يَبْدَؤُا الْخَلقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُه » وقوله تعالى[14] « وَهُوَ الَّذِي يَبْدَؤُا 9 الْخَلقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدهُ وَهُوَ أَهْوَنُ عَلَيهِ » يُريد وهو هيّن عليه فجعل الابتداء كالإعادة.

11 فانه قال قائل زيدوني وضوحاً في صحّة النظر قيل له قول الله تعالى 11 مُخبِرًا عن ابراهيم عليه السلام لمّا رأى الكوكب[15] « قَالَ هذا رَبِّي فَلَمَّا أَفَلَ قَالَ لَا أُحِبُّ الآفِلِينَ فَلَمَّا رَأَى القَمَرَ بَازِغاً قَالَ هذا رَبِّي فَلَمَّا أَفَلَ قَالَ 13 لَئِنْ لَمْ يَهْدِنِي رَبِّي لَأَكُونَنَّ مِنَ القَوْمِ الضَّالِّينَ » فَجَمَعَ عليه السلام القمر والكوكب في انه لا يجوز ان يكون واحد[16] منهما إلهًا ربًّا لاجتماعهما في 15 الأفول وهذا هو النظر والاستدلال الذي يُنكره المنكرون وينحرف عنه المنحرفون .

مسئلة

12 فانه قال قائل لم أنكرتم ان يكون الله تعالى جسماً قيل له أنكرنا 19 ذلك لانه لا يخلو (ص ٩) أن يكون القائل لذلك أراد ما أنكرتم أن

(12) 36.81
(13) 30.11/10
(14) 30.27/26
(15) 6.76/77
(16) M has واحدًا .

1 يكون طويلاً عريضاً مجتمعاً او ان يكون أراد تسميته جسماً وإن لم يكن طويلاً عريضاً مجتمعاً عميقاً فان كان أراد ما انكرتم أن يكون طويلاً عريضاً
3 مجتمعاً كما يُقال للاجسام فيما بَيّنّا فهذا لا يجوز لان المجتمع لا يكون شيئاً واحداً لان أقلّ قليل الاجتماع لا يكون الا بين شَيْئَين لان الشيء الواحد
5 لا يكون لنفسه مجامعاً وقد بَيَّنَّا آنفاً ان الله عز وجل شيء واحد فبطل بذلك أن يكون مجتمعاً . وان أراد لِمَ لا تُسمّونه جسماً وان لم يكن[17] طويلاً
7 عريضاً مجتمعاً فالأسماء ليست إلينا ولا يجوز لنا ان نُسمّي[18] الله تعالى باسم لم يُسَمِّ به نفسه ولا سمّاه به رسوله ولا أجمع المسلمون عليه ولا على معناه .

مسئلة

13 فان قال قائل لِمَ قلتم ان الله تعالى عالم قيل له لان الافعال المحكمة
11 لا تَتَّسِق في الحكمة الا من عالم وذلك أنه لا يجوز أن يحوك (ص ١٠) الديباج بالتقاوير ويصنع دقائق الصناعة من لا يحسن ذلك ولا يعلمه. فلمّا رأينا
13 الانسان على ما فيه من اتّساق الحكمة كالحياة التي ركبها الله فيه والسمع والبصر ومجاري الطعام والشراب وانقسامه فيه وما هو عليه من كماله وتمامه
15 والفلك وما فيه من شمسه وقمره وكواكبه ومجاريها دل ذلك على ان الذي صنع ما ذكرناه لم يكن يصنعه الا وهو عالم بكيفيته وكنهه . ولو جاز أن
17 تحدث[19] الصنائع الحكمية لا من عالم لم نَدْرِ لعلّ جميع ما يحدث من حكم الحيوان وتدابيرهم وصنائعهم يحدث منهم وهم غير عالمين فلما استحال ذلك دل
19 على ان الصنائع المحكمة لا تحدث الا من عالم .

14 كذلك لا يجوز ان تحدث الصنائع الا من قادر حَيّ لانه لو جاز
21 حدوثها مِمّن ليس بقادر ولا حيّ لم ندر لعل سائر ما يظهر من الناس يظهر منهم وهم

(17) M has يكون .
(18) M has يسمى .
(19) M has يحدث .

1 عجزة مَوتى فلمّا استحال ذلك دلّت الصنائع على (ص١١) ان اللهَ تعالى حيّ قادر .

مسئلة

3 **15** فإن قال قائل لم قلتم ان الله سميع بصير قيل له لان الحيّ اذا لم يكن موصوفاً بآفة تمنعه من إدراك المسموعات والمبصرات اذا وجدت فهو سميع
5 بصير فلمّا كان الله تعالى حياً لا يجوز عليه الآفات من الصمم والعمى وغير ذلك إذ كانت الآفات تدل على حدوث من جازت عليه صحّ أنه سميع بصير.

مسئلة

16 فإن قال أتقولون إن الله تعالى لم يزل عالماً قادرًا سميعاً بصيرًا قيل له
9 كذلك نقول . فان قال فما الدليل على ذلك قيل له الدليل على ذلك ان الحيّ إذا لم يكن عالماً كان موصوفاً بضد العلم من الجهل او الشكّ او الآفات فلو
11 كان [الـ]باري تعالى لم يزل حياً غير عالم لكان موصوفاً بضد العلم (ولو[20] كان موصوفاً بضد العلم) من الجهل او الشك (ص ١٢) والآفات (فلو كان
13 الباري تعالى لم يزل حياً غير عالم لكان موصوفاً بضد العلم) ولو كان لم يزل موصوفاً بضد العلم لاستحال أن يعلم لان ضد العلم لو كان قديماً لاستحال ان
15 يبطل واذا استحال أن يبطل ذلك لم يجز أن يصنع الصنائع الحكمية فلمّا صنعها ودلّت على انه عالم صحّ وثبت انه لم يزل عالماً اذ قد استحال أن يكون
17 لم يزل بضد العلم موصوفاً .

17 وكذلك لو كان لم يزل حياً غير قادر لَوَجَبَ أن يكون لم يزل عاجزًا
19 موصوفاً بضد القدرة ولو كان عجزه قديماً لاستحال أن يقدر وأن تحدث الأفعال منه . وكذلك لو كان لم يزل حياً غير سميع ولا بصير لكان لم يزل موصوفاً
21 بضد السمع من الصمم (ص ١٣) والآفات وبضد البصر من العمى والآفات

(20) The words in parentheses here, and a few words further on, seem to be superfluous.

1 ومحال جواز الآفات على الباري لانها من سمات الحدث فدل ما قلناه على ان
الله تعالى لم يزل عالماً قادراً سميعاً بصيراً .

مسئلة

18 **فان قال قائل** لم قلتم إن للباري تعالى علماً به عَلِمَ قيل له لان
5 الصنائع الحكمية كما لا تقع مِنّاً إلا من عالم كذلك لا تحدث منا إلا من ذي
علم فلو لم تدل الصنائع على علم من ظهرت منه منا لم تدل على أن مَنْ ظهرت
7 منه منا فهو عالم . فلو دلّت على أن الباري تعالى عالم قياساً على دلالتها على أنّا
علماء. ولم تدل على أن له علماً[21] قياساً على دلالتها على أن لنا علماً لجاز لزاعم
9 أن يزعم أنها تدل على علمنا ولا تدل على أنّا علماء . واذا لم يجز هذا لم يجز
ما قاله هذا القائل .

11 **19** (ص ١٤) **فان قال** فما انكرتم أن لا تدل الأفعال الحكمية
على علم العالم منا كما دلّت على أنه عالم لانه ليس معنى العالم منا ان له علماً
13 لأنه قد يَعلَم العالم منا عالماً من لا يعلم أنّ له علماً قيل له إن جاز لك أن
تزعم هذا جاز لغيرك ان يزعم أنّ الأفعال الحكمية تدل على أنّ لِي علماً بها
15 ولا تدل على أنّي عالم لأنه ليس معنى العالم ان له علماً[22] لانه قد يعلم الإنسان
مِنّا أن له علماً من لا يعلمه عالماً وأيضاً لنا شيء . وأيضاً هذه الدعوى عندي
17 فاسدة وذلك أن معنى العالم عندي أن له علماً ومن لم يعلم لزيد علماً لم يعلمه عالماً.

20 **فان قال قائل** فما انكرتم من أن يدل الفعل الحكمي على أن
19 للانسان علماً هو غيره كما قلتم انه يدل على علم قيل له ليس اذا دل الفعل
الحكمي على ان للانسان علماً دل على انه غيره كما ليس اذا دل على انه عالم
21 دل على أنه متغاير على وجه من الوجوه . وأيضاً فان معنى الغيريّة جواز مفارقة

(21) M has علم.
(22) M has علم.

1 أحد الشيئين للآخر على وجه (ص ١٥) من الوجوه فلمّا دلّت الدلالة على قِدَم
الباري تعالى وعلمه استحال ان يكونا غيرَيْن . وأيضاً فلو جاز لزاعم ان يزعم
3 أن الفعل الحكمي[23] يدل على أن العالم عالم ثم يعلم[24] علمه بعد ذلك لجاز
لزاعم أن يزعم أن الفعل الحكمي يدل على أن العلم علم ثم يُعلم أنه لعالم
5 بعد ذلك واذا لم يجز هذا وتكافأ القولان وجب أن تكون الدلالة على أن
العالم عالم دلالة على العلم .

7 **21 فان قال قائل** من انه إنما يدل الفعل الحكمي على علم العالم لأنه
ممن يجوز أن يموت ويجهل قيل له لو جاز هذا لقائله لجاز لزاعم ان يزعم ان
9 الفعل الحكمي يدل على أن العالم عالم لأنه ممن يجوز أن يموت ويجهل .

22 ومما يبطل قول من قال إن دلالة الفعل الحكمي على علم العالم منا
11 دلالة على انه غير العالم وانه محدَث ان العالم لعلم[25] ما كان عالماً لا للغيرية
ولا للحدث فوجب أن تكون الدلالة على أن العالم عالم دلالة على العلم . ولم
13 يكن العلم علماً لأنه غير (ص ١٦) العالم ولا لأنه[26] محدث لوجود غير
ليس بعلم ومحدث ليس بعلم فلم يجب أن تكون الدلالة على أن العلم علم
15 دلالة على أنه محدَث او أنه غير العالم . وأيضاً فلو جاز لزاعم أن يزعم ان
الدلالة على أن العلم علم دلالة على حدثه او دلالة على أنه غير العالم لجاز لزاعم
17 أن يزعم ان الدلالة على أن العالم [عالم] دلالة على حدثه وأنه متغاير في ذاته .

23 والدليل على أن الله[27] تعالى قدرة وحياة كالدليل على أن الله[28] تعالى علماً .

(23) M has الحكم .
(24) M repeats يعلم .
(25) M has للعلم ما . But the *mā* seems to be the *mā al-ibhāmiyya*, and therefore the noun should be indefinite.

(26) I vocalize as follows : *muḥdathun liwujūdi ghairin laisa bi'ilmin wa muḥdithin laisa bi'ilmin.* However the passage is awkward, and it might make better sense if one simply omitted the words after *muḥdathun*.

(27) M has الله .
(28) M has الله .

1 **24 وقد قال** الله جل ذكره[29] « أَنْزَلَهُ بِعِلْمِهِ » وقال[30] « وَمَا تَحْمِلُ مِنْ أُنْثَى وَلَا تَضَعُ إِلَّا بِعِلْمِهِ » فَثَبَتَ العلم لنفسه وقال تعالى[31] « أَوَ لَمْ 3 يَرَوْا أَنَّ ٱللهَ ٱلَّذِي خَلَقَهُمْ هُوَ أَشَدُّ مِنْهُمْ قُوَّةً » فثبت القوة لنفسه .

25 ومما يدل على ان الله تعالى عالم بعلم أنه لا يخلو أن يكون الله 5 عالماً بنفسه او بعلم يستحيل ان يكون هو نفسه . فان كان عالماً بنفسه كانت نفسه علماً لأن[32] قائلًا لو قال إن الله تعالى عالم بمعنى هو غيره لوجب 7 عليه أن يكون ذلك (ص ١٧) المعنى علماً ويستحيل أن يكون العلم عالماً او العالم علماً او يكون الله تعالى بمعنى الصفات . ألا ترى ان الطريق الذي 9 [به] يُعلم ان العلم علم ان العالم به عَلِمَ لأن قدرة الإنسان التي[33] لا يعلم بها لا يجوز ان تكون علماً فلمّا استحال أن يكون الباري تعالى علماً استحال 11 أن يكون عالماً لنفسه[34] فاذا استحال ذلك صحّ أنه عالم بعلم يستحيل أن يكون هو نفسه .

13 **26 فان قال قائل** ما أنكرتم أن يكون الباري سبحانه عالماً لا بنفسه ولا بمعنى يستحيل أن يكون هو نفسه قيل له لو جاز هذا لجاز أن يكون 15 قولنا عالم لم يرجع به الى نفسه ولا الى معنى[35] ولم يثبت به نفسه ولا معنى يستحيل أن يكون هو نفسه واذا لم يجز هذا بطل ما قالوه . وهذا 17 الدليل يدل على إثبات صفات الله تعالى لذاته كلّها من الحياة والقدرة والسمع والبصر وسائر صفات الذات .

---

(29) 4.166/164
(30) 35.11/12
(31) 41.15/14
(32) M has لا قايلا .
(33) M has الذي .
(34) So M, although one would expect بنفسه .
(35) For greater clarity perhaps one should add : يستحيل ان يكون نفسه

[الباب الثاني]

باب الكلام في القرآن والارادة

3 **27** **ان قال قائل** لم قلتم ان الله تعالى لم يزل (ص ١٨) متكلماً وان كلام الله تعالى غير مخلوق قيل له قلنا ذلك لأن الله تعالى قال[1] « إِنَّمَا 5 قَوْلُنَا لِشَيْءٍ إِذَا أَرَدْنَاهُ أَنْ نَقُولَ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ ». فلو كان القرآن مخلوقاً لكان الله تعالى قائلًا له كن والقرآن قوله ويستحيل أن يكون قوله مقولًا له لأن 7 هذا يُوجب قولًا ثانياً والقول في القول الثاني وفي تعلقه بقول ثالث كالقول في القول الأول وتعلقه بقول ثانٍ وهذا يقتضي ما لا نهاية له من الأقوال وذلك 9 فاسد واذا فسد ذلك فسد أن يكون القرآن مخلوقاً . ولو جاز أن يقول لقوله لجاز أن يريد إرادته وذلك فاسد عندنا وعندهم واذا بطل هذا استحال أن 11 يكون مخلوقاً .

28 **فان قال قائل** ما أنكرتم أن يكون معنى قوله تعالى « أَنْ نَقُولَ 13 [له] كُنْ فَيَكُونُ » اي نُكَوِّنُهُ[2] فيكون من غير أن نقول له في الحقيقة (ولا[3] ان نقول له في الحقيقة) شيئاً قيل له قال الله تعالى « إنما قولنا لشيء 15 إذا اردناه ان نقول له كن فيكون » فلو جاز لقائل ان يقول لم يكن الله تعالى قائلا لشيء في الحقيقة كن وانما المعنى ان يكوّنه فيكون لجاز لزاعم ان 17 يزعم ان الله تعالى لا يريد شيئاً في الحقيقة (ص ١٩) وانما معنى اردناه فعلناه من غير ان يكون ارادةً في الحقيقة على وجه من الوجوه .

19 **29** **فان قال قائل** انه[4] يكون معنى ان الله تعالى اراد الشيء انه فعله

(1) 16.40/42
(2) M has نُكوّنه .
(3) The words in parentheses seem to be superfluous.
(4) M has ما .

1 وهو مريد له في الحقيقة بمعنى انه فاعل له قيل له لو جاز هذا لقائله لجاز لزاعم
ان يزعم ان الله عز وجل قائل للشيء في الحقيقة كن ويزعم ان[5] معنى ذلك
3 انه يُكوّنه فيثبت لله تعالى قولًا في الحقيقة هو المقول له كما زعمتم ان لله
تعالى ارادةً في الحقيقة هي مراده ولو جاز لزاعم ان يزعم هذا لجاز[6] لآخر
5 ان يقول ان علم الله تعالى بالشيء هو فعله له .

30 فان قال قائل اليس قد قال الله تعالى[7] « جِدَارًا يُرِيدُ أَنْ يَنقَضَّ »
7 ولا إرادة للجدار في الحقيقة وانما قال يريد تَوَسُّعاً والمعنى انه ينقضّ قيل له
نعم فان قال فما انكرتم ان يكون معنى « ان[8] نقول له كن » اي نُكوِّنه
9 فيكون قيل له الفرق بين ذلك ان الجماد يستحيل مع جماديته ان يكون
مريدًا والباري تعالى في الحقيقة لا يستحيل عليه ان يريد (ص ٢٠) او يقول
11 فلذلك لم يكن قوله « ان نقول له كن فيكون » بمعنى نكوّنه[9] . وايضا
فلو كان قوله « ان نقول له » ليس معناه اثبات قول له وانما معناه ان يكوّنه
13 كما ان قوله « جدارًا يريد ان ينقضّ » معناه ان ينقض لجاز لزاعم ان يزعم
ان قوله « اردناه » فعلناه وهو في الحقيقة لا يريد فعله كما ان قوله « جدارًا
15 يريد ان ينقضّ » معناه انه ينقض وهذا اولى في حقيقة القياس . واذا لم يجب
هذا لم يجب ما قلتموه[10] .

17 31 ويقال لهم اذا كان معنى ان الله تعالى اراد فعل الشيء انه فعله ومعنى
أراد حركة الشيء انه حرّكه فما انكرتم ان يكون الجماد في الحقيقة مريدًا

(5) M has الله .
(6) M has جاز .
(7) 18.77/76
(8) M has القول .
(9) M has يكونه .
(10) Strictly speaking one would expect قلتَه , but the author is evidently thinking of a group of adversaries rather than of an individual opponent. Cf. n. 4 to Ch. 1.

1 لحركة نفسه بمعنى انه مُتحرِّك وان لا يكون للباري تعالى على الجماد مزيّة في
الارادة وان لا يكون له مزيّة على من وقع فعله وهو غير مريد له لانه قد
3 حصل له معنى فاعل كما حصل للباري تعالى معنى فاعل .

32 **فان قال** فما معنى قوله تعالى[11] « قالتا أتَيْنَـا طَائِعِينَ » قيل له
5 معنى ذلك انها (ص ٢١) قالتا في الحقيقة « أتينا طائعين » .

33 **ومما يدل** من القياس على ان الله تعالى لَمْ يَزَلْ متكلماً انه لو كان
7 لم يزل غير متكلم وهو ممن لا يستحيل عليه الكلام لكان موصوفاً بضد من
اضداد الكلام من السكوت او الآفة. ولو كان لم يزل موصوفاً بضد الكلام
9 لكان ضد الكلام قديماً . ولو كان ضد الكلام قديماً لاستحال ان يَعْدَمَ وان
يتكلم الباري لان القديم لا يجوز عدمه كما لا يجوز حدوثه فكان يجب ان
11 لا يكون الباري تعالى قائلًا ولا آمرًا ولا ناهياً على وجه من الوجوه وهذا
فاسد عندنا وعندهم . واذا فسد هذا صَحَّ وثبت ان الباري لم يزل متكلماً
13 قائلًا .

34 **فان قال قائل** وَلِمَ زعمتم انه لو كان لم يزل غير متكلم لكان
15 موصوفاً بضد الكلام قيل له لان الحيّ اذا لم يكن موصوفاً بالكلام كان
موصوفاً بضده كما انه اذا لم يكن موصوفاً بالعلم كان موصوفاً بضده. وذلك
17 ان الحيّ فيما بيننا ذلك حكمه ولم تقم دلالة على حَيّ (ص ٢٢) يخلو من
الكلام واضداده في الغائب كما لم تقم دلالة على حيّ يخلو من العلم واضداده
19 حتى يكون لا موصوفاً بانه عالم ولا بضد العلم . فقد اجتمع الامر فيهما انه
مستحيل فيما بيننا حيّ غير عالم ولا موصوف بضد العلم وانه مستحيل فيما بيننا
21 حيّ غير متكلم ولا موصوف بضد الكلام وانه لم تقم على ذلك دلالة في

(11) 41.11/10

1 الغائب . فلو جاز أحد الأمرين وهو حيّ غير متكلم ولا موصوف بضد
الكلام لجاز الامر الآخر وهو حيّ غير عالم ولا موصوف بضد العلم .

3 **35 وأيضاً** فانه يستحيل فيما بيننا عالم يوصف بضد العلم مع علمه ومتكلم
يوصف بضد الكلام مع كلامه فلما اجتمعا في الاحالة وجب ان يكون من
5 جوّز متكلماً في الغائب يوصف بضد الكلام مع كلامه كمن جوز عالماً في
الغائب يوصف بضد العلم مع علمه . فكذلك يجب أيضاً لما استحال فيما بيننا
7 حيّ غير عالم ولا موصوف بضد العلم وجب ان يستحيل فيما بيننا حيّ غير
متكلم ولا موصوف (ص ٢٣) بضد الكلام ان يستحيل ذلك في الغائب
9 ووجب ان يكون من جوّز أحد الأمرين في الغائب كمن جوّز الأمر الآخر .

36 وهذا هو الدليل على ان الله تعالى لم يزل مريدًا وذلك ان الحيّ
11 اذا كان غير مُريد لشي. اصلًا وجب ان يكون موصوفاً بضد من اضداد
الارادات من الآفات كالسهو والكراهة والإبا.(12) والآفات كما وجب ان
13 [يكون] الحيّ اذا كان غير عالم بشي. اصلًا موصوفاً بضد من اضداد العلوم من
الآفات كالجهل والسهو والغفلة او الموت او ما أشبه ذلك من الآفات. فلما(13)
15 استحال ان يكون الباري تعالى لم يزل موصوفاً بضد الارادة لان هذا يوجب
ان لا يريد شيئاً على وجه من الوجوه وذلك ان ضد الارادة اذا كان الباري
17 تعالى لم يزل موصوفاً به يوجب قدمه ومحال عدم القديم كما محال حدوث القديم
فاذا استحال عدمه وجب ان لا يريد الباري شيئاً ويقصد فعله على وجه من
19 الوجوه وذلك فاسد . واذا فسد هذا صحّ (ص ٢٤) وثبت ان الباري تعالى
لم يزل مريدًا .

(12) M has والاباء . الإباء is the only reading which I can suggest in the context.

(13) This is an involved sentence which does not seem to be completed properly; but the sense is clear.

1 **37** **فان قال قائل** لِمَ قلتم اذا كان من لم يزل غير متكلم ولا مريد
وجب ان يكون موصوفاً بضد الارادة والكلام اذا كان ممن لا يستحيل عليه
3 الكلام والارادة فَمَا انكرتم من ان من لم يزل غير فاعل وجب ان يكون
موصوفاً بضد الفعل وان يكون تاركاً فيما لم يزل <u>قيل له</u> لا يجب ما قلته وذلك
5 ان لِلكلام[14] ضداً ليس بكلام وللارادة ضد ليس بارادة فوجب لو كان
الباري [15] تعالى حَيّاً غير متكلم ولا مُريد ان يكون موصوفاً بضد الكلام
7 والارادة . وليس لِلفِعْل ضد[16] ليس بفعل فيجب بنفي الفعل عن الفاعل وجود
ضده لان الموجود اذا لم يكن محدثاً[17] كان قديماً والقديم لا يضاد المحدثات.
9 فلما لم يكن للفعل ضد ليس بفعل لم يجب بنفي الفعل عن الله تعالى في أزله
إثبات ضد . ولما كان للكلام ضد ليس بكلام وجب بنفي الكلام عن الله
11 تعالى في ازله اثبات ذلك الضد لا محالة .

38 **فان قال** فيجب اذا كان (ص ٢٥) القديم غير فاعل فيما لم يزل
13 ان[18] يكون عاجزًا او تاركاً <u>قيل له</u> فليس العجز مضاداً للفعل وذلك انه
ليس من جنس من اجناس الفعل من حركة وسكون وغيرهما من سائر الاعراض
15 الا وقد يجوز ان يخلقه الله مع العجز فعلمنا بذلك ان العجز لا يضاد الفعل لان
الاجسام والجواهر من افعال الله تعالى فعلمنا ان العجز لا يضاد الفعل لان
17 عجزي لَوْ ضَادَّ فعلي[19] للحركة لكان تضاد وقوع الحركة من ربي في جسمي.
الا ترى انه اذا استحال ان أفعل بِيَ علماً مع الموت استحال ان يفعل ربّي

(14) M has الكلام .
(15) M has بارى .
(16) M has ضدا .
(17) M has فعلا, but it scarcely seems possible to retain this unless we suppose that something has been omitted. Perhaps we might read : لان القديم اذا لم يكن فاعلاً كان قديماً والقديم الخ . The general argument is fairly clear, but this passage does puzzle me.
(18) M has ليكون .
(19) M repeats فعي .

1 فِيٌّ مع الموت علماً فلما لم يكن العجز مضاداً للفعل وانما يضادّ القدرة وكان الترك للشيء فعل ضده فكان الباري تعالى لم يزل غير فاعل لشيء على وجه
3 من الوجوه لم يجب بنفي[20] الفعل عنه في أزله عجزٌ[21] ولا تركٌ .

39 وأيضاً فان الحيّ اذا كان غير متكلم ومريد وجب ان يكون
5 موصوفاً بضد الارادة والكلام وليس اذا كان غير فاعل لشيء وجب إثبات ضد هو عجز او ترك (ص ٢٦) اذا كان عجز الانسان لا يضاد فعله فلم يجب
7 بنفي الفعل عن الله تعالى في أزله إثبات ترك او عجز كما وجب في نفي الكلام والارادة عنه في أزله إثبات أضدادهما .

9 **40 فان قال** فيجب بنفي الحركة عن الله تعالى في أزله ان يكون ساكناً قيل لو كان ممن يجوز ان يتحرك لوجب لعمري بنفي الحركة عنه ان
11 يكون ساكناً كما يجب بنفي الكلام والارادة عنه في أزله اثبات اضدادهما اذ كان ممن لا يستحيل ذلك عليه .

13 **41 فان قال** فيجب بنفي التفضُّل عنه فيما لم يزل ان يكون بخيلاً قيل له التفضل هو ما للمتفضِل ان يتفضَّل به وله ان لا يتفضل به والبخل انما يجب
15 بمنع مستحَق أستُحِقّ على من بخل والباري تعالى لا يجب عليه فعل شيء .

42 فان قال فيجب بنفي العدل عنه في ازله ان يكون جائراً[22] او
17 عاجزاً قيل له ليس يجب بنفي العدل ضد هو عجز او جور لانه ليس من جنس من أجناس العدل الا ويجوز ان يفعله الله تعالى فينا مع العجز فلم يجب بنفي
19 العدل إثبات (ص ٢٧) ضد هو عجز . ولم يجب ايضاً اثبات الجور لان الانسان قد لا يكون عادلاً اذا لم يكن منه عدل كَسْبُهُ ولا فعله ولا يكون

(20) M has نفى .
(21) M has عجزًا ولا تركا .
(22) M has جائزا , and so twice below.

1 جائزًا فليس مَنْ نَفَيْنا عنه العدل أثبتنا له ضدًا هو جور او عجز اذ كنا قد
نَنفي ذلك عنا ولا نثبت ضدًا هو عجز او جور والحيّ منا ومن غيرنا اذا لم
3 يكن(23) عالمًا كان موصوفاً بضد العلم . وايضاً فقد لا يكون الانسان عادلًا
ولا يكون جائرًا بجور من جنس العدل فليس يجب بنفي العدل ضد هو جور
5 كما وجب في الكلام والارادة لان الانسان قد يكون عادلًا بالكون في
المكان اذا أمره الله تعالى ان يكون فيه ويكون في وقت آخر جائرًا
7 بالكون فيه اذا نهاه الله تعالى عن الكون فيه فيكون العدل من جنس الجور
لان الكون في المكان من جنس الكون فيه .

9 **43** **فان قال** ما أنكرتم اذا لم يكن الباري تعالى مُحرِّكًا في أزله ان
يكون مُسكنا قيل له لا يخلو قولك اذا لم يكن محركًا ان يكون (ص ٢٨)
11 مسكنا يعني اذا كان لم يزل غير محرِّك لنفسه ان يكون مسكنا لها او
يعني(24) اذا لم يكن محركا لجسم كان مسكنا له . فان عنيتَ ان لم يُحرِّك
13 نفسَهُ كان مسكنا لها فهذا خطأ لانه يستحيل ان يحرِّك نفسه . ونحن لم نقل
اذا لم يتكلم من يستحيل كلامه كان موصوفاً بضد الكلام . وان عنيتَ اذا
15 لم يكن محركاً فيما لم يزل لجسم كان مسكنا له فليس مع الله تعالى في قدمه
أجسام فيجب اذا لم يحركها ان يُسكنها . وما لم يكن موجودًا يستحيل
17 تحرُّكه . فليس اذا لم يحرِّك ما تستحيل حركته وجب ان يُسكنه .

مسئلة

19 **44** **فان قال** القادر مِنّا على الكلام في حال قدرته عليه قد خلا من
الكلام وأضداده [قيل له] فهذا ضربٌ من الخلاف لان القادر منا على الكلام
21 في حال قدرته عليه متكلم لا محالة وسندل على ذلك بعد هذا الموضع من كتابنا .

(23) M has يكو .
(24) M has تعني . I have read يعني, understanding the subject to be قولك, as before, although تعني would seem to be allowable in both cases — especially in view of عنيتَ in the next sentence.

1 على أنّا نقول له ما أنكرت ان يكون القادر على العلم قد خلا من العلم
واضداده فان قال القادر على العلم قد خلا من العلم وضده[25] اللذين يقدر
3 عليها ولا يخلو من علم آخر او ضده قيل له فَقُلْ ان القادر على (ص ٢٩)
الكلام وضده [قد] يخلو منهما ولا يخلو من كلام آخر او ضده لا يقدر عليهما .

5 **45** **ودليل آخر** على ان الله تعالى لم يزل متكلماً ان الكلام لا يخلو ان
يكون قديماً او حديثاً[26] . فان كان محدثاً لم يخل ان يُحدِثه [الله] في نفسِهِ
7 او قائماً بنفسِهِ او في غيره . فيستحيل ان يحدثه في نفسه لانه ليس بمحل
للحوادث . ويستحيل ان يحدثه قائماً بنفسه لانه صفة والصفة لا تقوم بنفسها .
9 ويستحيل ان يحدثه في غيره لانه لو أحدثه في غيره لوجب ان يشتق[27] ذلك
الجسم الذي فيه الكلام من أخصّ أوصاف الكلام اللازمة له لنفسه اسماً
11 وللجملة التي المحل منها اسماً . فان كان أخص أوصاف الكلام انه كلام وجب
ان يكون ذلك الجسم متكلماً . وان كان أخص أوصافه انه أمر وجب ان
13 يكون ذلك الجسم آمرًا . وكذلك ان كان اخص اوصافه انه نهي وجب
ان يكون ذلك الجسم ناهياً . فلما استحال ان يتكلم بكلام الله تعالى غيره
15 ويأمر بأمره غيره وينهى بنهيه غيره استحال ان يُحدث كلاماً في غيره فيكون به
متكلماً . واذا (ص ٣٠) فسدت الوجوه التي لا يخلو الكلام منها لو كان
17 محدَثاً صَحَّ انه قديم وان الله تعالى لم يزل به متكلماً .

46 **فان قال** أفليس قد يُحدث الله تعالى في غيره فعلًا وتفضلًا ونعمةً
19 وإحساناً ورزقاً فيكون فاعلًا متفضلًا منعماً محسناً رازقاً فما[28] أنكرتم ان

(25) M has واضداده .
(26) One would have expected مُحدَثاً , the usual contrary of قديما.
(27) M has (كذلك : or) يشق لذلك . According to Lane the form شقّ may be used in the same sense as اشتقّ , and under رَجِمٌ he cites a *hadith qudsī* in which it is so used. But certainly the usual form is اشتقّ , which our author uses himself in a similar passage in the last part of No. 46. Perhaps لذلك could be retained, but ذلك seems better.
(28) M has فيما .

1 يُحدث في غيره كلاماً يكون به متكلماً قيل له لو لزم هذا لزم ان يعلم ويقدر بعلم وقدرة يُحدثها في غيره كما يتفضل ويُنعم ويُحسِن فيما يُحدثه في غيره تفضلاً
3 ونعمةً وإحساناً ورزقاً فان لم يلزم هذا لم يلزم ما قلتموه . وأيضاً فان الله تعالى اذا أحدث في غيره تفضلاً ونعمةً وفعلاً وإحساناً ورزقاً كان ذلك الجسم موصوفاً
5 بأخصّ أوصاف الفعل والتفضل والرزق والنعمة والاحسان لانه ان كان التفضل والنعمة والاحسان والفعل قوةً لا بد ان يكون ذلك الجسم قوياً وكذلك ان
7 كان علماً او حياةً او ارادةً او سمعاً او بصرًا فيجب اذا أحدث كلاماً[29] في غيره ان يشتق ذلك[30] الغير من أخصّ أوصاف الكلام. فلما لم يجز (ص ٣١)
9 ذلك بطل ان يكون الكلام مَقيساً على ما قلتم من ان الله تعالى يُحدث كلامه في غيره كما يحدث فعله وتفضله ونعمه وإحسانه في غيره .

11 **47 فان قالوا** أفليس قد يُحدث الله تعالى كتابة في غيره ولا يكون الشيء الذي قامت به الكتابة كاتباً قيل لهم ان أحدث الله تعالى في غيره
13 كتابة ضرورة كان ذلك الغير[31] كاتباً باضطرار وكذلك ان كانت الكتابة كَسْباً كان ذلك الغير كاتباً باكتساب فيجب اذا أحدث الله تعالى كلامه في
15 غيره ان يكون ذلك الغير متكلماً بكلام الله .

48 وهذا الدليل على قِدَم الكلام هو الدليل على قدم الارادة لله تعالى
17 لانها لو كانت محدثةً لكانت لا تخلو من ان يكون [الله] يحدثها في نفسه او في غيره او قائمةً بنفسها . فيستحيل ان يحدثها في نفسه لانه ليس بمحل للحوادث .
19 ويستحيل ان يحدثها قائمة بنفسها لانها صفة والصفة لا تقوم بنفسها كما لا يجوز أن يُحدث علماً وقدرة قائمَين (ص٣٢) بانفسها . ويستحيل ان يحدثها في غير[ه] لان
21 هذا يوجب ان يكون ذلك الغير مريدًا بارادة الله تعالى . فلما استحالت هذه الوجوه التي لا تخلو الارادة منها لو كانت محدثة صَحَّ انها قديمةٌ وان الله لم يزل مريدًا بها .

(29) Reading كلامه might make the following sentence more intelligible.
(30) M has كذلك العين .
(31) M has للغير .

[الباب الثالث]

باب الكلام في الارادة وانها تعم سائر المحدثات

3 **49** فان قال قائل لِمَ قلتم ان الله تعالى مريد لكل شيء يجوز ان يُراد
قيل له قلنا ذلك لان الارادة اذا كانت من صفات الذات بالدلالة التي ذكرناها
5 وجب ان تكون[1] عامة في كل ما يجوز ان يراد على حقيقة كما اذا كان
العلم من صفات الذات وجب عمومه بكل ما يجوز ان يُعلم على حقيقة[2] .
7 وأيضاً فقد دلت الدلالة على ان الله تعالى خالق كل شيء حادث [و] لا يجوز
ان يخلق ما لا يريده وقد قال الله تعالى[3] « فَعَّالٌ لِمَا يُرِيدُ » . وأيضاً فانه
9 لا يجوز ان يكون في سلطان الله تعالى ما لا يريده لانه لو كان في سلطان
الله تعالى ما لا يريده لوجب أحد أمرَيْن (ص ٣٣) إما إثبات سهو وغفلة او
11 اثبات ضعف وعجز ووهن وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده فلما لم يجز ذلك على الله
تعالى استحال ان[4] يكون في سلطانه ما لا يريده .

13 **50** فان قال وَلِمَ زعمتم ذلك قيل له زعمنا ذلك لان المراد اذا وقع لم
يلحق من وقع مراده ضعف ولا تقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده بوقع المراد فواجب
15 ان يلحقه الضعف والتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده اذا لم يقع مراده . ألا ترى ان
من وقع ما يعلمه لم يلحقه جهل ولا ضدّ من اضداد العلم بذلك الشيء اذا
17 وقع وهو يعلمه فدل ذلك على انه اذا لم يقع وهو لا يعلمه وجب جهله او

---

(1) M has يكون .
(2) M has حقيقته . This could be retained, and then the preceding على حقيقة could also be read : على حقيقته . In fact على حقيقته seems to me to be more accurate.
(3) 11.107/109 and 85.16
(4) M has الميكون .

1 وصفه بضد من اضداد العلم . وكذلك اذا كان ما يريده لم يجب سهوه ولا ضعفه ولا وهنه ولا تقصيره عن بلوغ ما يريده واذا كان ما لا يريده وجب
3 سهوه او ضعفه ووهنه وتقصيره عن بلوغ ما يريد .

51 وأيضاً اذا كان في كون ما لا يريده من أفعاله التي اجتمعنا على انها
5 أفعاله وجوب السهو والغفلة والضعف (ص ٣٤) والوهن والتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده فكذلك يلزم في كون ما لا يريده من غيره ما يلزم في كون ما لا يريده
7 مما اتفقنا على انه من أفعاله . الا ترى انه اذا لزم من زعم انه يكون من أفعال الله ما لا يعلمه ان يصفه بالجهل او بضد من أضداد العلم لزم مثل ذلك
9 من زعم انه يكون من غيره ما لا يعلمه وكذلك اذا لزم من زعم ان الله يُخبر انه يكون من فعله ما لا يكون التكذيب لله لزم من زعم ان الله تعالى
11 يخبر انه يكون من غيره ما لا يكون التكذيب لا فرق في ذلك بين ما اتفقنا على انه فعله وبين ما يكون من غيره . وكذلك اذا لزم في كون ما
13 لا يريده الباري تعالى من فعله ضعف وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده او سهو وغفلة لزم ذلك في كون ما لا يريده من غيره .

15 **52 وأيضاً** فقد دلّت الدلالة على ان كل المحدثات مخلوقات لله تعالى فاذا استحال ان يفعل الباري تعالى ما لا يريده استحال ان يقع من غيره ما لا
17 يريده اذ كان ذلك أجمع أفعالاً (ص ٣٥) لله تعالى .

53 وأيضاً فلو كان في العالَم ما لا يريده الله تعالى لكان ما يكره
19 كونه ولو كان ما يكره كونه لكان ما يأبى[5] كونه وهذا يوجب ان المعاصي كانت شاء الله ام أبى[6] وهذا صفة الضعيف المقهور وتعالى ربنا عن ذلك علواً
21 كبيراً .

---

(5) M has يابا .
(6) M has ابا .

1 **54 فإن قال قائل** خبّرونا عن ملك من ملوك الدنيا لو مَرَّ برجل مقعد زمن أعمى فشتمه والملك لا يريد شتمه أتقولون[7] ان الملك يلحقه في ذلك
3 ضعف ووهن وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده اذ[8] أراد ان لا يشتمه فشتمه قيل له أجل ولو لم يكن ما أراد الزمن من شتمه وكان ما أراده الملك من مدحه
5 إيّاه كان ذلك اولى بزوال الضعف والوهن عنه على أن الملك اذا لم يُرِدْ شتم الأعمى المقعد له فقد ذَكَرَهُ شتمه إياه وأبى ذلك وقد كان شتمه شاء ذلك
7 الملك او أباه وهذا[9] صفة الضعف والوهن . وأيضاً فان مَن اذا أراد منا أمرًا كان (ص ٣٦) واذا لم يرد كونه لم يكن أولى بصفة الاقتدار ممن يريد
9 كون ما لا يكون وان لا يكون ما يكون وربّ العالمين لا يوصف الا بالوصف الذي هو أولى بصفة الاقتدار .

11 **55 فإن قال قائل** من اذا أراد أمرًا كان واذا لم يرده لم يكن انما يكون اقتداره بمن يتبعه ويعينه ويكون ضعفه لقلة أنصاره وأتباعه وربّ العالمين
13 لا يتكثر باحد . يقال لهم فما أنكرتم ان كان هذا على ما تدّعون ان يكون من أراد من فعله كون ما لا يكون وان لا يكون [ما يكون] فهو أولى بصفة الاقتدار
15 ممن يريد كون ما يكون وان لا يكون ما لا يكون إنما يصحّ وصفه بالاقتدار لانه ممن يتكثر بفعله ويجب اقتداره بمن ينصره وضعفه بمن يقعد عنه .

17 **56 ويقال لهم** لِمَ زعمتم ان من أراد منا كون ما يكون إنما يصح وصفه بالاقتدار لانه ممن يقوى بكثرة من يتبعه ويضعف بكثرة من يقعد عنه. فان
19 (ص ٣٧) قالوا لان هذا فيما بيننا هكذا قيل وكذلك انما يدل الفعل الحكمي على ان من ظهر منه عالم قادر لانه ممن يعلم بعلم ويقدر بقدرة لانّا كذلك
21 وجدنا فيما بيننا من دلت الافعال الحكمية على انه عالم قادر . فما أنكرتم

(7) M has ان يقولون .
(8) M has اذا .
(9) M has هذه , but هذا seems better, as in the last part of No. 53.

1 من انه واجب على اعتلالكم ان (لا)[10] تدل الافعال الحكمية على ان
الباري تعالى قادر عالم وكذلك يُعارضون بان الافعال[11] الحكمية تدل على
3 ان من ظهرت منه عالم قادر لانه ممن له علم وقدرة من أجل أن ذلك فيما بيننا
كذلك .

5 **57** **فانه قال قائل** ما أنكرتم ان لا يلحق الباري الضعف والوهن والتقصير
عن بلوغ ما يريده لانه يقدر ان يلجئ[12] عباده الى ما أراد كونه منهم
7 قيل له ان الباري تعالى انما أراد كون الايمان منهم على أصلك بان يقع ذلك
منهم طوعاً يستحقون عليه الثواب واذا ألجأهم اليه لَمْ يكونوا عندك طائعين
9 ولا للثواب مستحقين . فكما يجب بكون[13] ما لا يريده الضعف والوهن
والتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده لو لم يوصف بالقدرة على ان يلجئهم[14] الى ذلك
11 (ص ٣٨) وكذلك يجب له الضعف والوهن والتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده اذا
أراد كونه على وجه لا يوصف بالقدرة على وقوعه على ذلك الوجه .

13 **58** **وأيضاً** فانه يلزم القدرية اذا كان من قدر ان يؤمن قدر ان يكفر
ان لا يكون الباري تعالى موصوفاً بالقدرة على الأمر الذي لو فعله لكانوا
15 مؤمنين لا محالة لانهم[15] يقدرون عندهم على ان (لا)[16] يكفروا عند نزول
الآيات الملجيات الى الايمان كما يقدرون ان يؤمنوا قبل ذلك ومن قدر على
17 الكفر عند نزول الآية لم يؤمن وقوعه منه . وأيضاً فلو كان يقع من الانسان
ما لا يريده الباري سبحانه ولا يلحق الباري بذلك وهن ولا ضعف لانه قادر

(10) The retention of this negative particle would seem to give a sense contrary to that intended by the author.
(11) M has لافعاله .
(12) M has يلجي .
(13) M has يكون .
(14) M has تلجيهم .
(15) M has لا يقدرون .
(16) We must either omit this negative particle, or read : على ان لا يؤمنوا .

1 ان يُلجئهم اليه لجاز ان يقع من الباري سبحانه من افعاله ما لا يريده ولا
يلحقه ضعف وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده لانه قادر على إيقاعه وتكوينه . فان
3 لم يجب هذا ولزم بكون ما لا يريده من فعله الضعف والوهن لزم ذلك في
فعل عباده .

5 **59 فان** (ص ٣٩) **قال قائل** ما أنكرتم ان يكون كون ما لا يريده
الانسان من فعله يوجب وقوع ذلك عن سهو او عن ضعف ووهن وليس يلزم
7 ذلك في كون ما لا يريده من فعل غيره فوجب مثل ذلك في القديم أيضاً
قيل له ليس الأمر كما ظَنَنْتَ بل القصّة فيما يكون من الانسان ومن غيره
9 واحدة وذلك ان الانسان اذا كان من فعله ما لا يريده فاما ان يكون ذلك
عن سهو او عن ضعف ووهن او تقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده . وكذلك
11 القول فيما يكون من غيره لانه ان لم يكن ذلك عن سهو فواجب ان يكون
عن ضعف وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده وذلك ان العِلّة التي لها لزم الانسان اذا
13 كان عالماً بما وقع منه وهو غير مريد له الضعف والتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده ان
مراده لم يقع وانه لم يرده لانه لو كان ما يريده لم يلحقه ضعف ولا وهن فاذا
15 لم يقع فانما لحقه الوهن والتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريده من أجل انه وقع منه وهو
عالم به غير مريد له . (ص ٤٠) فاذا كانت العلة ما ذكرنا وجب أيضاً مثل
17 ذلك فيما يقع من غيره وهو لا يريده لانه اذا كانت العلة التي لها وجب ان
يوصف الانسان بضد العلم في وقوع ما يقع منه انه وقع منه وهو لا يعلمه
19 وكذلك قصة ما يقع من غيره وهو لا يعلمه إذ[17] كانت العلة في ذلك واحدة
وكذلك القول في الارادة . وأيضاً فانه اذا كان من غيره ما لا يريده فقد
21 كرهه . واذا كره كونه فقد اباه وهذا يوجب ان الشيء كان شاء ام أبى
وهذا[18] صفة الضعف والوهن .

(17) M has اذا .
(18) M has هذه . Cf. n. 9, supra.

1 **60** **فانه قالوا** ما أنكرتم من ان الذي يجب في كون ما لا يريده الباري تعالى من عباده ان يكون كارهاً لذلك فقط ولا يجب في ذلك ضعف 3 ولا وهن قيل له بل وقوع ذلك منهم وهو كاره له يوجب الضعف والوهن لا محالة لانه اذا كان ما كره كونه كان ما أبى كونه واذا كان ما أبى كونه 5 فقد كان الشيء شاءه ام أباه . وهذا يوجب ان الشيء كان شاء الله تعالى ذلك ام أباه وهذا[19] صفة (ص ٤١) الضعف .

7 **61** **وأيضاً** فان المعتزلة رجلان أحدهما يقول ان إرادة الله تعالى في أفعال عباده الأمر بها . والآخر يقول إرادته في أفعال عباده خُلفٌ[20] غير الأمر بها . 9 فمن ذهب الى انها الأمر لزمه اذا لم يكن الباري آمرًا بأفعال الأطفال والمجانين ان يكون كارهاً لها اذا كان يجب بنفي الارادة لأفعال العباد الكراهة لها 11 والله تعالى لا يكره الا معصية كما لا ينهى الا عن معصية . واذا لم يكن هذا عندهم هكذا أبطل[21] ما قالوه . وأيضاً فاذا كان يلزم فيما جاز الامر 13 به اذا لم يأمر به ان يكون له كارهاً لزم من كان في عصر الرسول صلى الله عليه وجاز عنده ان ينزل النهي عن المباح الذي ليس بطاعة ان يكون اذا لم 15 يَرِدْ من الله تعالى الأمر به فقد كره وهذا يوجب ان كل مباح معصية .

62 **ومن ذهب** الى القول الثاني وهو قول ٱلْجُبَّائِي ان ارادة الله تعالى 17 لأفعال عباده هي غير الأمر بها[22] يقال له اذا كان يجب بنفي الارادة لافعال عباده الكراهة فحدِّثنا هل أراد[23] الله كون (ص ٤٢) الافعال التي ليست 19 بمعاصٍ[24] ولا طاعات فان قال نعم قيل له يلزمك ان تكون طاعة لان الطاعة

(19) M has هذه .
(20) In M خُلفٌ is written in small letters between the lines. Perhaps it would be better to leave it out, as it is left out below in No. 62. If it be retained, the meaning would seem to be that given in the *Munjid*: خلاف المفروض .
(21) M has ابطل .
(22) M has به .
(23) M has اراده .
(24) M has معاصى .

1 عندك انما كانت طاعة للطاع لانه أرادها . فان قال لم يردها قيل له فيلزمك
انه كاره لكونها وهذا يوجب ان تكون معصية لان ما كرهه الله سبحانه
3 فهو معصية كما ان ما نهى عنه فهو معصية عندكم . ويقال لهم اذا كان نفي
الارادة يوجب إثبات كراهة فيلزمكم اذا كان الله تعالى لم يزل غير مريد لشيء
5 بَتَّةً ان يكون لم يزل كارهاً اذ كان نفي[25] الارادة يوجب إثبات كراهة .

مسئلة

7 **63** ويقال للمعتزلة لِمَ زعمتم انه لا يريد السفه الا سفيه فان قالوا لان
مريد السفه منا سفيه يقال لهم فكذلك من أراد منا ما يعلم انه لا يكون
9 او يغلب عنده انه لا يكون فهو مُتَمَنٍّ[26] فاقضوا بذلك على الله تعالى اذا
زعمتم انه أراد ان يكون ما علم انه لا يكون . ويقال لهم وكذلك أيضاً من
11 خَلَّى[27] بين عبيده وإمائه يزني بعضهم ببعض وهو يراهم وهو لا يعجز عن
التفريق بينهم (ص ٤٣) مع كراهته الزنا. على أصولكم وقد نهاهم قبل ذلك
13 عن الزنا. فهو سفيه فاقضوا بذلك على الله تعالى والا كنتم متناقضين[28] .

64 فان قالوا لو جاز ان يريد السفه من ليس بسفيه لجاز[29] ان يقول
15 الكذب من ليس بكاذب يقال لهم ما الفرق بينكم وبين من قال ولو جاز
ان يريد ما علم انه لا يكون من ليس بِمُتَمَنٍّ[30] ويُخَلِّيَ بين عبيده وإمائه
17 يزني بعضهم ببعض مع كراهته الزنا. عندكم وقدرته على المنع والحَيْلُولَة من ليس
بسفيه لجاز ان يقول الكذب من ليس بكاذب وهذا ما لا يجدون فيه فرقاً.
19 ويقال لهم كما ان مريد السفه منا سفيه فكذلك مريد الطاعة منا مطيع فاقضوا
بذلك على الغائب .

(25) M has بنفي .
(26) M has متمنى .
(27) M has خلا .
(28) M has متناقضين , which perhaps could be retained if we supplied اصولكم .
(29) M has ولجاز .
(30) M has بمتمنى .

1 **65 ومما يبين** ان الله تعالى مريد لكل شيء يجوز ان يراد قول الله تعالى[31] « وَمَا تَشَاؤُونَ إِلَّا أَنْ يَشَاءَ اللهُ » فاخبر انّا لا نشاء الا ما شاء ان
3 نشاءه . وقال تعالى[32] وَلَوْ شَاءَ رَبُّكَ لَآمَنَ مَنْ فِي ٱلْأَرْضِ كُلُّهُمْ جَمِيعاً »
وقال تعالى[33] « وَلَوْ شِئْنَا لَآتَيْنَا كُلَّ نَفْسٍ هُدَاهَا » وقال[34] « وَلَوْ شَاءَ
5 رَبُّكَ مَا فَعَلُوهُ » وقال[35] « وَلَوْ شَاءَ اللهُ مَا ٱقْتَتَلُوا وَلَـٰكِنَّ اللهَ يَفْعَلُ مَا يُرِيدُ ». (ص٤٤) فأخبر انه لو لم يرد القتال لم يكن وان ما اراد من ذلك فقد فعله .

7 **66 فان قالوا** معنى هذا « لو شاء الله ما اقتتلوا » اي لو شاء ان يمنعهم من القتال لم يكن . يقال لهم ولِمَ لا حملتم الآية على ظاهرها وقلتم على أيّ
9 وجه شاء ان لا يكون القتال لم يكن وكذلك المطالبة عليهم في قول الله تعالى « ولو شاء ربك لآمن من في الارض كلهم جميعاً » . فان قالوا لو شاء
11 الله ان يُلجئهم الى الايمان لكانوا مؤمنين قيل لهم أوَليسوا مع الالجاء قادرين على ان يكفروا كما هم قادرون على ان يؤمنوا فكيف يجب بالالجاء كون
13 الايمان منهم وهم قادرون ألّا يكون منهم إيمان مع الالجاء كما هم قادرون على الايمان مع عدم الالجاء .

15 **67 فان قالوا** ليس في كون ما لا يريده إيجاب ضعف كما ليس في كون ما لم يأمر به إيجاب ضعف . قيل لهم قد كانت أفعاله عندكم ولم يأمر بها ولا
17 يلحقه ضعف ولو كانت وهو لا يريدها (ص٤٥) لحقه الضعف فكذلك كون ما لم يأمر به من غيره لا يوجب له ضعفاً وفي كون ما لم يرده من غيره [ما] يدل على الضعف .
19 وأيضاً فان ما لم يأمر به ونهى عنه وأراد وقوعه[36] فلذلك لَمْ يلحقه الضعف.

(31) 76.30
(32) 10.99
(33) 32.13
(34) 6.112
(35) 2.253/254

(36) The Arabic seems a bit awkward, but the sense is clear. God may will what He has not commanded, indeed has forbidden, and not be thereby subject to weakness. Thus He creates (and therefore wills) the evil men do, although He does not command it, and has positively forbidden it. This question is discussed at greater length in Chapters Five and Six.

[الباب الرابع]

باب الكلام في الرؤية

3 68 ان قال قائل لِمَ قلتم ان رؤية الله تعالى بالابصار جائزة من باب القياس
قيل له قلنا ذلك لان ما لا يجوز ان يوصف به الباري تعالى ويستحيل عليه
5 فإنما لا يجوز لان في تجويزه إثبات حدثه[1] او اثبات حدث معنى فيه او
تشبيهه[2] او تجنيسه او قلبه عن حقيقته او تجويره او[3] تظليمه او تكذيبه .

7 69 وليس في جواز الرؤية اثبات حدثه لان المرئيّ لم يكن مرئيًا لانه
محدث ولو كان مرئيًا لذلك للزمهم ان يُرى كل محدث وذلك باطل عندهم . على
9 ان المرئيّ لو كان مرئيًا لحدوثه لكان الرائي مُحدِثًا للمرئي اذ كان مرئيًا لحدوثه .

70 وليس في الرؤية اثبات حدوث معنى في المرئيّ لان (ص ٤٦) الالوان
11 مرئيات ولا يجوز حدوث معنى [فيها[4] . على ان المرئي لو كان مرئيًا لحدوث
معنى] فيه لكان ذلك المعنى هو الرؤية وهذا يوجب انّا اذا رأينا الميت فقد
13 حدثت فيه الرؤية وجامعت الرؤية الموت واذا رأينا عين الأعمى حدثت في عينه
رؤية فكانت الرؤية مجامعة للعمى فلما لم يجز ذلك بطل ما قالوه .

15 71 وليس في اثبات الرؤية لله تعالى تشبيه الباري تعالى ولا تجنيسه ولا
قلبه عن حقيقته لانّا نرى السواد والبياض فلا يتجانسان ولا يشتبهان بوقوع

(1) M has حده .
(2) M has تشبهه .
(3) M has و .
(4) The words supplied in the brackets seem to be required. If a reason was added, one could suppose that the فيها was followed by something like: اذ كانت أعراضًا ولا يقوم العرض بالعرض .

1 الرؤية عليها ولا ينقلب السواد عن حقيقته الى البياض بوقوع الرؤية عليه[5] ولا البياض الى السواد .

3 **72** **وليس**[6] في الرؤية تجويره ولا تظليمه ولا تكذيبه لانا نرى الجائر[7] والظالم والكاذب ونرى من ليس بجائر[8] ولا ظالم ولا كاذب. فلما لم يكن في 5 اثبات الرؤية شيء مما لا يجوز على الباري لم تكن الرؤية مستحيلة واذا لم تكن مستحيلة كانت جائزة على الله .

7 **73** **فان عارضونا** بان (ص ٤٧) اللمس والذوق والشم ليس فيه اثبات الحدث ولا حدوث معنى في الباري تعالى قيل لهم قد قال بعض أصحابنا ان 9 اللمس ضرب من ضروب المماسات وكذلك الذوق وهو اتصال اللسان واللهوات بالجسم الذي له الطعم وان الشم هو اتصال الخيشوم بالمشموم الذي يكون عنده 11 الادراك له وان المتماسين انما يتماسان بحدوث مماسين[9] فيهما وان في اثبات ذلك اثبات حدوث معنى في الباري .

13 **74** **ومن أصحابنا** من يقول لا يخلو القائل ان يكون أراد بذكره اللمس والذوق ان يُحدث الله تعالى له إدراكاً في هذه الجوارح من غير ان يحدث فيه 15 معنى او يكون أراد حدوث معنى فيه . فان كان أراد حدوث معنى فيه فذلك ما لا يجوز . وان كان أراد حدوث ادراك[10] فينا فذلك جائز والأمر في 17 التسمية الى الله تعالى ان أمرنا ان نُسَمِّيَهُ لمساً وذوقاً وشمّاً سميناه وان منعنا امتنعنا . واما السمع فلم يختلف أصحابنا فيه وجوّزوا[11] جميعاً وقالوا انه

(5) M has عليهما .
(6) M has والبس .
(7) M has الجائز .
(8) M has بجائز .
(9) Perhaps this should be مماستين .
(10) M has ادراكا , which could stay.
(11) So M, apparently; perhaps جوزوه would be better.

1 جائز ان يُسْمِعَنَا الباري (ص ٤٨) تعالى نفسه متكلماً وقد أسمع موسى عليه السلام نفسه متكلماً .

3 **75 والدليل** على ان الله تعالى يُرى بالأبصار قوله تعالى[12] «وُجُوهٌ يَوْمَئِذٍ نَاضِرَةٌ إِلَى رَبِّهَا نَاظِرَةٌ» ولا يجوز ان يكون معنى قوله «الى ربها ناظرة»
5 معتبرة كقوله[13] «أَفَلَا يَنظُرُونَ إِلَى ٱلْإِبِلِ كَيْفَ خُلِقَتْ» لان الآخرة ليست بدار اعتبار . ولا يجوز ان يعني متعطفة راحمة كما قال[14] «لا يَنْظُرُ اللهُ
7 إِلَيْهِمْ» أي لا يرحمهم ولا يتعطف عليهم لان الباري لا يجوز ان يتعطف عليه. ولا يجوز ان يعني منتظرة لان النظر اذا قرن بذكر الوجوه لم يكن معناه نظر
9 القلب الذي هو انتظار كما اذا قرن النظر بذكر القلب لم يكن معناه نظر العين. لان القائل اذا قال «انظر بقلبك في هذا الامر» كان معناه نظر القلب
11 وكذلك اذا قرن النظر بالوجه لم يكن معناه إلّا نظر الوجه والنظر بالوجه هو نظر[15] الرؤية التي تكون بالعين التي في الوجه. فَصَحَّ ان معنى (ص٤٩) قوله
13 تعالى «الى ربها ناظرة» رائية اذ لم يجز ان يعني شيئاً من وجوه النظر. واذا كان النظر لا يخلو من وجوه اربع وفسد منها ثلاثة أوجه صَحَّ الوجه الرابع
15 وهو نظر رؤية العين التي في الوجه .

76 فان قال قائل اليس قد قال الله تعالى [16] «وُجُوهٌ يَوْمَئِذٍ بَاسِرَةٌ
17 تَظُنُّ أَنْ يُفْعَلَ بِهَا فَاقِرَةٌ» والظن لا يكون بالوجه . وكذلك قوله «وجوه يومئذ ناضرة الى ربها ناظرة» أراد نظر القلب . قيل له [لا] لان الظن لا
19 يكون بالوجه ولا يكون الّا بالقلب فلما قرن الظن بذكر الوجه كان معناه ظن القلب اذ لم يكن الظن الّا به . فلو كان النظر لا يكون الا بالقلب

(12) 75.22-23
(13) 88.17
(14) 3.77/71
(15) M has النظر .
(16) 75.24-25

1 لوجب اذا ذكره مع ذكر الوجه ان يرجع به الى القلب فلما كان النظر قد يكون بالوجه وبغيره وجب اذا قرنه بذكر الوجه ان يريد به نظر الوجه كما انه اذا
3 قرنه بذكر القلب وجب ان يريد به نظر القلب .

مسئلة

5 **77** فان قالوا فما معنى قوله تعالى[17] «لَا تُدْرِكُهُ ٱلْأَبْصَارُ وَهُوَ يُدْرِكُ ٱلْأَبْصَارَ» قيل لهم في الدنيا دون الآخرة لان القرآن لا يتناقض . (ص٥٠)
7 فلما قال في آية اخرى انه تنظر[18] اليه الابصار علمنا ان الوقت الذي قال انه لا تدركه الابصار فيه غير الوقت الذي أخبرنا انها تنظر اليه فيه .

9 **78** فان قال قائل ما أنكرتم ان يكون قوله تعالى « الى ربها ناظرة » اي الى ثواب ربها ناظرة قيل له ثواب الله تعالى غيره ولا يجوز ان يُعدَل بالكلام
11 عن الحقيقة الى المجاز بغير حجة ولا دلالة . الا ترى ان الله تعالى لما قال « صلوا[19] إليَّ واعبدوني » لم يجز ان يقول قائل عنى غيره ولو جاز لزاعم ان
13 يزعم ان قوله « لا تدركه » اراد به انها لا تدرك غيره الابصار [لجاز[20] لزاعم ان يزعم ان قوله صلوا الي واعبدوني اراد به غيره . فاذا فسد هذا
15 فسد ما قاله] .

79 فان قال [قائل] فاذا كان قوله « لا تدركه الابصار » في وقت
17 دون وقت فما أنكرت ان يكون قوله[21] « لَا تَأْخُذُهُ سِنَةٌ وَلَا نَوْمٌ » في وقت دون وقت قيل له الفرق بينهما انه قال لنا في آية انه لا تدركه الابصار

(17) 6.103

(18) M has انه لا تدركه الابصار — surely a slip of the copyist or the author.

(19) M has صلو الى, which might be read صلوا لي.

(20) Some such words as those in the brackets are required to complete the sense.

(21) 2.255-256

1 وقال في آية أخرى ان الوجوه تنظر اليه فاستعملنا الآيتين وقلنا ان المعنى في ذلك انها تنظر اليه في وقت ولا تدركه في وقت . ولم يقل لنا[22] في آية
3 ان السنة والنوم يأخذانه[23] وفي آية اخرى لا يأخذانه[24] فَيُسْتَعْمَلَ في وقتين. وأيضاً فان النوم آفة تقوم بالنائم تزيل عنه العلم وليست الرؤية آفة تحل في
5 المرئي فيجب منع الرؤية بمثل ما به وجب منع النوم .

مسئلة

7 **80** (ص ٥١) **فان قالوا** لو جاز ان يُرى القديم سبحانه وليس كالمرئيات لجاز ان يُلمَس ويُذاق ويُشم وليس كالمذوقات ولا كالملموسات ولا
9 كالمشمومات قيل لهم ما الفرق بينكم وبين من قال ولو جاز ان يكون القديم رائياً عالما قادرا حيًا لا كالرائين العلماء القادرين الاحياء لجاز ان يكون لامساً
11 ذائقاً شامًا لا كاللامسين الذائقين الشامّين . فان [لم] يجب هذا فما أنكرتم من ان لا يجب ما قلتموه .

مسئلة

81 **فان قال قائل** فهل شاهدتم[25] مرئيًا إلّا جوهرًا او عرضاً محدودًا
15 او حالًا في محدود قيل له لا ولم يكن المرئي مرئيًا لانه محدود ولا لانه حالّ في محدود ولا لانه جوهر ولا لانه عرض. فلما لم يكن ذلك كذلك لم يجب القضاء بذلك
17 على الغائب كما لم يجب اذا لم نجد فاعلًا الّا جسماً ولا شيئاً الا جوهرًا او عرضاً ولا عالمًا قادرًا حيًا الا بعلم وحياة وقدرة محدثة ان نقضي بذلك على الغائب.
19 اذ لم يكن الفاعل فاعلًا لانه جسم ولا الشي‌ء شيئاً لانه جوهر[26] او عرض.

(22) M has لنا.
(23) M repeats في آية after يأخذانه.
(24) M has تاخذه.
(25) In the margin of M; the text has شاهدتم.
(26) M has جوهرا او عرضا, though it seems that عرضا was corrected to عرض.

[الباب الخامس]

باب الكلام في القدر

3 **82** (ص ٥٢) ان قال قائل لم زعمتم ان أكساب العباد مخلوقة لله تعالى قيل له قلنا ذلك لان الله تعالى قال[1] « وَٱللَّهُ خَلَقَكُمْ وَمَا تَعْمَلُونَ » وقال[2]
5 « جَزَاءً بِمَا كَانُوا[3] يَعْمَلُونَ » فلما كان الجزاء واقعاً على أعمالهم كان الخالق لاعمالهم .

7 **83** فان قال أفليس الله تعالى قال[4] « أَتَعْبُدُونَ ما تَنْحِتُونَ » وعنى[5] الأصنام التي نحتوها فما انكرتم ان يكون قوله « خلقكم وما تعملون » أراد
9 الاصنام التي عملوها قيل له خطأ ما ظننته لأن الاصنام منحوتة لهم في الحقيقة فرجع الله تعالى بقوله « أتعبدون ما تنحتون » اليها وليست الخشب معمولة لهم
11 في الحقيقة فيرجع بقوله « خلقكم وما تعملون » اليها .

84 فان قال قائل أليسَ قد قال الله تعالى[6] « تَلْقَفُ مَا يَأْفِكُونَ » ولم
13 يرد إفكهم فما أنكرت ان لا يرجع بقوله « خلقكم وما تعملون » الى أعمالهم قيل له الذي يأفكون هو الامثلة التي خيّلوا الى الناس انها حيّات تسعى وافكهم
15 تخيلهم فاراد بقوله (ص ٥٣) « يأفكون » أي يخيلون الى الناس انها حيات تسعى وافكهم هي ايهامهم الشيء على خلاف ما هو بسبيله فالامثلة هي التي
17 يأفكون ويخيلون الى الناس انها تسعى في الحقيقة وهي التي تلقفها العصا .

(1) 37.96/94
(2) 46.14/13
(3) M has بما كنتم تعملون, which seems to be a mistake.
(4) 37.95/93
(5) M has عنا .
(6) 7.117/114 and 26.45/44

1 وليس يجوز ان يعملوا الخشب في الحقيقة فلم يجز ان يكون الله تعالى رجع[7]
بقوله « خلقكم وما تعملون » اليها ووجب ان يرجع الى الأعمال كما رجع
3 بقوله « جزاء بما كانوا[8] يعملون » الى الاعمال . فلو جاز لزاعم ان يزعم ان
قول الله تعالى « خلقكم وما تعملون » أراد غير أعمالهم كما أراد بقوله « ما
5 يأفكون » غير إفكهم لساغ لزاعم ان يزعم ان قول الله تعالى « جزاء بما
كانوا[9] يعملون » انما أراد به غير اعمالهم كما أراد بقوله « خلقكم وما تعملون »
7 غير أعمالهم كما ان قوله « ما يأفكون » انما أراد به غير افكهم فلما لم يجز
هذا لم يجز ما قاله هذا .

9 **85** **والدليل** من القياس على خلق أعمال الناس انّا وجدنا الكفر قبيحاً
فاسداً باطلاً متناقضاً خلافاً (ص ٥٤) لما خالف ووجدنا الايمان حسناً مُتعِباً
11 مُؤْلِماً . ووجدنا الكافر يقصد ويجهد نفسه الى ان يكون الكفر حسناً حقّاً
فيكون بخلاف قصده. ووجدنا الايمان لو شاء المؤمن ان لا يكون متعباً مُؤْلِماً
13 ولا مُرمِضاً لم يكن ذلك كائناً على حسب مشيئته وارادته . وقد علمنا ان
الفعل لا يحدث على حقيقته الّا من مُحدِث أحدَثَهُ عليها لانه لو جاز ان يحدث
15 على حقيقته لا من محدث أحدثه على ما هو عليه لجاز ان يحدث الشي. فعلاً لا
من محدث أحدثه فِعلاً . فلما لم يجز ذلك صَحَّ انه لم يحدث على حقيقته الا من
17 محدث احدثه على ما هو عليه وهو قاصد الى ذلك لانه لو جاز حدوث فعل على
حقيقته[10] لا من قاصد لم يؤمن ان تكون الافعال كلها كذلك كما انه لو
19 جاز حدوث فعل لا من فاعل لم يؤمن ان تكون الافعال كلها كذلك .

86 **واذا كان** هذا هكذا فقد وجب ان يكون لِلكفر[11] محدِث

(7) M has اراد, which seems to be a slip.
(8) M has بما كنتم تعملون, as in n. (3), supra.
(9) M as in previous note.
(10) M has الحقيقة, but حقيقته seems to be the author's customary expression.
(11) M has الكفر.

1 أحدثه كفرًا باطلًا قبيحاً وهو قاصد الى ذلك ولن يجوز ان يكون المحدث (ص ٥٥) له هو الكافر الذي يريد ان يكون الكفر حسناً صواباً حقًا
3 فيكون على خلاف ذلك . وكذلك لِلايمان[12] محدِث أحدثه على حقيقته متعباً مؤلِمًا مرمضاً غيرِ المؤمن الذي لو جهد ان يقع الايمان خلاف ما وقع من إيلامه
5 وإتعابه وإرماضه لم يكن له الى ذلك سبيل. واذا لم يجز ان يكون المحدث للكفر على حقيقته الكافر ولا[13] المحدث للايمان على حقيقته المؤمن فقد وجب
7 ان يكون محدث ذلك هو الله تعالى رب العالمين القاصد الى ذلك لانه لا يجوز ان يكون أحدث ذلك جسمٌ من الأجسام لان الاجسام لا يجوز ان تفعل في
9 غيرها شيئاً .

87 **فانه قال قائل** فَلِمَ لا دَلَّ وقوع الفعل الذي هو كَسْب على انه لا
11 فاعل له الّا الله كما دَلَّ على انه لا خالق [له] الا الله تعالى قيل له كذلك نقول . فان قال فَلِمَ لا دل على انه لا قادر عليه الا الله عز وجل قيل له
13 لا فاعل له (ص ٥٦) على حقيقته الا الله تعالى ولا قادر عليه ان يكون على ما هو عليه من حقيقته ان يخترعه الا الله تعالى .

15 **88** **فانه قال** فَلِمَ لا دل كونه كسباً على حقيقته على انه لا مكتسب له في الحقيقة الا الله قيل له الافعال لا بُدّ لها من فاعل على حقيقتها لان الفعل
17 لا يستغني عن فاعل فاذا لم يكن فاعله على حقيقته الجسم وجب ان يكون الله تعالى هو الفاعل له على حقيقته . وليس لا بدّ للفعل من مكتسب يكتسبه
19 على حقيقته كما لا بد من فاعل يفعله على حقيقته فيجب اذا كان الفعل كسباً كان الله تعالى هو المكتسب له على حقيقته .

21 **89** **الا ترى** ان حركة الاضطرار تدل على ان الله تعالى هو الفاعل لها

(12) M has الايمان .
(13) M has والا .

1 على حقيقتها ولا تدل على ان المتحرك بها في الحقيقة هو الله تعالى اذا[14] كانت
حركة كما كان هو الفاعل لها في الحقيقة ولا يجب ان يكون المتحرك المضطر
3 اليها فاعلًا لها على حقيقتها (ص ٥٧) اذا[15] كان متحركاً بها على الحقيقة اذ
كان معنى المتحرك ان الحركة حلّته ولم يكن جائزًا على ربنـا تعالى[16] .
5 وكذلك اذا كان الكسب دالًا على فاعل فعله على حقيقته لَمْ يجب ان يدل
على ان الفاعل له على حقيقته هو المكتسب له ولا على ان المكتسب له على
7 الحقيقة هو الفاعل له على حقيقته اذ كان المكتسب مكتَسِباً للشيء لانه وقع
بقدرة له عليـه محدثة ولم يجز ان[17] يكون رب العالمين قادرًا على الشيء
9 بقدرة[18] محدثة فلم يجز ان يكون مكتسباً للكَسْب وان كان فاعلًا له
في الحقيقة .

11 **90** فان قال فهل اكتسب الانسان الشيء على حقيقته كفرًا باطلًا وايماناً
حسناً قيل له هذا خطأ وانما معنى « اكتسب الكفر » انه كفر بقوة محدثة
13 وكذلك قولنا «اكتسب الايمان[19] » انما معناه انه آمن بقوة محدثة من غير ان
يكون اكتسب الشيء على حقيقته بل الذي فعله على حقيقته هو رب (ص ٥٨)
15 العالمين . والقول في الكذب وان له فاعلًا [يفعله على] حقيقته وكاذباً به غير
مَنْ فعله على حقيقته كالقول في فاعل الحركة على حقيقتها[20] والمتحرك بها على
17 الحقيقة غير مَنْ فعلها على حقيقتها وقد بيّنّا ذلك آنفاً .

---

(14) M has اذ . I regard this phrase — اذا كانت حركة — as parenthetical. It might well be omitted. It is also possible that something has been omitted from the text.

(15) M has اذ .

(16) This last phrase seems to lack something. Perhaps one should read ولم يكن ذلك جائزًا ; or perhaps one should add a phrase like ان تحله الحركة .

(17) M has ايكون .

(18) M has بقدره .

(19) M has اكتسب الايمان انما هو انما امن .

(20) M has الحقيقة .

1 **91** **ودليل آخر** من القياس على خلق أفعال الناس ان الدليل على خلق الله تعالى حركة الاضطرار قائم في[21] خلقه حركة الاكتساب وذلك ان حركة
3 الاضطرار ان كان الذي يدل على ان الله تعالى خلقها حدوثها فكذلك[22] القصة في حركة الاكتساب . وان كان الذي يدل على خلقها حاجتها الى مكان
5 وزمان فكذلك قصة حركة الاكتساب . فلما كان كل دليل يستدل به على ان حركة الاضطرار مخلوقة لله تعالى يجب به القضاء على ان حركة الاكتساب مخلوقة
7 لله تعالى وجب خلق حركة الاكتساب بمثل ما وجب خلق حركة الاضطرار .

92 **فان قال قائل** فيجب اذا كانت إحدى الحركتين (ص ٥٩) ضرورة
9 ان تكون الاخرى كذلك واذا كانت إحداهما كسباً ان تكون الاخرى كذلك قيل له لا يجب ذلك لافتراقهما في معنى الضرورة والاكتساب لان الضرورة ما
11 حُمل عليه الشيء وأُكره وجُبر عليه ولو جهد في التخلص[23] منه وأراد الخروج عنه واستفرغ في ذلك مجهوده لم يجد منه انفكاكاً ولا الى الخروج عنه سبيلاً.
13 فاذا كانت إحدى الحركتين بهذا الوصف الذي هو وصف الضرورة وهي حركة المرتعش من الفالج والمرتعد من الحمى كانت اضطرارًا. واذا كانت الحركة الاخرى
15 بخلاف هذا الوصف لم تكن اضطرارًا لان الانسان في ذهابه ومجيئه وإقباله وإدباره بخلاف المرتعش من الفالج والمرتعد من الحمى يعلم الانسان التفرقة بين
17 الحالين من نفسه وغيره علم اضطرار لا يجوز معه الشك . فقد وجب اذا كان العجز في إحدى الحالتين ان القدرة التي هي ضده حادثة (ص ٦٠) في الحال
19 الاخرى لان العجز لو كان في الحالين جميعاً لكان سبيل الانسان فيهما سبيلاً واحدة . فلما لم يكن هذا هكذا وكانت[24] القدرة في إحدى الحركتين

(21) M has قايم في حركه خلق حركه الاكتساب .
(22) M has فذلك .
(23) M has التحصل . And after جهد add : [الانسان] .
(24) M has كان .

1 وجب ان[25] تكون كسباً لان حقيقة الكسب ان الشيء وقع من المكتسب
له بقوة محدثة لافتراق الحالين في الحركتين ولان إحداهما بمعنى الضرورة وجب
3 ان تكون ضرورة ولان الاخرى بمعنى الكسب وجب ان تكون كسباً ودليل
الخلق[26] في حركة الاضطرار وحركة الاكتساب واحد فلذلك وجب اذا كانت
5 إحداهما خلقاً ان تكون الاخرى خلقاً .

93 **الا ترى** ان افتراقهما في باب الضرورة والكسب لا يوجب افتراقهما
7 في باب الحدث والكون بعد ان لم تكونا فكذلك لا يوجب افتراقهما في باب
الضرورة والكسب افتراقهما في الخلق . الا ترى ان الجسم لما لَمْ يسبق المحدثات
9 وجب حدوثه بدخوله في معنى الحدث وليس يجب اذا دخل في الحدث بمشاركة
(ص ٦١) المحدثات في معنى الحدث اذا كان من المحدثات ما هو حركة ان يكون
11 الجسم حركة واذا كان منها ما هو جسم [لا] يجب ان تكون الحركة جسماً اذ
لم يكونا[27] يستويان في معنى جسم وحركة واستويا في معنى الحدوث . فكذلك
13 لما استوى الكسب والضرورة في معنى الخلق والحدث وجب اذا كان أحدهما
خلقاً لله ان يكون الآخر كذلك فلذلك لم يوجب افتراقهما في باب الضرورة
15 والكسب افتراقهما في الخلق .

94 **فان قال قائل** ما انكرتم ان يكون الذي دلَّ على ان إحدى
17 الحركتين مخلوقة لله تعالى هو ان حركة الاضطرار وقعت معجزًا عنها فاذا وقعت
الاخرى مقدورًا عليها خرجت من ان تكون مخلوقة قيل له لو كان ما وقع
19 مقدورًا لغير الله تعالى خرج من ان يكون مخلوقاً لم يؤمن ان تكون حركات
المرتعش من الفالج والمرتعد من الحمى قد أقدر الله تعالى عليها بعض ملائكته يفعلها
21 في المتحرك باضطرار اذ كان لا يستحيل (ص ٦٢) عند مخالفينا ان يقدر القادر

(25) M has ايكون .
(26) M repeats الخلق .
(27) M has يكن .

1 من المخلوقين على ان يفعل في غيره فبطلت[28] دلالتها على ان الله تعالى فعلها
على ما هي عليه . وكذلك القول في حركات الافلاك واجتماع أجزاء السماء
3 وتأليفها . واذا كان هذا هكذا فقد بطلت دلالة هذه الاشياء على ان الله
تعالى [فعلها على ما هي عليه] ولم يؤمن ان يكون لاجزاء السماء جامع غير
5 الله سبحانه وللافلاك محكم وللكواكب محرك غيره . واذا لم يجز ذلك فقد
بطل ما[29] قالوه من ان الشيء اذا كان مقدورًا لغير الله تعالى خرج من ان
7 [يكون] لله[30] تعالى مخلوقًا .

95 وأيضًا فليس العجز بان يدل على ان الله تعالى خلق المعجوز عنه بأولى
9 من ان تكون القدرة التي جعلها[31] الله تعالى دلالة على ان الله خلق المقدور
عليه لان ما خلق الله القدرة فينا عليه فهو عليه أقدر كما ان [ما] خلق فينا
11 العلم به فهو به أعلم وما خلق فينا السمع له فهو له أسمع . فاذا استوى ذلك
في قدرة الله تعالى وجب اذا أقدرنا الله تعالى (ص ٦٣) على حركة الاكتساب
13 ان يكون هو الخالق لها فينا كسباً لنا لان ما قدر عليه ان يفعله فينا ولم يفعله
فينا كسباً فقد ترك ان يفعله فينا كسباً . واذا ترك ان يكون كسباً لنا
15 استحال ان نكون[32] له مكتسبين . فدل ما قلنا على انّا لا نكتسبه[33]
الا وقد خلقه الله تعالى لنا كسباً .

مسئلة

96 فان قال قائل اذا كان كسب الانسان خلقاً فما انكرتَ ان يكون
19 له خالقاً قيل له لَمْ أقُلْ ان كَسْبي خلق لي فيلزمني ان أكون له خالقاً وانما

(28) M has فبطل .
(29) M has ما قالوه .
(30) M has الله .
(31) Perhaps خلقها would be better.
(32) M has يكون .
(33) M has يكتسبه .

1 قلت خلقٌ لغيري فكيف يلزمني اذا كان خلقاً لغيري ان أكون له خالقاً ولو
كان كسبي اذا كان خلقاً لله تعالى كنت له خالقاً لكانت حركة المتحرك
3 باضطرار اذا كانت خلقاً لله تعالى كان بها متحركاً . فلما لم يجز ذلك لانه
خلقها حركة لغيره لم يلزمنا ما قالوه لان كسبنا خلق لغيرنا .

5 **97** **فان قال** افليس[34] قد خلق الله تعالى جور العباد قيل له خلقه جوراً
لهم لا له . فان قال فما أنكرتم (ص ٦٤) ان يكون جائراً قيل له لم يكن
7 الجائر جائراً لانه فعل الجور جوراً لغيره لا له لانه[35] لو كان جائراً لهذه العلة
لم يكن في المخلوقين جائر . فلما لم يكن الجائر جائراً لانه فعل الجور جوراً
9 لغيره لم يجب ان يكون الله بخلقه الجور جوراً لغيره لا له جائراً . وايضاً
فلو لزم ما قالوه لزم اذا فعل إرادة وشهوة وحركة لغيره لا له ان يكون مريداً
11 مشتهياً متحركاً فلما لم يجب هذا لم يجب ما قالوه .

98 **فان قالوا** فقد يخلق الله تعالى حركة لا يكتسبها أحد ولا يكون
13 متحركاً قيل لهم وكذلك لو خلق الله تعالى جوراً لا يكتسبه أحد لم يكن
به جائراً وكان جوراً لمن خلقه جوراً له به يكون جائراً .

15 **99** **فان قالوا** فَلِمَ لا يقول قول غيره كما خلق جور غيره قيل لهم لم
نقل انه يجور [بِجَوْر] غيره فيلزمنا ان يقول بقول غيره وانما قلنا انه يخلق جوراً
17 لغيره لا له ولا يكون به جائراً . فعروض هذا ان يخلق قولاً لغيره لا له ولا
يكون به قائلاً . وأيضاً فلو وجب [هـذا لوجب] (ص ٦٥) ان يقول
19 الكذب من ليس بكاذب كما فعل الجور من ليس بجائر[36] كما فعل الارادة
من ليس بمريد لها والحركة من ليس بمتحرك بها فان لم يجب هذا لم يجب ما

(34) M has اليس, which could stay.
(35) M has لا.
(36) M has بكاذب.

1 قالوه . وأيضاً فقد دللنا على ان كلام الله تعالى من صفات(37) ذاته في صدر كتابنا هذا فاستحال(38) لذلك ان يكون بِقَوْل(39) غيره قائلاً كما اذا كان
3 العلم من صفات نفسه استحال ان يكون علم غيره علماً له وان يكون ربّ العالمين عالماً بعلم محدَث .

مسئلة

100 فان قال قائل فهل يخلو العبد ان يكون بين نعمة يجب عليه
7 شكرها او بلية يجب عليه الصبر عليها قيل له لا يخلو العبد من نعمة وبلية والبلايا منها ما يجب الصبر عليها كالمصائب من الامراض والاسقام وفي الاموال
9 والاولاد وما أشبه ذلك ومنها ما لا يجب الصبر عليها كالكفر وسائر المعاصي .

مسئلة

11 101 (ص ٦٦) فان قال قائل فهل قضى(40) الله تعالى المعاصي وقدّرها قيل له نعم بان خلقها وبان كتبها وأخبر عن كونها كما قال(41) « وَقَضَيْنَا إِلَى
13 بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ فِي ٱلْكِتَابِ » يعني أخبرناهم وأعلمناهم وكما قال (42) « إِلَّا ٱمْرَأَتَهُ قَدَّرْنَاهَا مِنَ ٱلْغَابِرِينَ » يريد كتبناها وأخبرنا انها من الغابرين . ولا
15 نقول قضاها وقدرها بان أمر بها .

102 فان قال [أو] قضاء(43) الله تعالى حقّ قيل له من قضاء الله تعالى
17 الذي هو خلق ما هو حق كالطاعات وما لم يَنْهَ عنه . ومن قضاء الله تعالى الذي هو خلق ما هو جور كالكفر والمعاصي لان الخلق منه حق ومنه باطل .

(37) M has صفا .
(38) M has فستحال .
(39) M has بقو .
(40) M has قضا .
(41) 17.4.
(42) 27.57/58.
(43) M has قال قضا .

1 واما القضاء الذي هو أمر والقضاء الذي هو إعلام وإخبار وكتاب فحق لانه
غير المقضِيّ .

3 **103 ومن أصحابنا** من يجيب(44) بان يقول قضاء الله المعصية والكفر –
ويقول بلفظ المعصية والكفر هما باطلان ولا يقول بلفظ القضاء انه باطل لان
5 قول القائل قضاء الله باطل كما يقول اذا رأى خشبة منكسرة بلفظ (ص ٦٧)
الخشبة هي منكسرة وهي مع ذلك حجة لله تعالى ولا يقول بلفظ الحجة انها
7 منكسرة لان هذا يوهم ان حجة الله تعالى لا حقيقة لها. فكذلك ان الكفر
باطل والكفر قضاء الله تعالى بمعنى انه خلق الله ولا نقول(45) قضاء الله باطل
9 لانه يوهم ان لا حقيقة لقضاء الله تعالى . وهذا كما نقول(46) الكافر مُؤمن
بالجبت والطاغوت ولا نقول(47) مؤمن ونسكت لما فيه من الابهام . ونقول
11 [ان] النبي صلى الله عليه [ل] كافر بالجبت والطاغوت ولا نقول لكافر
ونسكت لما في ذلك من الابهام .

مسئلة

104 فان قال قائل أفترضون بقضاء الله وقدره الكفر قيل له نرضى بان
15 قضى الله تعالى الكفر قبيحاً وقدره فاسدًا ولا نرضى بان كان الكافر به كافرًا
لان الله تعالى نهانا عن ذلك وليس اذا أطلقنا الرضى(48) بلفظ القضاء وجب
17 ان نُطلقه بلفظ الكفر كما لا يجب اذا قلنا ان الخشبة حجة الله تعالى وان
الخشبة مَكسُورة ان نقول (ص ٦٨) حجة الله تعالى مكسورة لان هذا يوهم
19 حجة الله تعالى لا حقيقة لها . فكذلك نطلق الرضى(49) بلفظ القضاء والقدر

(44) M has يجنب (and the same at the beginning of No. 105). In the latter case يجيب seems certain, and it also seems best here.
(45) M has يقول .
(46) M has يقول .
(47) M has يقول , but then لسكت and نقول .
(48) M has الرضا .
(49) M has القضا .

1 ولا نطلقه بلفظ الكفر . هذا جواب أصحابنا الذين ذكرنا جوابهم آنفاً .

105 **ومن أصحابنا** من يُجيب بان نرضى بقضاء الله تعالى وقدره اللذين
3 أمرنا ان نرضى بهما اتباعاً لِأمره [لانه] لا يتقدم بين يديه ولا يعترض عليه .
وهذا كما نرضى [بـ] بقاء النبيين عليهم السلام ونكره موتهم ونكره بقاء
5 الشياطين وكل بقضاء رب العالمين .

مسئلة

7 **106** **فان قال قائل** فَأَيُّما[50] خير الخير او مَن الخير منه قيل له من الخير
منه مُتَّصِلًا به فهو خير مِن الخير . فان قال فَأَيُّما شرّ الشرّ او مَن الشرّ منه
9 قيل له مَن كان الشرّ منه جائرًا به فهو شرّ مِن الشرّ .

مسئلة

11 **107** **فان قال** أَوَتقولون ان الشرّ من الله تعالى قيل له من أصحابنا من
يقول بان الاشياء كلها مِن الله في الجملة ولا يطلق بلفظ الشرّ انه (ص ٦٩)
13 من الله تعالى كما يقال الاشياء كلها لِله في الجملة ولا يقال على التفصيل
الزوجة[51] والولد لِله تعالى وكما نقول في الجملة ما دون الله ضعيف ولا يقال
15 على التفصل دين الله ضعيف . قال الشيخ أَبُو ٱلْحَسَن رحمه الله فاما أنا فاني
أقول ان الشرّ من الله تعالى بان خلقه شرًا لغيره لا له .

مسئلة

108 **فان قال** فما معنى قوله[52] « يَلْوُونَ أَلْسِنَتَهُمْ بِٱلْكِتَابِ لِتَحْسَبُوهُ
19 مِنَ ٱلْكِتَابِ وَمَا هُوَ مِنَ ٱلْكِتَابِ وَيَقُولُونَ هُوَ مِنْ عِنْدِ ٱللهِ وَمَا هُوَ مِنْ

(50) M has فايما here and in the similar question following.
(51) M has الزوجة الا والولد .
(52) 3.78/72.

1 عِندِ اللهِ » قيل له معنى ذلك انهم حَرَّفوا[53] وصف رسول الله صلع وأوهموا
السفيه منهم انه [من] كتابهم قال الله تعالى « وما هو من الكتاب ويقولون
3 هو من عند الله » يعني ان الله تعالى أنزله قال الله تعالى « وما هو من عند الله »
أي لم أنزل عليهم ذلك كما يدّعون .

مسئلة

109 فان قال فما معنى قوله تعالى[54] « مَا تَرَى فِي خَلْقِ ٱلرَّحْمَـٰنِ مِن
7 تَفَاوُتٍ » قيل له قال الله تعالى « خَلَقَ سَبْعَ سَمَـٰوَاتٍ طِبَاقًا » واحدة فوق
الاخرى (ص ٧٠) « ما ترى في خلق الرحمـن من تفاوت » يعني في السموات
9 لانه قال « فارجع البصر » بعد[55] ذكره السموات « هَلْ تَرَىٰ مِن فُطُورٍ »
يعني من شقوق والكفر لا شقوق فيه . ثم قال[56] « ثُمَّ ٱرْجِعِ ٱلْبَصَرَ
11 [كَرَّتَيْنِ » يعني] في السموات والارض « يَنقَلِبْ إِلَيْكَ ٱلْبَصَرُ خَاسِئًا » يعني
معيناً « وَهُوَ حَسِيرٌ » يعني مغلوباً . ولم يذكر الله تعالى الكفر ولا أفعال العباد
13 في هذه الآية فيكون[57] للقدرية في ذلك حجة .

مسئلة

15 110 فان قال قائل فما معنى قول الله تعالى[58] « أَحْسَنَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقَهُ »
قيل له معنى ذلك انه يُحسن ان يخلق كما يقال فلان يحسن الصِيَاغة أي يعلم
17 كيف يصوغ . فاخبر الله تعالى انه يعلم كيف يخلق الاشيا.[59] .

---

(53) M has حرفو .
(54) 67.3.
(55) M has بعمد .
(56) 67.4.
(57) M has فيكو .
(58) 32.7/6.
(59) M has الانسان .

مسئلة

111 فان قال فما معنى قوله تعالى(60) « وَمَا خَلَقْنَا ٱلسَّمَاءَ(61) وَٱلْأَرْضَ
3 وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا بَاطِلًا » قيل له قال الله تعالى(62) « ذَٰلِكَ ظَنُّ ٱلَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا »
فدل ذلك على ان المعنى فيما خلقها وما بينها و [لا] أنا لا أثيب من أطاعني
5 ولا أعاقب من عصاني وكفر بي لان الكافرين ظنوا انهم لا يعادون (ص ٧١)
ولا لهم رجعة فيعاقبون . فبيّن الله تعالى انه ما خلق الخلق الا ومصير بعضهم
7 الى ثواب(63) ورجوع بعضهم الى العقاب وان الكافرين ظنوا ذلك لانه بيّن
ان ذلك باب الثواب والعقاب لانه تعالى قال(64) « أَمْ نَجْعَلُ ٱلَّذِينَ آمَنُوا
9 وَعَمِلُوا ٱلصَّالِحَاتِ كَٱلْمُفْسِدِينَ فِي ٱلْأَرْضِ أَمْ نَجْعَلُ ٱلْمُتَّقِينَ كَٱلْفُجَّارِ » فأخبر
تعالى ان ظن المشركين الذين أنكر عليهم انهم ظنوا انه لا عاقبة تقع فيها
11 تفرقة(65) بين المؤمنين والكافرين .

112 قال الشيخ ابو الحسن وقد يحتمل « ما خلقنا السماء(66) والارض
13 وما بينهما باطلا » أي لم أخلق ذلك أجمع باطلا لان الباطل بعض خلق الله تعالى.
ويحتمل ما خلقتُ ذلك باطلًا أي لم أجعله باطلًا اذ خلقتها لان الباطل حدث
15 بعد ان خلقتها .

113 وقد قال الله تعالى(67) « [ٱلَّذِي] خَلَقَ ٱلسَّمَـٰوَاتِ وَٱلْأَرْضَ
17 وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ » فعموم هذا القول يدل (ص ٧٢) على انه خالق ما

(60) 38.27/26.
(61) M has السموات — a confusion with 15.85?
(62) *ibid.*
(63) This seems to be a slip for الثواب .
(64) 38.27/26.
(65) M has سوقه .
(66) M has السموات .
(67) 25.59/60.

1 بينهما مما حدث من الخلق كالملائكة الذين كانوا بينهما وما خلقه بينهما من أعمال الحيوان في ذلك الوقت . فَلِمَ قضوا باحدى الآيتين على ان الله تعالى
3 لم يخلق الباطل دون ان يقضوا بالآية الأخرى على ان الله خلق ما كان بينهما من فعل الملائكة وغيرهم في ذلك الوقت .

5 **114 ويقال** ان كان قول الله تعالى في المشركين(68) « يلوون ألسنتهم بالكتاب لتحسبوه من الكتاب وما هو من الكتاب ويقولون هو من عند الله
7 وما هو من عند الله » معناه لم يخلقه الله فَلِمَ لا تكون الطاعات مخلوقة [له] لانها عندكم من عند الله تعالى . وان كان الكفر والمعاصي غير مخلوقة لله تعالى
9 لانها متفاوتة فَلِمَ لا تكون الطاعات مخلوقة له لانها عندكم غير متفاوتة . واذا كان قوله سبحانه(69) « أحسن كل شيء خلقه » على العموم في كل شيء خلقه
11 الله تعالى فَلِمَ لا كان قوله (ص ٧٣) تعالى(70) « خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ » [على العموم] في كل شيء هو غيره .

13 **115 فان قال** فما معنى قوله(71) « مَا خَلَقْنَا ٱلسَّمٰوَاتِ وَٱلْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا إِلَّا بِٱلْحَقِّ » قيل له خلق الله ذلك فان قال له « كن » فالحق قوله بهما
15 « كونا » فكانتا .

مسئلة

17 **116 ويقال** لاهل القدر أليس قول الله تعالى(72) « بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ » يدل على انه لا معلوم الا والله به عالم فاذا قالوا نعم قيل لهم فما(73) أنكرتم

(68) 3.78/72.
(69) 32.7/6.
(70) 13.16/17.
(71) 15.85.
(72) 2.29/27 et al.
(73) M has لما .

1 ان يدل قوله تعالى(74) « عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ »(75) على انه لا مقدور الا والله عليه قادر وان يدل قوله تعالى(76) « خالق كل شي. » على انه لا محدَث 3 مفعول الا والله محدث له فاعل خالق .

مسئلة

5 **117** ان سأل سائل عن قول الله تعالى(77) « أَنَّ ٱللَّهَ بَرِيءٌ مِنَ ٱلْمُشْرِكِينَ وَرَسُولُهُ » فالجواب ان الآية انما نزلت في العهود التي كانت بين المشركين وبين 7 رسول الله صلى الله عليه لان الله تعالى قال(78) « بَرَاءَةٌ مِنَ ٱللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ إِلَى ٱلَّذِينَ عَاهَدْتُمْ مِنَ ٱلْمُشْرِكِينَ فَسِيحُوا فِي ٱلْأَرْضِ أَرْبَعَةَ أَشْهُرٍ (ص ٧٤) 9 وَٱعْلَمُوا أَنَّكُمْ غَيْرُ مُعْجِزِي ٱللَّهِ وَأَنَّ ٱللَّهَ مُخْزِي ٱلْكَافِرِينَ » فأحلهم الله أربعة أشهر ثم قال(79) « وَأَذَانٌ مِنَ ٱللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ » يقول وإعلام من الله 11 ورسوله « إِلَى ٱلنَّاسِ يَوْمَ ٱلْحَجِّ ٱلْأَكْبَرِ أَنَّ ٱللَّهَ بَرِيءٌ مِنَ ٱلْمُشْرِكِينَ وَرَسُولُهُ » يعني من العهود التي كانت بين رسول الله صلى الله عليه وبينهم(80) اذا انقضت 13 الاربعة الاشهر . ثم استثنى قوماً من المشركين يقال انهم من بني كِنانة فقال(81) « إِلَّا ٱلَّذِينَ عَاهَدْتُمْ عِنْدَ ٱلْمَسْجِدِ ٱلْحَرَامِ فَمَا ٱسْتَقَامُوا لَكُمْ فَٱسْتَقِيمُوا لَهُمْ » 15 الى انقضاء مدتهم .

118 على انه الله تعالى ذكر المشركين ولم يقل « من شركهم » 17 ولو كان قوله « بريء من المشركين » يدل على انه لم يخلق شركهم لدل على انه لم يخلقهم لانه تعالى بريء من المشركين ومن شركهم . ولو كان قوله

(74) 2.20/19.
(75) M repeats يدل after قدير .
(76) 13.16/17.
(77) 9.3.
(78) 9.1-2.
(79) 9.3.
(80) M has وبينه .
(81) 9.7.

1 « بريء من المشركين » يوجب انه ما خلق شركهم للزم القدرية اذ قال انه[82] « وَلِيُّ ٱلْمُؤْمِنِينَ » فقد خلق إيمانهم . فلما لم يكن هذا عندهم هكذا بطل 3 ما قالوه .

مسئلة

5 **119** (ص ٧٥) **ان قال قائل** حدثونا عن تَوْأَمَين كانا في برِيّة فوقع بقلب أحدهما ان الله واحد من القى ذلك في قلبه قلنا له الله تعالى . فان قال 7 أفحقّ ما ألقاه بقلبه قيل له نعم . فان قال أفصَدَقه [في] ما ألقاه بقلبه قيل صِدْق الله تعالى لا يكون الا كلامه وما وقع بقلب الانسان ليس بكلام الله 9 تعالى فيقال ان الله تعالى صدقه فيه . فان قال فان الآخر وقع في قلبه ان الله ثالث ثلاثة من ألقى ذلك بقلبه قيل له الله تعالى .فان قال أفباطل ما ألقاه بقلبه 11 قيل له نعم . فان قال أفصدقه فيا ألقاه بقلبه ام كذبه قيل خطأ ان يقال له صدقه فيه لان صِدق الباري من صفات نفسه وهو كلامه .وخطأ ان يقال كذبه 13 فيه لان الكذب لا يجوز على الباري تعالى لانه مستحيل ان يكذب وليس يجب اذا خلق كذباً لغيره وكذباً في قلب غيره ان يكون كاذباً كما لا يجب 15 اذا خلق قدرة في غيره وارادة (ص ٧٦) في غيره وحركة في غيره ان يكون بذلك قادرًا مريدًا متحركاً .

مسئلة

120 **فان قالوا** لِمَ سَمَّيْتمونا قدرية قيل لهم لانكم تزعمون في 19 أكسابكم انكم تقدّرونها وتفعلونها مقدَّرة لكم دون خالقكم . والقدري هو من ينسب ذلك لنفسه كما ان الصائغ هو من يعترف بانه يصوغ دون من 21 يزعم انه يصاغ له والنجار هو من يدعي انه ينجر دون من يعترف بانه يُنجر

(82) 3.68/61.

1 له ولا ينجر شيئاً . وكذلك القدري من يدعي انه يفعل أفعاله مقدّرة دون رَبِّهِ ويزعم ان ربه لا يفعل من اكتسابه شيئاً .

3 **121 فإنه قال** يلزمكم ان تكونوا قدرية لانكم تُثبتون القدر قيل لهم نحن نثبت ان الله تعالى قدّر أعمالنا وخلقها مقدرة لنا ولا نثبت ذلك لانفسنا .

5 فمن أثبت القدر لله تعالى وزعم ان الافعال مقدرة لربّه لا يكون قدرياً كما ان من أثبت الصياغة والنجارة لغيره لا يكون صائغاً (ص ٧٧) ولا نجارًا .

7 ولو كنا قدرية بقولنا ان الله فعل أفعالنا مقدرة [لنا] لكانوا قدرية بقولهم ان الله تعالى فعل أفعاله كلها مقدرة له . ولو كنا بقولنا ان الله قدّر المعاصي

9 قدرية لكانوا بقولهم ان الله قدّر الطاعات قدرية . فلما لم يكن ذلك كذلك بطل ما قالوه .

[الباب السادس]

باب الكلام في الاستطاعة

3 122 ان قال قائل لِمَ قلتم ان الانسان يستطيع باستطاعة هي غيره قيل له لانه يكون تارةً مستطيعاً وتارةً عاجزًا كما يكون تارة عالما وتارة غير
5 عالم وتارة متحركا وتارة غير متحرك فوجب ان يكون مستطيعاً[1] بمعنى هو غيره كما وجب ان يكون عالمًا بمعنى هو غيره وكما وجب ان يكون متحركاً بمعنى
7 هو غيره لانه لو كان مستطيعاً بنفسه او بمعنى تستحيل مفارقته له لم يوجد الا وهو مستطيع فلما وجد مرة مستطيعاً ومرة غير مستطيع صحّ وثبت ان
9 استطاعته غيره .

123 فان قال قائل فاذا أثبتّم له (ص ٧٨) استطاعة هي غيره فَلِمَ
11 زعمتم انه يستحيل تقدُّمها للفعل قيل له زعمنا ذلك من قبل ان الفعل لا يخلو ان يكون حادثاً مع الاستطاعة في حال حدوثها او بعدها . فان كان حادثاً
13 معها في حال حُدُوثها فقد صحّ انها مع الفعل للفعل . وان كان حادثاً بعدها وقد دلت الدلالة على انها لا تبقى وجب حدوث الفعل بقدرة معدومة. ولو جاز
15 ذلك لجاز ان يحدث العجز بعدها فيكون الفعل واقعاً بقدرة معدومة ولو جاز ان يفعل في حال هو فيها عاجز بقدرة معدومة لجاز ان يفعل بعد مائة سنة من
17 حال حدوث القدرة وان كان عاجزًا في المائة سنة كلها بقدرة عدمت من مائة سنة وهذا فاسد .

19 124 وايضاً فلو جاز حدوث الفعل مع عدم القدرة ووقع الفعل بقدرة معدومة لجاز وقوع الاحراق بحرارة نار معدومة وقد قلب الله النار بردًا والقطع

(1) M has متحركا .

1 بجد سيف معدوم وقد قلب الله تعالى السيف قصباً والقطع بجارحة (ص ٧٩) معدومة وذلك محال . فاذا استحال ذلك وجب ان الفعل يحدث مع الاستطاعة 3 في حال حدوثها .

125 فانه قال ولِمَ زعمتم ان القدرة لا تبقى قيل له لانها لو بقيت لكانت 5 لا تخلو ان تبقى لنفسها او لبقاء يقوم بها . فان كانت تبقى لنفسها وجب ان تكون نفسها بقاء لها وان لا توجد الا باقية وفي هذا ما يوجب[2] ان تكون 7 باقية في حال حدوثها . وان كانت تبقى ببقاء يقوم بها والبقاء صفة فقد قامت الصفة بالصفة والعرض بالعرض وذلك فاسد . ولو جاز ان تقوم بالصفة صفة لجاز 9 ان تقوم بالقدرة قدرة وبالحياة حياة وبالعلم علم وذلك فاسد .

126 [فانه] قال فما أنكرتم ان تكون القدرة على الشيء قدرة عليه 11 وعلى ضده قيل له لان من شرط القدرة المحدثة ان يكون في وجودها وجود مقدورها . لان ذلك لو لم يكن من شرطها وجاز وجودها وقتاً ولا مقدور 13 لجاز وجودها (ص ٨٠) وقتين واكثر من ذلك اذ لا فرق بين وقت ووقتين واكثر . ولو كان هذا هكذا لجاز وجودها الأبدَ[3] وهو فاعل غير فاعل على 15 وجه من الوجوه . ألا ترى انه لما لم يكن من[4] شرط قدرة القديم ان في وجودها وجود مقدورها وجاز وجودها ولا فعل لم يستحل[5] ان لا تزال 17 موجودة ولا فعل على وجه من الوجوه فلما استحال ان تكون قدرة الانسان الأبدَ[6] موجودة ولا موجود[7] منه فعل لا أخذ[8] ولا ترك ولا طاعة ولا

(2) M has يجب .

(3) Perhaps the phrase الى الابد is the one used more commonly, though الابد also seems to be correct. It may also be that the copyist intended to write للابد .

(4) M repeats من شرط .

(5) M has يستحيل .

(6) Cf. note (3), supra.

(7) M has بوجود .

(8) M has لاخذ .

1 عصيان والأمر والنهي قائمان استحال ذلك وقتاً واحدًا . واذا استحال وقتاً
واحدًا ان توجد القدرة ولا مقدور فقد وجب ان [يكون] من شرط قدرة
3 الانسان ان في وجودها وجود مقدورها فاذا كان ذلك كذلك استحال ان
يقدر الانسان على الشيء وضده لانه لو قدر عليهما لوجب (ص ٨١) وجودهما
5 وذلك محال .

127 فان قال قائل ما أنكرتم ان تكون قدرة واحدة على إرادتين
7 وعلى حركتين او على مثلين قيل له انّا[9] أنكرنا ذلك من قبل ان القدرة لا
تكون قدرة الا على ما يوجد معها في مَحَلّها فلو كانت قدرة واحدة على
9 حركتين لم تخل ان تكون قدرة على حركتين ان توجدا معها في حال حدوثها
او على حركتين ان تكون[10] واحدة بعد اخرى . فان كانت قدرة على
11 حركتين ان تكونا معاً فقد وجدت حركتان في موضع واحد في وقت واحد.
ولو جاز هذا لجاز ارتفاع إحدى الحركتين الى ضدها من السكون فيكون
13 الجوهر متحركاً عن المكان ساكناً فيه في وقت واحد وهذا محال[11] . وان
كانت قدرة على حركتين [ان] توجد إحداهما[12] بعد الاخرى فقد قام الدليل
15 والبرهان على ان القدرة لا تبقى (ص ٨٢) وهذا يوجب جواز وجود الفعل
بقدرة معدومة وهذا مما قد بيّنا فساده .

17 128 ومما يدل على ان الاستطاعة مع الفعل للفعل ان من لم يخلق الله
تعالى له استطاعة مُحَال ان يكتسب شيئاً . فلما استحال ان يكتسب الفعل
19 اذا لم تكن استطاعة صحّ ان الكَسْبَ انما يوجد لوجودها وفي ذلك إثبات
وجودها مع الفعل للفعل .

(9) M has ان .
(10) M has يكون , but perhaps تكونا would be better.
(11) M has المحال .
(12) M has احدهما

1 **129** **فان قالوا** أليس في عدم الجارحة عدم الفعل قيل لهم في عدم الجارحة عدم القدرة وفي عدم القدرة عدم الاكتساب لانها اذا عدمت عدمت القدرة 3 فلعدم القدرة ما استحال الكسب اذا عدمت الجارحة لا[13] لعدم الجارحة ولو عدمت الجارحة وووجدت القدرة لكان الاكتساب واقعاً ولو كان انما استحال 5 الاكتساب لعدم الجارحة لكان[14] اذا وجدت وُجد الكسب. فلما كانت توجد ويقارنها العجز وتعدم القدرة (ص ٨٣) فلا يكون كسب[15] عُلِمَ ان 7 الاكتساب انما لم يقع لعدم الاستطاعة لا لعدم الجارحة .

130 **فان قالوا** أفليس في عدم الحياة عدم الكسب قيل لهم نعم لان 9 الحياة اذا عدمت عدمت القدرة فلعدم القدرة ما استحال الكسب لا لعدم الحياة . ألا ترون ان الحياة تكون موجودة وثم عجز فلا يكون الانسان 11 مكتسباً فعُلِم ان الكسب لم يعدم لعدمها ولا يوجد لوجودها . والجواب في الحياة كالجواب في الجارحة .

13 **131** **فان قالوا** اذا كان في عدم الإحسان للحياكة عدم الحياكة فَلِمَ لا يكون في وجود الاحسان[16] لها وجودها قيل ان الحياكة تعدم لعدم 15 قدرتها لا لعدم إحسانها ولو عدمت الحياكة لعدم الاحسان لها لوجدت بوجود[17] الاحسان لها . فلما لم يكن ذلك كذلك وكان الاحسان لها يجامعه[18] العجز 17 عُلم انها انما تعدم لعدم القدرة عليها ولو أجرى الله تعالى العادة ان يخلق القدرة عليها مع عدم الاحسان لها لوقعت الحياكة لا محالة .

19 **132** (ص ٨٤) **فان قالوا** فاذا كان في عدم التخلية[19] والإطلاق

(13) M has الا .
(14) M has لكانت .
(15) M has كسبا .
(16) M has الاجسام .
(17) M has بوجو .
(18) This seems to be altered to يجمعه in M.
(19) M has التحليه .

1 عدم الفعل ففي وجودهما وجود الفعل قيل لهم كذلك نقول . فان قالوا فاذا كان في عدم احتمال البنية للفعل عدم الفعل فلِمَ لا يكون في وجود احتمال 3 البنية للشيء وجوده قيل لهم كذلك نقول لان البنية لا تحتمل الا ما يقوم بها. وكلما تعارضونا به في هذه العلّة فالجواب فيه كالجواب في الجارحة والحياة لانه 5 ليس عدم الكسب لعدمه .

133 ومما يدل على ان الاستطاعة مع الفعل قول الخضر لموسى عليهما 7 السلام[20] « إِنَّكَ لَنْ تَسْتَطِيعَ مَعِي صَبْرًا » . فعلمنا انه لما لم يصبر لم يكن للصبر مستطيعاً . وفي هذا بيان ان ما لم تكن[21] استطاعة لم يكن الفعل 9 وانها اذا كانت كان لا محالة .

134 ومما يبين ذلك ان الله تعالى قال[22] «مَا كَانُوا يَسْتَطِيعُونَ ٱلسَّمْعَ» 11 وقال[23] « وَكَانُوا[24] لَا يَسْتَطِيعُونَ سَمْعاً » وقد أُمروا ان يسمعوا الحق وكلّفوه . فدل ذلك على جواز تكليف ما لا يطاق وان (ص ٨٥) من لم 13 يقبل الحق ولم يسمعه على طريق القبول لم يكن مستطيعاً . فان قالوا ألا يستطيعون الاستقبال[25] قيل لهم ما الفرق بينكم وبين من قال انهم لا 15 يستطيعون قبول الحق للاشتغال بتركه .

مسئلة

17 **135 فان قال قائل** أليس قد كلّف الله تعالى الكافرَ الايمانَ قلنا له نعم. فان قال فيستطيع الايمان قيل له لو استطاعه لآمَنَ فان قال فكلفه ما لا

(20) 18.67/66.
(21) M has يكن .
(22) 11.20/22.
(23) 18.101.
(24) M has وما كانوا يستطيعون .
(25) M has للاستقبال .

1 يستطيع قيل له هذا كلام على أمرين. ان أردتَ بقولك انه لا يستطيع الايمان
لعجزه عنه فلا . وان أردتَ انه لا يستطيعه لتركه واشتغاله بضده فنعم .
3 فان قال ما أنكرتم ان يكون الله تعالى كلّف الكافر ما يعجز عنه لتركه له
قيل له العجز عن الشيء انه يخرج عنه وعن ضده فلذلك استحال ان يعجز
5 العاجز عن الشيء لتركه له .

136 **فان قال** ما أنكرت ان يكون القادر على (ص ٨٦) الشيء
7 قادراً[26] على ضده كما كان العاجز عن الشيء عاجزاً عن ضده قيل له لو كانت
القوّة على الشيء قوة على ضده قياساً على العجز للزم ان يكون العون على الشيء
9 عوناً على ضده قياساً على ان العجز عن الشيء عجز عن ضده . وأيضاً فلو
كانت القدرة على الشيء قدرةً على ضده قياساً على العجز لان العجز عن الشيء
11 عجز عن ضده لوجب في القدرة ما وجب في العجز من انه يتأتّى بها الشيء وضده
كما يتعذّر بالعجز الشيء وضده ولكان العجز اذا [وُجد] عدم الشيء وضده
13 المعجوز عنهما مع وجوده فلم يكن الانسان مكتسباً لهما [و][27] لكان يلزم
في القدرة مثله اذا وجدت وهي قدرة على الشيء وضده ان يوجد الشيء وضده
15 معها لانه يجب من وجود الضدين مع وجودها بخلاف ما يُحكم به في العجز
لان العجز يحكم فيه بعدم المعجوز عنه وضده مع وجوده . فان لم يجز هذا
17 (ص ٨٧) فقد بطلت العلة وانتقضت المعارضة ولم يجب ان تُقاس القدرة على
العجز اذ[28] لم تكن علة تجمع بينهما ولم تكن القدرة من جنس العجز .

19 **137** **فان قالوا** فيجوز ان يكلف الله تعالى الشيء مع عدم الجارحة
ووجود العجز قيل لهم [لا] لان المأمور اذا يؤمر ليقبل او ليترك ومع عدم

(26) M has قادر .
(27) This conjunction may help a little, but this long sentence is certainly awkward.
(28) M has اذا .

1 الجارحة لا يوجد أخذ ولا ترك . وكذلك العجز لا يوجد معه اخـذ ولا ترك
لا [نه] عجز عن الشيء وعن ضده. وأيضاً فلو وجب اذا أمر الله تعالى الانسان
3 بالشيء مع عدم قدرته[29] ان يأمر به مع عدم القدرة كلها لوجب اذا أمر الله
تعالى الانسان مع عدم بعض العلوم وهو العلم بالله تعالى وبانه آمر ان يأمره بالفعل
5 مع عدم العلوم كلها. فان لم يجب هذا لم يجب اذا أمر الانسان مع عدم القدرة
على ما أمره به ان يأمر مع عدم الجارحة التي اذا عدمت عدمت القدرة كلها ومع
7 وجود العجز الذي لم تعدم القدرة بوجوده .

138 **قال** الشيخ ابو الحسن (ص ٨٨) رحمه الله وكل مسئلة في تكليف
9 ما لا يطاق من الأمر بالزكوة مع عدم المال وغير ذلك من المسائل فالجواب
عنه كما أجبتُ به عن سؤالهم عن الأمر مع عـدم الجارحة والتكليف مع
11 وجود العجز .

139 **فان قال قائل** ما أنكرتم ان يعدم الشيء وضده لوجود عجزين
13 قيل له لانه نهاية لما يعجز عنه الانسان العاجز الذي لا قدرة فيه . فلو كان
العجز عن كل شيء غير العجز [عن] غيره لكان في الانسان من الأعجاز ما
15 لا يتنـاهى وهذا محال . وأيضاً فان الموت هو أكبر الأعجاز لانه يتعذر معه
الافعال كلها فلو كان العجز عن كل شيء غير العجز عن غيره لكان بعض الميتين
17 انما تعدم منه الافعال[30] لوجود أعجاز وهذا يوجب ان في الجزء الواحد عجزين
وموتين ولو جاز هذا لجاز ان يرتفع أحدهما الى حياة[31] فيكون الجزء الواحد
19 حَياً (ص ٨٩) ميتاً في حال معاً وهذا محال . فلما استحال هذا علم انه محال
في قول من قال ان العجز عن كل شيء غير العجز عن غيره وبالله التوفيق .

---

(29) So M, but جارحته seems to make better sense.
(30) M has للافعال .
(31) M has موت .

مسئلة

140 فانه قال [قائل] خبرونا عمن طلق امرأته واعتق عبده متى
3 [استطاع[32] طلاق امرأته وعتق عبده قيل له] استطاع عتق عبده في حال
العتق واستطاع طلاق امراته في حال الطلاق . فان قال فاستطاع ان يطلق من
5 ليست امراته وان يعتق من ليس عبده قيل له استطاع ان يطلق من ليست
امراته في حال الطلاق وقد كانت امراته قبل ذلك وان يعتق من ليس عبده
7 في حال العتق وقد كان عبده قبل ذلك كما انه طلق من ليست امراته في حال
الطلاق وقد كانت قبل ذلك امراته[33] (واعتق من ليس عبده في حال العتق
9 وقد كان عبده قبل ذلك) وكذلك الجواب في إلقاء العصا والانتقال من
الشمس الى الظلّ وعن كسر المكسور .

مسئلة

141 (ص ٩٠) انه قال قائل خبّرونا عن قول الله تعالى[34] « وَعَلَى
13 الَّذِينَ يُطِيقُونَهُ فِدْيَةٌ » قيل له يحتمل ان يكون الله تعالى أراد الذين يطيقون
الاطعام ويعجزون عن الصيام عليهم الفدية اذا أفطروا . ويحتمل ان يكون
15 أراد الذين يطيقون الصيا[م] ان تكلفوه وارادوه على قول من رجع بالهاء الى
مذكور تقدّم على[35] الصيام .

17 **142** وقد قالت المعتزلة لا يجوز ان يرجع بالها.[36] الا الى مذكور تقدّم

(32) The words in the brackets seem to be required to complete the sense.

(33) The words in the parentheses seem to be superfluous.

(34) 2.184/180.

(35) So M, but it would seem better to read وهو — as in the next sentence.

(36) M has بها , which could stay as a pronominal reference to the letter and not the letter itself.

1 وهو الصيام . قيل لهم التأويل الذي تأولناه و[37]هو تأويل بعض المتقدمين
وليس النحويون حجة على الصحابة والتابعين . على ان كثيرًا من النحويين قد
3 اجازوا ان لا يرجع بالهاء الى مذكور تقدم .

143 ثم نكر على المعتزلة راجعين فنقول لهم حدثونا عن قول الله تعالى[38]
5 « هُوَ ٱلَّذِي خَلَقَكُم مِّن نَّفْسٍ وَاحِدَةٍ وَجَعَلَ[39] مِنْهَا زَوْجَهَا لِيَسْكُنَ إِلَيْهَا»
– يعني آدم وحوا – « فَلَمَّا تَغَشَّاهَا حَمَلَتْ حَمْلًا خَفِيفًا فَمَرَّتْ بِهِ فَلَمَّا
7 أَثْقَلَتْ » – يعنى حوا – « دَعَوَا ٱللَّهَ رَبَّهُمَا لَئِنْ آتَيْتَنَا صَالِحًا لَّنَكُونَنَّ مِنَ
ٱلشَّاكِرِينَ »–يريد آدم وحوا. وقوله (ص ٩١) تعالى[40] « فَلَمَّا آتَاهُمَا »[41]
9 زعمت المعتزلة ان الهاء والميم لم يرجع بهما الى ما تقدم ذكره بل رجع بهما الى
المشركين من ولدهما فنقضوا قولهم ان الهاء لا يرجع بها الا الى مذكور قد
11 تقدم ذكره . وقد قرأها بعض الصحابة « وعلى الذين يطيقونه[42] فدية »
وكان تاويله انهم يحملونه ولا يطيقونه .

مسئلة

144 وقد سألوا عن قول الله تعالى[43] « وَلِلَّهِ عَلَى ٱلنَّاسِ حِجُّ ٱلْبَيْتِ مَنِ
15 ٱسْتَطَاعَ إِلَيْهِ سَبِيلًا » فالجواب ان الله تعالى أراد المال وهو الزاد والراحلة ولم
يرد استطاعة البدن التي في كونها كون مقدورها . وقيام الدلالة من القياس على
17 ان الاستطاعة مع الفعل يصح تأويلنا ويبطل تأويل مخالفينا .

(37) This waw seems to be superfluous.
(38) 7.189.
(39) M has وخلق.
(40) 7.190.
(41) i. e. صالحا — Cf. the commentators.
(42) It is difficult to determine from the text of M just what this reading was. At first sight the world in M looks like يطقونه, which seems to have no sense. There is a space between the *ṭā'* and the *qāf* — enough to allow for a *yā'* — but the connecting line is straight and there are no dots.
(43) 3.97/91.

مسئلة

145 ان قال قائل ما معنى قول الله تعالى(44) « [وسـ] يَحْلِفُونَ بِاللهِ
3 لَوِ ٱسْتَطَعْنَا لَخَرَجْنَا مَعَكُمْ » . هل يخلو ان يكونوا كانوا مستطيعين الخروج
فلم يخرجوا ولو استطاعوا الخروج لم يخرجوا فالجواب انهم عنوا بالاستطاعة
5 الجدة والمال وحلفوا (ص ٩٢) لرسول الله صلى الله عليه انهم لا مال لهم ولا
ظهر يحملون به مع نبيّ الله صلى الله عليه فاكذبهم الله في حلفهم لانهم كانوا
7 يجدون المال . ولم تكن المناظرة بينهم وبين رسول الله في ان الاستطاعة مع
الفعل او قبله وانما كانت المجاراة(45) بينهم وبينه في الجدة والظهر وهكذا
9 ذكر اهل التفسير ونقلة الاخبار وحملة الآثار . واذا كان هذا هكذا فنحن
لا ننكر تقدّم المال للفعل وانما انكرنا تقدّم استطاعة البدن للفعل .

مسئلة

146 فان سألوا عن قول الله تعالى(46) « فَٱتَّقُوا ٱللَّهَ مَا ٱسْتَطَعْتُمْ » فقد
13 يحتمل ان يكون الله تعالى أراد اتقوا الله ما كنتم مستطيعين فان كانوا للتقوى
مستطيعين كان عليهم ان يتقوا وان كانوا لتركه مستطيعين فعليهم ان يتقوا
15 لان التقوى لا يلزمهم الا ان يستطيعوه او يستطيعوا تركه . وقد يحتمل اتقوا
الله فيما استطعتم .

مسئلة

147 ومن سأل عن قوله تعالى(47) « فَمَنْ لَمْ يَسْتَطِعْ فَإِطْعَامُ سِتِّينَ
19 مِسْكِيناً » (ص ٩٣) فالجواب ان من لم يستطع لعجز فعليه إطعام ستين
مسكيناً .

(44) 9.42.
(45) M has مجاره .
(46) 64.16.
(47) 58.4/5.

1 **148 ومن سأل** عن قوله تعالى[48] « لَا يُكَلِّفُ ٱللهُ نَفساً إِلَّا ما آتَاهَا »
فالمعنى انه لا يكلفها من النفقة الا ما آتاها لانه قال ذلك عقيب ذكر النفقة
3 قال[49] « وَمَنْ[50] قُدِرَ عَلَيهِ رِزْقُهُ فَلْيُنْفِقْ مِمَّا آتَاهُ ٱللهُ لَا يُكَلِّفُ ٱللهُ نَفساً
إِلَّا مَا آتَاهَا » .

5 **149 ومن سأل** عن قوله تعالى[51] « لَا يُكَلِّفُ [ٱللهُ] نفساً إِلَّا[52]
وُسْعَهَا » فالجواب عن ذلك ان الله تعالى لا يكلفها ما يضيق عليها من إزالة
7 الخواطر عن النفوس التي تدعو الى الشر لان الله تعالى قد تجاوز[53] عن ذلك ووسع
على المسلمين فيما تدعوهم نفوسهم اليه من المعصية اذا لم يرتكبوا ذلك بعد ان
9 كان ذلك مضيقاً عليهم . فمعنى « لا يكلف الله نفساً الا وسعها » يعني الا ما
يطيقه عليها لان ما أمر الله تعالى به عباده لا يضيق عليهم فعله ولا يعجزون
11 عن الاتيان به . وقد قال بعض أصحابنا « لا يكلف الله نفساً الا وسعها »
يعني الا ما يسعها ويحلّ (ص ٩٤) لها .

13 **150 ومن سأل** عن قول الله تعالى مخبراً عن العفريت[54] « وَإِنِّي عَلَيْهِ
لَقَوِيٌّ أَمِينٌ » [فالجواب عن ذلك] ان[55] كان العفريت صادقاً فالمعنى في
15 قوله « واني عليه لقوي امين » ان تكلفتُ ذلك وأردتُهُ[56] . وان كان ممن
اذا أراد ذلك أحدث الله تعالى له القدرة عليه لم يكن كاذباً . وان لم يقل
17 هذا القول على هذا المعنى فهو كاذب وليس في قول العفاريت والشياطين حجة
على دين رب العالمين .

(48) 65.7.
(49) *ibid.*
(50) M has فمن .
(51) 2.286.
(52) M has الا ما , but it appears that an effort was made to erase the ما .
(53) M has تحاوز .
(54) 27.39.
(55) M has فان كانت .
(56) M has واراد ته .

1 **151 وزعمت** المعتزلة ان العفريت لم يكذبه سليمن وهو نبيّ من أنبياء
الله تعالى على قوله[57] « أَنَا آتِيكَ بِهِ قَبْلَ أَنْ تَقُومَ مِنْ مَقَامِكَ وَإِنِّي عَلَيْهِ
3 لَقَوِيٌّ أَمِينٌ » ولا يجوز لأحد ان يكذب بين يدي نبيّ وهو يعلم انه اذا
كذب رَدَّ الله عليه كذبه على لسان النبيّ صلى الله عليه كما قال لنبيه[58]
5 « إِذَا جَاءَكَ ٱلْمُنَافِقُونَ الآية » فأخبر الله تعالى بكذبهم ومثل ذلك في القرآن
كثير . واحتجوا بذلك ان الاستطاعة قبل الفعل فبئس ما بالوا وظنّوا بل
7 سولت لهم انفسهم الاباطيل .

152 فالجواب انا نقول لمن احتج (ص٩٥) علينا بذلك انه ليست تخلو
9 هذه الآية التي حكاها الله تعالى عن العفريت ان يكون العفريت عنى بقوله
« واني عليه لقوي امين » ان استطعتُ ذلك وتكلفتُهُ واردته او يكون عنى
11 بقوله « واني عليه لقوي أمين » ان شاء الله او يكون عنى بقوله ان قواني الله
تعالى عليه . وَلَوْ لَمْ يعلم سليمن ان العفريت أَضمر[59] شيئاً من ذلك لكذّبه
13 ورد عليه قوله .

153 والدليل في ذلك قول الله تعالى[60] « فَمَا ٱسْطَاعُوا أَنْ يَظْهَرُوهُ وَمَا
15 ٱسْتَطَاعُوا لَهُ نَقْباً » وقد جاء في التفسير لا خلفَ بين أحد من الموحدين فيه
انهم في كلّ يوم يأملون ان يصبحوا[61] وقد فتحوه ولا يقولون ان شاء الله
17 فاذا كان المقدر قالوا ان شاء الله فأصبحوا وقد فتحوه فدل ان لا استطاعة لهم
قبل الفعل الا مع الفعل للفعل بارادة الله تعالى ذلك .

19 **154 وقول الله** تعالى في صاحب يوسف[62] « فَأَنْسَاهُ ٱلشَّيْطَانُ ذِكْرَ

(57) 27.39.
(58) 63.1.
(59) M has اضمره .
(60) 18.97/96.
(61) M has يصبحوان — with the alif crossed out.
(62) 12.42.

1 رَبِّهِ فَلَبِثَ فِي ٱلسِّجْنِ بِضْعَ سِنِينَ » . أنسى الشيطان للناجي ان يذكر
يوسف عند الملك فلم تكن للناجي استطاعة (ص ٩٦) ان يذكر أمر يوسف
3 للملك اذ كان قد وعد يوسف بان يذكره عند ربّه قبل خروجه من السجن .
وكان ذلك اتمام مراد الله تعالى بيوسف الى الوقت المعلوم الذي رأى الملك
5 فيه الرؤيا .

155 **وايضاً** قول الله تعالى لنبيه عليه السلام(63) « وَلَا تَقُولَنَّ لِشَيْءٍ
7 إِنِّي فَاعِلٌ ذَٰلِكَ غَدًا إِلَّا أَنْ يَشَاءَ ٱللَّهُ » فأمر الله تعالى نبيّه بأن لا يقدم على
فعل شيء يقع في نفسه لم يَأبَ(64) ان يستثني في قوله فأخبر الله تعالى نبيه ان
9 لا يكون قولك هذا كان قبل فعلك له ان أردتُ انا ذلك فسلم النبي صلى
الله عليه لأمر الله تعالى .

11 **156** **وقول** موسى(65) « رَبَّنَا ٱطْمِسْ عَلَىٰ أَمْوَالِهِمْ وَٱشْدُدْ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبِهِمْ
فَلَا يُؤْمِنُوا حَتَّىٰ يَرَوُا ٱلْعَذَابَ ٱلْأَلِيمَ » فلم يقدروا اذا رأوا العذاب الملجئ
13 لهم الى الايمان ان يؤمنوا ولو استطاعوا ذلك لآمنوا عند معاينتهم لأوّل العذاب
النازل بهم . ومثل ذلك في كتاب الله تعالى كثير . وفيما دللنا به كفاية ومثله
15 قوله تعالى(66) « إِلَّا قَوْمَ يُونُسَ لَمَّا آمَنُوا » .

مسئلة

17 **157** **وممه سأل** (ص ٩٧) عن قول ابنة شُعَيب لابيها(67) « يَا أَبَتِ
ٱسْتَأْجِرْهُ إِنَّ خَيْرَ مَنِ ٱسْتَأْجَرْتَ ٱلْقَوِيُّ ٱلْأَمِينُ » فزعم الجُبّائي ان معنى هذه

(63) 18.23.
(64) M has تاب, with a line drawn as though to cross out the two dots يأب is the best reading I can suggest.
(65) 10.88.
(66) 10.98.
(67) 28.26.

1 الآية انها أخبرت عنه انه قويّ على ما يحتاج اليه أبوها من الاعمال واستدل فيما
زعم بذلك على ان الاستطاعة قبل الفعل . فما أعجزه من أيّ طريق استدل
3 بهذه الآية على هذا الفصل وذلك انها لم تعرف موسى من قبل قلعه للحجر
الذي قلعه ونزعه بالدلو الذي نزع وانما لما عاينت من شدته وقوته وأمانته .
5 وذلك انها لما رجعت اليه في المرة الثانية فقالت له(68) « إنَّ أَبِي يَدْعُوكَ » قال
لها « امشي خلفي واهديني الطريق » ففعلت ذلك فكانت الريح تصفها له
7 فادركت موسى عليه السلام الحشية فقال لها « امشي خلفي وعرفيني(69) الطريق
بلسانك يمنه ويسره وتلقاه »(70) ففعلت ذلك. فلما جاءت الى أبيها وقالت(71) له
9 « انه قوي أمين » فجرد عليها جردًا شديدًا وقال لها « يا ابنتي أما قوته فقد
علمتِ (ص ٩٨) بها لما رأيتِ منه فبما عرفت أمانته » فأخبرته بما رأت منه .
11 فكيف عَلِمَتْ انه كان مستطيعا لما قبل الفعل وانما ظهر لها ذلك منه بعد فعله
إيّاه . فصحّ عندنا وصحت الحجة [على] من خالفنا ان ينبغي ان تكون
13 استطاعته لذلك مع نفس فعله له .

158 والدليل على ذلك من القياس انا لو رأينا رجلًا في الحال قائمًا يصلّي
15 لما كنا نعلم استطاعته متى حدثت له الا انا نعلم من نفس الفعل ظهرت منه
للفعل وهي الصلاة التي كان يفعلها . وحجتنا على من خالفنا في كل ما يورده
17 من المسائل في باب الاستطاعة كما رسمنا فيما بيّنّا وشرحنا وبالله التوفيق .

مسئلة

19 159 ومن سأل عن قول الله تعالى(72) « وَمَا خَلَقْتُ ٱلْجِنَّ وَٱلْإِنسَ إِلَّا

(68) 28.25.
(69) M has وعرفني .
(70) M has وتلقا . The words of Moses to the daughter of Shuʿaib, and Shuʿaib's reprimand, are not in the Qurʾān.
(71) M has فقالوا له .
(72) 51.56.

1 لِيَعْبُدُونِ » قيل له المعنى في ذلك انه أراد بعض الجن والانس وهم العابدون لله منهم لان الله تعالى قال في موضع آخر(73) « وَلَقَدْ ذَرَأْنَا(74) لِجَهَنَّمَ كَثِيرًا مِنَ
3 الْجِنِّ وَالْإِنسِ » والقرآن لا يتناقض فوجب ان يكون الله تعالى خلق لجهنم كثيرًا بالآية التي (ص ٩٩) تلوناها وانه خلق بعضهم للعبادة بقوله « وما خلقت
5 الجن والانس الا ليعبدون » . والذين خلقهم لعبادته هم الذين اراد(75) هو ان يعبدوه وعاقبتهم عبادته .

7 **160 ومن سأل** عن قوله تعالى(76) « مَا جَعَلَ اللَّهُ مِنْ بَحِيرَةٍ وَلَا سَائِبَةٍ وَلَا وَصِيلَةٍ وَلَا حَامٍ وَلَـٰكِنَّ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا يَفْتَرُونَ عَلَى اللَّهِ الْكَذِبَ »
9 فالمعنى اني لم أفرض عليهم ذلك ولم آمرهم به ولكنهم كذبوا عليّ وافتروا الكذب في قولهم اني أمرتهم به .

11 **161 والدليل** على جواز تكليف ما لا يطاق من القرآن قوله للملائكة(77) « أَنبِئُونِي بِأَسْمَاءِ هَـٰؤُلَاءِ » يعني أسماء الخلق وهم لا يعلمون ذلك ولا يقدرون
13 عليه . وايضاً فقد أخبر انهم(78) « يُدْعَوْنَ إِلَى السُّجُودِ فَلَا يَسْتَطِيعُونَ ». فاذا جاز تكليفه اياهم في الآخرة ما لا يطيقون جاز ذلك في الدنيا . وقد
15 أمر الله تعالى بالعدل وقد قال(79) « وَلَن تَسْتَطِيعُوا أَن تَعْدِلُوا بَيْنَ النِّسَاءِ وَلَوْ حَرَصْتُمْ » .

17 **162 ومن سأل** عن قوله تعالى(80) « وَمَا اللَّهُ يُرِيدُ ظُلْمًا لِلْعِبَادِ »

(73) 7.179/178.

(74) In M a line runs from ذرانا to an explanatory خلقنا in the margin.

(75) M has اراده ان. The reading could be ارادوا ان, but my reading seems more in accord with al-Ashʿarī's doctrine.

(76) 5.103/102.

(77) 2.31/29.

(78) 68.42.

(79) 4.129/128.

(80) 40.31/33.

1 [و][81] « وَمَا ٱللَّهُ يُرِيدُ ظُلْمًا لِلْعَالَمِينَ » فالمعنى في ذلك انه لم يرد ان يظلمهم وان كان اراد ان يتظالموا

3 **163 ومن سأل** عن قوله تعالى[82] [« سَيَقُولُ[83] ٱلَّذِينَ أَشْرَكُوا] لَوْ شَاءَ ٱللَّهُ مَا أَشْرَكْنَا[84] وَلَا آبَاؤُنَا » الى قوله « كَذَٰلِكَ كَذَّبَ ٱلَّذِينَ 5 (ص ١٠٠) مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ » فالجواب انهم قالوا ذلك على طريق الاستهزاء ولم يقولوه على جهة الاعتقاد فأكذبهم في قولهم الذي لم يكونوا له معتقدين كما 7 أكذب المنافقين في قولهم[85] « نَشْهَدُ إِنَّكَ لَرَسُولُ ٱللَّهِ » على طريق الاستهزاء. فقال الله تعالى « وَٱللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ إِنَّكَ لَرَسُولُهُ وَٱللَّهُ يَشْهَدُ إِنَّ ٱلْمُنَافِقِينَ لَكَاذِبُونَ ».

9 **164 ومن سأل** عن قوله تعالى[86] « يُرِيدُ ٱللَّهُ بِكُمُ ٱلْيُسْرَ وَلَا يُرِيدُ بِكُمُ ٱلْعُسْرَ » فالجواب انه أراد ان لا يكونوا بالصيام في السفر والمرض 11 حرجين ولا آثمين ولا ان يكونوا في عسر من افطارهم .

(81) 3.108/104.
(82) 6.148/149.
(83) M has وقالوا لو شاء الخ.
(84) M has شركنا.
(85) 63.1.
(86) 2.185/181.

[الباب السابع]

باب الكلام في التعديل والتجوير

3 **165** **فان قال قائل** هل يقدر الله على لطف لو فعله بالكفار[1] لآمنوا قيل لهم نعم والدليل على ذلك انه يقدر ان يفعل بالمؤمنين وبعباده ما لو فعله
5 بهم لبغوا في الارض قال الله تعالى[2] « وَلَوْ بَسَطَ ٱللَّهُ ٱلرِّزْقَ لِعِبَادِهِ لَبَغَوْا فِي ٱلْأَرْضِ » وقال[3] « وَلَوْلَا أَنْ يَكُونَ ٱلنَّاسُ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً » — يعني على
7 الكفر — « لَجَعَلْنَا لِمَنْ يَكْفُرُ بِٱلرَّحْمَٰنِ لِبُيُوتِهِمْ سُقُفًا مِنْ فِضَّةٍ وَمَعَارِجَ عَلَيْهَا يَظْهَرُونَ » . فلما كان الله تعالى قادرًا على ان يفعل بالخلق ما لو فعله بهم
9 [ا] كفروا كان قادرًا [على] ان يفعل بهم ما لو فعله (ص ١٠١) بهم لآمنوا. وأيضاً . فقد دللنا على ان في كون الاستطاعة كون الفعل فاذا كان قادرًا على
11 إقدارهم على الايمان فهو قادر على ان يفعل ما لو فعله بهم لآمنوا .

166 **فان قال** فاذا لم يفعل بالكفار ما يؤمنون عنده فقد بخل عليهم
13 قيل له البخل ان لا يفعل الفاعل ما يجب عليه فعله فأما ما كان تفضُّلًا فللمتفضّل ان يتفضل به وله ان [لا] يتفضل به وما كان تفضّلًا لم يلحق البخل في ان
15 لا يفعله الفاعل .

167 **فان قال** فاذا لم يفعل [الله] بهم ما يؤمنون عنده فهل أراد سفههم
17 وكفرهم قيل له نعم وقد أوضحنا ذلك فيما سلف من كلامنا .

مسألة

19 **168** **ثم يقال لهم** ان كان الله تعالى اذا لم يفعل بهم ما يؤمنون عنده

(1) M has بالكافر .
(2) 42.27/26.
(3) 43.33/32.

1 يجب ان يريد فسادهم فما أنكرتم من انه اذا خلقهم وهو يعلم انهم يكفرون فقد أراد كفرهم فان قالوا مريد السفه سفيه قيل لهم أليس خالق من يعلم انه 3 يكفر لا يكون سفيهاً بخلقه ولا يكون خلقه إيّاه سفهاً فما أنكرتم ان يكون الخالق اذا أراد سفههم لم يكن سفيهاً وقد تكلمنا في هذه المسألة قبل هذا الموضع .

مسئلة

169 (ص ١٠٢) **فان قال قائل** هل لله تعالى ان يؤلم الاطفال في الآخرة 7 قيل له لله تعالى ذلك وهو عادل ان فعله . وكذلك كل ما يفعله على جرم متناه[4] بعقاب لا يتناهى وتسخير الحيوان بعضهم لبعض والإنعام على بعضهم دون 9 بعض وخلقه إيّاهم مع علمه بانهم يكفرون كل ذلك عدل منه . ولا يقبح من الله لو ابتدأهم بالعذاب الأليم وأدامه[5] ولا يقبح منه ان يُعذّب المؤمنين 11 ويُدخل الكافرين الجنان وانما نقول انه لا يفعل ذلك لانه أخبرنا انه يعاقب الكافرين وهو لا يجوز عليه الكذب في خبره .

13 **170** **والدليل** على ان كل ما فعله فله فعله انه المالك القاهر الذي ليس بمملوك ولا فوقه مُبيح ولا آمر ولا زاجر ولا حاظر ولا من رسم له الرسوم 15 وحدّ له الحدود . فاذا كان هذا هكذا لم يقبح منه شيء . اذ[6] كان الشيء انما يقبح منا لانا تجاوزنا ما حدّ ورسم لنا وآتينا ما لم نملك إتيانه . فلما لم 17 يكن الباري مُملكاً ولا تحت آمر[7] لم يقبح منه شيء .

171 **فان قال** فانما يقبح الكذب لانه قبحه قيل له أجل ولو حسّنه 19 لكان حسناً ولو أمر به (ص ١٠٣) لم يكن عليه اعتراض .

172 **فان قالوا** فجوّزوا[8] عليه ان يكذب كما جوّزتم ان يأمر بالكذب

(4) M has متناهي .
(5) M has وادامته .
(6) M has اذا , but اذ seems better.
(7) M has امر , which could be آمر or أمر .
(8) M has تُجوّزوا , but my reading seems better.

1 قيل لهم ليس كل ما جاز ان يأمر به جاز ان يوصف به . ألا ترون انه قد
أمرنا ان نصلّي ونخضع ونتحرك ولا يجوز عليه ان يصلي ويخضع ويتحرك لان
3 ذلك مستحيل عليه وكذلك لا يجوز عليه الكذب ليس لقبحه ولكن لانه
يستحيل عليه الكذب ولا يجوز ان يوصف بالقدرة على ان يكذب كما لا يجوز
5 وصفه بالقدرة على ان يتحرك ويجهل . ولو جاز لزاعم ان يزعم انـه يوصف
الباري بالقدرة على ان يكذب ولا يوصف بالقدرة على ان يجهل ولا يأتي بين
7 ذلك بفرقان لجاز لقالب ان يقلب القصة فزعم ان الباري يوصف بالقدرة على
ان يجهل ولا يوصف بالقدرة على ان يكذب . فلما لم يجز ذلك بطل ما قالوه .

9 **173** **فان قال قائل** اذا أمر الله تعالى ان نصلي فصلاتنا هي حركاتنا
التي نتحرك [بها] اذا صلينا والمتحرك متحرك لحلول الحركة فيه والشاتم
11 والكاذب انما كان شاتمًا كاذبًا لانه فعل الشتم والكذب لا لان ذلك حلّ فيه .

174 **يقال له** ان كانت العلة (ص ١٠٤) التي لها ألزمتنا ان نُجوِّز(9)
13 ان يكذب الباري – تعالى عن ذلك علوًا كبيرًا – انه أمر به فيجب في كل
شيء أمر به ان يجوز وصفه به فاذا أمر ان تحلّ في أنفسنا حركات نتحرك بها
15 وصلاة نصلي بها لزم ان يجوز ان تحلّ في نفسه حركات يتحرك بها وصلاة
يصلي بها اللهم الا ان لا يقولوا اذا جاز ان يأمر الباري غيره [ان يكذب]
17 فلِمَ لا يجوز ان يفعل كذبًا يكون به غيره كاذبًا كما اذا أمر غيره ان يصلي
جاز ان يفعل لغير[ه] صلاة كان غيره بها مصليًا. فان سألونا عن هذا السؤال على
19 هذا الوجه فهذا ما لا ينكر .

175 **على انه** ان كان [المصلي] مصليًا لحلول الصلاة فيه كما ان المتحرك
21 [كان] متحركًا لحلول الحركة فيه فواجب ان يكون كل جزء(10) من الانسان

(9) Or one might read يَجُوز .
(10) M has جزو here and a few words further on.

1 [اذا حلته الصلاة] مصلياً كما كان كل جزء منه اذا حلته الحركة متحركاً .
ويقال لهم الصلاة في اللغة هي الدعاء. فان [كان] المصلي مصلياً لحلول الصلاة
3 فيه فيجب ان يكون داعياً لحلول الدعاء فيه وهذا فاسد عندهم .

176 ثم يقال لهم اذا جاز ان يفعل الباري تعالى صلاة لغيره ويكون
5 بها مصلياً فلِمَ لا [يجوز ان] يفعل لغيره إرادةً يكون بها مريداً (ص ١٠٥)
وكلاماً يكون به متكلماً فان قالوا المتكلم المريد متكلم مريد لانه فعل
7 الكلام والارادة قيل لهم فما أنكرتم ان يكون المصلي مصلياً لانه فعل
الصلاة فيه والمتحرك متحركاً لانه فعل الحركة فيه فان قال [قائل] قد يتحرك
9 منا من لا يفعل الحركة قيل له وقد يريد ويتكلم [منا] من لا يفعل إرادة
ولا كلاماً كالعاشق الذي يحب معشوقته محبة لا يمكنه الانصراف عنها وكالذي
11 يتكلم وهو نائم او(11) في حال صَرْعه كلاماً لا يمكنه الانصراف عنه .
فان قال ليست محبة العاشق محبة في الحقيقة ولا إرادته ارادة [في الحقيقة]
13 قيل له وليس كلام المصروع والنائم كلاماً في الحقيقة ولا كلام اليقظان كلاماً
في الحقيقة ولا إرادة العاشق ارادة في الحقيقة وهذا ما لا يعجز عنه أحد .

15 177 ثم يقال لهم ان كان المصلي مصلياً لحلول الصلاة فيه أفليس الخاضع
خاضعاً عندكم لحلول الخضوع فيه لان الخضوع يكون في القلب والانسان بكماله
17 خاضع فان ادّعوا ان القلب خاضع (ص ١٠٦) خاشع الزمناهم ان يكون اللسان
متكلماً في الحقيقة والقلب مريداً في الحقيقة. وان قالوا الخاضع لم يكن خاضعاً
19 لحلول الخضوع فيه قيل لهم فاذا أمر[نا](12) الله تعالى ان نخضع فيجب على
قياسكم ان يخضع هو . فان قالوا لا ولكنه يفعل خضوعاً لغير[ه] قيل لهم
21 وكذلك ان أمرنا بالكذب فجائز ان يفعل كذباً لغيره . فان قالوا الكاذب

(11) M has و .
(12) I add the ن and read نخضع since this seems to conform with the rest of the passage.

1 كاذب لانه فعل الكذب قيل لهم مثل ذلك في الخاضع . فان قالوا لم يكن الخاضع خاضعاً لحلول الخضوع فيه ولا لانه فعله قيل لهم ذلك في الكاذب .
3 ثم يقال لهم اذا أمرنا الله ان نتحرك أفليس جائزاً[13] ان يجعلنا متحركين فان قالوا نعم قيل لهم فكذلك لو أمرنا بالكذب لجاز ان يجعلنا كاذبين .

5 **178** ثم يقال لهم خبّرونا أليس زعمتم ان الصلاة اذا كانت [كانت] حركات وكان المتحرك متحركاً لحلول الحركة فيه والمصلي مصلياً[14] لحلول
7 الصلاة فيه فان قالوا نعم قيل لهم فيجب اذا أطاع الانسان بفعل حركة أمره الله تعالى بها ان يكون طائعاً لان الطاعة حلّته (ص ١٠٧) كما انه متحرك
9 لحلول الحركة فيه فان قالوا نعم قيل لهم فبعض الانسان طائع وبعضه عاصٍ اذا حلّته المعصية ولا بدّ من نعم [ثم] يقال لهم فما[15] أنكرتم ان يكون
11 بعض الانسان متكلماً وهو اللسان وبعضه عالم مريد وهو القلب فان قالوا الحركة اذا كانت [كانت] طاعة فالمتحرك [كان] متحركاً لحلول الحركة
13 فيه وليس الطائع طائعاً لحلول الطاعة فيه بل هو طائع [لانه] يفعل الطاعة قيل لهم ما أنكرتم وان كانت الحركات صلاةً وكان المتحرك متحركاً لحلول
15 الحركة فيه فالمصلي مصلٍّ[16] لانه فعل الصلاة لا لانها[17] حلّته .

179 فان أجابوا الى ذلك قيل لهم فاذا امرنا ان نصلي ولم يجز ان يصلي
17 هو فيلزم[18] لو أمرنا [الله] ان نكذب ان لا يجوز ان يكذب هو بل يجوز ان يفعل لنا كذباً كما جاز ان يفعل لنا صلاة ولم يجز ان يصلي هو فقل في
19 الكذب هذا القول . ثم يقال لهم اذا أمرنا ان نتحرك جعل لنا حركات نتحرك بها فكذلك لو امرنا بالكذب لِمَ يستحيل ان يفعل لنا كذباً نكذب به .

(13) M has جايز .
(14) M has مصل .
(15) M has فا .
(16) M has مصلى .
(17) M has لانه .
(18) M has فليزم .

[الباب الثامن]

باب الكلام في الايمان

3 **180** (ص ١٠٨) ان قال قائل ما الايمان عندكم بالله تعالى قيل له هو
التصديق بالله وعلى ذلك إجماع[1] أهل اللغة التي نزل بها القرآن . قال الله
5 تعالى[2] « وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ رَسُولٍ إِلَّا بِلِسَانِ قَوْمِهِ » وقال تعالى[3] « بِلِسَانٍ
عَرَبِيٍّ مُبِينٍ » . فلما كان الايمان في اللغة التي أنزل الله تعالى بها القرآن هو
7 التصديق وقال الله تعالى[4] « وَمَا أَنْتَ بِمُؤْمِنٍ لَنَا وَلَوْ كُنَّا صَادِقِينَ » أي
بمصدّق لنا وقالوا جميعاً « فلان يؤمن بعذاب القبر والشفاعة » يريدون يصدّق
9 بذلك فوجب ان يكون الايمان هو ما كان عند اهل اللغة ايماناً وهو التصديق .

181 فان قال قائل فحدِّثونا عن الفاسق من أهل القبلة أمؤمن هو قيل له
11 نعم مؤمن بإيمانه فاسق بفسقه وكبيرته . وقد أجمع أهل اللغة ان من كان منه
ضرب فهو ضارب ومن كان منه[5] قتل فهو قاتل ومن كان منه كفر فهو
13 كافر ومن كان منه فسق فهو فاسق ومن كان منه تصديق فهو مصدِّق .
وكذلك من كان فيه إيمان فهو مؤمن .

15 **182** ولو كان الفاسق لا مؤمناً ولا كافرًا لم يكن منه كفر ولا إيمان
ولكان[6] لا موحِّدًا (ص ١٠٩) ولا ملحدًا ولا وليًا ولا عدوًا فلما استحال
17 ذلك استحال ان يكون الفاسق لا مؤمناً ولا كافرًا كما قالت المعتزلة .

---

(1) M has اجتماع , but إجماع seems to be better.
(2) 14.4.
(3) 26.195.
(4) 12.17.
(5) M has من كان منه قيل فهو قايل , but the reading which I have given seems to be better.
(6) M has ولكن .

1 **183 وأيضاً** فاذا كان الفاسق مؤمناً قبل فسقه بتوحيده فحدوث الزناء بعد التوحيد لا يبطل اسم الايمان الذي لم يفارقه .

3 **184 وأيضاً** فقد كان الناس قبل حدوث وَاصِل بن عَطاء رئيس المعتزلة على مقالتين . منهم خوارج يكفّرون مرتكبي الكبائر ومنهم أهل استقامة 5 يقولون هو مؤمن بايمانه فاسق بكبيرته . ولم يقل منهم قائل انه ليس بمؤمن ولا كافر قبل حدوث واصل بن عطاء. حين[7] اعتزل واصل الامة وخرج عن 7 قولها فَسُمِّيَ معتزليًا بمخالفته الاجماع . فبعدم الاجماع [على] قوله — واتّفق المسلمون عليه من ان العاصي من أهل الصلاة لا يخلو من ان يكون مؤمناً او 9 كافرًا — يُقضى على بطلان قوله .

185 وأيضاً فلو جاز لقائل ان يقول ان من معه إيمان وأتى كبيرة فليس 11 مؤمنا ولا كافرًا[8] لجاز لقائل ان يقول (ص ١١٠) بل هو مؤمن بايمانه ولا يقال فاسق بفسقه . فان كان هذا القول مستحيلًا لانه لا يجوز فسق لا لفاسق 13 كان قولهم مستحيلًا لانه لا يجوز إيمان لا لمؤمن .

(7) This might be حق in M, though it looks more like حين .
(8) M has فاسقا .

[الباب التاسع]

باب الكلام في الخاص والعام والوعد والوعيد

3 **186** **ان قال قائل** خبّرونا عن قول الله تعالى[1] « وَإِنَّ ٱلْفُجَّارَ لَفِي جَحِيمٍ » وعن قوله[2] « وَمَنْ يَفْعَلْ ذَٰلِكَ عُدْوَانًا وَظُلْمًا فَسَوْفَ نُصْلِيهِ نَارًا »
5 وقوله تعالى[3] « [إِنَّ] ٱلَّذِينَ يَأْكُلُونَ أَمْوَالَ ٱلْيَتَامَىٰ ظُلْمًا إِنَّمَا يَأْكُلُونَ فِي بُطُونِهِمْ نَارًا وَسَيَصْلَوْنَ سَعِيرًا » فالجواب عن ذلك ان قوله « ومن يفعل
7 ذلك عدواناً » يحتمل ان يقع على جميع من يفعل ذلك ويحتمل ان يقع على بعض لان لفظ « من » يقع في اللغة مرة على الكل ومرة على البعض فلما كانت
9 صورة اللفظة ترد مرة ويراد بها البعض وترد أخرى ويراد بها الكل لم يجز ان يقطع على الكل بصورتها كما لا يقطع على البعض بصورتها .

11 **187** **ولذلك** لا يقضى بقوله « وان الفجار لفي جحيم » و« الذين يأكلون » على بعض ولا على كل اذ كان يقع ذلك تارةً على الكل وتارةً على
13 البعض . ولو جاز لزاعم (ص ١١١) ان يزعم ان الصورة انما هي للكل حتى تأتي دلالة البعض لم يكن هذا لزاعم بزعمه هذا أولى بمن قال صورة هذا القول
15 يوجب القضاء على البعض الى ان تقوم دلالة الكل . فلما تكافأ القائلان في قولها وجب ان يكون القولان جميعاً مُلغَيَيْن .

17 **188** **وقد قال زهير** :[4]

وَمَنْ لَمْ يُصَانِعْ فِي أُمُورٍ كَثِيرَةٍ ... يُضَرَّسْ بِأَنْيَابٍ وَيُوطَأْ بِمَنْسِمِ

(1) 82.14.
(2) 4.30/34.
(3) 4.10/11.
(4) The two citations are from his Muʿallaqa. Cf., e.g., J. Hausheer, *Die Muʿallaka des Zuhair*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 55-6.

1 وليس كل من لا يصانع كذلك وقال

وَمَنْ لَا يَظْلِمِ ٱلنَّاسَ يُظْلَمِ

3 وليس كل من لا يظلم الناس يُظلم . ويقول القائل « جاءني من أحببت » وانما يعني واحدًا . ويقول « جاءني التجار » وان لم يكن الكل جاءه .
5 و « جاءني جيراني » وان لم يأتِهِ جميعهم . ويقول القائل « لعنني الفجار بأكهت » ولا يعني جميعهم . فلما كانت هذه الالفاظ تَرِد مرة يراد بها الكل وترد
7 أخرى[5] يراد بها البعض لم يجز ان يقضى على الكل دون البعض ولا على البعض[6] دون الكل الا بدلالة .

9 **189** وأيضاً فلو وجب القضاء بصورة هذه الآيات ان يقضى على عذاب كل فاجر وآكل أموال (ص ١١٢) اليتامى ظلماً وآكل اموال الناس بالباطل
11 لوجب ان يقضى على ان كل الموحّدين من أهل الصلاة في الجنة بظاهر قوله تعالى[7] « مَنْ جَاءَ بِالْحَسَنَةِ فَلَهُ خَيْرٌ مِنْهَا وَهُمْ مِنْ فَزَعٍ يَوْمَئِذٍ آمِنُونَ »
13 وبظاهر قوله[8] « وَلَا تَحْسَبَنَّ ٱلَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ ٱللهِ أَمْوَاتاً بَلْ أَحْيَاءٌ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ يُرْزَقُونَ » على ان كل مقتول في سبيل الله في الجنان يرزق فيها .
15 وبظاهر قوله تعالى[9] « إِنَّ ٱللهَ يَغْفِرُ ٱلذُّنُوبَ جَمِيعاً » على كل ذنب انه مغفور الا ذنباً[10] وقف عليه النبي صلى الله عليه وأجمع المسلمون انه لا يُغفر
17 وهو الشرك والكفر . وليس قول من قال ان الآيات (عامة)[11] في

(5) M has ويراد .
(6) M has بعض .
(7) 27.89/91.
(8) 3.169/163.
(9) 39.53/54.
(10) So M, though we should expect something like حق الذنب الذي وقف الخ .
(11) This word seems to be superfluous.

1 الوعيد عامّة والآيات الأُخر خاصّة اولى من [قول] قالب قلب القصّة وجعل آيات الوعيد خاصّة والآيات الأُخر عامّة .

3 **190 وأيضاً** فلو وجب ان يقضى بظواهر الآيات على ان كل فاجر وآكل اموال اليتامى ظلماً في جهنم لجاز ان يقضى بقول الله تعالى[12] « كُلَّمَا 5 أُلْقِيَ فِيهَا فَوْجٌ سَأَلَهُمْ خَزَنَتُهَا أَلَمْ يَأْتِكُمْ نَذِيرٌ قَالُوا بَلَى قَدْ جَاءَنَا نَذِيرٌ فَكَذَّبْنَا وَقُلْنَا مَا نَزَّلَ ٱللَّهُ مِنْ شَيْءٍ » مكذباً ان النار لا يدخلها الا كافر 7 وبظاهر قوله تعالى[13] « فَأَنْذَرْتُكُمْ نَاراً تَلَظَّى لَا يَصْلَاهَا إِلَّا ٱلْأَشْقَى ٱلَّذِي (ص ١١٣) كَذَّبَ وَتَوَلَّى » ان كل من يصلى النار كذلك . وبظاهر 9 قول الله تعالى[14] « وَمَنْ لَمْ يَحْكُمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ ٱللَّهُ فَأُولٰئِكَ هُمُ ٱلْفَاسِقُونَ »[15] انه لا يترك الحكم بما أنزل الله الا فاسق[16] . فلما لم يلزم ان لا يدخل النار 11 الا كافر[17] بهذه الآيات لم يلزم ان يكون كل فاجر في جهنم وكل آكل أموال اليتامى ظلما وكل من يأكل اموال الناس بالباطل في النار للآيات 13 التي تلوناها . والجواب عن كل آية يعتلون بها في الوعيد كالجواب عن هذه الآيات .

15 **191 وقوله**[18] « وَمَنْ يَفْعَلْ ذٰلِكَ عُدْوَاناً وَظُلْماً » يحتمل من يفعل ذلك مستحِلًا[19] ويحتمل الجميع . وقوله[20] « ان الفجار لفي جحيم » يحتمل 17 البعض منهم وهم الكفّار ويحتمل الجميع . وكذلك الجواب عن كل آية في الوعيد .

(12) 67.8-9.
(13) 92.14-16.
(14) 5.47/51.
(15) M has الكافرون .
(16) M has كافر .
(17) M has كافرا .
(18) 4.30/34.
(19) M has مستحيلا .
(20) 82.14.

1 **192** وبلزم المعتزلة ان يكون جميع أهل الشمال كافرين بظاهر قول الله تعالى[21] « وَأَصْحَابُ ٱلشِّمَالِ مَا أَصْحَابُ ٱلشِّمَالِ فِي سَمُومٍ وَحَمِيمٍ وَظِلٍّ
3 مِنْ يَحْمُومٍ لَا بَارِدٍ وَلَا كَرِيمٍ إِنَّهُمْ كَانُوا قَبْلَ ذَٰلِكَ مُتْرَفِينَ وَكَانُوا يُصِرُّونَ عَلَى ٱلْحِنْثِ ٱلْعَظِيمِ وَكَانُوا يَقُولُونَ أَئِذَا[22] (ص ١١٤) مِتْنَا
5 وَكُنَّا تُرَابًا وَعِظَامًا[23] أَإِنَّا لَمَبْعُوثُونَ » وبقوله[24] « وَأَمَّا مَنْ أُوتِيَ كِتَابَهُ بِشِمَالِهِ فَيَقُولُ يَا لَيْتَنِي لَمْ أُوتَ كِتَابِيَهْ » الى قوله تعالى « إِنَّهُ كَانَ لَا يُؤْمِنُ
7 بِٱللَّهِ ٱلْعَظِيمِ وَلَا يَحُضُّ عَلَى طَعَامِ ٱلْمِسْكِينِ » .

(21) 56.41-47/40-47.
(22) M has اذا .
(23) M has وعظا انا لبعوثون .
(24) 69.25-34 (verses 26-32 not cited).

[الباب العاشر]

باب الكلام في الامامة

3 193 ان قال قائل ما الدليل على إمامة أبي بكر رضي الله عنه قيل له
الدلالة على ذلك انّا وجدنا الناس على ثلاثة أصناف قائلين يقولون بامامة عَلِيّ
5 بعد الرسول صلى الله عليه وقائلين يقولون بامامة العَبَّاس رضي الله عنه [وقائلين
يقولون بامامة أبي بكر رضي الله عنه .] ورأينا عليًّا والعباس قد بايعاه وانقادا
7 لأمره في كافّة المسلمين . وان كان قد تَوَقَّفَ[1] عن البيعة متوقفون[2] وقتاً ما
فقد أطبقوا[3] على البيعة له والانقياد لامامته والكون تحت رايته واتباع أمره
9 وقالوا له « يا خليفة رسول الله » صلع . ولا يجوز ان يجمع الأُمّة على خطأ.

194 ولا يجوز لمدّعٍ ان يدّعي ان باطن عليّ والعباس بخلاف ما أظهراه
11 ولو جاز ذلك لم يجز لنا ان نقضي على صحة إجماع من الامة على شي.[4] [لانا]
لا نامن ان يكون باطن بعض الامة خلاف ظاهرهم فلما كان (ص ١١٥) بما
13 يظهر من الامة من الاتفاق قد يُعلم به الإجماع ولا يُلتفَت الى دعوى من
ادّعى الباطن وكان مدّعي ذلك كقائل يقول من الخوارج من يقول ان باطن
15 عليّ بخلاف ظاهره . فلما كان في هذا إبطال الاجماع وجب القضا. على إمامة
ابي بكر بعقد من عقدها له من المسلمين وبيعة من بايعه من المهاجرين والانصار
17 وإجماع المسلمين عليه في وقته لا سيا وعليّ والعباس عاقدان له البيعة على أنفسهما
ومُقِرّان له بالامامة وخلافة الرسول صلى الله عليه . فاذا كانت الامامة لا تخرج

(1) M has يوفق .
(2) M has متوفقون .
(3) M has اطبقوا .
(4) M has شي لا نامن .

1 عن هؤلاء الثلاثة باجماع وقد بايعاه في كافّة المسلمين وجب ان يكون اماماً
مفترض الطاعة .

3 **195 وقد نطق** القرآن بامامة الصدّيق ودلّ على امامة الفاروق وذلك
ان الله تعالى قال في سورة براءة للقاعدين عن نصرة نبيه صلى الله عليه والمتخلّفين
5 عن الجهاد معه[5] « [فـ]قل لَنْ تَخرُجوا مَعِي أبَدًا وَلَنْ تُقَاتِلوا مَعِي عَدُوًّا
إنَّكُمْ رَضِيتُمْ بِٱلْقُعُودِ أوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ فَٱقْعُدُوا مَعَ ٱلْخَالِفِينَ » وقال في سورة
7 أخرى[6] « سَيَقُولُ ٱلْمُخَلَّفُونَ إذَا ٱنْطَلَقْتُمْ إلَى مَغَانِمَ لِتَأْخُذُوهَا ذَرُونَا نَتَّبِعْكُمْ
يُرِيدُونَ أنْ يُبَدِّلُوا كَلَامَ ٱللهِ » — يعني قوله « لن تخرجوا معي أبدًا ولن
9 تقاتلوا معي عدوًّا » — ثم قال « كَذَٰلِكُمْ قَالَ ٱللهُ مِنْ قَبْلُ فَسَيَقُولُونَ بَلْ
تَحْسُدُونَنَا بَلْ كَانُوا لَا يَفْقَهُونَ إلَّا قَلِيلًا » . ثم قال (١١٦)[7] « قُلْ
11 لِلْمُخَلَّفِينَ مِنَ ٱلْأعْرَابِ سَتُدْعَوْنَ إلَى قَوْمٍ أُولِي بَأْسٍ شَدِيدٍ تُقَاتِلُونَهُمْ أوْ
يُسْلِمُونَ فَإنْ تُطِيعُوا يُؤْتِكُمُ ٱللهُ أجْرًا حَسَنًا » — يقولون [اذا] أطعتم
13 الداعي لكم الى قتالهم آتاكم الله تعالى أجرًا حسنًا — « وَإنْ تَتَوَلَّوْا » — يعني
[إن] تعرضوا عن إجابة الداعي لكم الى قتالهم — « كَمَا تَوَلَّيْتُمْ مِنْ قَبْلُ » —
15 كما أعرضتم من قبل — « يُعَذِّبْكُمْ عَذَابًا أليمًا » .

196 وقد علمنا ان الداعي لهم غير النبي صلى الله عليه لانه قال لنبيّه[8]
17 « قل لن تخرجوا معي أبدًا » وقال في سورة الفتح[9] « يريدون ان يبدلوا
كلام الله » . فمنعهم الله تعالى عن الخروج مع نبيّه صلى الله عليه وجعل
19 خروجهم معه تبديلًا لكلامه . فوجب ان الداعي الذي أُمروا باتباعه داعٍ
يدعوهم بعد الرسول .

(5) 9.83/84.
(6) 48.15.
(7) 48.16.
(8) 9.83/84.
(9) 48.15.

1 **197 وقد قال** الناس قولين. قال بعضهم هم فَارِس والروم وقال آخرون هم أهل اليامة . وأبو بكر قاتل الروم وأهل اليامة وقوتلت فارس في أيّامه
3 وظهر بهم من بعده . فان كانوا أهل اليامة او الروم فقد قاتلهم أبو بكر رضي الله عنه وفي ذلك إيجاب إمامته . وان كانوا فارس فقد قوتلوا في أيامه
5 وفرغ عُمَرُ منهم من بعده فقد وجبت إمامة عمر . واذا وجبت امامة عمر وجبت امامة أبي بكر رضي الله عنهما لان أبا بكر عقدها له. وان كان المعنى
7 من قاتل فارس وفرغ منهم فاذا وجبت امامة عمر وجبت امامة أبي بكر (ص ١١٧) لانه هو العاقد لامامته .

9 **198 فدل** ما قلناه من القرآن على امامة الصديق والفاروق. واذا وجبت امامة أبي بكر بالدلالات التي ذكرناها بظاهر القرآن وباجماع المسلمين في وقته
11 عليها فسد قول من قال ان النبي صلى الله عليه نَصّ على امامة غيره لانه لا تجوز امامة من نَصّ الرسول على امامة غيره . وهذا يقضي على بطلان قول من
13 قال ان النبي صلى الله عليه نصب عَلياً بعده إماماً .

199 ومما يبطل قول من قال بالنصّ على أبي بكر ان أبا بكر قال
15 لِعُمَرَ « ابسط يدك أبايعك » يوم السقيفة . فلو كان رسول الله صلى الله عليه نَصّ على إمامته لم يجز ان يقول « ابسط يدك أبايعك » .

17 **200 وقد قلنا** في الأبواب التي تكلمنا عليها قولًا وجيزًا(10) . تم الكتاب والحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على محمد وآله وسلّم .

(10) M has وخبرا , which could be وخبرًا ; but وجيزا seems to be a better reading.

رسالة
في استحسان الخوض في علم الكلام

تصنيف

الشيخ الإمام

أبي الحسن علي بن اسمعيل الأشعري

نشرها عن النصّ المطبوع (الطبعة الثانية)
بمطبعة مجلس دائرة المعارف النظامية
في حيدر آباد الدكّن في الهند سنة ١٣٤٤ هـ.

وعلق عليها

الاب رتشرد يوسف مكارثي اليسوعي

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد
وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم اجمعين

1 انبانا الشيخ الامام جمال الدين ابو الحسن بن ابراهيم بن عبدالله القرشي
5 اجازة بخطه قال انبا الفقيه الامام العالم الامام فخر الدين ابو المعالي محمد بن ابي
الفرج بن محمد بن بركة الموصلي قراءة عليه وانا اسمع في مسجده بسوق السلطان
7 ببغداد يوم الثلاثاء الثامن من شوال سنة ست مائة — قيل له قرأت على الشيخ
الامام الصدوق ابي منصور المبارك بن عبدالله بن محمد البغدادي يوم عرضك
9 برباطه المعروف برباط البربهرية شرقي مدينة السلام من سنة ثلاث وسبعين
وخمس مائة فأقرّ به .

11 انا الشيخ الامام الحافظ جمال الدين ابو الفضل عبد الرحيم بن احمد بن محمد
ابن محمد [بن] ابراهيم بن خالد المعروف بابن الاخوة سنة اثنتين واربعين وخمس مائة
13 انبانا الشيخ ابو الفضل محمد بن يحيي الناتلي بمازندران في منزله بقراءتي عليه
انبأ ابو نصر عبد الكريم بن محمد بن هارون الشيرازي انبأ علي بن رستم ثنا
15 علي بن مهدي قال سمعت الشيخ الاوحد شيخ المشائخ ابا الحسن علي بن اسمعيل
الاشعري رضي الله عنه يقول —

17 الحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على محمد النبي وآله الطيبين واصحابه الائمة
المنتخبين .

19 2 اما بعد فان طائفة من النـاس جعلوا الجهل رأس مالهم وثقل عليهم
النظر والبحث عن الدين ومالوا الى التخفيف والتقليد وطعنوا على من فتش عن

1 أصول الدين ونسبوه الى الضلال وزعموا ان الكلام في الحركة والسكون والجسم والعرض والالوان والاكوان والجزء والطفرة وصفات الباري عز وجل 3 بدعة وضلالة .

3 **وقالوا** لو كان ذلك هدًى ورشادًا لتكلم فيه النبي صلى الله عليه 5 وآله وسلم وخلفاؤه واصحابه (قالوا) ولأن النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يمت حتى تكلم في كل ما يحتاج اليه من امور الدين وبيّنه بياناً شافياً ولم 7 يترك بعده لاحد مقالًا فيما للمسلمين اليه حاجة من امور دينهم وما يقربهم الى الله عز وجل ويباعدهم عن سخطه .

9 4 **فلما** لم يرووا عنه الكلام في شيء مما ذكرناه علمنا ان الكلام فيه بدعة والبحث عنه ضلالة لانه لو كان خيرًا لما فات النبي صلى الله عليه وآله 11 واصحابه وسلم ولتكلموا فيه . (قالوا) ولانه ليس يخلو ذلك من وجهين ، اما ان يكونوا علموه فسكتوا عنه ، او لم يعلموه بل جهلوه . فان كانوا علموه 13 ولم يتكلموا فيه وسعنا ايضاً نحن السكوت عنه كما وسعهم السكوت عنه ووسعنا ترك الخوض [فيه] كما وسعهم ترك الخوض فيه ، ولانه لو كان من 15 الدين ما وسعهم السكوت عنه . وان كانوا لم يعلموه وسعنا جهله كما وسع أولائك جهله ، لانه لو كان من الدين لم يجهلوه . فعلى كلا الوجهين الكلام 17 فيه بدعة والخوض فيه ضلالة . فهذه جملة ما احتجوا به في ترك النظر في الاصول .

19 5 **قال الشيخ** ابو الحسن رضي الله عنه الجواب عنه من ثلاثة اوجه — احدها قلب السؤال عليهم بان يقال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يقل 21 ايضاً « إنه من بحث عن ذلك وتكلم فيه فاجعلوه مبتدعاً ضالًا ». فقد لزمكم ان تكونوا مبتدعة ضلالا اذ قد تكلمتم في شيء لم يتكلم فيه النبي صلى الله 23 عليه وآله وسلم وضلّلتم من لم يُضلله النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم .

1 **6 الجواب الثاني** ان يقال لهم إن النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يجهل
شيئاً مما ذكرتموه من الكلام في الجسم والعرض والحركة والسكون والجزء
3 والطفرة وان لم يتكلم في كل واحد من ذلك معيناً وكذلك الفقهاء والعلماء
من الصحابة . غير ان هذه الاشياء التي ذكرتموها معينة اصولها موجودة في القرآن
5 والسنة جملة غير مفصّلة .

7 اما الحركة والسكون والكلام فيهما فاصلهما موجود في القرآن وهما
7 يدلان على التوحيد وكذلك الاجتماع والافتراق . قال الله تعالى مُخبِرًا عن
خليله ابراهيم صلوات الله عليه وسلامه في قصة أُفول الكوكب والشمس والقمر
9 وتحريكها من مكان الى مكان ما دل على ان ربه عز وجل لا يجوز عليه
شيء من ذلك وان من جاز عليه الافول والانتقال من مكان الى مكان
11 فليس بإله[1] .

8 واما الكلام في اصول التوحيد فمأخوذ ايضاً من الكتاب . قال الله
13 تعالى[2] « لَوْ كَانَ فِيهِمَا آلِهَةٌ إِلَّا ٱللهُ لَفَسَدَتَا » وهذا الكلام موجز منبّه
على الحجة بانه واحد لا شريك له وكلام المتكلمين في الحجاج في التوحيد
15 بالتمانع والتغالب فانما مرجعه الى هذه الآية وقوله عز وجل[3] « مَا ٱتَّخَذَ ٱللهُ
مِنْ وَلَدٍ وَمَا كَانَ مَعَهُ مِنْ إِلٰهٍ إِذًا لَذَهَبَ كُلُّ إِلٰهٍ بِمَا خَلَقَ وَلَعَلَا بَعْضُهُمْ
17 عَلَى بَعْضٍ » الى قوله عز وجل[4] « أَمْ جَعَلُوا لِلّٰهِ شُرَكَاءَ خَلَقُوا كَخَلْقِهِ
فَتَشَابَهَ ٱلْخَلْقُ عَلَيْهِمْ » . وكلام المتكلمين في الحجاج في توحيد الله انما مرجعه
19 الى هذه الآيات التي ذكرناها وكذلك سائر الكلام في تفصيل فروع التوحيد
والعدل انما هو ماخوذ من القرآن .

ولعلا

(1) Cf. *Luma*ʿ, N° 11.
(2) 21.22.
(3) 23.91/93.
(4) 13.16/17.

1 **9 فكذلك الكلام** في جواز البعث واستحالته الذي قد اختلف عقلاء العرب ومن قبلهم من غيرهم فيه حتى تعجبوا من جواز ذلك فقالوا[5] « أَإِذَا 3 مِتْنَا وَكُنَّا تُرَاباً ذَٰلِكَ رَجْعٌ بَعِيدٌ » وقولهم[6] « هَيْهَاتَ هَيْهَاتَ لِمَا تُوعَدُونَ » وقولهم[7] « مَنْ يُحْيِي ٱلْعِظَامَ وَهِيَ رَمِيمٌ » وقوله تعالى[8] « أَيَعِدُكُمْ أَنَّكُمْ 5 إِذَا مِتُّمْ وَكُنْتُمْ تُرَاباً وَعِظَاماً أَنَّكُمْ مُخْرَجُونَ » وفي نحو هذا الكلام منهم انما ورد بالحجاج في جواز البعث بعد الموت في القرآن تأكيدًا لجواز ذلك في 7 العقول وعلّم نبيه صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ولقّنه الحجاج عليهم في إنكارهم البعث من وجهين على طائفتين منهم ، طائفة أقرّت بالخلق الاول وأنكرت 9 الثاني ، وطائفة جحدت ذلك بِقِدَم العالم .

10 فاحتجّ على المُقِرّ منها بالخلق الاول بقوله[9] « قُلْ يُحْيِيهَا ٱلَّذِي أَنْشَأَهَا 11 أَوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ » وبقوله[10] « وَهُوَ ٱلَّذِي يَبْدَؤُ ٱلْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُهُ وَهُوَ أَهْوَنُ عَلَيْهِ » وبقوله[11] « كَمَا بَدَأَكُمْ تَعُودُونَ » . فنبّههم بهذه الآيات على ان من قدر 13 ان يفعل فعلًا على غير مثال سابق فهو أقدر ان يفعل فعلًا محدثًا فهو أهون عليه فيما بينكم وتعارفكم واما الباري جل ثناؤه وتقدّست أسماؤه فليس خلق 15 شيء بأهون عليه من الآخر . وقد قيل ان الهاء في « عليه » انما هي كناية للخلق بقدرته ان البعث والإعادة أهون على أحدكم وأخفّ عليه من ابتداء خلقه 17 لان ابتداء خلقه انما يكون بالولادة والتربية وقطع السرة والقماط وخروج الاسنان وغير ذلك من الآيات الموجعة المؤلمة وإعادته انما تكون دفعة واحدة

(5) 50.3.
(6) 23.36/38.
(7) 36.78.
(8) 23.35/37.
(9) 36.79.
(10) 30.27/26.
(11) 7.29/28.

1 ليس فيها من ذلك شيء فهي أهون عليه من ابتدائه . فهذا ما احتجّ به على الطائفة المُقِرّة بالخلق .

3 **11** **واما الطائفة** التي أنكرت الخلق الاول والثاني وقالت بِقِدَم العالم فانما دخلت عليهم شبهة بان قالوا وجدنا الحياة رطبة حارّة والموت باردًا يابساً
5 وهو من طبع التراب فكيف يجوز ان يجمع بين الحياة والتراب والعظام النخرة فيصير خلقاً سوياً والضدان لا يجتمعان فأنكروا البعث من هذه الجهة .

7 **12** **ولعمري** ان الضدين لا يجتمعان في محلّ واحد ولا في جهة واحدة ولا في الموجود في المحلّ ولكنه يصحّ وجودهما في محلّين على سبيل المجاورة .
9 فاحتج الله تعالى عليهم بان قال[12] « ٱلَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمْ مِنَ ٱلشَّجَرِ ٱلْأَخْضَرِ نَارًا فَإِذَا أَنْتُمْ مِنْهُ تُوقِدُونَ » فردّهم الله عز وجل في ذلك الى ما يعرفونه
11 ويشاهدونه من خروج النار على حرّها ويبسها من الشجر الاخضر على بردها ورطوبتها فجعل جواز النشأة الاولى دليلًا على جواز النشأة الآخرة لانها دليل
13 على جواز مجاورة الحياة التراب والعظام النخرة فجعلها خلقاً سوياً وقال[13] « كَمَا بَدَأْنَا أَوَّلَ خَلْقٍ نُعِيدُهُ » .

15 **13** **واما ما** يتكلم به المتكلمون من ان الحوادث أولا[14] وردّهم على الدهرية [القائلين] انه لا حركة الا وقبلها حركة ولا يوم الا وقبله يوم والكلام
17 على من قال ما من جزء الا وله نصف لا الى غاية فقد وجدنا اصل ذلك في سنة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم حين قال « لا عدوى ولا طيرة »
19 فقال اعرابي « فما بال الابل كانها الظباء تدخل في الابل الجربى فتجرب » فقال

(12) 36.80.
(13) 21.104.
(14) The editor of the printed edition notes that there is a gap in the original here, and suggests الحوادث لها اول as a possible reading. It would be even simpler to keep the text as it is, but to read للحوادث instead of الحوادث .

1 النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم « فمن أعدى الاول » فسكت الاعرابي لما
أفهمه بالحجّة المعقولة . وكذلك نقول لمن زعم انه لا حركة الا وقبلها حركة
3 لو كان الامر هكذا لم تحدث منها واحدة لان ما لا نهاية له لا حدث له.

14 **وكذلك** لما قال الرجل « يا نبي الله ان امرأتي ولدت غلاماً أسود »
5 وعرض بنفيه فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم « هل لك من ابل » فقال
« نعم » . قال « فما ألوانها » قال « حمر » . فقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه
7 وآله وسلم « هل فيها من أورق » قال « نعم ان فيها اورق » . قال « فأنّى
ذلك » قال « لعلّ عرقاً نزعه » . فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم « ولعلّ
9 ولدك نزعه عرق » . فهذا ما علّم الله نبيه من ردّ الشيء الى شكله ونظيره
وهو اصل لنا في سائر ما نحكم به من الشبيه والنظير .

11 15 **وبذلك** نحتج على من قال إن الله تعالى وتقدس يشبه المخلوقات وهو
جسم بان نقول له لو كان يشبه شيئاً من الاشياء لكان لا يخلو من ان يكون
13 يشبهه من كل جهاته او يشبهه من بعض جهاته . فان كان يشبهه من كل
جهاته وجب ان يكون محدثاً من كل جهاته . وان كان يشبهه من بعض
15 جهاته وجب ان يكون محدثاً مثله من حيث أشبهه لان كل مشتبهَين حكمهما
واحد فيما اشتبها له . ويستحيل ان يكون المحدَث قديماً والقديم محدثاً . وقد
17 قال تعالى وتقدس(15) « لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ » وقال تعالى وتقدس (16) « وَلَمْ
يَكُنْ لَهُ كُفُوًا أَحَدٌ » .

19 16 **واما الاصل** بان للجسم نهاية وان الجزء لا ينقسم فقوله عز وجل
اسمه(17) « وَكُلَّ شَيْءٍ أَحْصَيْنَاهُ فِي إِمَامٍ مُبِينٍ » ومحال إحصاء ما لا نهاية له

(15) 42.11/9.
(16) 112.4.
(17) 36.12/11. (Cf. 72.28).

1 ومحال ان يكون الشيء الواحد ينقسم[18] لان هذا يوجب ان يكونا شيئين وقد أخبر ان العدد وقع عليهما .

3 **17 واما الاصل** في ان المحدِث يجب ان يتأتى له الفعل نحو قصده واختياره وتنتفي عنه كراهيته فقوله تعالى[19] « أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تُمْنُونَ أَأَنْتُمْ 5 تَخْلُقُونَهُ أَمْ نَحْنُ الْخَالِقُونَ » فلم يستطيعوا ان يقولوا بحجة انهم يخلقون مع تمنيهم الولد فلا يكون مع كراهيته له فنبّههم ان الخالق هو من يتأتى منه 7 المخلوقات على قصده .

18 واما اصلنا في المناقضة على الخصم في النظر فمأخوذ من سنة سيدنا 9 محمد صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم . وذلك تعليم الله عز وجل اياه حين لقي الحبر السمين فقال له « نشدتك بالله هل تجد فيما أنزل الله تعالى من التوراة ان 11 الله تعالى يبغض الحبر السمين » فغضب الحبر حين عيره بذلك فقال[20] « مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَى بَشَرٍ مِنْ شَيْءٍ » فقال الله تعالى[20] « قُلْ مَنْ أَنْزَلَ الْكِتَابَ 13 الَّذِي جَاءَ بِهِ مُوسَى نُورًا الآية » فناقضه عن قرب لان التوراة شيء وموسى بشر وقد كان الحبر مُقرًا بان الله تعالى أنزل التوراة على موسى . وكذلك 15 ناقض الذين زعموا ان الله تعالى عهد اليهم ان لا يؤمنوا لرسول حتى يأتيهم بقربان تأكله النار . فقال تعالى[21] « قُلْ قَدْ جَاءَكُمْ رُسُلٌ مِنْ قَبْلِي بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ 17 وَبِالَّذِي قُلْتُمْ فَلِمَ قَتَلْتُمُوهُمْ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ » فناقضهم بذلك وحاجّهم .

19 واما اصلنا في استدراكنا مغالطة الخصوم فمأخوذ من قوله تعالى[22]

---

(18) A gap here in the original, according to the editor. One might read : الى غير نهاية .
(19) 56.58-59.
(20) (bis) 6.91.
(21) 3.183/180.
(22) 21.98-100.

1 « إِنَّكُمْ وَمَا تَعْبُدُونَ مِنْ دُونِ ٱللهِ حَصَبُ جَهَنَّمَ أَنتُمْ لَهَا وَارِدُونَ — الى قوله — لَا يَسْمَعُونَ » فانها لما نزلت هذه الآية بلغ ذلك عبدالله بن الزِّبَعْرَى
3 وكان جدلًا خصماً فقال « خصمت محمدًا وربِّ الكعبة » . فجاء اليه رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم فقال « يا محمد ألستَ تزعم ان عيسى وعزيراً
5 والملائكة عبدوا » فسكت النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لا سكوت عيّ ولا منقطع تعجباً من جهله لانه ليس في الآية ما يوجب دخول عيسى وعزير
7 والملائكة فيها لانه قال « وما تعبدون » ولم يقل « وكل ما تعبدون من دون الله » . وانما أراد ابن الزبعرى مغالطة النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ليوهم
9 قومه انه قد حاجّه . فأنزل الله عز وجل[23] « إِنَّ ٱلَّذِينَ سَبَقَتْ لَهُمْ مِنَّا ٱلْحُسْنَى » يعني من المعبودين « أُولَٰئِكَ عَنْهَا مُبْعَدُونَ » فقرأ النبي صلى الله عليه
11 وآله وسلم ذلك فضجّوا عند ذلك لئلا يتبيّن انقطاعهم وغلطهم فقالوا « أَآلِهَتُنَا خَيْرٌ أَمْ هُوَ » يعنون عيسى فأنزل الله تعالى[24] « وَلَمَّا ضُرِبَ ٱبْنُ مَرْيَمَ مَثَلًا
13 إِذَا قَوْمُكَ مِنْهُ يَصِدُّونَ — الى قوله — خَصِمُونَ » .

20 وكل ما ذكرناه من الآي او لم نذكره اصل وحجة لنا في الكلام
15 فيما نذكره من تفصيل وان لم تكن مسئلة معينة في الكتاب والسنة لان ما حدث تعينها من المسائل العقليات في ايام النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم
17 والصحابة قد تكلموا فيه على نحو ما ذكرناه .

21 **والجواب الثالث** ان هذه المسائل التي سألوا عنها قد علمها رسول الله
19 صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ولم يجهل منها شيئاً مفصلًا غير انها لم تحدث في ايامه معينة فيتكلم فيها او لا يتكلم فيها وان كانت أصولها موجودة في القرآن
21 والسنة . وما حدث من شيء فيما له تعلق بالدين من جهة الشريعة فقد تكلموا

(23) 21.101.
(24) 43.57-58.

1 فيه وبحثوا عنه وناظروا فيه وجادلوا وحاجّوا كمسائل العَول والجدّات من مسائل الفرائض وغير ذلك من الاحكام وكالحرام والبائن والبتة و « حبلك على
3 غاربك » وكالمسائل في الحدود والطلاق مما يكثر ذكرها مما قد حدثت في ايامهم ولم يجئ في كل واحدة منها نصّ عن النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم
5 لانه لو نصّ على جميع ذلك ما اختلفوا فيها وما بقي الخلاف الى الآن .

22 وهذه المسائل وان لم يكن في كل واحدة منها نص عن رسول
7 الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم فانهم ردّوها وقاسوها على ما فيه نص من كتاب الله تعالى والسنة واجتهادهم فهذه أحكام حوادث الفروع ردّوها الى
9 احكام الشريعة التي هي فروع لا تستدرك احكامها الا من جهة السمع والرسل . فاما حوادث تحدث في الاصول في تعيين مسائل فينبغي لكل عاقل
11 مسلم ان يردّ حكمها الى جملة الاصول المتفق عليها بالعقل والحسّ والبديهة وغير ذلك لان حكم مسائل الشرع التي طريقها السمع ان تكون مردودة
13 الى اصول الشرع التي طريقها السمع . وحكم مسائل العقليات والمحسوسات ان يُردّ كل شيء من ذلك الى بابه ولا تخلط[25] العقليات بالسمعيات ولا
15 السمعيات بالعقليات . فلو حدث في ايام النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم الكلام في خلق القرآن وفي الجزء والطفرة بهذه الالفاظ لتكلم فيه وبيّنه كما بيّن سائر
17 ما حدث في ايامه من تعيين المسائل وتكلم فيها .

23 ثم يقال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يصحّ عنه حديث في أن
19 القرآن غير مخلوق او هو مخلوق . فَلِمَ قلتم انه غير مخلوق فان قالوا قد قاله بعض الصحابة وبعض التابعين قيل لهم يلزم الصحابيّ والتابعيّ مثل ما يلزمكم
21 من ان يكون مبتدعاً ضالّاً اذ قال ما لم يقله الرسول صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم. فان قال قائل فأنا أتوقّف في ذلك فلا أقول مخلوق ولا غير مخلوق قيل له

(25) The printed edition has يخلط.

1 فانت في توقُّفك في ذلك مبتدع ضالّ لان النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يقل « ان حدثت هذه الحادثة بعدي توقفوا فيها ولا تقولوا فيها شيئاً » ولا
3 قال « ضلِّلوا وكفِّروا من قال بخلقه او من قال بنفي خلقه » .

24 وضربوا لو قال قائل إن عِلمَ الله مخلوق أكنتم تتوقفون فيه ام لا
5 فان قالوا لا قيل لهم لم يقل النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ولا اصحابه في ذلك شيئاً . وكذلك لو قال قائل هذا ربكم شبعان او ريان او مكتسٍ او
7 عريان او مقرور او صفراوي او مرطوب او جسم او عرض او يشمّ الريح او لا يشمها او هل له انف وقلب وكبد وطحال وهل يحجّ في كل سنة وهل
9 يركب الخيل او لا يركبها وهل يغتمّ ام لا ونحو ذلك من المسائل لكان ينبغي ان تسكت عنه لان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يتكلم في
11 شيء من ذلك ولا اصحابه . او كنت لا تسكت فكنت تبين بكلامك ان شيئاً من ذلك لا يجوز على الله عز وجل وتقدس كذا وكذا بحجة كذا وكذا.

13 25 فان قال قائل أسكت عنه ولا اجيبه بشيء او اهجره او اقوم عنه او لا اسلم عليه او لا اعوده اذا مرض او لا اشهد جنازته اذا مات قيل له
15 فيلزمك ان تكون في جميع هذه الصيغ التي ذكرتها مبتدعاً ضالًا لان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يقل « من سأل عن شيء من ذلك فاسكتوا
17 عنه » ولا قال « لا تسلموا عليه » ولا « قوموا عنه » ولا قال شيئاً من ذلك. فانتم مبتدعة اذا فعلتم ذلك .

19 26 [ويقال لهم] ولِمَ لَمْ تسكتوا عمن قال بخلق القرآن ولِمَ كفرتموه ولم يَرِدْ عن النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم حديث صحيح في نفي خلقه وتكفير
21 من قال بخلقه . فان قالوا لان أحمد بن حنبل رضي الله عنه قال بنفي خلقه وتكفير من قال بخلقه قيل لهم ولِمَ لَمْ يسكت أحمد عن ذلك بل تكلم فيه
23 فان قالوا لان عباس العنبري ووكيعاً وعبد الرحمن بن مهدي وفلاناً وفلاناً

1 قالوا انه غير مخلوق ومن قال بانه مخلوق فهو كافر قيل لهم ولِمَ لَمْ يسكت اولئك عما سكت عنه [النبي] صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم فان قالوا لان عمرو بن دينار 3 وسفيان بن عُيَيْنة وجعفر بن محمد رضي الله عنهم وفلاناً وفلاناً قالوا ليس بخالق ولا مخلوق قيل لهم ولِمَ لَمْ يسكت اولئك عن هذه المقالة ولم يقلها رسول الله 5 صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم .

27 فان احالوا ذلك على الصحابة او جماعة منهم كان ذلك مكابرة 7 فانه يقال لهم فلِمَ لَمْ يسكتوا عن ذلك ولم يتكلم فيه النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ولا قال « كفروا قائله » وان قالوا لا بد للعلماء من الكلام في 9 الحادثة ليعلم الجاهل حكمها قيل لهم هذا الذي أردناه منكم . فلِمَ منعتم الكلام فأنتم ان شئتم تكلمتم حتى اذا انقطعتم قلتم نهينا عن الكلام وان شئتم 11 قلّدتم من كان قبلكم بلا حجة ولا بيان وهذه شهوة وتحكم .

28 ثم يقال لهم فالنبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يتكلم في النذور 13 والوصايا ولا في العتق ولا في حساب المناسخات ولا صنّف فيها كتاباً كما صنعه مالك والثوري والشافعي وابو حنيفة فيلزمكم ان يكونوا مبتدعة ضلالاً اذ 15 فعلوا ما لم يفعله النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وقالوا ما لم يقله نصاً بعينه وصنفوا ما لم يصنفه النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وقالوا بتكفير القائلين 17 بخلق القرآن ولم يقله النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم . وفيما ذكرنا كفاية لكل عاقل غير معاند .

19 تمّ والحمد لله وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم .

فهرس الاسماء

فهرس الكلمات والاصطلاحات

Note : This Index will give the reader a general idea of al-Ash'arī's vocabulary. It contains both technical terms, and words which, for one reason or another, may be considered interesting. In the alphabetical order which I have followed, *hamza* (regardless of its "bearer") and *alif* (even when the sign of a long vowel) are regarded as the first letter of the alphabet; *tā marbūṭa* occupies the same position as *tā ṭawīla*; the doubling of letters is ignored so far as alphabetical position is concerned; verbs precede *maṣdars* of the same orthography. The references are to page and line of the texts. The reader will note that page numbers from 87 upwards indicate that the word occurs in the *Risāla*. For a few words (like *kasb, juz'*, *ḥulūl*, etc.) the references are complete. When a word occurs frequently a plus sign is added, usually after a single reference. When more than one reference is given this usually indicates either a change of meaning, or that the word occurs in the *Risāla* as well as in the *Luma'*.

It has not been possible to indicate meanings or add any further notes on the more interesting words in this list. But I should like to remind the reader of such lists as those to be found in : Horten, M., *Die spekulative und positive Theologie des Islam nach Razi*... mit einem Anhang : *Verzeichnis philosophischen Termini im Arabischen*, Leipzig, 1912 ; Bouyges, M. (ed.), *Algazel. Tahafot al-Falasifat*, Beyrouth, 1927, Index D, pp. 416-440 ; Gauthier, L., *Hayy Ben Yaqdhān*, Beyrouth, 1936, pp. ١٨٨-١٦٢ ; and Gardet et Anawati, *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris, 1948, pp. 475-492. Perhaps the following list will also be a help to scholars interested in realizing the project of a technical dictionary suggested by the distinguished Spanish orientalist, Asín Palacios (cf. his *Obras Escogidas*, II y III, Madrid, 1948, pp. 171-215).

فهرس الكتاب


كتاب اللمع


الرسالة في استحسان الخوض في علم الكلام

الفهارس

(١) الصفحة والسطر

تمّ طبع هذا الكتاب في المطبعة
الكاثوليكية ، بيروت في الثلاثين
من شهر تشرين الثاني سنة ١٩٥٢





ACHEVÉ D'IMPRIMER
SUR LES PRESSES DE
L'IMPRIMERIE CATHOLIQUE
A BEYROUTH LE DIX SEPT
JUIN MIL NEUF CENT
CINQUANTE TROIS

IV. — INDEX OF SUBJECTS, TERMS, ETC.

III. — INDEX OF WORKS MENTIONED

In this list are included only those works of al-Ash'arī which seem to have a more or less proper title. «Kitāb» (or: K.) is disregarded alphabetically, as are also the articles. The name of the author is added in parentheses immediately after the title.

D. — *Place Names*

B. — *Western Names*

C. — *Group Names*

II. — INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

This Index is divided into four parts: Arabic names, western names (person or form), group names (and adjectives derived from them), names of places. The order of the English alphabet has been adhered to strictly. The sign for *ʿain* (ʿ) and the dots and long marks, as well as *al* and *b.*, are disregarded. But *Abu* and *Ibn* will be found in their proper alphabetical positions. Relative adjectives formed from place names, etc., have usually been retained.

A. — *Arabic Names*

I. — INDEX OF CITATIONS FROM THE QUR᾿AN

The first verse number is that of the Cairo edition of 1342/1923. When the number of Flügel's edition is different it is added after the virgule.

INDICES

Maqālāt

studying fiqh with humility and submission; and of good moral character; and of generous well-doing; and of refraining from injury; and of abstention from backbiting and slander and calumny and greediness for food and drink.

This is the compendium of what they enjoin and observe and approve. And we hold and embrace all these doctrines of theirs which we have mentioned. Our help is in God alone! He is our Sufficiency and the best of managers! On Him do we call for help; in Him do we place our trust; to Him is the final return!

Ibāna

We shall adduce arguments for the views of ours which we have mentioned, and for the others which we have not mentioned, chapter by chapter, and subject by subject, God willing!

MAQĀLAT

60. They confess that God knows what creatures will do, and has written that it will be, and that (all) affairs are in the hand of God.

61. They approve of patient endurance of what God ordains, and of holding fast to what God has commanded, and of abstaining from what God has forbidden, and of sincerity of action, and of loyalty to Muslims.

62. They profess the worship of God among those who worship; and loyalty to the Muslim community; and the avoidance of grave sins, and adultery, and speaking falsely, and party spirit, and boasting, and insolence, and contemning men, and pride.

63. They approve of shunning every summoner to innovation; and of diligence in reciting the Qurʾān and writing traditions; and of

IBĀNA

that has come down in the traditions.

57. We profess that God knows what creatures will do, and what will become of them, and what has been, and what will be, and how what will not be would have been if it had been.

58. We profess obedience to the Imāms.

59. We profess loyalty [42] to Muslims.

60. We approve of shunning every summons to innovation, and of avoiding the people of vain desires.

(42) H has *ṣuḥba* — company, friendly relations (with).

Maqālāt	Ibāna
vants, be they lawful or forbidden.	servants, whether they be lawful or forbidden.
56. They confess that Satan tempts man, and suggests doubts to him, and deranges him.	54. We acknowledge that Satan tempts man, and suggests doubts to him, and deranges him, contrary to the view of the Muʿtazila and the Jahmiyya, as God said: « Those who devour usury will not rise save as he rises whom Satan deranges by madness » (2.275/276), and: « Against the evil of the furtive Tempter, who breathes temptations into the breasts of men, (the tempter) issued from jinn and men » (114.4-6).
57. They confess that God may favor the righteous with signs which appear at their hands (41).	55. We hold that God may favor the righteous with signs which appear at their hands.
58. They confess that the Sunna is not abrogated by the Qurʾān.	
59. They confess that the affair of infants (who die) belongs to God; if He will, He will punish them; and if He will, He will do with them what He wills.	56. Our view concerning the infants of polytheists is that God will kindle for them a fire in the next life, and then will say to them: « Rush ye into it blindly! » — as

(41) I understand the text as referring to *karāmāt*, i.e. the miracles worked by holy men, as distinguished from *muʿjizāt*, the apologetic miracles of the apostles sent by God.

Maqālāt	Ibāna
49. They believe in the seeing of visions during sleep.	47. We hold that many a vision seen during sleep is genuine, and we acknowledge that it has an interpretation.
50. They believe that prayer for dead Muslims and almsgiving on their behalf reach them.	48. We approve of almsgiving on behalf of the Muslim dead, and of prayer for them, and we believe that God benefits them thereby.
51. They believe that there are sorcerers in this world; and that the sorcerer is an unbeliever, as God has said; and that sorcery is really existing in this world (40).	49. We believe that there are sorcerers in the world; and that sorcery is really existing in this world.
52. They approve of the Prayer over those of the People of the Qibla who die, be they just men or sinners, and of accepting their bequests.	50. We profess the Prayer over those of the People of the Qibla who die, be they just men or sinners, and the validity of inheriting from them.
53. They confess that the Garden and the Fire are created.	51. We acknowledge that the Garden and the Fire are created.
54. They confess that he who dies, dies at his term, and likewise that he who is killed, is killed at his term.	52. We acknowledge that he who dies or is killed, dies or is killed at his term.
55. They confess that sustenances are from God, granted by Him to His ser-	53. We acknowledge that sustenances are from God, granted by Him to His

(40) Cf. art. *Siḥr*, in EI or Hwb.

Maqālāt	Ibāna
fight al-Dajjāl (36), and after that.	
45. They approve of prayer for the welfare of the Imāms of the Muslims, and of not revolting against them with the sword, and of not fighting in civil strife.	43. We approve of prayer for the welfare of the Imāms of the Muslims, and of acknowledging their Imāmate, and of calling him erring who approves of rebelling against them when they manifestly abandon rectitude. And we profess disapproval of armed rebellion against them, and we profess abstention from fighting in civil strife.
46. They believe in the going forth of al-Dajjāl, and that ʿĪsā b. Maryam (37) will slay him.	44. We acknowledge that al-Dajjāl will go forth, according to what has come in the tradition from the Apostle of God.
47. They believe in Munkar and Nakīr (38). Cf. 28, supra	45. We believe in the punishment of the grave, and in Nakīr and Munkar, and their questioning those buried in their graves. Cf. 30, supra
48. They believe in the Ascent (39).	46. We credit the tradition of the Ascent.

(36) i.e. a kind of Antichrist — cf. MC, 227, and the art. *Dadjdjāl*, in EI or Hwb.

(37) i.e. Jesus.

(38) MC, 164-6; and art. *Munkar wa Nakīr*, in EI or Hwb.

(39) i.e. Muḥammad's ascent into heaven — cf. MC, 242-3, and references given there; art. *Miʿrādj*, in EI or Hwb.

Maqālāt	Ibāna
rank » (89.22/23).	rank ».
41. They confess that God draws near to His creatures howsoever He wishes, as He said : « And we are closer to him than his jugular vein » (50.16/15).	40. We hold that God draws near to His servants howsoever He wishes, as He said : « And we are closer to him than his jugular vein », and : « Then he approached and remained suspended, and he was two bowlengths away, or less » (53.8-9).
42. They think it right to pray the festival and Friday and assembly prayers behind any Imām, just man or sinner.	41. It is a part of our religion to pray the Friday and festival prayers, and the other prayers and assemblies, behind every just man and sinner, as it is related of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar that he used to pray behind al-Ḥajjāj ([33]).
43. They approve of wiping the shoes ([34]) as a custom (*sunna*), and think it right both at home and when travelling.	42. We believe that wiping the shoes is a custom (*sunna*), both at home and when travelling, contrary to the belief of him who denies it.
44. They affirm the obligation of the Jihād ([35]) against the polytheists, from the time when God sent His Prophet to the last band which will	

---

(33) An Umayyad Governor who was particularly disliked by the Abbasids — cf. Muir, *The Caliphate*.

(34) MC, 158 ff.

(35) The « holy war » — cf. art. *Djihād*, in EI or Hwb.

Maqālāt

37. They confess that they were the well-directed, rightly-guided Caliphs, the best of all men after the Prophet.

38. They credit the traditions which have come from the Apostle of God reporting that God descends to the lowest heaven and says : « Is there anyone who seeks forgiveness ? » — as has come in the tradition from the Apostle of God.

39. They hold to the Book and the Sunna, as God said : « And if you disagree about something, refer the matter to God and the Apostle » (4.59/62) ; and they think it good to follow the Imāms of the Religion who have gone before, and not to introduce into their religion what God has not permitted.

40. They confess that God will come on the Day of the Resurrection, as He said : « And thy Lord will come, and the angels, rank on

Ibāna

36. In submission to God we confess that the four Imāms were well-directed, rightly-guided Caliphs, virtuous men, of peerless merit.

37. We credit all the traditions approved by the transmitters regarding the descent to the lowest heaven, and we hold that the Lord says : « Is there anyone who asks ? Is there anyone who seeks forgiveness ? », and the rest of what they have transmitted and affirmed, contrary to what the misleading deviators hold.

38. We rely, in that wherein we disagree, on the Book of our Lord, and the Sunna of our Prophet, and the Consensus of the Muslims, and what is of the same meaning as that. And we do not introduce into the Religion of God any innovation which He has not permitted, nor do we say against God what we know not.

39. We hold that God will come on the Day of the Resurrection, as He said : « And thy Lord will come, and the angels, rank on

MAQĀLĀT

Cf. 35, supra

IBĀNA

that God glorified Religion by him, and rendered him victorious over the Backsliders; and that the Muslims chose him for the Imāmate, just as the Apostle of God had chosen him to lead the Prayer; (30) and that they all called him the Caliph of the Apostle of God (30); and after him, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb; then ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān — and we hold that those who attacked him did so unjustly and wrongfully; then ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. These, then, were the Imāms after God's Apostle, and their Caliphate was « The Caliphate of Prophecy » (31).

34. We testify to the assurance of the Garden for the Ten (32) for whom the Apostle of God testified that it was assured.

35. We befriend all the Companions of the Prophet, and we refrain from discussing what was disputed among them.

(30) ... (30) Omitted in T.

(31) This seems to refer to the tradition from Muḥammad that the Caliphate would last for thirty years — cf. *Ibāna* (Klein) 136, and Wensinck, *Handbook*, 109 B.

(32) Cf. art. *al-ʿAshara ʾl-Mubashshara* in Hwb.

Maqālāt	Ibāna
tion [29], and of argument about the matters of their religion concerning which the disputatious argue and disagree; (and they profess) submissive acceptance of the sound relations and of what has come in the traditions which have been related by the trustworthy, just man from just man, going back to the Apostle of God. They do not say « How? » or « Why? », because that is innovation.	Cf. end of 31, supra
34. They hold that God does not command evil, but forbids it and commands good; and that He does not approve of evil, even though He wills it.	
35. They recognize the justice of the ancients whom God chose to companion His Prophet, and they seize upon their virtues, and refrain from (passing judgment on) what was disputed among them, small and great.	32. We profess love of the ancients whom God chose to companion His Prophet, and we praise them as God has praised them, and we befriend them all. Cf. 35, infra
36. They put Abū Bakr foremost, then ʿUmar, then ʿUthmān, then ʿAlī.	33. We hold that the Imām after God's Apostle was Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, and

(29) i.e. the Qadar.

Maqālāt	Ibāna
is speech and work; and that it increases and decreases; and they do not say that it is created or uncreated.	is both speech and work; and that it increases and decreases; and we admit the sound traditions concerning that which have been related from the Apostle of God by trustworthy narrators, just man from just man, going back to the Apostle of God.
30. They hold that the Names of God are God (cf. 11, supra).	Cf. 11, supra
31. They bear no witness of the Fire for any grave sinner, nor do they give judgment of the Garden in favor of any confessor of God's oneness, until God will have sent them where He will. They say that their affair belongs to God: if He will, He will punish them, and if He will, He will forgive them.	28. We profess that we do not assign to the Garden or to the Fire any confessor of God's oneness who holds fast to faith, save him who has been assured of the Garden by the witness of the Apostle of God. We hope for the Garden for those guilty of crimes, while fearing that they will be punished by the Fire.
32. They believe that God will bring forth a group of the confessors of His oneness from the Fire, according to what has come in traditions from the Apostle of God.	Cf. 29, supra
33. They disapprove of disputation and quarrelling about religion, and of contention over the Determina-	

Maqālāt

27. They confess the intercession of God's Apostle, and that it is on behalf of the grave sinners of his Community.

28. They confess the punishment of the grave; and that the Basin is a reality; and that the Bridge is a reality; and that the resurrection after death is a reality; and that God's settling of accounts with creatures is a reality; and that the Station before God is a reality.

29. They confess that faith

Ibāna

hearts are between two of His fingers; ([22]) and that He puts the heavens on a finger and the worlds on a finger, as has come down in traditions related from the Apostle of God.

29. We hold that God will bring forth a group from the Fire, after they will have been burned, because of the intercession of the Apostle of God; ([23]) for we believe what has come down in the traditions from the Apostle of God.

30. We believe in the punishment of the grave ([24]); and in the Basin ([25]); and that the Balance ([26]) is a reality, and the Bridge ([27]) a reality, and the resurrection after death a reality; and that God will stop creatures at the Station ([28]), and will settle accounts with the believers.

31. We believe that faith

---

(22) T omits from here to the end of this number.
(23) T omits from here to the end of this number.
(24) MC, 117 ff.
(25) MC, 231 f.
(26) MC, 167 ff.
(27) MC, 232 f.
(28) EI, s.v. *mawkif*.

Maqālāt

such as adultery, theft, and the like grievous sins. By reason of the faith which they have they are believers, even though they commit grave sins [19].

25. Faith, according to them is faith in God, His Angels, His Books, His Apostles, and in the Determination, its good and its evil, its sweet and its bitter, and in the fact that what missess them could not have hit them, and what hits them could not have missed them. And Islām is one's testifying that there is no God at all save God, and that Muḥammad is the Apostle of God, according to what has come in the tradition [21]. And Islām, according to them, is other than faith.

26. They confess that God scrutinizes hearts.

Ibāna

which he commits, such as adultery, theft, and wine-drinking, as do the Khawārij, who claim that they are thereby unbelievers. But we hold that he who commits a grave sin, such as adultery, theft, and the like, at the same time declaring it licit and not believing in its being forbidden, is an unbeliever.

26. We hold that Islām is more extensive than faith, and that the whole of Islām is not faith [20].

Cf. 21, supra

27. We profess that God scrutinizes hearts, and that

(19) *Fiqh Akbar* I, art. 1 — MC, 103 ff.

(20) So T. H reads : *wa laisa kullu islāmin īmānun (sic).*

(21) MC, 35 and 22 ff.

MAQĀLĀT

say that the utterance of the Qurʾān is created, or that it is uncreated.

23. They hold that God will be seen by eyes on the Day of the Resurrection as the moon is seen on the night of full moon. The believers will see Him, but the unbelievers will not see Him, for they will be prevented from access to God. God has said: « Out upon them! On that day they will surely be prevented from access to their Lord! » (83. 15) And they hold that Moses asked God for the vision (of Him) in this life, and that God revealed Himself to the mountain and pulverized it, thus making it known to him that he would not see Him in this life, but would see Him in the next. (cf. 7.143/139)

24. They do not call any member of the People of the Qibla an unbeliever because of a crime which he commits,

IBĀNA

24. We profess that God will be seen by eyes (17) in the next life as the moon is seen on the night of full moon. The believers will see Him, according to the traditions related from the Apostle of God. And we hold that the unbelievers will be prevented from access to God when the believers see Him in the Garden (18), as He has said: « Out upon them! On that day they will surely be prevented from access to their Lord! » And we hold that Moses asked God for the vision (of Him) in this life, and that God revealed Himself to the mountain and pulverized it, thus making it known to Moses that he would not see Him in this life.

25. We profess that we do not call any member of the People of the Qibla an unbeliever because of a crime

(17) T omits « in the next life », but after « eyes » has « on the Day of Resurrection ».

(18) T omits « in the Garden ».

MAQĀLĀT	IBĀNA
19. They confess that good and evil are by God's decision and determination; and they believe in God's decision and determination; its good and its evil, its sweet and its bitter.	20. We hold that good and evil are by God's decision and determination; and we believe in God's decision and determination, its good and its evil, its sweet and its bitter.
20. They believe that of themselves they possess neither harm nor advantage, save what God wills, as He has said.	21. We know that what misses us could not have hit us, and that what hits us could not have missed us(15); and that creatures of themselves possess neither harm nor advantage, save what God wills, as He has said.
21. They commit their affair to God, and affirm the need of God at every time and the want of Him in every circumstance.	22. We commit our affairs to God, and affirm the constant need and want of Him.
22. They hold that the Qurʾān is the uncreated speech of God. As for kalām on the suspension of judgment and on the utterance (of the reciter), they consider him who holds the utterance (to be uncreated), or who holds that judgment should be suspended, to be an innovator. One should not	23. We hold (16) that the Qurʾān is the uncreated speech of God, and that he who holds the creation of the Qurʾān is an unbeliever.

(15) *Fiqh Akbar* I, art. 3 — MC, 103 and 107-9.

(16) H has: « that the speech of God is uncreated ».

MAQĀLĀT

IBĀNA

out of nothing? Or are they the creators? » (52.35). And this occurs frequently in the Book of God.

18. They confess that God helps believers to obey Him and abandons unbelievers; and that He favors believers and has compassion on them and makes them righteous and guides them, but does not favor unbelievers or make them righteous or guide them; and that, if He were to make the latter righteous, they would be righteous, and if He were to guide them, they would be guided. But God can make unbelievers righteous and favor them so that they will be believers. However, He has willed not to make unbelievers righteous, and not to favor them so that they will be believers, and has rather willed that they be unbelievers, as He foreknew, and He abandons them and leads them astray and sets a seal on their hearts.

19. We hold that God helps believers to obey Him and favors them and has compassion on them and makes them righteous and guides them, but that He leads unbelievers astray and does not guide them and does not favor them with signs [13], as the impious deviators claim. If God were to favor the latter and make them righteous, they would be righteous, and if He were to guide them, they would be guided, [14] as He said: « Whom God guides is indeed guided; and whom He leads astray, those indeed are the losers » (7.178/177) [14]. But we hold that God can make unbelievers righteous and can favor them, so that they will be believers. However, He has willed that they be unbelievers, as He foreknew, and He abandons them and sets a seal on their hearts.

(13) T has: « with faith ».
(14)...(14) Omitted in H.

Maqālāt

that all things are by the will of God, as He said: « But you shall not will, unless God will » (76.30 and 81.29), and as the Muslims say: What God wills, is; and what He does not will, is not.

16. They hold that no one can (*yastaṭīʿu*) do a thing before he does it, and that no one is able to evade God's knowledge, or to do a thing which God knew he would not do.

17. They confess that there is no creator at all, save God; and that the evil actions of creatures are created by God; and that the (good) actions of creatures are created by God; and that creatures are unable to create anything [any of them].

Ibāna

and that all things are by the will of God.

17. We hold that no one can (*yastaṭīʿu*) do a thing before he does it[11], and that no one is independent of God, or able to evade God's knowledge.

18. We hold that there is no creator at all, save God; and that the acts of creatures are created and determined [12] by God, as He said: « When it is God who has created you and what you make » (37.96/94); and that creatures are unable to create anything, but are themselves created, as God said: « Is there any creator save God? » (35.3), and: « They create nothing, but are themselves created » (16.20), and: « Is he then who creates like him who creates not? » (16.17), and: « Or were they created

(11) T has: « before God does it ».
(12) H — *muqaddara*; T — *maqdūra*.

Maqālāt	Ibāna
of God are other than God, as do the Muʿtazila and the Khawārij.	of God are other than He, is in error.
12. They confess that God has a knowledge, as He said: « He has sent it down with His knowledge » (4.166/164), and: « No female conceives or bears save with His knowledge » (35.11/12).	12. We confess that God has a knowledge, as He said: « He has sent it down with His knowledge », and: « No female conceives or bears save with His knowledge ».
13. They affirm hearing and sight, and do not deny that of God, as do the Muʿtazila.	13. (9) We affirm hearing and sight, and do not deny that, as do the Muʿtazila, the Jahmiyya, and the Khawārij.
14. They affirm power of God, as He said: « Did they then not see that God, who created them, was far more powerful than they? » (41. 15/14).	14. We affirm that God has a power (10), as He said: « Did they then not see that God, who created them, was far more powerful than they? »
	15. We hold that God's speech is uncreated; and that God has created nothing without having said to it « Be! », as He said: « When we will a thing, our only utterance is that we say to it 'Be!', and it is ». (16.40/42)
15. They hold that there is no good or evil on earth, save what God wills; and	16. We hold that there is nothing good or evil on earth, save what God wills;

(9) T reverses 13 and 14.
(10) H — *quwwa*; T — *qudra*.

Maqālāt

Hour [4] is coming, no doubt whatever about it.

6. They confess that God will raise up those who are in the graves.

7. They confess that God is on His Throne [5], as He said : « The Beneficent is firmly seated on the Throne » (20.5/4).

8. They confess that God has two hands [6], without asking how [7], as He said : « I have created with my two hands » (38.74/75), and : « On the contrary, both His hands are stretched wide » (5.64/69).

9. They confess that God has two eyes, without asking how, as He said : « Which moved along under our eyes » (54.14).

10. They confess that God has a face, as He said : « But the face of thy Lord will endure, glorious and venerable » (55.27).

11. They confess that one must not say that the Names

Ibāna

Hour is coming, no doubt whatever about it.

6. We confess that God will raise up those who are in the graves.

7. We confess that God is firmly seated on His Throne, as He said : « The Beneficent is firmly seated on the Throne ».

9. We confess that God has two hands, without asking how, as He said : « I have created with my two hands », and : « On the contrary, both His hands are stretched wide ».

10. We confess that God has two eyes, without asking how, as He said : « Which moved along under our eyes ».

8. We confess that God has a face, as He said : « But the face of thy Lord will endure, glorious and venerable ».

11. We confess that he who claims that the Names [8]

---

(4) i.e. the end of the world — cf. MC, 23-4.
(5) Cf. *Ibāna* (Klein) 83 ff.
(6) Cf. *Ibāna*, 88 ff.
(7) Cf. MC, Index, under *bilā kaifa*.
(8) T has : « the Name ».

Maqālāt	Ibāna
1. The compendium of what is held by the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth wa'l-Sunna*: the acknowledgment of God, and His Angels, and His Books, and His Apostles, and what has come from God, and what the trustworthy have related from the Apostle of God. They reject nothing of that.	1. The compendium of our belief is that we acknowledge God, and His Angels, and His Books, and His Apostles (1), and the revelation they brought from God (1), and what the trustworthy have related from the Apostle of God. We reject nothing of that.
2. They confess that God is one God, unique, eternal, no God at all save Him, and that He has not taken to Himself consort or child.	2. We confess that God (2) is one God, and that there is no God at all save Him, and that He is the unique and eternal (2), and that He has not taken to Himself consort or child.
3. They confess that Muḥammad is the servant of God and His Apostle.	3. We confess that Muḥammad is the servant of God and His Apostle (3), sent by Him with the Guidance and the Religion of Truth (3).
4. They confess that the Garden is a reality, and that the Fire is a reality.	4. We confess that the Garden is a reality and the Fire is a reality.
5. They confess that the	5. We confess that the

(1)...(1) T has: « and what has come from God ». In general the differences in T make the T text more like that of the *Maqālāt* creed.

(2)...(2) T has: « is one God, unique, eternal, no God at all save Him ».

(3)...(3) Omitted in T.

APPENDIX IV

TWO CREEDS OF AL-ASHʿARĪ

The two creeds are those of his *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn* and his *Ibāna ʿan Uṣūl al-Diyāna*. The text of the former will be found in Ritter's edition, Vol. I, pp. 290-297, and in the edition of Muḥammad Muḥyi'l-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Vol. I, pp. 320-325. The texts of the *Ibāna* creed which I have used are those found in the Hyderabad edition, pp. 7-13, and in Ibn ʿAsākir's *Tabyīn*, pp. 158-163. In the notes the former is referred to as H, and the latter as T. Only the more important differences have been noted.

Other translations of both creeds have been made. The following translations are my own, as is also the numbering of the articles. To each article which I regard as distinct I have given a number, hoping thus to facilitate reference in any comparison with other creeds. The parallel arrangement will also, I think, be useful.

The *Maqālāt* creed is introduced with these words: « This is a compendious account of the doctrine of the *Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth* and the *Ahl al-Sunna*.

The *Ibāna* creed is preceded by the title: « Chapter on the exposition of the doctrine of the *Ahl al-Ḥaqq wa'l-Sunna* ».

IV. TWO CREEDS OF AL-ASH'ARĪ

errors of his adversaries. (Klein, p. 49; Hyderabad ed., p. 7) This second promise is fulfilled more adequately than the first. It seems to me not improbable that the entire creed section was an insertion made, either by al-Ashʿarī himself, or by some later Ashʿarite. If this was so, there may have been some truth in the charges which al-Ahwāzī levelled at the *Ibāna* (Nº 22 of the list of his charges).

I do not propose to enter here into any detailed comparison of the *Ibāna* with the *Lumaʿ*. But I think it is obvious that the former is much more traditionist than the latter. If al-Ashʿarī was the author of both, the difference could be explained on the score that the *Ibāna* really was a kind of conciliatory gesture which al-Ashʿarī made to the Ḥanbalites, either immediately after his conversion, or towards the end of his life. But perhaps it is a little too much to say, with Wensinck, that the *Ibāna* reveals al-Ashʿarī as « the stern adherent of Kuran and sunna » and nothing more. (MC, p. 91) It may be true that in most of the *Ibāna* « there is scarcely a word that could not have been written by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal » (MC, p. 92), but it seems to me equally true that Aḥmad never would have written such a work. And I think that Aḥmad would have shrunk in holy horror from the mere thought of writing such a work as the *Lumaʿ*.

I feel unable to share Dr. Klein's enthusiasm for the *Ibāna*. He tells us: « In it al-Ashʿarī displays a very high degree of forensic genius ». (p. 29) He refrains from further elaboration of the point on the ground that the pages of his translation « afford so many illustrations of his acumen ». Such praise seems more apposite in the case of the *Lumaʿ* — though even in the latter case I should be somewhat more reserved in my judgment. However, the reader is now in a position to make his own comparison. Here I should like to say, quite unapodictically, that I am unable to subscribe wholeheartedly to the proposition that the *Ibāna*, in the form in which we have it, is a genuine work of al-Ashʿarī.

A NOTE ON THE IBĀNA

Goldziher called this an important treatise, and one of the fundamental documents for the history of Muslim dogmas. He made good use of it in his *Vorlesungen über den Islam,* and it has also been used to good effect by other scholars, such as Wensinck and Watt. Goldziher also refers to the *Ibāna* as « the last definitive exposition of his (al-Ashʿarī's) doctrine » (*Vorlesungen*², p. 113; Arin, p. 92), though he gives no reason for calling it « the last ». Indeed, the indications given in the *Tabyīn* would seem to make it one of the first works written by al-Ashʿarī after his abandonment of Muʿtazilism.

Ibn ʿAsākir makes a good deal of the *Ibāna* in his *Tabyīn.* Apart from the *khuṭba* of the *Tafsīr*, it is the only work of al-Ashʿarī which he actually cites. It may have been the only work of al-Ashʿarī on which he actually laid eyes. If it was such an important work, it is certainly surprising, to say the least, that there is no mention of it in the list of al-Ashʿarī's works given in the *Tabyīn.* It also seems strange that it was not known to Ibn al-Nadīm under the title of *Ibāna* — and it is not certain that the *Kitāb al-Tabyīn* which he mentions is simply the *Ibāna* under another title.

At the end of the creed in the *Ibāna* the author says: « We shall adduce arguments for those views of ours which we have mentioned, and for the others which we have not mentioned, chapter by chapter, and point by point ». (Klein, p. 55; Hyderabad ed. p. 13) This promise is certainly not fulfilled in our text. A similar promise is made at the end of the chapter in which the author enumerates the principal

103. *Risāla kataba bihā ilā ahl al-thaghr bi bāb al-abwāb* Letter addressed to the men of the frontier on a certain subject).

N. Cf. N° 99 above. This was edited by Qiwameddin in *Ilahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuasi*, 7, 154 ff., and 8, 50 ff.

104. *Kitāb al-Īmān* (Book on Faith)

N. The same as N° 98 ?

105. *Kitāb al-Ibāna ʿan Uṣūl al-Diyāna* (Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Religion)

N. Printed in Hyderabad, 1321, and Cairo, 1348. English translation by W. C. Klein, *The Elucidation of Islām's Foundation*, American Oriental Series, Vol. 19, 1940. One should read the extended review of Professor Thomson, *The Moslem World*, XXXII (1942) 242-260. It would be well to check any use of this translation with the Arabic text.

Another possible title is that referred to in the text of the *Tabyīn*, 39.18. See n. 19 to App. II, for what seems to be a curious coincidence.

106. *Kitāb Kashf al-Asrār wa Hatk al-Astār* (The Revealing of Secrets and Rending of Veils)

N. This may have been one of the works mentioned without a definite title in the list above.

explaining what they had asked him about the doctrine of the Ahl al-Ḥaqq (Partisans of the Truth).

N. It is not quite clear that this number was distinct from the previous.

Ibn ʿAsākir: (from Abuʾl-Qāsim b. Naṣr, from Abuʾl-Maʿālī b. ʿAbd al-Malik) — « I heard a man whom I trust say: I saw the titles of the books of the Imām Abuʾl-Ḥasan, and I counted more than two hundred and three hundred ».

Mehren also reads: « two hundred (sic) and three hundred ». But Abuʾl-ʿAbbās says that al-Ashʿarī had « nearly two hundred books » — *Tabyīn*, 140.1-2.

In the *Fihrist* of Ibn al-Nadīm five works of al-Ashʿarī are mentioned (ed. Cairo, 1348, p. 257): *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*, *Kitāb al-Mūjiz*, *Kitāb Īḍāḥ al-Burhān*, *Kitāb al-Tabyīn ʿan Uṣūl al-Dīn*, and *Kitāb al-Sharḥ waʾl-Tafṣīl fīʾl-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Ifk waʾl-Taḍlīl*. This gives us one more title for our list:

100. *Kitāb al-Tabyīn ʿan Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Religion)

N. Was this the *Ibāna* ?

The reader should also consult GAL G I 195, S I 345-6; and H. Ritter, *Philologika* III, Nº 13, in *der Islam*, XVIII, 34-55. These supply us with a few more titles:

101. *Risālat Istiḥsān al-Khawḍ fī ʿIlm al-Kalām* (Treatise on Thinking Well of Engaging in the Science of Kalām) Printed in Hyderabad, 1323 and 1344.

102. *Qawl jumlat aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth wa ahl al-sunna fīʾl-Iʿtiqād* (The Belief of the Generality of the Traditionists and the Sunnites).

89. *Kitāb Naqḍ Sharḥ al-Kitāb* (Refutation of the Explanation of the Book)

N. What « the Book » was I do not know. On the other hand, Mehren, p. 102, reads : « *al-Kibār* » (the Great Men).

90. A book on questions discussed by him and Abu'l-Faraj the Mālikite concerning « *ʿillat al-khamr* ».

N. *ʿilla* is an excuse, or a cause, etc. Possibly this discussion concerned the legality of drinking wine.

91. Refutation of Aristotle's *Kitāb Āthār al-ʿUlwiyya* (Meteorologica ?)

92. A book of answers to questions of Abū Hāshim, dictated at the request of Ibn Abī Ṣāliḥ al-Ṭabarī.

N. Abū Hāshim was the son of al-Jubbā'ī. Cf. *Tritton*, pp. 149-155.

93. *Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj* (The Argument, or : Adducing of Arguments)

94. *Kitāb al-Akhbār* (On Testimony, or : Traditions) — dictated to al-Burhān (Mehren : al-Dahhān)

Ibn Fūrak : « And that is the last which has reached us of the names of his works. And he had — »

95. A separate book on the signs of prophethood.

96. And another single book on the Imāmate.

III. ADDITIONS OF IBN ʿASĀKIR

97. *Risālat al-Ḥathth ʿala'l-Baḥth* (Incitement to Investigation).

98. Epistle on Faith : Is the term « creation » to be applied to it ?

99. Reply to questions, addressed to the men of the frontier,

78. Questions put to al-Jubbāʾī on names and predications.

79. Meetings on individual testimony (*khabar al-wāḥid*).

80. Vindication of Analogy (*Qiyās*) — or : Reasoning.

N. This and the preceding three numbers are not very clearly distinguished in the text.

81. *Kitāb fī Afʿāl al-Nabī* (On the Actions of the Prophet)

82. *Kitāb fīʾl-Wuqūf waʾl-ʿUmūm* (On withholding one's assent and universality)

N. The precise meaning of this title escapes me. It may refer to the suspension of judgment regarding Muslim mortal sinners and the contrary position, or, perhaps, to attitudes regarding the creation of the Qurʾān.

83. *Kitāb fī Mutashābih al-Qurʾān* (On the ambiguous verses of the Qurʾān)
— in which he identified the Muʿtazila and the Mulḥidūn in their attacks upon ambiguous traditions and refuted the *Kitāb al-Tāj* (the Crown) of Ibn al-Rāwandī.

84. A book containing an exposition of the doctrine of the Christians.

85. A book on the Imāmate.

86. A book containing kalām against the Christians from the arguments against them drawn from all the books which they acknowledge.

87. A book against Ibn al-Rāwandī refuting his refutation of *tawātur* and dealing with the arguments relied upon by the opponents of *tawātur*, and with questions concerning the affirmation of consensus.

N. Cf. Wensinck's article and reff., Hwb. s.v. Mutawātir.

88. A book containing accounts of the views of the Mujassima and the arguments used by them.

NN. 1. — I have not succeeded in identifying Ibn Qais.
22. — Perhaps he refers to Aristotle's *De Coelo* and *De Mundo*.

Ibn Fūrak : « These are the names of the books which he had written by the year 320, apart from his dictations to people and various replies to questions that reached him from various quarters, and apart from what he dictated to people but did not here identify by name. He lived after that until the year 324, and during that time composed works among which are — »

II. IBN FŪRAK'S LIST FOR 320-324

71. A book against al-Iskāfī, in which he refuted the latter's *al-Muḍāhāt* (Rivalry) on the application of the name « *Qadar* ».

N. This was very probably the question discussed in the *Luma*ʿ, Nos 120-121, and the *Ibāna*, Klein, p. 113.

72. *Kitāb al-ʿAmad fiʾl-Ruʾya* (The Supports, on the Vision)

N. I have read *ʿAmad*, plural of *ʿimād*. Other vocalizations are possible, but the point is not of great importance. This is the work from which Ibn Fūrak quoted Nos 1-70 of this list.

73. *Kitāb fī maʿlūmāt Allāh wa maqdūrātihi* (On the objects of God's knowledge and power)
— that they are unlimited, against Abuʾl-Hudhail.

74. A book against Ḥārith al-Warrāq, on the divine atttributes, concerning the latter's refutation of Ibn al-Rāwandī.

75. A book against the *Ahl al-Tanāsukh* (The Metempsychosists)

76. A book of refutation concerning motions, against Abuʾl-Hudhail.

77. A book against the *Ahl al-Manṭiq* (The logicians)

even, « atom ». But « gem », or « pearl », is probably correct here.

67. A book in which we answered the questions of al-Jubbāʾī on reasoning and inference and its conditions.

68. *Adab al-Jadal* (The Art of Argument)

NN. 1.— The translation of the title seems to me the correct one. Possibly the book dealt with the type of matter we find in Aristotle's *Topica* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. Cf. Ibn Khaldūn's *Prolegomena*, Quatremère III, pp. 25-6; and De Slane's translation and notes, III, pp. 38-9.

2.— Nº 30 of this list may have been a commentary on this work.

3.— The list of al-Bāqillānī's works contains a *Sharḥ Adab al-Jadal*, which may have been a commentary on this work of al-Ashʿarī. (*Tamhīd*, Cairo ed., p. 258, Nº 9).

69. A book devoted especially to the views of the Philosophers.

N. Probably a compendious survey along the lines of Nºs 18 and 19.

70. *Kitāb fīʾl-Radd ʿalaʾl-Falāsifa* (Refutation of the Philosophers)

— containing three treatises (*maqālāt*). In it we mentioned the allegations of Ibn Qais the Materialist and refuted them; and we argued in it against those who hold prime matter (*al-hayūlā*) and the elements *(al-ṭabāʾiʿ)*; and in it we refuted the arguments of Aristotle concerning the heavens and the world, and we explained what is against them respecting their view which ascribes production *(al-iḥdāth)* to the stars and makes the determination of happiness and misery dependent on them.

only « *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* » as a title; the rest of the title is mentioned by Ibn ʿAsākir, 136.16 f. The Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabī said that the commentary « which he called *al-Mukhtazan* » (sic!) numbered 500 volumes (*mujallad*)! Al-Maqrīzī said it numbered 70 volumes. Al-Kawtharī adds that the number of volumes would differ according to the handwriting. Ibn Fūrak cited it frequently, and al-Tāj b. al-Subkī said that he had come upon a volume of it. The Shaikh al-Kawtharī laments the fact that his long quest failed to turn up any of this commentary. He adds a report to the effect that al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād, the Muʿtazilite, paid the keeper of the Caliphal Library (*Khizāna Dār al Khilāfa*) ten thousand dinars to burn the unique copy kept in that library. However, he does not credit the story, but regards it as one of the many lies of al-Tawḥīdī against the Ṣāḥib. (Footnotes to the *Tabyīn*, p. 29, and pp. 136-7).

62. *Ziyādāt al-Nawādir* (Additions to the Rarities)

N. Additions to Nº 43?

63. *Jawābāt Ahl Fārs* (Replies to the Men of Fārs)

64. A book in which we reported the argument of those who claim that the inert (*al-mawāt*) acts by its nature, and refuted their argument and made plain their deception.

65. A book on the vision of God, in which we refuted the objections urged against us by al-Jubbā'ī in different places in his books, which Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Ṣaimarī collected and related from al-Jubbā'ī; and we made their falsity perfectly plain.

66. *al-Jawhar fi'l-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Zaigh wa'l-Munkar* (The Gem, in Refutation of the Pernicious Deviators)

N. « *Jawhar* » also means « substance », « essence », and

57. *Kitāb al-Masāʾil ʿalā Ahl al-Tathniya* (The Book of Questions against the Dualists)

N. Cf. the article, Thanawīya, in EI or Hwb.

58. *al-Istiqṣāʾ li Jamīʿ Iʿtirāḍ al-Dahriyyīn wa Sāʾir Aṣnāf al-Mulḥidīn* (The Last Word to Every Objection of the Materialists and All Kinds of Mulḥidūn)
— a separate book, in which we mentioned every objection of the Materialists to the doctrine of the professors of God's oneness that (the series of) temporally produced beings has a *first* member, and that they cannot but proceed from a producer, and that the producer is one; and we answered every objection of theirs in a way that will satisfy those who seek the right direction. And we also mentioned their allegations concerning the eternity of bodies. This book is different from the books which we mentioned at the beginning of this book of ours.

N. The reader may consult the article, *Dahrīya*, by Goldziher, in EI or Hwb.

59. A book against the Materialists concerning their arguments for the eternity of bodies on the ground that if they were produced, the producer would have produced them either of himself, or because of some cause.

60. A book in which we refuted the argument of ʿAlī Daʾūd b. ʿAlī al-Iṣbahānī on the question of belief (*Iʿtiqād*).

61. *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān (waʾl-Radd ʿalā man Khālafaʾl-Bayān min Ahl al-Ifk waʾl-Buhtān)* (Commentary on the Qurʾān and Refutation of the Liars and Deceivers Who Opposed the Clear Argument)
— in which we refuted the errors of al-Jubbāʾī and al-Balkhī in interpreting the Qurʾān.

N. As noted before (No 48) there seems to be some confusion regarding this and *al-Mukhtazan*. Al-Ashʿarī himself gives

should chance on this book, he should place no reliance on it.

N. This question occurs in al-Bāqillānī's *Tamhīd*, 40.8 ff. And the list of al-Bāqillānī's works contains one with the title: *Fī anna'l-Ma'dūm Laisa bi Shai'* (That the inexistent is not a thing).

50. *Fi'l-Ijtihād fi'l-Aḥkām* (The right to exercise personal judgment in legal matters?)

51. *Fī anna'l-Qiyās Yakhuṣṣu Ẓāhira'l-Qur'ān* (That Reasoning (?) is proper to the literal meaning of the Qur'ān)

N. I am not sure of the precise meaning of this title. Perhaps this work had to do with the question discussed in al-Ash'arī's *Risāla*, translated above.

52. *A slender book Fi'l-Ma'ārif* (On Knowledge(s))

N. Probably a treatise on the definition of knowledge and its divisions. Cf. the beginning of al-Bāqillānī's *Tamhīd*.

53. *Kitāb fi'l-akhbār wa takhṣīṣihā* (On traditions and their exclusive attribution)

N. « Traditions » here in a rather broad sense, as in the *Tamhīd* of al-Bāqillānī, 160.15 ff. « Testimony » would perhaps be a better translation.

54. *Kitāb al-Funūn* (Kinds, or: Branches)
— on kalām subjects, different from the *Kitāb al-Funūn* which we composed against the Mulḥidūn (N° 42).

55. *Jawāb al-Miṣriyyīn* (Reply to the Egyptians)
— in which we dealt with many kalām subjects.

56. A book dealing with the thesis that inability to do a thing is distinct from the inability to do its contrary, and that inability can attach only to what exists, in which we championed those associates of ours who hold that view.

N. Cf. *Luma'*, N° 136.

— on various subtle points of kalām.

N. One could also read « *al-Adrāk* », which would give other meanings for the title. But the matter is of no great importance.

45. A refutation of al-Iskāfī's *al-Laṭīf* (The Subtle ?)

N. For al-Iskāfī cf. *Tritton*, pp. 123-5; *Watt*, pp. 78-80; *Intiṣār*, Index, s.v. *al-Iskāfī*.

46. A book in which I refuted the kalām of ʿAbbād b. Sulaimān on the abstruse points of kalām.

N. For ʿAbbād cf. *Tritton*, pp. 115-9; *Watt*, pp. 81-3; *Intiṣār*, Index, s.v. ʿAbbād.

47. A book in which I refuted a book of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, which he himself composed.

N. ʿAlī was a famous Vizier. Cf. *The Life and Times of ʿAli ibn ʿIsa, the Good Vizier*, H. Bowen, Cambridge and London, 1928.

48. *al-Mukhtazan* (The Storehouse)

— on various aspects of kalām. In it we mentioned the questions of our adversaries which they did not ask us about, or write down in their books, or undertake to ask about, and we answered them with the help which God gave us.

N. In a footnote on p. 136 of the *Tabyīn* al-Kawtharī seems to identify this work with al-Ashʿarī's Commentary on the Qurʾān — Nº 61 below. Possibly the Commentary was also called *al-Mukhtazan*, or perhaps the use of this name was simply an error on the part of al-Maqrīzī and the Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabī. Cf. also the footnote on p. 29 of the *Tabyīn*.

49. A book on the subject of « *shaiʾ* » (thing), and that things are things, even though they be inexistent. But we have retracted that view and have refuted it. So if anyone

36. *Jawāb al-Jurjāniyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Jurjān)
— on questions debated by us and the Muʿtazila.

37. *Jawāb al-Dimashqiyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Damascus)
— on subtle points of kalām.

38. *Jawāb al-Wāsiṭiyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Wāsiṭ)
— on branches of kalām.

39. *Jawāb al-Rāmhurmuziyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Rāmhurmuz)
— one of the Muʿtazila of Rāmhurmuz had written to me asking for an answer to certain questions which were occupying his mind, and I answered them.

N. The interested reader may get some idea of the geographical extent of al-Ashʿarī's correspondence by looking at the map on p. 11 of the *Atlas of Islamic History*, Princeton, 1951.

40. *al-Masāʾil al-Manthūrat al-Baghdādiyya* (Scattered Baghdad Questions)
— assemblies that took place between us and the leading Muʿtazila.

N. I take it that « *Manthūra* » means « scattered » or « various », though there may be another meaning which eludes me.

41. *al-Muntakhal fī l-Masāʾil al-Manthūrāt al-Baṣriyyāt* (Anthology of Scattered Baṣra Questions)

42. *Kitāb al-Funūn* (Kinds, or: Branches)
— in refutation of the Mulḥidūn.

43. *Kitāb al-Nawādir fī Daqāʾiq al-Kalām* (The Book of Rarities on the Fine Points of Kalām)

44. *Kitāb al-Idrāk* (The Book of Apprehension, or: Perception)

concerning the existence and nature of God, and particularly the questions concerning the divine essential attributes.

2.— On secondary causation (*al-tawallud*) cf. *Intiṣār*, pp. 76-8; *Watt*, Index, s.v. *tawallud*; *Tritton*, Index, s.v. Secondary Effects.

3.— The question of the imputation of justice and injustice to God is the subject of Ch. 7 of the *Lumaʿ*. The phrase used in the *Tabyīn* is « *al-taʿjīz waʾl-tajwīr* », and not « *al-taʿdīl waʾl-tajwīr* ». I believe, however, that they are equivalent in meaning, since the second phrase also covers what God can or cannot do with respect to His creatures.

30. *Kitāb fī sharḥ Adab al-Jadal* (An explanation of « The Art of Argument »)

N. I think that this was a commentary on Nº 68. See my note on the latter.

31. *Kitāb al-Ṭabariyyīn* (Letter to the Men of Ṭabarastān) — on many aspects of many questions.

N. This, and the following eight works, were very probably replies to questions which had been sent to al-Ashʿarī by men in the places mentioned. So the titles were understood by Ibn ʿAsākir, 412.4 ff.

32. *Jawāb al-Khurāsāniyya* (Reply to the Khurāsānians) — on many sorts of questions.

33. *Kitāb al-Arrajāniyyīn* (Letter to the Men of Arrajān) — on different questions of kalām.

34. *Jawāb al-Sīrāfiyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Sīrāf) — on various aspects of kalām.

35. *Jawāb al-ʿUmāniyyīn* (Reply to the Men of ʿUmān) — on diverse aspects of kalām.

26. A book against al-Khālidī in which we refuted a book of his in which he denied that the creation and determination of human acts are from the Lord of the Worlds.

27. A book in which we refuted a book of al-Balkhī in which he was said to correct the mistakes of Ibn al-Rāwandī in *jadal*.

N. « *Jadal* » seems to mean « argumentation », or « logic ». Cf. the note on Nº 68.

28. *Kitāb fi'l-Istishhād* (On appealing to experience) — in which we showed how the Muʿtazila are compelled, according to their own adducing of the visible as an argument to the invisible, to affirm God's knowledge, power, and other attributes.

N. For examples of this turning the argument from our experience against the Muʿtazila see Nºs 56 and 81 of the *Lumaʿ*. Frequent use of this retort was made by al-Bāqillānī, e.g. *Tamhīd* (Cairo ed.) 51.17 ff.; 70.20-23; 78.22 — 81.7; 152.4 ff.; 155.23 — 156.25. The transference of conclusions regarding the visible to the invisible was regarded by al-Simnānī as the basic false principle of the heretics: *Kitāb al-Bayān ʿan Uṣūl al-Īmān*, 9a, 2 ff.

29. *Kitāb al-Mukhtaṣar fi'l-Tawḥīd wa'l-Qadar* (The Compendium on the Divine Nature and the Divine Determination of Human Acts) — on various chapters of kalām, among them the affirmation of the ocular vision of God, the kalām on all the attributes, and the kalām on all the matters related to the divine determination, and on secondary causation, and on the imputation of justice and injustice to God. In this book we asked them (Muʿtazila) about many questions which they could neither answer nor escape by argument.

NN. 1.— « *Tawḥīd* » seems to include all the questions

20. *Kitāb al-Jawābāt fīʾl-Ṣifāt ʿan Masāʾil Ahl al-Zaigh waʾl-Shubahāt* (Answers on the Divine Attributes to the Questions of the Doubting Deviators)
— a large book on the attributes (and this is the largest of his books) in which we refuted a former work of our own in justification of the Muʿtazilite doctrine. No such work had ever been composed on their behalf; but then God showed us the truth and we turned from that work and refuted it and made plain its falsity.

21. *Kitāb ʿalā Ibn al-Rāwandī* (A book against Ibn al-Rāwandī)
— on the divine attributes and the Qurʾān.

22. A book in which we refuted a book of al-Khālidī, which he wrote on the Qurʾān and the divine attributes before he composed his book called *al-Mulakhkhaṣ* (The Abridgment).

N. So far I have been unable to identify this al-Khālidī.

23. *al-Qāmiʿ li Kitāb al-Khālidī fīʾl-Irāda* (The Subduer of al-Khālidī's Book on the Divine Will)
— a book in which we refuted a work of al-Khālidī in which he affirmed the beginning to be of God's will and claimed that God willed what did not take place and that there took place what He did not will.

24. *al-Dāfiʿ liʾl-Muhadhdhib* (The Repeller of the Corrector)
— in which we refuted what we disagreed with in the book of al-Khālidī which he called *al-Muhadhdhib*, on the *Maqālāt*.

N. Perhaps the work of al-Khālidī was one in which he ventured to offer some corrections of al-Ashʿarī's *Maqālāt* (Nº 18).

25. A refutation of a work by al-Khālidī in which he denied the ocular vision of God.

and we mentioned the Muʿtazilite arguments which he did not adduce, and we refuted them by the splendid arguments and dazzling proofs of God; a book containing our kalām against him, and refuting him on all the questions and answers of the Muʿtazila concerning the points on which we and they differed.

N. This was the al-Jubbāʾī who was al-Ashʿarī's teacher for so long. Cf. *Watt*, pp. 83-6, and *Tritton*, pp. 141-9.

17. *Kitāb kabīr* (A large book)
— in which we refuted the book known as *Naqḍ Taʾwīl al-Adilla* (Refutation of the Interpretation of the Proofs), against al-Balkhī, on the principles of the Muʿtazila; in it we explained the difficulties which he brought forth, by means of God's clear proofs and shining signs; and to that we added the refutation of his kalām on the divine attributes concerning the principal questions and answers.

N. The Arabic is somewhat ambiguous, but it seems clear enough that al-Balkhī was the author of the book mentioned. This man was also known as al-Kaʿbī. Cf. *Tritton*, pp. 157-161, *Watt*, pp. 80-81.

18. *Kitāb fī maqālāt al-Muslimīn* (The Views of the Muslims)
— including all their disagreements and their views.

N. This is doubtless the *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa Ikhtilāf al-Muṣallīn* (The Views of the Adherents of Islām and the Disagreement of Those Who Pray). Ed. Ritter, Istanbul, 1929. Ed. Muḥammad Muḥyi'l-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Part I, Cairo, 1950. This work, since its publication by Ritter, has proved a veritable gold mine for students of the history and development of Muslim theological thought.

19. *Kitāb Jumal al-Maqālāt* (Compendia of Views)
— compendia of the views of the Mulḥidūn and of the doctrines of the professors of God's oneness.

— an introduction to *al-Mūjiz* (Nº 2), in which we discussed the same questions.

11. *Kitāb laṭīf sammaināhu Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī'l-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Zaigh wa'l-Bidaʿ* (A slender work which we called: Highlights of the Polemic against Deviators and Innovators)

N. This has been discussed sufficiently in other parts of this book.

12. *al-Lamʿ al-Kabīr* (The Large Brightness — or: Flashing) — an introduction to the *Īḍāḥ* (Nº 10).

N. The title could also be read « *al-Lumaʿ* », with « *al-Kabīr* » modifying an understood « *Kitāb* ». But perhaps *al-Lamʿ* goes better with the idea of *Īḍāḥ*.

13. *al-Lamʿ al-Ṣaghīr* (The Small Brightness) — an introduction to the previous work.

14. *Kitāb al-Sharḥ wa'l-Tafṣīl fī'l-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Ifk wa'l-Taḍlīl* (Explanation and Detail(ing) in Refutation of Lying Misleaders)
— a beginners' book and an introduction to be studied before the *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*; suitable for learners.

N. I take it that he refers to Nº 11, since a limit of simplification seems to have been reached in the series ended by Nº 13.

15. *Kitāb mukhtaṣar* (An abridgment)
— to serve as an introduction to the previous work.

16. *Kitāb kabīr* (A large book)
— in which we refuted the book known as *al-Uṣūl* (The Principles), against Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbā'ī, and revealed his deception in all the chapters in which he discoursed on the principles of the Muʿtazila;

firmly seated on the Throne; and against al-Nāshī and his doctrine on the names and attributes.

N. For further details regarding the individuals mentioned cf. the indices of *Tritton*, *Watt*, and the *Intiṣār*. On the name « Maʿmar » cf. *Tritton*, p. 100, n. 1.

6. *Kitāb fī jawāz ruʾyat Allāh biʾl-abṣār* (On the possibility of the ocular vision of God)
— in which we refuted all the arguments employed by the Muʿtazila in denying and refuting the vision.

7. *Kitāb kabīr dhakarnā fīhi ikhtilāf al-nās fīʾl-asmāʾ waʾl-aḥkām waʾl-khāṣṣ waʾl-ʿāmm* (A large book in which we mentioned the different views of men regarding names and predications and the general and the particular)

N. The « names and predications » are those which one is to apply to the Muslim who commits a grave sin — cf. *Lumaʿ*, Nos 181-185; for « the general (or: universal) and particular » cf. *Lumaʿ*, Ch. 9.

8. *Kitāb fīʾl-radd ʿalaʾl-Mujassima* (Refutation of the Anthropomorphists)

9. *Kitāb ākhar fīʾl-jism* (Another book on the body)
— showing that the Muʿtazila cannot reply to the questions of the Jismiyya as we can, and showing the compelling force of the questions of the Jismiyya according to their (Muʿtazila) principles.

N. The Jismiyya are presumably the same as the Mujassima, and « *fīʾl-jism* » undoubtedly is the equivalent of « *fīʾl-tajsīm* », i.e. attributing a body to God.

10. *Kitāb Īḍāḥ al-Burhān fīʾl-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Zaigh waʾl-Ṭughyān* (The Elucidation of the Proof in Refutation of the Deviators and the Unbelievers)

in which he discoursed on the vindication of Abū Bakr's Imāmate and refuted those who maintained the doctrine of designation and held that there must be an infallible Imām in every age.

NN. 1.— Possibly this was an epitome of the *Fuṣūl*. At any rate it contained the same number of treatises.

2.— The treatise on the Imāmate is put last, as it is in the *Lumaʿ*, the *Ibāna*, al-Bāqillānī's *Tamhīd*, al-Juwainī's *Irshād*, al-Ghazālī's *Iqtiṣād*, etc. This position seems to have been due to the fact that the question was not strictly dogmatic. Thus al-Juwainī remarks that it is not one of the *uṣūl al-iʿtiqād* — *Irshād*, 231/344.

3. *Kitāb fī khalq al-aʿmāl* (On the creation of human acts) — in which we refuted the allegations of the Muʿtazila and the Qadariyya regarding the creation of acts and laid bare their deception in that.

N. The question discussed in the *Lumaʿ*, Ch. 5.

4. *Kitāb kabīr fīʾl-istiṭāʿa* (A large book on the capacity) — against the Muʿtazila, in which we refuted their proofs that the capacity precedes the act and their questions and answers.

N. The question discussed in the *Lumaʿ*, Ch. 6.

5. *Kitāb kabīr fīʾl-Ṣifāt* (A large book on God's attributes) — in which we argued against the various Muʿtazila, Jahmiyya, and other adversaries of ours on the question of the attributes, concerning their denial of God's knowledge, and His power, and His other attributes; and against Abuʾl-Hudhail and Maʿmar (Muʿammar) and al-Naẓẓām and al-Fuwaṭī; and against those who maintained the eternity of the world; and in which we discussed many questions connected with the attributes concerning the affirmation of God's face and hands and His being

maintain the eternity of *al-dahr*, according to their different opinions and various doctrines; then he refuted therein the Brahmans, Jews, Christians, and Magians. It is a large book containing twelve books, of which the first is a vindication of reasoning and rational argument and a refutation of those who denied that; then he mentioned and replied to the arguments used by the Mulḥidūn and the Materialists to prove the eternity of the world, and he dealt thoroughly with the assertions made by al-Rawandī in his *Kitāb al-Tāj* (The Crown), i.e. the work in which the latter defended the doctrine of the eternity of the world.

NN. 1.— « The Chapters » is probably the correct translation. The original was very likely fuller and perhaps involved a rhyming word like « *uṣūl* ». For other possible meanings cf. SDA, s.v. *faṣl*.

2.— « Materialists » might conceivably be « Epicureans » cf. SDA, s.v. *dahrī*.

3.— « *al-dahr* » is a famous Arabic word. Here it is perhaps equivalent to « the world ».

4.— On al-Rawandī cf. *Kitāb al-Intiṣār*, ed. Nyberg, Preface, pp. 25 ff. (In Arabic) The *Kitāb al-Tāj* is mentioned on p. 34. *Tritton*, pp. 134-5.

5.— The brief indications of the schema of this work suggest the plan followed by al-Bāqillānī in his *Tamhīd*. The length of the *Fuṣūl* may have been an obstacle to its multiplication by copying. In any case, we can be sure that much of its contents appeared again in other works of al-Ashʿarī.

2. *Kitāb al-Mūjiz* (The Epitome)

— containing twelve books according to the various opinions of adversaries, both Muslim and non-Muslim. The last part of this is the *Kitāb al-Imāma* (The Imâmate),

APPENDIX III

THE WORKS OF AL-ASHʿARĪ


The following list is taken from Ibn ʿAsākir's *Tabyīn*, 128.14 - 136.14. The authority for most of this list is Ibn Fūrak. He, in turn, draws most of his list from a list given by al-Ashʿarī himself in his *al-ʿAmad*. The latter list covers the works written by al-Ashʿarī up to the year 320/932. Ibn Fūrak then adds the titles of works composed by al-Ashʿarī between 320 and his death in 324/935-6. Ibn ʿAsākir himself adds a few more titles.

This list is certainly very interesting. It helps us to form an idea of the nature and extent of al-Ashʿarī's kalām. Suggestive as many of the titles are, I have been very wary of drawing unjustified conclusions. On the whole I have added very few notes, preferring, at least for the present, to let the list speak for itself. I see no reason for questioning its authenticity. My chief regret, no doubt shared by many others, is that so few of al-Ashʿarī's works seem to have survived the ravages of time — and, perhaps, of men.

I.— *WORKS MENTIONED IN* AL-ʿAMAD

1. *al-Fuṣūl* (The Chapters)

A refutation of the Mulḥidūn and of those who depart from (or: are outside of) the religion of Islām, such as the Philosophers, the Naturalists (or: Elementalists), the Materialists, the Assimilators, and those who



III. THE WORKS OF AL-ASHʿARÎ

O Lord, be merciful to our Shaikh and Leader,
And reveal his true worth to the seeker.

By Thy might rend the veil of his slanderer,
Be he envier, or reprover, or foul accuser.

Inspire men's hearts with sympathy for his followers,
For they call Thee One, Thou most powerful sympathizer.

I end my discourse with Thy praise, O Most Generous!
Thanking Thee for Thy most beneficent favor!

---

by everybody because of the advantage there would be for him in that on the Day of Judgment. There is also a report to the effect that if anyone calumniates the ʿulamāʾ, God will cause his heart to die before he himself dies.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

426.1 May God quicken our hearts with the light of faith and wisdom, and forgive us our sins because of our love for our brethren the Imāms who have preceded us in the faith! May He reward us for defending our Muslim brothers as He has promised by the tongue of His Prophet. Eleven traditions from Muḥammad, their general tenor being that he who defends an absent Muslim brother will be safe from the Fire and assured of the Garden.

430.6 I hope that God will strengthen the Ahl al-Ḥaqq (96) by what I have mentioned in this book, and reward me for it after my death. I fear no adversaries who may reproach me, for I have reported what I know to be certain, and I have aimed at showing how the early Muslims were innocent of what later slanderers attributed to them. It has been said: Who dares, despite rebukes, to support the truth, God returns to him those rebukes as praise; and he who seeks praise by opposing truth, God returns to him that praise as blame. My only motive in defending the honor of al-Ashʿarī has been salvation from the Fire on the day of retribution!

431.9 Ibn ʿAsākir concludes his work with thirty-two verses of his own composing. They include some *fakhr*, praise of al-Ashʿarī and of Ashʿarism, reproof of al-Ahwāzī. As a conclusion to this summary I offer the reader this translation of his last four verses:

---

(96) People of the Truth — the « orthodox », the Sunnites.

to believe what he said. But « every fallen date has its gleaner, and the hairdresser will match the worth of the face ! »

CONCLUSION OF THE REFUTATION

419.18 This is a sufficient answer to al-Ahwāzī who has harmed no one but himself by what he said. Al-Ashʿarī's glory remains undiminished by al-Ahwāzī's lying. He is a model worthy to be set beside the great Companions (95). And if the Ashʿarites have been calumniated, we must remember that such was also the lot of the Companions. Thus Abū Bakr and ʿUmar were vilified by the Rawāfiḍ, and ʿUthmān by the Rawāfiḍ and the Khawārij, and ʿAlī by the Khawārij and the Banū Umayya, and ʿA'isha by the Ahl al-Rafḍ. The same has been true in the cases of the other Companions and of the Imāms of religion in all countries.

421.5 ʿĀ'isha is reported to have said: « I heard your Prophet say: 'This Community will not pass away until later members curse its early members' ». Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was bitterly attacked by the Muʿtazila, though others recognized his excellence. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mahdī and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī also suffered from the tongues of detractors and slanderers. Yaḥyā b. Zakariyyā (John the Baptist) is said to have prayed to God for protection from the tongues of men. He received this answer from God: « O Yaḥyā, I have not done this for Myself; how, then, shall I do it for you? »

423.5 But those who have thus suffered have an increased reward from God. ʿĀ'isha and al-Shāfiʿī are cited to the effect that such slander profits the dead, God thus willing that they should not be cut off from further reward, though they have been cut off from further good works. And ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mahdī said that if it were not for the fact that it would be disobedience towards God, he would desire to be calumniated

(95) i.e. Muslims who were contemporaries of Muḥammad.

Ibn Fūrak, and Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. ʿAtīq b. Muḥammad. Some ignorant Ḥanbalites destroyed the superstructure of his tomb, but they harmed al-Ashʿarī no more than the burning of ʿUthmān's tomb by some of the Rawāfiḍ harmed ʿUthmān. I have been told that a certain Ḥanbalite of Baghdad shamefully defiled al-Ashʿarī's tomb, only to die in agony three days later. It is really a grace from God that al-Ahwāzī ended his calumnies with this palpable lie about the death of al-Ashʿarī ; otherwise, his previous lies might have been believed by some ignorant men.

ATTACK ON AL-AHWĀZĪ

414.7 The immorality of al-Ahwāzī singularly unfitted him for criticism of the defects of others. He exemplifies the prophetic tradition that he who puts Muslims to shame will himself be shamed by God. Moreover, al-Ahwāzī was the most lying of men in the matter of traditions on the Qurʾānic « readings ». This is proved by various testimonies. He died in the year 446/1054-5. If he lied in the matter of the « readings », it is not surprising that he lied against an outstanding Imām like al-Ashʿarī, whose work was of prime importance to the professors of God's oneness. The Khaṭīb said: « Abū ʿAlī al-Ahwāzī — a great liar in both Tradition and Readings ».

416.20 I shall not emulate the ravings of al-Ahwāzī, but am content to leave it to God to requite him for them. Had he possessed any faith and reverence, he would not have cursed and vilified Imāms. Four traditions from Muḥammad condemning cursing, and another, non-prophetic, against slander. 419.9 Another defect of al-Ahwāzī was his incorrect language and barbarous expression. Really it would have been preferable to ignore him, for his utterances are not surprising in one possessed of so many personal defects. What is surprising is the fact that men have been found who are ignorant enough

A. He would have been truthful had he said the exact opposite! No country is without an Ashʿarite who expounds the truth and refutes the evasions of the Muʿaṭṭila and the Mushabbiha. But every age also has some ignorant and obtuse individual whose slanders and calumnies harm himself most and who seduces only ignorant men of his own ilk.

411.13 41.— Al-Ahwāzī affirms that al-Ashʿarī never ceased wandering about countries, his teaching unaccepted, his state lowly, obscure and unwelcome in Islāmic countries, finding no glory in Muslim domains and meeting no kindly reception among the learned, until he reached the land of al-Aḥsāʾ, a land which no believer enters and in which no Muslim dwells, the resort only of wicked profligates and partisans of the unbelieving Qarmaṭians (93).

A. This is the gigantic sort of falsehood which only the most insolent prevaricator would dare to utter. It is a matter of common knowledge that al-Ashʿarī dwelt only in Baṣra and Baghdad. Al-Ahwāzī's fondness for rhymed prose blinded him to the truth. Perhaps the titles of some of al-Ashʿarī's works led him to suppose that al-Ashʿarī had actually visited various countries. Actually those titles merely embrace the answers he gave to questions sent to him from men in those countries (94). These works, incidentally, show that al-Ashʿarī was anything but obscure.

412.18 42.— Al-Ahwāzī asserts that al-Ashʿarī died in al-Aḥsāʾ.

A. This is the concluding lie of his book. No one disputes the fact that al-Ashʿarī died in Baghdad. I myself have visited his tomb and shed most copious tears there. Near it are the tombs of three of his famous followers: Ibn Mujāhid,

---

(93) Cf. art. *Ḳarmaten* (Massignon), in EI or Hwb; also, B. Lewis, *The Origins of Ismaʿilism*, Cambridge, 1940.

(94) Cf. App. III, Nos 31 ff.

run away with him as to speak offensively of the divine attributes.

410.5 38.— Al-Ahwāzī asserts that al-Ashʿarī's doctrine has always been shunned.

A. This is manifestly untenable, since the majority of ʿulamāʾ and imāms everywhere follow al-Ashʿarī. These are the leading authorities on religious matters to whom men turn in all their doubts and difficulties. Opposition to al-Ashʿarī is confined to a small group of men, secretly anthropomorphists, inimical to those who profess *tanzīh,* imitators of the Muʿtazila in assailing al-Ashʿarī, and chiefly remarkable for their profound ignorance of his vast learning.

410.14 39.— Al-Ahwāzī asserts that Ashʿarism has been strong for less than thirty years.

A. The designation « Ashʿarite » became widespread only in the time of al-Bāqillānī (90). I have already mentioned how Muʿtazilism prevailed and the adherents of the Sunna remained in seclusion until al-Bāqillānī boldly championed Ashʿarism. From him it spread east and west, while he himself rendered it victorious in the « Abode of Peace and Dome of Islām » (91), i.e. Baghdad. Al-Bāqillānī was on the most friendly terms with a group of the Ḥanbalites and was buried in the cemetery of the Imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (92). He is famous everywhere.

411.6 40.— Al-Ahwāzī asserts that God leaves no country without someone to refute the doctrine of the Ashʿarites and to expose their ignominy and overcome their utterances.

---

(90) Roughly 50-75 years after Ashʿarī's death.

(91) Qubbat al-Islām (the Dome of Islām) means Baṣra according to Hava; but most of Bāqillānī's work seems to have been done in Baghdad.

(92) The Cemetery of the Martyrs — cf. Le Strange, *Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate,* 158.

A. What a barbarous expression! And it is also a lie, because the Aṣḥāb al-Kalām refuted those others and warned men against them and exposed all their deficiencies.

401.9 36.— Al-Ahwāzī adds: « and with those who professed unbelief and *ilḥād* » (87).

A. How could this have been so, when they exposed and refuted the unbelief and innovation of those others? This is a particularly shameful thing to come from one who pretends to be a Muslim. This enormity leads Ibn ʿAsākir to embark on a long discussion of *takfīr* and *tafsīq* (88). He cites ten traditions to show the abhorrence in which one should hold such *takfīr*. 406.3 These are reinforced by the citation of a letter written by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Zaid of Qairawān to the Muʿtazilite, ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Ismāʿīl of Baghdad, in which the former refutes the charges of the latter that Ibn Kullāb and al-Ashʿarī were guilty of innovation and unbelief respectively. 409.5 Al-Ahwāzī has simply imitated the Muʿtazila. Al-Ashʿarī himself would never accuse any of the Ahl al-Qibla (89) of unbelief. And his followers showed the same restraint, even though they differed on some questions. In this they were unlike the Khawārij, Muʿtazila, and Rawāfiḍ.

409.16 37.— Al-Ahwāzī accuses the Ashʿarites of abandoning Book and Tradition and of plunging into analogy and reasoning.

A. This is a calumnious lie and an empty and heedless claim! They were ceaseless students of the texts which they illuminated by their toils and illustrated by the soundest traditions, unlike the babbling al-Ahwāzī who so far let his tongue

---

(87) i.e. irreligion, atheism, unbelief.

(88) *Takfīr* — calling one a *kāfir* (unbeliever); *tafsīq* — calling one a *fāsiq* (grave sinner).

(89) Another name for Muslims, i.e. the people who turn in the direction of Mecca when they pray.

al-Ashʿarī's followers. Thus he erred in counting al-Qalānisī among the « four » followers, because al-Qalānisī was a contemporary, and not a disciple, of al-Ashʿarī (83). Moreover, his impugning of Ibn Mujāhid is shown to be false by the weightier testimony of the Khaṭīb. His remark that al-Bāqillānī was the hireling of al-Fāmī, and that he attained eminence only by dancing attendance on the rulers, and not by learning, is ignorance and wilful blindness to the widespread fame of al-Bāqillānī. The same is true of his assertion that Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī, the companion of al-Bāqillānī, was never distinguished in kalām.

400.7 34.— Al-Ahwāzi asserts that al-Ashʿarī had no standing in learning, Qurʾān, jurisprudence, or tradition.

A. This is a lie often repeated by this malicious and ignorant man. Al-Ashʿarī's knowledge of the Qurʾān is amply attested by the acknowledged excellence of his *Tafsīr*. As for his knowledge of the *uṣūl* (84), the ʿulamāʾ are agreed that he was unique in his time in this respect. In jurisprudence he followed the system of al-Shāfiʿī, or that of Mālik, and composed works on its roots which he garrisoned with excellent proofs. As for tradition, he learned what he needed to know in order to accomplish his aims. Notice, furthermore, how clumsily al-Ahwāzī expresses himself by seeming to distinguish between « learning » and what follows.

401.2 35.— Al-Ahwāzī asserts that the Aṣḥāb al-Kalām are found only in the *ṣadr* (85) along with the philosophers and geometry and logic and *zandaqa* (86).

---

(83) Al-Kawtharī notes that al-Qalānisī preceded Ashʿarī in defending the Sunna. He also refers to a work of Ibn Fūrak which has the interesting title : « The Disagreement *(al-ikhtilāf)* of the Two Shaikhs, al-Qalānisī and al-Ashʿarī ».

(84) i.e. the *uṣūl al-dīn* — cf. n. 69, supra.

(85) The word means : breast, chest, beginning, forefront. Perhaps he meant what we mean by « right up with... »

(86) i.e. free thought — cf. n. 65, supra.

without being killed? We have already mentioned the zeal of al-Ashʿarī in the performance of his religious duties.

395.10 29.— Al-Ahwāzī's relation from Ibn al-Ṣuʿlūkī from the latter's father gives away his lie, for he did not know what name to give al-Ṣuʿlūkī. Both father and son were circumcised by the Qāḍī Abū ʿUmar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain, who was one of the most zealous champions in Khurāsān of the systems of al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ashʿarī. Indeed, all three propagated the system of al-Ashʿarī. How, then, could father and son have related any such thing of the Imām whom they followed?

396.9 30.— Al-Ahwāzī's assertion that al-Ashʿarī resided in Baṣra unfrequented by the learned because he himself was not one of the learned reveals his own irreligion and impudence and want of understanding. Al-Ashʿarī's learning is a commonplace among the learned.

397.2 31.— Al-Ahwāzī's assertion that al-Ashʿarī had only four followers is patently false. Those who heard him lecture and followed him became outstanding Imāms in all countries. The list we have already given is a sufficient exposure of al-Ahwāzī's ignorance and malice.

397.9 32.— Al-Ahwāzī asserts that Ibn ʿAinūn manifested no unbeliefs in Baghdad.

A. Were there, then, in the teaching of al-Ashʿarī, unbeliefs which Ibn ʿAinūn concealed, but which were manifested by other followers of al-Ashʿarī? Ibn ʿAinūn and the other Ashʿarites were far removed from unbelief. They held fast to Book and Sunna in very adverse circums tances, refusing to go the way of the Qadarite Muʿaṭṭila (82), joining together traditional and rational proofs, shunning the excesses of the Muʿtazila and other heretics, and exposing the errors put forward by the latter.

398.6 33.— Al-Ahwāzī makes various false statements about

(82) « Strippers » — i.e. those who deny God's attributes.

effect that al-Ashʿarī did not show himself in Baghdad up to the time that he departed from that city.

A. The last detail mentioned shows the falsity of the whole story. Al-Ashʿarī never left Baghdad once he had made his way there. There he died, and his tomb is there. As for his not showing himself, we have already related how he went every Friday to attend the circle of Abū Isḥāq of Merv, the renowned jurisprudent.

393.6 24.— Al-Ahwāzī's assertion regarding the question of faith goes well with his other calumnies. Al-Ashʿarī did not hold the absolute eternity of faith, but he distinguished between the uncreated faith of God and the created faith of creatures.

394.10 25.— Al-Ahwāzī's assertion that it is firm and certain from the transmission of excellent men that al-Ashʿarī was a man of no religion is quite untrue according to the learned and intelligent — even though it may have been maintained by the Sālimiyya, Muʿtazila, and Jahmiyya. As for al-Ahwāzī himself, his opinion is worthless.

394.14 26.— Al-Ahwāzī's citation from Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Shāhid is valueless, for the latter has no authority. Indeed, what he said shows that he was a Muʿtazilite. For he considered abandoning the doctrine of the Muʿtazila to be *ilḥād*.

394.18 27. Al-Ahwāzī's likening al-Ashʿarī to Ibn al-Rawandī [81] is absurd. We have already seen that al-Ashʿari refuted the false doctrines of Ibn al-Rawandī. How, then, could they be regarded as comparable in *ilḥād* ?

395.1 28.— Al-Ahwāzī's story, related from his own brother, that al-Ashʿarī did not pray for twenty years is an especially loathsome lie. What standing has al-Ahwāzī's brother ? How could anyone have omitted prayer for so long in those times

(81) Cf. n. 2, under nº 1, App. III.

work and not believe and profess what it contained? As a matter of fact the Ḥanbalites are firmly attached to the doctrine of the *Ibāna* and rely on the work. For they are not Muʿtazila, nor do they deny God's attributes, etc. When kalām is useless, they refrain from it, just as a skilful doctor uses now one remedy and now another. Recall the saying of Sufyān : « If you are in Syria, speak of the virtues of ʿAlī; and if you are in Kūfa, speak of the virtues of ʿUthmān. » A swimmer does not use his skill in swimming while he is on dry land, but he makes energetic use of it when he finds himself in a sinking ship. So it is only when the tranquil possession of faith is threatened by *tashbīh* or *taʿṭīl* that men need to resort to interpretation and kalām. The *Ibāna* has always been highly regarded by men of religion. The Imām Abū ʿUthmān Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad al-Ṣābūnī never went out to give a lecture without taking the *Ibāna* with him. Had the Ḥanbalites rejected what is in the *Ibāna*, the fact would certainly have been handed down. But I have it from trustworthy sources that al-Ashʿarī was a friend of many of them, as were also Ibn Mujāhid and al-Bāqillānī. In the year 370/980-1, a distinguished gathering in the house of Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. al-Ḥārith al-Tamīmī, the Shaikh of the Ḥanbalites, included Abū Bakr al-Abharī, the Shaikh of the Mālikites, and Abu'l-Qāsim al-Dārikī the Shaikh of the Shāfiʿites, and Abu'l-Ḥasan Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥasan, the Shaikh of the Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth, and Abu'l-Ḥusain b. Samʿūn, the Shaikh of the preachers and ascetics, and Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Mujāhid, the Shaikh of the Mutakallimūn, and the latter's companion, Abū Bakr b. al-Bāqillānī. Had the roof fallen on them, there would have remained in ʿIrāq no *muftī* comparable to anyone of these!

390.18 23.— Al-Ahwāzī has a story from al-Barbahārī [80] to the

(80) Cf. al-Kawtharī's two notes, p. 390, and p. 392.

is a dreadful thing to say of one at that terrible hour when the tomb opens before him. Besides, we know that al-Ashʿarī vigorously refuted the Mulḥida. So this whole assertion is simply proof of an impious mind, in addition to its having been related from one who has no standing whatever among the traditionists.

383.6 21.— Al-Ahwāzī contends that the repentance of heretics is unacceptable. He argues from the Qurʾān (3.90/84), and from certain traditions. He asserts that a heretic's repentance would not be valid unless all those who had followed his heresy also repented. But heretics do no repent, for their repentance is inconceivable, and they never come to believe that they have been in error.

A. The argument from the Qurʾān is inadmissible. The verse must be taken in its context (3.85-91/79-85). The correct interpretation of this passage according to expert commentators : 384.2 — 387.3. As for the traditions which al-Ahwāzī cites, they are rejected by the experts. The assertion regarding the necessity of the repentance of the heretic's followers is untenable. How does al-Ahwāzī know that al-Ashʿarī led anyone to profess Muʿtazilism ? And if he did, can al-Ahwāzī prove that those who had gone astray did not return to the doctrine of the Ahl al-Sunna when al-Ashʿarī did ? The last statement — that heretics simply do not repent — is absurd and is contradicted by the efforts of the Imāms of the Ahl al-Sunna to draw men away from heresy and by the historical case of such a man as Naʿīm b. Ḥamād, who recognized the error he had followed while he was a Jahmī.

388.4 22. The attacks of al-Ahwāzī on the *Kitāb al-Ibāna*. He asserts that al-Asharī's followers used the *Ibāna* as a protection against the Ḥanbalites. And he claims that the Ḥanbalites did not accept what al-Ashʿarī had set forth in the *Ibāna*.

A. How could a Muslim compose such a distinguished

repented and is not a religious and pious man. But when he manifests sorrow for his past sin, and is known to be truthful and trustworthy, there can be no doubt about the genuineness of his repentance. This was the case with al-Ashʿarī, and it is further attested by his effective disputation with al-Jubbāʾī and other Muʿtazila and by his writings against the heretics.

381.10 19.— Al-Ahwāzī relates from Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamrānī — an unknown witness — that the latter said: « Men differed over the cause of al-Ashʿarī's conversion. His followers said that the truth became clear to him, and that this was the cause of his shunning Muʿtazilism. Others said that one of his male or female relatives died, and therefore he repented lest the judge should prevent his inheriting. And others said that he abandoned the doctrines of the Muʿtazila because he had attained to no eminence in the eyes of the common people.»

A. We have already mentioned the abstinence and unworldliness of al-Ashʿarī, which amply refute the assertion about the inheritance. And in that case how explain his books which must have converted many? The assertion that his conversion was motivated by a desire for fame and honor can be made only by one who does not believe in the resurrection. How could a Muslim give expression to what contradicted his real interior sentiments, especially in matters touching beliefs and fundamental religious principles? It is the first reason mentioned by al-Ḥamrānī which is the true one.

382.10 20.— A second relation which al-Ahwāzī reported from al-Ḥamrānī seems to have been the assertion that al-Ashʿarī was born a *mulḥid* (79) and died a *mulḥid*. The first part of this assertion contradicts the view of the Muʿtazila that everyone is born a professor of God's oneness. As for the second part, it

(79) Irreligious, atheist, unbeliever.

Baṣra really means that he was reporting what was said by the Muʿtazila and by Sālimiyya like himself. His sources are either unknown, or liars like himself. Where does he find authorization for such an orgy of cursing and blaming ? God Himself said : « Curse not those, apart from God, upon whom they call, lest they in return unwittingly curse God » (6.108). And if God forbade the cursing of wood and stone, how can it be licit for one to curse excellent ʿulamāʾ ? A possible objection is refuted by the example of Muḥammad, who would not curse the polytheists, but said : « I was not sent as a curser, but as a mercy. » Al-Ahwāzī follows neither the guidance of God nor the example of the Apostle, but in his blindness does the will of Satan. For God said : « Satan only seeks the incidence of enmity and hatred among you » (5.91/93). If al-Ahwāzī had possessed any sense, or any knowledge of the Law, he would have known that his cursing of the great ʿulamāʾ was a hateful thing and a great sin.

380.6 17.— The assertion that al-Ashʿarī turned from Muʿtazilism is denied by nobody. But only those whose opinion is negligible deny that he became a Sunnite after having been a Muʿtazilite.

380.10 18.— Al-Wazzān asserted that al-Ashʿarī underwent no real change of mind in his « conversion », for God sent no prophet guaranteed by miracles so that creatures should necessarily abandon their position.

A. A stupid statement, since he claimed that a change of mind was the cause of the conversion. Moreover, the assertion that one abandons his position only on the occasion of a miracle is absurd. Many other reasons can be assigned, such as effective reasoning, the guidance of God, a dream, or persevering search for truth — all of which were realized in the case of al-Ashʿarī. Doubt may arise concerning the sincerity of repentance when the one repenting merely claims to have

we are told that al-Ashʿarī lived on the income from a property left by Bilāl to his descendants. If Abuʾl-Ḥasan had not been one of his descendants, he certainly would not have received that income. Al-Ahwázī's appeal to an ancient verse is of no avail, for it merely serves to manifest his ignorance and his inability to distinguish between *al-kunā and al-kināyāt*. (77)

377.3 13.— Al-Ahwāzī says: « And he (al-Ashʿarī) claimed to belong to the Ahl al-Sunna.» No claim that, but the simple truth, as anyone with any knowledge can testify !

377.4 14.— He continues: « And a group of ignorant men were partial to him.» Actually, those who followed al-Ashʿarī were the ʿulamāʾ and the jurisprudents, distinguished Imāms in every country, as we have shown in the list which we have already given.

377.8 15.— His next words — « and his case became notorious and was talked about everywhere » — contradict his later assertion that al-Ashʿarī was obscure and that he was not received in the countries of Islām. But such contradiction is not surprising in one so ignorant and foolish !

377.10 16.— Al-Ahwāzī asserts that al-Ashʿarī was wont to defend innovation and to urge upon men the doctrine of the Muʿtazila and the Zanādiqa. (78)

A. Another example of weak-minded invention. Look at al-Ashʿarī's works and you will see how he detested the Muʿtazila, and the Zanādiqa, as did also his followers. Al-Ahwāzī's claim to be reporting what was said by the people of

---

(77) *Kunā* is the plural of *kunya*, and *kināyāt* the plural of *kināya* — i.e. allusion, or the expression of something by means of a word which does not clearly indicate it — cf. Shartūnī, *Mabādiʾ al-ʿArabiyya*, IV, 134.

(78) Plural of *zindīq* — cf. n. 65, supra.

374.9 10. Al-Ahwāzī continues: « However, his genealogical claim is a lie. »

A. This is a brazen calumny by one who did not realize the enormity of his crime. We have already mentioned several testimonies to al-Ashʿarī's genealogy. And in another, reported from Abū Bakr b. ʿUthmān b. Muḥammad, the Imām of Baghdad, the genealogy is traced back through eight intermediaries to Abū Mūsā.

374.17 11. Al-Ahwāzī asserts that followers of al-Ashʿarī avoid the genealogical ascription of al-Ashʿarī to Abū Bishr and zealously and earnestly fly from that because of what they know about the reason for that ascription.

A. This is also a lie. We have already mentioned that Ibn Fūrak and the Khaṭīb, two of al-Ashʿarī's famous followers, both ascribe al-Ashʿarī genealogically to Abū Bishr. One calls him al-Ashʿarī's father, and the other his grandfather, because of the confusion caused by the use of the name and the *kunya* (76) with reference to the same person. That was the case with many of the great Companions, e. g. Abū Bakr b. Abī Qaḥāfa, and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, and ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Awfā.

375.9 12.— Al-Ahwāzī mentions a baseless narrative from some of the shaikhs of Baṣra to the effect that Abū Bishr was a Jew who embraced Islām at the hands of one of the Ashʿariyyūn.

A. This is a lie related from unknown sources. Only this calumniator has denied al-Ashʿarī's descent from Abū Mūsā. How could he dare tell this lie, when all know that al-Ashʿarī's genealogy is as we have mentioned? Recall the account of Bandār b. al-Ḥusain, already mentioned, in which

---

(76) The *kunya* is the name compounded, e.g., of « Father of » and the son's name — for example, Abu'l-Ḥasan (The Father of Ḥasan), which was Ashʿarī's *kunya*. Cf. Wright, *Arabic Grammar*³, I, 107 D. Ashʿarī's grandfather had the name Isḥāq, and the *kunya*, Abū Bishr.

lack of learning. He did not know fiqh, and his knowledge of Arabic was abominable. His writings on tradition deserve only erasure. Though he was learned in Qurʾānic readings, some of his statements about them were out and out lies. His knowledge of interpretation and exegesis was indifferent. On the other hand, we have already seen how the ʿulamāʾ were eloquent in their praise of al-Ashʿarī's learning. God choke al-Ahwāzī in his lie and shatter his mouth! He was a Sālimī (73), mushabbih, mujassim, ḥashwī. Anyone who chances on his *Kitāb al-Bayān fī Sharḥ ʿUqūd Ahl al-Īmān* (74), a part of which in his own handwriting is in Damascus, will easily recognize the evil of his beliefs. That it was which moved him to such violent criticism of al-Ashʿarī!

371.3 9. « Tracing back Abuʾl-Ḥasan's origin to Abū Mūsā reflects no credit on the religion of the former, for Prophets and just men have begotten unbelievers and hypocrites. »

A. It is true that genealogy alone does not take the place of doing good. But when both ancestor and descendant are good and distinguished, then distinguished ancestry is a blessing of God, and the excellence of the forebears is an earnest of successful posterity. Recall the Qurʾānic story of the noble youths and their pious father (75). And some of the commentators say that the ancestor in question was ninth or seventh. There are several traditions from Muḥammad to the effect that God preserves the believer in his son, and the son of his son, and the son of the son of his son, and his neighbor, etc. And Abū Mūsā was the ninth forebear of al-Ashʿarī in the ascending line.

---

(73) One of the Sālimiyya — cf. *Tritton*, 136.

(74) « Exposition of the Tenets (?) of the People of Faith ». It is not quite clear that al-Ahwāzī's attack on Ashʿarī was contained in this work, as Mehren states, *Exposé*, 5-6.

(75) Qur. 18.82/81.

to repel error; nor does He allow the heretic to be high and mighty in speech and act.» True enough, but it was those whom he attacked, and not himself, who were such.

366.14 5.— « There is no good superior to the Sunna, nor is there any evil worse than innovation.»

A. Consider this carefully that you may know that it was al-Ashʿarī, and not al-Ahwāzī, who showed the greater attachment to the Sunna and superior learning by his refutations of all sorts of heretics. Could al-Ahwāzī point out any place where al-Ashʿārī was guilty of innovation?

367.5 6.— « In His beneficence God has manifested in the case of every group of heretics something which has turned away from them the hearts of the common people. »

A. And what is it that turns men's hearts from the doctrine of the heretics? Knowledge and understanding? Or belief in *tawḥīd* and *tanzīh*, and shunning *tajsīm* and *tashbīh*? Or affirmation of the divine attributes and reverent refusal to predicate members of God? Surely such things as these, and not their contraries.

367.13 7.— He said: « And God has removed the heretics far from the threefold teaching [72] which is the root of the Law and the mainstay of the Community. » Note the faulty Arabic in that expression « threefold teaching », and recognize the ignorance and barbarous diction of the man!

367.19 8.— Al-Ahwāzī claimed that al-Ashʿarī fitted that description, and that he was not a man of science and learning, and so for all like him among the mutakallimūn.

A. Al-Ahwāzī himself is the man whom this description fits! His own works amply demonstrate his shortcomings and

(72) Book, Tradition, and Consensus? The Arabic is: *al-taʿlīm al-thalāth* — which Ibn ʿAsākir would correct to: *taʿlīm thalāth hunna aṣl*, or, *ʿan al-ʿulūm al-thalāthat allawātī hunna aṣl...*

of those of others; for he who seeks out the vices of others does so in proportion to those which he himself has!»

364.16 1.— Al-Ahwāzī said: « I have remarked that the good estate of religion is threatened by serious opposition, and that neglect in this matter has become excessive. The leaders have become impotent and the multiplication of error abridgment [71]. The foolish are many, and the learned few. »

Answer: His words are true, but not to *his* purpose! If such had not been the case, a Persian from Ahwāz would not have shown such ignorant presumption in attacking a great Arab Imām. Had the learned in his day not been so few, the deceivers of Ahwāz would not have been able to stigmatize the Arabs of Baṣra. But the children of the Magians accused the sons of the Emigrants of atheism and irreligion out of pique and spite, because Ahwāz was one of the places conquered by Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī. But since al-Ahwāzī dared not calumniate Abū Mūsā, he tried to vent his spleen on Abuʾl-Ḥasan.

366.6 2.— Al-Ahwāzī's words « and the investigators of doubts have disappeared » must be true, for otherwise he would not himself have been able to profess such a dubious doctrine!

366.7 3.— He went on to say: « and seekers of the Sunna have become weak, except those to whom God has granted immunity and special help — and these are few indeed. » But how could he say that, when he claimed that the great multitude of men followed his doctrine?

366.10 4.— Then he said: «Truly God does not leave earth without a learned speaker and wise savant to speak the truth and

---

(71) Arabic: *waʾl-ikthār min al-bāṭil ījāzan.* Ibn ʿAsākir criticizes this use of *ījāz*. And what I have translated by « Leaders have become impotent » seems literally to be « heads have become buttocks ».

heretics what was common to the Ahl al-Sunna and explained what was held by all four of the Imāms and others.

362.1 We style ourselves « Ashʿarites » in matters pertaining to dogma, not by way of blind and unquestioning acceptance, but because we agree with the proofs established by al-Ashʿarī in such matters, and also in order to distinguish ourselves from the various heretics who were refuted by al-Ashʿarī. The four great Imāms did not differ regarding the basic principles of religion, but were agreed on *tawḥīd* and *tanzīh* (70) and the denial af *tashbīh*. If you consider the holding of *tanzīh* and the renouncement of *tashbīh* as « Ashʿarizing », then all who profess God's oneness are Ashʿarites!

363.5 There is a verse by al-Shāfiʿī in which he says : « If a love for the family of Muḥammad be *rafḍ*, then let men and jinn bear witness that I am a Rāfiḍite! » In a similar sense someone sang: « If you consider that one who denies all defects of his Lord has Ashʿarized, and think that he entertains innovation in his mind, then let men and jinn bear witness that I am an Ashʿarite !» It is also reported that someone once said to Abū ʿUmar b. Yamnālish: « They say that you are an Ashʿarite.» He replied: « What a blessing, if it be true! »

DIRECT REPLY TO AL-AHWĀZĪ

364.1 A few introductory remarks in condemnation of al-Ahwāzī. If the latter had not himself been possessed of so many defects and faults, he would not so readily have forged so many against a man not of his own race. His case recalls the remark a certain Bedouin is said to have made to another whom he heard speaking of the vices of others: « You have proved the multitude of your own vices by speaking so much

(70) i. e. removing (the human element from perfections predicated of God) — cf. SDA, s.v. *nazzaha*.

in technical terminology. Such terminology was used by the mutakallimūn to facilitate the progress of learners. The pious early Muslims did not use that terminology, but they had the same knowledge. Parallels are to be found in the development of the terminology used by jurisprudents, grammarians, and traditionists.

358.6 Preoccupation with the science of kalām is not an innovation. The early Muslims followed the way of reasoning and were not characterized by blind and unquestioning acceptance. The Companions, the Followers, and the successors of the latter were in, or close to, the age of the Apostle. It was only the advent of the Khawārij, Jahmiyya, Muʿtazila and Qadariyya which compelled the Ahl al-Sunna to busy themselves more explicitly with kalām. They followed the injunction of God: « And dispute with them, using what is best.» (16.125/126). There is certainly kalām in the Qurʾān itself.

359.3 In fine, then, two types of men are opposed to kalām: the ignorant, for men are always hostile to what they do not know; and the heretics, who fear that kalām will lay bare their heresies and evil beliefs.

THE NAME «ASHʿARITE»

359.14 Some ignorant heretics may say: « We recognize only four systems. Whence, then, this fifth *Ashʿarite* system? Why are you not content with being known as Shāfiʿites? » I reply: This objection is far-fetched and untrue. Why do you limit the systems to four? What about other systems such as those of al-Laith b. Saʿd of Egypt, and ʿUthmān b. Sulaimān al-Battī of Baṣra, and Isḥāq b. Rāhawaih of Khurāsān, and Daʾūd b. ʿAlī of Iṣbahān, and others? They differed on legal questions, but not on the fundamental principles of religion. Moreover, we do not concede that al-Ashʿarī originated a fifth system in the sense alleged. He simply defended against the

other Imāms of ours. ʿAbdallāh b. Yazīd b. Hurmuz of Medina, the Shaikh of Mālik b. Anas, the master of al-Shāfiʿī, was penetrating in his kalām and refutation of heretics. Al-Ḥusain b. al-Faḍl al-Bajilī relates the discussion which Zuhair b. Ḥarb had with al-Maʾmūn on the creation of the Qurʾān, and tells of the instruction which he (al-Bajilī) received from Zuhair.

354.4 Abuʾl-Maʿālī points out how the Companions and early Muslims had revelation and the Prophet's guidance under their eyes, as it were, and so had no need of the various Islāmic sciences (67). But as time went on various circumstances led to the development and organization of these sciences.

355.19 A testimony in favor of kalām is drawn from a dream of Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Yūsuf al-Juwainī. In that dream he saw Abraham and asked him his opinion on the science of kalām. Abraham replied: « By it doubts and vanities are repelled. »

356.5 Abuʾl-Qāsim al-Qushairī remarks that just as we distinguish between two men praying, the one distractedly and the other recollectedly, so we must distinguish between the ʿālim who cannot answer a difficulty and one who can. Kalām is the greatest jihād (68), for it is a jihād against *all* the enemies of religion. Alas, however, the men learned in the *uṣūl* (69) are very few nowadays! This is reinforced by some verse. And another verse citation contains the phrase: « every science is a servant of the science of kalām. »

357.11 The same Abuʾl-Qāsim denies that al-Ashʿarī held that most men are unbelievers because they do not know the science of kalām. But he and others did demand a reasonable knowledge of God and His attributes. This need not be phrased

(67) Cf. GAI, 101 ff.
(68) The « holy war » — cf. art. *Djihād*, in EI or Hwb.
(69) i.e. *uṣūl al-dīn* — kalām, or « theology ».

with Ḥafṣ and with others on such questions as the increase and decrease of faith, the vision of God, etc.

342.7 Two more incidents in which al-Shāfiʿī figures as an opponent of kalām. As a matter of fact he himself knew kalām well, but he preferred to avoid it when it was unnecessary. That was also the case with the early Muslims who were content with Book and Sunna with regard to the Qadar and other questions. But when Book and Sunna were attacked and impugned, our Imāms undertook to show that they were in harmony with reason.

345.1 There is another reason which explains the abstention from kalām by al-Shāfiʿī and others. When al-Shāfiʿī came to ʿIrāq during the caliphate of al-Rashīd, he visited al-Maʾmūn and saw the favor which the latter showed to Bishr al-Marīsī and other heretics. And when he returned to ʿIrāq during the caliphate of al-Maʾmūn and saw the prevalence of heresy, and knew the Miḥna in the time of al-Muʿtaṣim and al-Wāthiq, he, and other pious men like him, opposed associating with the rulers, and he advised his companions not to engage in kalām, lest they suffer from the Miḥna. His words to Abū Yaʿqūb al-Buwaiṭī — « You will die in iron » — were prophetic. For the latter was loaded with chains during the Miḥna, because he would not admit that the Qurʾān is created, and died in his bonds.

349.1 Everyone knows what befell Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and others during the Miḥna. Some were actually put to death, and some even capitulated. We are told that Abū Ibrāhīm al-Muzanī refused to discuss the creation of the Qurʾān. Abuʾl-Qāsim al-Anmāṭī took his place and brought forth telling arguments from Book, Sunna, Consensus, and reason.

351.13 All this shows why our Imāms abstained from kalām, and that the kalām they reproved was that of the heretics who opposed Book and Sunna. But kalām in conformity with Book and Sunna was approved of and engaged in by al-Shāfiʿī and

that it refers to the kalām of the innovators. It may also be explained as referring to the devoting of oneself to kalām to the exclusion of fiqh and practice. Ḥātim b. ʿUnwān al-Aṣamm said: « Kalām is the root of religion, fiqh its branch, and practice its fruit.» A similar saying, attributed to Abū Bakr al-Warrāq, speaks of kalām, fiqh, asceticism, and piety.

335.6 The objection to kalām drawn from the sayings of al-Shāfiʿī is more serious. He is reported to have said: « If a man were afflicted by everything which God has forbidden, save polytheism, it would be better for him than to be afflicted by kalām. I have known the devotees of kalām to say a thing which I never thought would be said by a Muslim. » Again: « No one ever engaged in kalām and was successful. » And: « If men knew the vain desires which are in kalām, they would flee it as they do the lion.» And on the occasion of the proximity of some men engaged in kalām: « Either be near us with good, or move away from us! »

336.12 Such sayings of al-Shāfiʿī are to be explained as expressions of disapproval of the kalām of innovators, particularly the Qadariyya. But kalām which conforms with Book and Sunna and explains the truths of the fundamental principles of religion when discord makes its appearance is praised by the ʿulamāʾ. Al-Shāfiʿī himself engaged in this praiseworthy kalām, e. g. with Ḥafṣ al-Fard on the question of the increation of the Qurʾān, and with Ibrāhīm b. Ismāʿīl b. ʿUlya on the *khabar al-wāḥid* (66). Al-Baihaqī tells us that al-Shāfiʿī's disapproval was aimed precisely at such kalām as that of Ḥafṣ al-Fard. But he can scarcely be said to have disapproved of all kalām in view of the fact that he himself engaged in it

---

(66) Lit. the testimony of one man, though the term was also used of any testimony which did not give *necessary* knowledge — cf. *Tamhīd*, 164.12 ff.

And Ibn ʿIyāḍ said: « The ways of guidance are not lonely because of the few who follow them, nor do they become dry because of the multitude of them who perish. » Ibn ʿAsākir then observes that those who persist in blaming the Ashʿarites after reading this book will be lying calumniators and will fully deserve the fate of such.

332.1 Citation of a *fatwā* (62) in which the Ashʿarites are praised and those who curse them are condemned. It is signed by the three distinguished Imāms, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Dāmighānī, Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī al-Fīrūzabādhī, and Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Shāshī.

THE LEGITIMACY OF KALĀM (63)

333.4 It may be objected that there is no glory for al-Ashʿarī in the fact that he was a mutakallim. For the best ʿulamāʾ of Islām have regarded kalām as an innovation and have strongly disapproved of it. Moreover, even if no other had done so, the fact that al-Shāfiʿī (64) condemned kalām would be enough to damn it. Furthermore, a tradition attributed to al-Shaʿbī, and in two other versions to Abū Yūsuf and Mālik b. Anas, affirms that he who seeks religion by kalām becomes a zindīq (65).

334.7 Abū Bakr al-Baihaqī explains that tradition by saying

(62) A legal decision, given by a *muftī*, concerning a problem of conduct — almost like an authoritative solution of a « casus conscientiae ».

(63) This section is very interesting from the standpoint of the historical development of Muslim theology. It seems significant that Ibn ʿAsākir finds it relevant, and possibly necessary, to devote so much space to the subject.

(64) The famous founder of what came to be known as the Shāfiʿite school (of jurisprudence). Cf. J. Schacht, *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1950.

(65) Cf. art., s.v., in EI or Hwb. « Freethinker » conveys the general idea, though the epithet was often used to stigmatize various kinds of adversaries.

321 75. Our Shaikh, the Qāḍī the Imām Abu'l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Salāma b. ʿUbaidallāh b. Mukhallad, known as Ibn al-Ruṭbī (d. 527/1132-3).

322 76. Our Shaikh, the Imām Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Furawī (Mehren: Furāwī) al-Naisābūrī (d. 530/1135-6).

325 77. Our Shaikh, the Imām Abū Saʿd Ismāʿīl b. Abī Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Ṣamad al-Naisābūrī, known as al-Kirmānī (452/1060-1 — 531/1136-7).

326 78. Our Shaikh, the Imām Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Sulamī al-Dimashqī (450-2/1058-60 — 533/1138-9).

327 79. Our Shaikh, the Imām Abū Manṣūr Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Munʿim b. Māshādhah (d. 536/1141-2).

328 80. The Imām Abu'l-Futūḥ Muḥammad b. al-Faḍl b. Muḥammad b. al-Muʿtamid al-Isfarāʾīnī (d. 538/1143-4).

330 81. Our Shaikh, the Imām Abu'l-Fatḥ Naṣrallāh b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Qawī al-Maṣīṣī (448/1056-7 — 542/1147-8).

330.12 (Ibn ʿAsākir) Those whom I have mentioned are outnumbered by those left unmentioned. I should have said much more about the distinguished Ashʿarites, were it not that I am aiming at brevity. Enough has been said to illustrate the point. Just as I cannot number the stars of heaven, so I am unable to exhaust the list of those who have followed the teaching of al-Ashʿarī. Let the merits of those mentioned be an indication of the merits of those unmentioned. The mere mention of upright men calls down the blessings of God!

331.6 Someone may object that the great majority of men, in different times and countries, have not followed the teaching of al-Ashʿarī. The answer to this is that the men who really count did follow al-Ashʿarī. In this matter it is quality, and not number, which is to be desired. God Himself said: « And only a few believed along with him » (11.40/42), and again, « Rare among my creatures is the truly thankful » (34.13/12).

276 61. Abuʾl-Muẓaffar al-Isfarāʾīnī (d. 471/1078-9).

276 62. The Shaikh Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī b. Yūsuf al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083-4).

278 63. The Imām Abuʾl-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbdallāh b. Yūsuf al-Juwainī al-Naisābūrī (419/1028 — 478/1085-6). The Imām al-Ḥaramain, son of No. 47.

286 64. Abuʾl-Fatḥ Naṣr b. Ibrāhīm al-Muqaddasī (d. 490/1096-7).

287 65. Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ṭabarī, Nazīl Makka (d. 498/1104-5).

V.— *THE FIFTH CLASS*

This class includes men of whom Ibn ʿAsākir was a contemporary, some of whom he knew by sight or from being with them in assemblies.

288 66. Abuʾl-Muẓaffar al-Khawāfī al-Naisābūrī (d. 500/1106-7).

288 67. The Imām Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī, known as al-Kiyā (d. 504/1110-1).

291 68. The Imām Abū Ḥamid al-Ṭūsī al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111).

306 69. The Imām Abū Bakr al-Shāshī (d. 507/1113-4) ([61 bis]).

307 70. The Imām Abuʾl-Qāsim al-Anṣārī al-Naisābūrī (d. 512/1118-9).

308 71. The Imām Abū Naṣr ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Hawāzin al-Qushairī (d. 514/1120-1). Son of No. 59.

318 72. Our Shaikh, the Imām Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan b. Sulaimān (Mehren: Salmān) al-Iṣbahānī (d. 525/1130-1).

320 73. The Shaikh, the Imām Abū Saʿīd Asʿad b. Abī Naṣr b. al-Faḍl al-ʿUmarī al-Mīhanī (d. 527/1132-3).

321 74. Our Shaikh, the Sharīf the Imām Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Jinnī al-ʿUthmānī al-Dībājī al-Muqaddasī (462/1069-70 — 527/1132-3).

(61 bis) The date in the text, 577, is surely a mistake — cf. GAL, G I, 390, where the date is given as 507, which fits in with Ibn ʿAsākir's chronological listing according to the date of death.

256 46. Abū Bakr al-Dimashqī al-Zāhid, known as Ibn al-Jirmī (d. 436/1044-5).

257 47. The Imām Abū Muḥammad al-Juwainī (d. 438/1046-7). The father of Imām al-Ḥaramain, No. 63.

258 48. Abu'l-Qāsim b. Abī ʿUthmān al-Hamdānī al-Baghdādī (355/966 — 440/1048-9).

259 49. Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Simnānī, the Qāḍī of Mosul (361/971-2 — 444/1052-3).

260 50. Abū Ḥātim al-Ṭabarī, known as al-Qazwīnī (?).

260 51. Abu'l-Ḥasan Rishā b. Naẓīf al-Dimashqī (d. 444/1052-3).

261 52. Abū Muḥammad al-Iṣbahānī, known as Ibn al-Labbān (d. 446/1054-5).

262 53. Abu'l-Fatḥ Salīm b. Ayyūbī al-Rāzī (d. 447/1055-6, aged more than eighty).

263 54. Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Khabbāzī al-Naisābūrī (d.447/1055-6).

264 55. Abu'l-Faḍl b. ʿAmrūs (Mehren: Amroush) al-Baghdādī al-Mālikī (372/982-3 — 452/1060).

265 56. The Ustādh Abu'l-Qāsim al-Isfarā'īnī (d. 452/1060). A teacher of Imām al-Ḥaramain.

265 57. Abū Bakr al-Naisābūrī al-Baihaqī al-Ḥāfiẓ (384/994 — 458/1065-6).

IV.— *THE FOURTH CLASS*

This class consists of men who sought light in al-Ashʿarī's penetrating exposition through imitating and following his views.

268 58. Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī al-Ḥāfiẓ, known as al-Khaṭīb (391/1000-1 — 463/1070-1).

271 59. Abu'l-Qāsim al-Qushairī al-Naisābūrī, then al-Ustuwā'ī (376/986-7 — 465/1072-3).

276 60. Abū ʿAlī b. Abī Ḥarīṣa (Mehren: Haridha — حريضة) al-Hamdānī al-Dimashqī (d. 466/1073-4).

233 28. Abū Saʿd b. Abī ʿUthmān al-Naisābūrī al-Kharkūshī (d. 406-7/1015-7).

236 29. The Qāḍī Abū ʿUmar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain al-Bisṭāmī (d. 407-8/1016-18).

238 30. Abuʾl-Qāsim b. Abī ʿAmr al-Bajilī al-Baghdādī (d. 410/1019-20).

239 31. Abuʾl-Ḥasan b. Māshādhah al-Iṣbahānī (d. 414/1023-4).

240 32. The Sharīf Abū Ṭālib b. al-Muhtadī al-Hāshimī al-Dimashqī (d. 415/1024-5).

240 33. Abū Maʿmar b. Abī Saʿd b. Abī Bakr al-Jurjānī (?) Son of No. 20, grandson of No. 9, nephew of No. 26.

241 34. Abū Ḥāzim al-ʿAbdawī al-Naisābūrī (d. 417/1026-7).

243 35. The Ustādh Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī (d. 418/1027-8).

245 36. Abū ʿAlī b. Shādhān al-Baghdādī (339/950-1 — 426/1034-5).

246 37. Abū Naʿīm al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Iṣbahānī (336/947-8 — 430/1038-9).

247 38. Abū Ḥāmid Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Dalwiya (Mehren: ابه دلويه) al-Ustuwāʾī al-Dalwī (d. 434/1042-3).

III. — *THE THIRD CLASS*

This class consists of those who met the companions of al-Ashʿarī's companions and acquired knowledge from them.

248 39. Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Sukkarī al-Baghdādī, the poet (357/967-8 — 413/1022-3).

249 40. Abū Manṣūr al-Ayyūbī al-Naisābūrī (d. 421/1030).

249 41. The Qāḍī Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. ʿAlī al-Baghdādī (d. 422/1031).

250 42. Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Naʿīmī al-Baṣrī (d. 423/1031-2).

252 43. Abū Ṭāhir b. Kharāsha al-Dimashqī (d. 428/1036-7).

253 44. The Ustādh Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Naisābūrī, known as al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037-8).

255 45. Abū Dharr al-Harawī (355-6/966-7 — 434/1042-3).

195 11. Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Mahdī al-Ṭabarī (?).

196 12. Abū Jaʿfar al-Sulamī al-Baghdādī al-Naqqāsh (294/906-7-379/989).

197 13. Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Iṣbahānī, known as al-Shāfiʿī (d. 381/991-2).

197 14. Abū Muḥammad al-Qurashī al-Zuhrī (d. 382/992-3).

198 15. Abū Bakr al-Bukhārī, known as al-Ūdanī (d.385/995).

199 16. Abū Manṣūr b.Ḥimshād (Mehren : Mimshād) al-Naisābūrī (316/928 — 388/998).

200 17. The Shaikh Abu'l-Ḥusain b. Samʿūn al-Baghdādī al-Mudhakkir (300/912-3 — 387/997).

206 18. Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Shurūṭī al-Jurjānī (d. 389/999).

206 19. Abū ʿAlī al-Faqīh al-Sirakhsī (293/905-6 — 389-999).

II.— *THE SECOND CLASS*

This class consists of those who were the companions of the companions of al-Ashʿarī.

207 20. Abū Saʿd b. Abī Bakr al-Ismāʿīlī al-Jurjānī (333/944-5 — 396/1005-6).

211 21. Abu'l-Ṭayyib b. Abī Sahl al-Ṣuʿlūkī al-Naisābūrī (?). The son of No. 6.

214 22. Abu'l-Ḥasan b. Daʾūd al-Muqrī al-Dārānī al-Dimashqī (d.402/1011-2).

217 23. The Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-Ṭayyib b. al-Bāqillānī al-Baṣrī (d. 403/1013).

226 24. Abū ʿAlī al-Daqqāq al-Naisābūrī (d. 405/1014-5).

227 25. Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamdawaih (Mehren : Ḥamuwaih and حمدويه) (321/933 — 405/1014-5).

231 26. Abū Naṣr b. Abī Bakr al-Ismāʿīlī al-Jurjānī (d.405/1014-5) The son of No. 9.

232 27. Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Fūrak al-Iṣbahānī (d. 406/1015-6).

DISTINGUISHED ASHʿARITES

177.1 Ibn ʿAsākir now embarks upon a series of more or less biographical notices of famous Ashʿarites. ([61]) The number and quality of these is a testimony to the excellence of al-Ashʿarī himself based on the principle: « The merit of the follower is a proof of the merit of him who is followed.»

I.— THE FIRST CLASS

This class consists of those who were al-Ashʿarī's contemporaries. They were those who followed his teaching, or who actually studied under him.

177 1. Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Mujāhid al-Baṣrī (d. 370/980-1).
178 2. Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Bāhilī al-Baṣrī (?).
179 3. Abu'l-Ḥusain Bandār b. al-Ḥusain al-Shīrāzī al-Ṣūfī (d. 353/964).
181 4. Abū Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī, known as al-ʿIrāqī (d. 359/970).
182 5. Abū Bakr al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī (d. 365/975-6).
183 6. Abū Sahl al-Ṣuʿlūkī al-Naisābūrī (276/889 — 369/979).
188 7. Abū Zaid al-Marwazī (d. 371/981-2).
190 8. Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Khafīf al-Shīrāzī al-Ṣūfī (d.371/981-2).
192 9. Abū Bakr al-Jurjānī, known as al-Ismāʿīlī (277/890 - 371/981-2).
195 10. Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Muḥammad b. Isḥāq al-Ṭabarī, known as « al-dml » (?) (Mehren: al-Dummal).

(61) I have contented myself with listing the names and the dates so that the interested reader may know those whom the author thought worthy of mention. The « biographies » are very unequal in merit, but often some interesting information is given. Mehren gives some references to some of the men listed. I cannot guarantee the correctness of my transliterations, since I was unable to check on all the names, and of course the texts contain none ot the short vowels or any indication of doubled consonants.

(39.18/19). We are asked to remark especially the passages concerning Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal in order that we may know that he and al-Ashʿarī agreed in their belief and were not at variance regarding the fundamental principles of religion and the doctrine of the Sunna. Of old the Baghdad Ḥanbalites invoked the assistance of the Ashʿarites against the heretics. For those Ḥanbalites were mutakallimūn belonging to the Ahl al-Ithbāt, and those of them who discoursed in refutation of the heretics did so in the language of the Ashʿarites.

163.12 That was the case until disagreement arose in the time of Abū Naṣr al-Qushairī, during the ministry of al-Naẓẓām. There has always been a group of the Ḥanbalites who exaggerate regarding the Sunna. The fact that these were always ready to stir up trouble reflects no discredit on Aḥmad. Ibn Shāhīn said: « Two upright men were sorely tried by evil followers: Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.»

164.3 A citation from Abuʾl-Maʿālī ʿAzīzī b. ʿAbd al-Malik, largely concerned with al-Ashʿarī's ancestry. In the few lines which describe al-Ashʿarī's work as a defense of truth based on tradition and reason the four « loci », or sources, of al-Ashʿarī are mentioned: al-Kitāb, al-Sunna, al-Ijmāʿ, al-Qiyās (Qurʾān, Tradition, Consensus, Reasoning).

165.6 *THREE DREAM-ANECDOTES* [60]

LAUDATORY VERSE

167.9 Twelve citations from poems in praise of al-Ashʿarī. There are 153 lines in all, but they add nothing new to the material already cited in the more pedestrian vehicle of prose.

---

(60) These are interesting, but they scarcely add anything very pertinent.

after embracing Islām, and that some of them had not really embraced Islām. And the Umawiyya held that they could not be wrong at all. But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that every *mujtahid* (58) is right, and that all of them were in the right, and that they did not differ about fundamental principles, but only about secondary conclusions, and that each one's *ijtihād* led to something, and that he was right and received reward and recompense for that.

152.4 13.— And the same was true of other principles too numerous to enumerate and relate. Al-Ashʿarī did not follow these ways out of vain desire or wilfulness, nor did he originate them by way of innovation and personal opinion. Rather did he affirm them because of tried rational demonstrations and tested proofs from positive sources and signs leading to the truth and arguments summoning to the right and the true. These are the ways to God Most High, and the path to salvation and deliverance. He who holds fast to them will be delivered and saved; but he who deviates from them will stray and be misled.

THE SOUNDNESS OF HIS DOCTRINE

152.11 To show the soundness of al-Ashʿarī's beliefs, Ibn ʿAsākir now quotes the *Ibāna* from its beginning to the end of the Creed. Then he says:

163.3 Reflect on the clarity and expository force of this creed, and acknowledge the excellence of this Imām who explained and elucidated it! (59) Behold the easy eloquence and excellence of its expression, and be of those of whom God said: « Those who listen to the word and follow the best of it »

---

(58) One who exercises *ijtihād* — personal exertion in solving a problem or determining a course of action; cf. art. *Idjtihād*, in EI or Hwb.

(59) The reader may form some judgment on this creed from the translation of it in App. IV.

once sincerely believes in God does not become an unbeliever by apostasy or unbelief, and that a grave sin is never written against him. And the Muʿtazila held that a grave sinner, despite his having believed and obeyed for a hundred years, will never emerge from the Fire. But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that the grave sinner who is a believer and professes God's oneness is dependent on the will of God: if God wills, He will pardon him and introduce him into the Garden; and if God wills, He will punish him for his crime and then introduce him into the Garden; but no individual and distinct grave sin is punished by a continuous and perpetual punishment.

151.10 10.— In like manner, the Rāfiḍa held that the Apostle of God and ʿAlī have the power to intercede without God's command or leave, and that even though they were to intercede for unbelievers, their intercession would be acceptable. And the Muʿtazila held that Muḥammad has no power of intercession whatsoever. But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that the Apostle intercedes acceptably in the case of believers who deserve punishment, interceding for them by God's command and permission, and not interceding save for whom He wills.

151.15 11.— Likewise, the Khawārij held that ʿUthmān and ʿAlī were guilty of unbelief, whereas al-Ashʿarī enjoined the profession of friendship for them both and preference of the former to the latter.

151.17 12.— Similarly, the Muʿtazila held that the Caliph Muʿāwiya and Ṭalḥa and al-Zubair and the Mother of the Faithful, ʿĀʾisha (57), and all who followed them were in the wrong, and that even though they were to bear witness concerning a single seed, their testimony would be unacceptable. And the Rāfiḍa held that all these were unbelievers who apostatized

(57) The doings of these will be found chronicled in Muir, *The Caliphate*.

is the descent of some of God's signs and of His angels, and that the « being firmly seated » (on the Throne) means God's dominion. And the Mushabbiha and the Ḥashwiyya held that the descent is the descent of God Himself, involving motion and movement from place to place, and that the being firmly seated is sitting on the Throne and localization thereon. But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that the descent is one of God's attributes, and that the being firmly seated is one of His attributes, and that the action of His action on the Throne is called « being firmly seated ».

150.14 7.— In like manner, the Muʿtazila held that God's speech is created, produced, originated. And the Ḥashwiyya al-Mujassima held that the separate letters, and the bodies written upon, and the colors in which the writing is executed, and everything between the two covers, are antecedently eternal. But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that the Qurʾān is God's speech, eternal, immutable, uncreated, unbegun, and unoriginated; but the separate letters, the bodies, the colors, the sounds, things limited, and all the qualified things of the world are created, originated, produced.

150.20 8.— Likewise, the Muʿtazila, Jahmiyya, and Najjāriyya held that faith is created absolutely. And the Ḥashwīyya al-Mujassima held that faith is eternal absolutely. But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that faith is of two kinds: the faith of God, which is eternal, because He said: « the Faithful, (55bis) the Watcher » (59.23); and the faith of creatures, which is created, because it becomes manifest in them and they are rewarded according to its sincerity and punished according to its uncertainty.

151.4 9.— And similarly, the Murjiʾa (56) held that he who

(55bis) Blachère : le Pacificateur (?) — cf. his note, II, 981.

(56) The Postponers — cf. *Tritton*, 44 ff. ; art. *Murdjiʾa* (Wensinck), in EI or Hwb ; *Watt*, 42 ff.

149,13 2.— Similarly, Jahm b. Ṣafwān held that the creature can neither create nor acquire anything. And the Muʿtazila held that he can both create and acquire. But al-Ashʿarī followed a course between them and held that the creature cannot create, but can acquire, and he denied the power to create and affirmed the power to acquire.

149.17 3.— In like manner, the Ḥashwiyya al-Mushabbiha held that God will be seen, qualified and limited, like all things seen. And the Muʿtazila and Jahmiyya and Najjāriyya (54) held that God will not be seen in any state whatsoever. But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that God will be seen without any localization or limits or qualification; just as He sees us without being Himself limited or qualified, so we shall see Him without His being limited or qualified.

150.2 4.— Likewise, the Najjāriyya held that the Creator is in every place without localization or direction. And the Ḥashwiyya and Mujassima held that God is localized on the Throne, and that the Throne is a place for Him, and that He is sitting on it. But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that God was when no place was, and then He created the Throne and the Seat without His needing a place, and He was just the same after creating place as He had been before He created it.

150.6 5.— And the Muʿtazila held that God has a hand in the sense of power and grace, and that His face is a « face of existence ». And the Ḥashwiyya held that God's hand is a corporal member, and that His face is a « face of form ». But al-Ashʿarī followed a middle course between them and held that God's hand is a « hand of attribute », and that His face is a « face of attribute », as in the case of hearing and seeing.

150.9 6.— Similarly, the Muʿtazila held that the « descent » (55)

(54) Followers of al-Najjār — cf. *Tritton*, 71 ff.

(55) Cf. App. IV, *Maqālāt* 38, *Ibāna* 37; *Ibāna* (Klein) 85; MC 90.

AL-ASHʿARĪ'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HERETICS

148.12 Abū ʿAlī Zāhir b. Aḥmad said that al-Ashʿarī died in his arms, and that he muttered something as he was dying. Abū ʿAlī leaned over and listened and heard these words: «God curse the Muʿtazila! They confused men and lied!»

149.1 According to another account Abū ʿAlī said: «When the time of al-Ashʿarī's term drew near in my house in Baghdad, he called me. I came to him and he said: 'Be my witness that I accuse no one of the people of this *qibla* of unbelief, for they all point to the same God. But all this is only a difference of expressions.'»

THE MIDDLE POSITION OF AL-ASHʿARĪ (51)

149.5 The Qāḍī Abu'l-Maʿālī mentioned al-Ashʿarī and said:

1.— He studied the books of the Muʿtazila, the Jahmiyya, and the Rāfiḍa, and saw that they stripped and cancelled and held that God has no knowledge, no power, no hearing, no sight, no life, no perdurance, and no will. On the other hand, the Ḥashwiyya (52) and the Mujassima and the Mukayyifa al-Muḥaddida (53) held that God has a knowledge like other knowledges, and a power like other powers, and a hearing like other hearings, and a sight like other sights. But al-Ashʿarī followed a course between them and held that God has a knowledge which is not like other knowledges, and a power which is not like other powers, and a hearing which is not like other hearings, and a sight which is not like other sights.

---

(51) Cf. GAI, 58-9; and L. Gardet's art. *Raison et foi en Islām*, Revue Thomiste, 1937, 457-464.

(52) Cf. A. S. Halkin's art. *The Ḥashwiyya*, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 54 (1934) 1-28.

(53) i.e. those who attribute a shape and assign limits (to God). The epithets seem to be generic.

date is 324/935-6. Perhaps al-Wazzān meant to say « a little after 320 » rather than « a little after 330. » Ibn Fūrak mentions 324, and he was in a position to know, because he was a disciple of al-Bāhilī, who was a disciple of al-Ashʿarī.

A DREAM

147.13 The Shaikh Abu'l-Ḥusain b. Samʿūn said that he had a certain companion who used to frequent his assembly. This man was virtuous, handsome, and zealous. The Shaikh gave this excellent man a fine burial, when he died, and then: « A few days later I saw him in sleep, and he was naked, deformed, and miserable looking. So I said to him: 'O ʿAbdallāh, what has God done to you?' He replied: 'I have been repelled, as you see.' I said: 'But did you not think rightly of God Most High?' He answered: 'Yes, but I thought ill of this Shaikh.' I looked, and there was a Shaikh, exceedingly tall, bright in appearance, well-formed, sweet smelling, with beautiful features, reciting in a loud and splendid voice: 'We have found what our Lord promised us to be true. Have you found what your Lord promised to be true?' (7.44/42) He was looking at that wretched companion of mine, and with him were an innumerable multitude of men. And I asked about him and was told: 'This is Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. God has pardoned him.' And I think that they said: 'And God has constituted him intercessor for his companions.'» Ibn ʿAsākir remarks that he himself has heard it reported that al-Ashʿarī, like his ancestor Abū Mūsā, was described as having a beautiful voice — just as he was heard by Ibn Samʿūn in his dream. [50]

---

(50) Dreams figure very often in the old biographies and accounts. We have seen some examples in the accounts of Ashʿarī's conversion, and both of his creeds contain an article on visions seen during sleep — *Maqālāt* 49, *Ibāna* 47, in App. IV. I am not aware of any study devoted to this subject. Cf. *Handbook*, s.v. Dream(s), 61-2.

continually in his company in Baghdad until he died. I never met a godlier man or one who kept his eyes averted more, and I never saw a Shaikh more restrained concerning the things of this world or more active about the things of the next world.»

141.15 The Qāḍī Abu'l-Maʿālī spoke highly of al-Ashʿarī's services to truth and religion and of his putting to flight the forces of error and heresy. Bandār b. al-Ḥusain is quoted to the effect that al-Ashʿarī's yearly expenditure amounted to seventeen dirhams.

A PECULIAR GRACE

142.12 Ibn ʿAsākir devotes this section to the special grace enjoyed by al-Ashʿarī by reason of his belonging to the best of the centuries of the Islāmic Community. This claim is based on a tradition from Muḥammad which is cited in three forms, each slightly different from the other two [49]. Here is the one related from ʿAbdallāh:

143.11 « The Apostle of God said: The best of my Community are those of my century, then those who will follow them, then those who will follow them, then those who will follow them; then will come people among whom one's *shahāda* will outstrip his oath, and his oath will outstrip his *shahāda*.»

145.4 Four traditions cited to prove that a « qarn » is a hundred years. This is the word translated in the previous citation by « century ».

THE DATES OF AL-ASHʿARĪ

146.14 Abū Bakr al-Wazzān is the authority for the statement that al-Ashʿarī was born in the year 260/873-4. There is a difference of opinion regarding the date of his death, but the best

(49) Many references to this tradition in Wensinck, *Handbook*, 48 A.

the doctrine of al-Ashʿarī and composed works agreeing with it. « However, some of our associates among the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamāʿa hold that Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī erred on some questions, e.g. his identification of *al-takwīn* and *al-mukawwin* (47), etc., as will appear.... So he who is aware of the questions in which Abu'l-Ḥasan erred and knows his error may fearlessly read his books. Indeed many of our companions among the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamāʿa have accepted his books and studied them.»

140.13 (Ibn ʿAsākir) The questions referred to in the preceding citation bring no discredit on al-Ashʿarī and do not involve him in unbelief, deviation, or heresy. Careful study will show that there is really basic agreement. The ʿulamā' have constantly disputed certain points among themselves and have exerted themselves in research and examination without that being considered a fault on their part. His two companions opposed Abū Ḥanīfa on certain points in times past. God covers all the ʿulamā' with His mercy and assembles us all in their party by His kindness and compassion !

AL-ASHʿARĪ'S PIETY AND ASCETICISM

141.5 Abu'l-Ḥusain al-Sarawī used to say that for nearly twenty years al-Ashʿarī was accustomed to say his morning prayer with the night ablution (48), and that he never said a word about his zeal to anyone. Abū ʿImrān Mūsā b. Aḥmad b. ʿAlī the jurisprudent said that he had heard his father say: « I served the Imām Abu'l-Ḥasan in Baṣra for several years, and I was

---

(47) *Takwīn*: production, or creation ; *mukawwin* : producer, or creator. The reference may be to the question : Is the *ṣifa* (attribute) the same as the *waṣf* (description), or as the *mawṣūf* (the qualified, described) ?

(48) This may refer to his taking very little sleep ; but I am puzzled by the Arabic here.

of al-Ashʿarī's book *Fīʾl-Naqḍ ʿalaʾl-Jubbāʾī fīʾl-Uṣūl* (44), in forty parts, from the copy which the last named had made from al-Ashʿarī's own copy in Baṣra.

128.14 The works of al-Ashʿarī. (Cf. Appendix III).

136.14 The *khuṭba* of al-Ashʿarī's *Tafsīr* (45).

139.7 Abuʾl-ʿAbbās, known as Qāḍīʾl-ʿAskar, tells us how he examined the books of those who had written on *ʿilm al-tawḥīd* (46). Those by philosophers, such as Isḥāq al-Kindī, al-Isfarāzī, and others, stray far from the straight path of religion. They should not be read, since they lead to perilous places, being filled with polytheism and hypocrisy under the name of *tawḥīd*. Hence the Ahl al-Sunna waʾl-Jamāʿa took nothing from their books. Then there were the books of the Muʿtazila, such as ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Rāzī, al-Jubbāʾī, al-Kaʿbī, al-Naẓẓām, and others. These, too, should not be read, lest they create doubts, injure faith, and lead to heresy. And therefore the Ahl al-Sunna waʾl-Jamāʿa took nothing from those books. Then there were the books of the Mujassima, such as Muḥammad b. al-Haiṣam and others, which should also be avoided, for those are the worst of heretics.

139.20 « And I found many books on this subject by Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. They number nearly two hundred, and *al-Mūjiz al-Kabīr* contains all that is in his books. Al-Ashʿarī had composed a large work to prove the doctrine of the Muʿtazila — for he followed that doctrine at first. Then God showed him their error and he abandoned what he had held of their doctrine and composed a work refuting what he had written in defense of the Muʿtazila.» The Shāfiʿites followed

(44) This seems to be Nº 16 of the list in App. III.

(45) i.e. the Preface (or Introduction) to his Commentary on the Qurʾān — App. III, Nº 61. This *khuṭba* is competent, but not especially remarkable.

(46) i.e. theology — lit. the science of the profession of God's unicity.

126.13 Another tradition reports ʿAbdallāh b. Masʿūd as saying : « The apostle of God asked me : 'What bonds of Islām are the strongest ?' I said : 'God and His Apostle know best.' He said : 'Ruling in God, love in God, and hatred in God. And O ʿAbdallāh, do you know which man is the most learned ?' I said : 'God and His Apostle know best.' He said : 'Verily the most learned is he who is most learned in the truth when men disagree, even though he be remiss in practice, and even though he crawl on his buttocks.' » And ʿAbdallāh is reported to have said : « Let him who has knowledge speak of what he knows ; and let him who has no knowledge say : God knows best.' » Ibn ʿAsākir says that such traditions are a perfect description of al-Ashʿarī and of his work.

127.9 Abū Bakr b. Fūrak : « The Shaikh Abuʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī turned from the doctrines of the Muʿtazila to the defense of the doctrines of the Ahl al-Sunna waʾl-Jamāʿa by means of rational arguments and composed many works along those lines.» After a brief mention of al-Ashʿarī's background he continues : « When God helped the Shaikh Abuʾl-Ḥasan to abandon his Muʿtazilite errors and guided him to the defense of the Ahl al-Sunna waʾl-Jamāʿa, he became prominent and his works had a wide circulation after the year 300/912-3. He lived until the year 324/935-6.»

127.19 Ibn Fūrak then mentions some of al-Ashʿarī's companions and disciples. One was Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Bāhilī, formerly a distinguished Imāmī (43), converted as the result of a disputation with al-Ashʿarī. Others were Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Rummāni, Abū ʿAbdallāh Hamawaih al-Sīrāfī, Abū ʿAlī Zāhir b. Aḥmad al-Sirakhsī, Abū Zaid al-Marwazī, Abū Sahl al-Ṣuʿlūkī, and Abū Naṣr al-Kawwāzī. Ibn Fūrak tells us that he made a copy

(43) An Imāmite (one of the Imāmiyya). Cf. EI or Hwb under *Imām*, and *Ithnā ʿAsharīya* ; al-Nawbakhtī, *Firaq al-Shīʿa* (ed. Ritter, Istanbul, 1931) 90 ff.

Al-Ashʿarī replies readily enough with two traditions, both isnāds beginning with the name of his master, al-Sājī, and both affirming that there is no prayer without the Fātiḥa. Ibn ʿAsākir remarks that an intelligent and sharp-minded person will see in this story a proof that al-Ashʿarī was a Shāfiʿite. So said Abū Bakr b. Fūrak in the *Kitāb Ṭabaqāt* (40) *al-Mutakallimīn* and others of our Imāms and Shaikhs.

125.2 Enough for Abu'l-Ḥasan that his excellence is attested by such outstanding Imāms, and sufficient for his glory that he is praised by such prominent ʿulamā'. He cannot be harmed by witless calumnies wich are no more than mere assertions and bare accusations !

THE RENOWN OF HIS LEARNING

125.12 Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Isfarā'īnī is reported to have said : « By the side of the Shaikh Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Bāhilī I was like a drop of water in the sea, and I have heard that Shaikh say that by the side of the Shaikh al-Ashʿarī he was like a drop of water beside the sea. » Abū Jaʿfar al-Simnānī, the « Crown of the ʿUlamā' », said that someone once said to the Qāḍī, the « Tongue of the Community », al-Bāqillānī that his kalām was better than that of Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. Al-Bāqillānī retorted : « By God ! The best of my circumstances is that I understand the kalām of Abu'l-Ḥasan ! »

126.5 Ibn ʿAbbās explained the Qur'ānic text « Obey God and obey the Apostle and your leaders » (41) by saying : « That means the men of *fiqh* and of *dīn* (42) and those obedient servants of God who teach men the contents of their religion and command them to do what is good and forbid them to do what is evil ; hence God made obedience to them obligatory. »

---

(40) « The Classes of... »
(41) Qur. 4.59/62.
(42) « Religion ».

peculiar to himself.» Just as the people of Medina became Mālikites, though Mālik himself simply followed others, so did the Ahl al-Sunna become Ashʿarites.

118.11 Al-Māyurqī goes on to mention some details concerning such outstanding Ashʿarites as al-Bāqillānī, Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Azdī, Abū Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, Abū Muḥammad b. Abī Zaid, and Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Qābisī.

122.13 Abuʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī of Qairawān, known as Ibn al-Qābisī, in answer to a question from a Tunisian, said: « Know that Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī's only aim in this (kalām) was to explain and to confirm the *sunan* and to dispel doubts about them... He was only one of a group who undertook to defend the truth... As for your saying that theology was perfected only by the doctrine of al-Ashʿarī, why this shows that you understand that al-Ashʿarī held theological doctrines which put him outside the Ahl al-Ḥaqq... He himself refuted those who urged that against him. Al-Ashʿarī died, and the Ahl al-Sunna wept for him, whereas the innovators were delighted to be rid of him. Whoever describes him otherwise simply does not know him. »

123.10 The Mālikite, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Zaid of Qairawān, in a letter which he wrote in reply to accusations made against al-Ashʿarī by the Muʿtazilite, ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Ismāʿīl of Baghdad, said of al-Ashʿarī: «He is famous for his refutation of heretics and Qadariyya and Jahmiyya, and held fast to the *sunan*. I have it (ultimately) from ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir the Ṣūfī, who said: I saw Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī in the Mosque of Baṣra. He had just silenced the Muʿtazila in disputation when one of those present said to him: 'We know very well your profound knowledge of kalām, but I am going to ask you about an outstanding problem of jurisprudence.' Al-Ashʿarī said: 'Ask what you will.' The other said: 'What is your view regarding prayer without the Fātiḥa ? [39]'»

(39) The first Sura of the Qurʾān, the « Opener ».

Mūsā al-Māyurqī we are told that in the time of the Miḥna [33], under al-Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim, such men as Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Makkī, and al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī refrained in pious horror from disputing with the Muʿtazila. But al-Ashʿarī wrote works against them and sought them out to dispute with them, so that the true doctrine of the Ahl al-Sunna might prevail over the pernicious Muʿtazilite teaching which had been gaining ground under the aegis of prominent men. He soon became a center of attachment for Mālikites, Shāfiʿites, and some Ḥanafites. [34] The arguments of his kalām were used by the Ahl al-Sunna in east and west. He wrote numberless works, among them his *Mukhtazan*, on the Qurʾān, which is said to have reached the Sura of the Cave [35] in one hundred books.

117.11 Al-Māyurqī says that al-Ashʿarī was a Mālikite, though the Shāfiʿites have claimed that he was of their rite. [36] Nowadays the Ahl al-Sunna are Ashʿarite in their theology because al-Ashʿarī's works were so numerous and so widely read. But « he was not the first mutakallim in the tongue of the Ahl al-Sunna. He simply followed the *sunan* [37] of others and championed a well-known body of beliefs. His own contribution to that *madhhab* [38] was by way of argument and exposition; but he introduced no new doctrine of his own, nor any belief

---

(33) i.e. the « inquisition » — cf. W. M. Patton, *Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, Leyden, 1897.

(34) Three of the four chief « rites », or legal schools — cf. the handbooks on Islām. The fourth, the Ḥanbalite, is omitted — perhaps significantly. It will be seen that there was a certain amount of Ḥanbalite opposition to Ashʿarī and Ashʿarism.

(35) Sura (Chapter) 18 of the Qurʾān — a little less than half way through the text. Is this N° 48 of the list of Ashʿarī's works? Cf. the note added there.

(36) Cf. al-Kawtharī's note, p. 117, in which it is said that Ashʿarī was really a Ḥanafite.

(37) Plural of *sunna* — custom, practice, « tradition ».

(38) System of belief, doctrine, « school ».

ill of all the Ahl al-Sunna. » Dated: Dhuʾl-Qaʿda of the year 436/1045; written by ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Hawāzin al-Qushairī.

113.9 Then follow the autograph expressions of concurrence and signatures of: Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Khabbāzī; Abū Muḥammad al-Juwainī; Naṣr b. Muḥammad al-Shāshī; ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Juwainī; Nāṣir b. al-Ḥusain al-ʿUmarī al-Harawī; Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Abī Ayyūb; ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Abī Ayyūb (brother of the former); Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ṣābūnī; ʿAbdallāh b. Ismāʿīl al-Ṣābūnī (son of the former); ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan al-Bakrī al Zubairī; Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan; ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Mulqābādhī; ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Isfarāʾīnī (his approval in Persian); Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Muḥammad (the former's son).

115.1 The Shaikh Rukn al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Yūsuf al-Juwainī, in the last part of his book *ʿAqīdat Aṣḥāb al-Imām al-Muṭṭalibī al-Shāfiʿī* (32), mentions that al-Ashʿarī, though a Shāfiʿite, differed from al-Shāfiʿī on certain points. If so, al-Juwainī must differ from al-Ashʿarī. It has also been alleged, he says, that al-Ashʿarī held certain doctrines — that there is no Qurʾān in the volume, and no prophet in the grave, and the use of the exceptive clause regarding faith, and the denial of eternal creative power, and accusing the common people of unbelief and holding them obliged to know the proof of doctrine. Al-Juwainī remarks that he has examined some of al-Ashʿarī's books, but has found nothing to support such charges. Al-Ashʿarī was such a thorn in the side of the Qadariyya and other heretics that their calumniating him arouses no wonder: a man who is not envied is not much good!

116.3 In a lengthly citation from Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b.

(32) The Belief (Creed) of the Associates of the Imām al-Muṭṭalibī (?) al-Shāfiʿī. The author was the father of Imām al-Ḥaramain — cf. GAL, GI, 385, SI, 667.

106.2 Explanation of the tradition: « Ikhtilāfu ummatī raḥma.» (29)

109.15 A letter of Abuʾl-Qāsim al-Qushairī on the cursing of al-Ashʿarī in Naisābūr in the year 445/1053-4. After his introductory remarks and a eulogy of al-Ashʿarī, he writes:

111.12 « The only fault they could find with al-Ashʿarī was that he affirmed God's qadar, its good and evil, its benefit and harm, and that he affirmed of God the attributes of majesty — His power, knowledge, will, life, duration, hearing, seeing, speech, face, and hand, — and affirmed that the Qurʾān is the uncreated speech of God, and that God Most High exists and can be seen, and that His will effectively accomplishes His volitions, and other well-known fundamental questions in which al-Ashʿarī's ways are contrary to those of the Muʿtazila and the Mujassima (30) ».

112.18 (Ibn ʿAsākir) From the previous writer's grandson I have received the following document which I recognize as being in the handwriting of his grandfather:

113.1 « In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Beneficent! The Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth (31) are agreed that Abuʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī was one of the Imāms of the Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth, and that his doctrine was that of the Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth. He discoursed on the fundamental principles of religion according to the method of the Ahl al-Sunna, and refuted erring and heretical adversaries, and was a drawn sword against the Muʿtazila, Rawāfiḍ, and innovators within and without the Community. Whoever calumniates, attacks, curses, or vilifies him, speaks

---

(29) « The diversity of my Community is a mercy (of God) ». I translate « diversity » in keeping with the explanation which follows. For another explanation of this tradition, see MC, 112-3.

(30) The Corporealizers — i.e. those who attributed to God a body *(jism)*; cf., e.g., *Tritton*, 48-50.

(31) The Partisans (Fellows) of Tradition. These were the « orthodox », opposed especially to the Muʿtazila and the Shīʿa.

103.5 (al-Baihaqī) « Our Shaikh, Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, introduced nothing new into the religion of God, nor did he bring into it any innovation. On the contrary, he accepted the doctrines of the Companions, Followers, and later Imāms on the fundamental principles of religion. These he defended by fuller explanation and exposition, and showed that those doctrines on the fundamental principles and what has come by way of divine positive law are sound from the viewpoint of reason, contrary to the specious claims of the heretics that some of those doctrines do not square with the conclusions of reason. His exposition was both a corroboration of what had not been proved by any member of the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamāʿa and a defense of the doctrines of former Imāms. » Such former Imāms were: Abū Ḥanīfa, Sufyān al-Thawrī, al-Awzāʿī, Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-Laith b. Saʿd, al-Bukhārī, and Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj. After citing the tradition on the centenary reformer, al-Baihaqī continues:

104.11 « When the innovators grew numerous in this Community and abandoned the literal meaning of Book and Sunna, denying the traditional doctrine on God's attributes, viz, life, power, knowledge, will, hearing, seeing, and speech, and rejecting what was proved by Book and Sunna, viz, the ascension of Muḥammad, the punishment of the grave, the Balance, the creation of the Garden and the Fire, the exit of believers from the fires, our Prophet's Basin and his intercession, the vision of God by the People of the Garden, and the legitimacy of the rule of the first four Caliphs, claiming that nothing of that was supported by reason or consonant with rational truth — then did God raise up from the seed of Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī an Imām who undertook the defense of God's religion... and showed that what has come in Book and Sunna and was professed by the early members of this Community agrees perfectly with right reason. »

THE EXCELLENCE OF AL-ASHʿARĪ HIMSELF

91.2 The account of al-ʿAskarī, already cited, supra, pp. 155-6.

91.17 The clumsiness in composition which al-ʿAskarī ascribes to al-Ashʿarī characterized him only in the beginning and not after he had received guidance from God. Ibn Ḥazm's declaration that al-Ashʿarī's works numbered fifty-five is incorrect, as we shall see.

93.14 Abū Sahl al-Ṣuʿlūkī tells us how al-Ashʿarī, in a Baṣra assembly, routed the Muʿtazila, one after the other, so that they were afraid to come back to a second assembly. A similar incident caused Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Khafīf to wonder how many tongues and ears and eyes al-Ashʿarī had !

95.11 Two more stories from the same Abū ʿAbdallāh show that al-Ashʿarī did not initiate discussions in the assemblies, but, when questioned, replied in order to make plain the truth as God had commanded him to do.

97.10 An expression used by al-ʿAsharī himself has been wrongly understood by some. There are two kinds of «innovation», one blameworthy, the other not, as al-Shāfiʿī himself pointed out. Al-Ashʿarī called disputation with the heretics « innovation » and disliked it, because the ancients had regarded it as error and folly.

99.11 Muḥammad said : « Do not sit in the company of the Ahl al-Qadar, and do not begin to dispute with them ». But when error became widespread and dangerous to the Community, such disputation became a necessity. Muḥammad also said : « Whenever Islām is ensnared by any innovation, God has a friend who defends Him and discourses on His signs. So seize upon those assemblies as occasions for defending the weak, and trust in God, the best of managers ! »

100.11 A long letter of Abū Bakr Aḥmad al-Ḥusain al-Baihaqī, occasioned by the public cursing of the Ashʿarites during the reign of Tughralbeg.

Billāh. In my opinion (Ibn ʿAsākir) the list should read : ʿUmar, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, and al-Ghazālī.

THE DATE OF AL-ASHʿARĪ'S DEATH

55.18 According to Abuʾl-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAlī al-Asadī he died in Baghdad «after 320/932 and before 330/941-2, and was buried in the Street of the Cells. » And according to Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd b. Ḥazm of Andalusia he died in 324/935-6. Some contemporaries said that he died a little after 330. This last seems to me (i.e. Ibn ʿAsākir) incorrect, and the best date is 324. So Ibn Fūrak. Al-Ashʿarī's conversion seems to have taken place in the year 300/912-3, for it took place in the lifetime of al-Jubbāʾī, who is said to have died in the month Shaʿbān of the year 303/916.

DISTINGUISHED ANCESTRY

57.1 Many traditions on the virtues of the Ashʿariyyūn — their generosity, bravery, impressiveness in reciting the Qurʾān, etc.

71.3 In the time of the Apostle of God the Ashʿariyyūn were expert in fiqh and outstanding among the Companions for their knowledge. The most renowned among them was Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī. Fortunate the man who had such an ancestor !

71.8 The virtues of Abū Mūsā — many traditions.

85.10 The virtues of Abū Mūsā's son, Abū Burda.

88.6 The virtues of Abū Burda's son, Bilāl.

90.16 These details concerning the virtues of Abū Mūsā and his sons redound to the credit of al-Ashʿarī.

and victory, and the people of al-Yaman have come.' Someone said: 'O Apostle of God, and what are the people of al-Yaman?' He said: 'A people with subtle minds and supple obedience. And faith is Yamanite, and fiqh (27) is Yamanite and wisdom (28) is Yamanite.' »

49.1 Five traditions in which Muḥammad himself interprets a certain verse of the Qurʾān as referring to Abū Mūsā and his descendants. Here is the first, going back to ʿIyāḍ al-Ashʿarī. « On the occasion of the revelation of 'And God will bring a people whom He will love and who will love Him' (5.54/59), the Prophet nodded towards Abū Mūsā and said: 'They are the people of this man.'»

THE CENTENARY REFORMER

51.6 Another prophetic foreshadowing of al-Ashʿarī's eminence is contained in the tradition announcing the appearance of a great religious reformer in every century. Abū Huraira said that the Apostle of God said: « God will indeed send to this Community at the beginning of every hundred years a man who will renew for it its religion.»

52.7 The reformers for the first two centuries were the Caliph ʿUmar b. Abd al-ʿAzīz and the great jurisprudent, Al-Shāfiʿī. For the third century there is mention of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-Ashʿarī, Abū Naʿīm al-Astarābādī, and Abuʾl-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. ʿUmar b. Suraij. Al-Bāqillānī and Abuʾl-Ṭayyib Sahl al-Ṣuʿlūkī have been suggested for the fourth century, and for the fifth al-Ghazālī and the Caliph al-Mustarshid

---

(27) Cf. Goldziher's art. *Fiḳh*, in EI or Hwb. Here the word seems to have more of its earlier meaning of insight into religious doctrine. Cf. MC, 110-112.

(28) Arabic: *ḥikma*. This word was used at times to designate philosophy. This tradition occurs in several of the collections — cf. Wensinck, *Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition*, 263 (Yaman). It would be interesting to know more about its circumstances.

as his representative. That went on for a long time. One day al-Ashʿarī was representing al-Jubbāʾī in an assembly when another disputed with him and overcame him in the dispute. A companion of al-Ashʿarī, one of the common people, started sprinkling almonds and sweetmeats on him. But al-Ashʿarī said to him: « I have done nothing. My opponent has triumphed over me and explained the argument and reduced me to silence. He is more deserving of your favor than I am. » After that incident he manifested repentance and changed his belief. ([26])

43.13 It may be objected that such a sudden about-face as that of al-Ashʿarī was suspicious, unheard of, and unacceptable. But these allegations are bare assertions, supported only by weak traditions, and are contrary to the Qurʾān, reason, and actual historical cases.

PROPHETIC INTIMATIONS

45.10 Eight traditions, the burden of which is Muḥammad's announcement of the coming of a very intelligent people. These turn out to be the Ashʿarites from Yaman, and in particular, Abū Mūsā. Here is the text of the eighth, which goes 48.14 back to Ibn ʿAbbās. « While the Apostle of God was in Medina, suddenly he said: 'God is supreme! God's help has come,

---

(26) This sixth « account » may well be the closest to what really happened. I do not mean that we must a priori reject the other accounts, but it seems to me likely that Ashʿarī's conversion was a gradual process, marked by gathering doubts, and, as it were, brought to a head by some such incident as that related here. One also thinks of the « story of the three brothers » which Ashʿarī is said to have proposed as a difficulty to Jubbāʾī — cf. e.g. Elder, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, p. 9. (It is at least curious that this oft-quoted story is not mentioned by Ibn ʿAsākir).

side of affirmation.» Then he said to me : « Reflect on the other questions and be mindful of them.» Then I awoke and rose and collected all my kalām books and set them aside and devoted myself to books on Tradition, Qurʾānic exegesis, and the legal sciences. However, I did ponder the other questions in accordance with his command.

43.5 And after we entered the third decade I saw him again on the Night of Power and he said to me, with an appearance of exasperation, « What have you done about what I said to you ? » I answered : « O Apostle of God, I keep reflecting on what you said and continue to think about and ponder the questions. However, I have rejected and turned aside from all kalām and I have devoted myself to the legal sciences.» Then he said to me angrily : « And who commanded you to do that? Compose books, and reflect in this way which I have commanded you, for it is my religion and the truth which I brought. » And I awoke, and thenceforth began to compose books and to defend and expound the true doctrine. — So this was the cause of his return from the views of the Muʿtazila to the doctrines of the Ahl al-Sunna waʾl-Jamāʿa.

6.— *An account from Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-ʿAskarī :*

91.2 Al-Ashʿarī was the disciple of al-Jubbāʾī under whom he studied and from whom he acquired learning, never leaving him for forty years. He was a master of reasoning in the assemblies and boldly attacked opponents. But he was not a writer. Whenever he took the pen in his hand he produced either nothing, or a kalām that was disagreeable. On the other hand, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī was a master of composition and writing who never had any difficulty in expressing copiously whatever he wanted to say ; but he was an indifferent disputant in the assemblies. So when the necessity of attending the assemblies weighed heavy on him he used to send al-Ashʿarī

5.— *An account from Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusain b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥātim al-Azdī :*

42.4 The Shaikh Abuʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī was originally a Muʿtazilite. We have been told by Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusain, the mutakallim of Raiy, that he had it from Abuʾl-Ḥasan b. Mahdī in Ṭabaristān, that he had been told by Abuʾl-Ḥasan himself: The motive which impelled me to turn from Muʿtazilism and to examine their proofs and to explain their error was that I saw the Apostle of God in my sleep at the beginning of Ramaḍān. He said to me: « O Abuʾl-Ḥasan, have you written traditions? » I replied: « Certainly, O Apostle of God! » Then he said: « Have you not written that God Most High will be seen in the next life? « I answered: « Certainly, O Apostle of God! » Then he said to me: « Then what prevents you from holding that doctrine? » I replied: « Rational proofs have prevented me, and therefore I have interpreted the traditions. » And he said to me: « Do you not find that there are rational proofs which prove that God Most High will be seen in the next life? » I answered: « Certainly, O Apostle of God, but they are only doubts (25) ». He said to me: « Reflect on them and examine them most carefully; they are not doubts, but they are proofs. » And he disappeared, and I awoke in great fear and began to reflect on what he had said. And I persevered and found the matter to be as he had said. The proofs of affirmation grew strong in my mind, while those of negation grew weak. So I kept silent and revealed nothing to men, remaining the while in great perplexity over my position.

42.18 Then in the second decade of Ramaḍān I saw the Apostle of God again. He approached me and said: « O Abuʾl-Ḥasan, what have you done about what I said to you? » I replied: « O Apostle of God, the matter is as you said, and power is on the

(25) Arabic: *shubah* — doubts here in the sense of difficulties to be solved, if possible.

Creator ?» And he said to me : « Defend the doctrines related from me, for they are the truth ! » Then I awoke, much saddened and disheartened, and resolved to give up kalām. And I applied myself to Tradition and the recitation of the Qurʾān.

41.5 On the night of the twenty-seventh [24] — and it was our custom in Baṣra for the Reciters and men of learning and virtue to meet for a global recitation of the Qurʾān during that night — I remained among them in accordance with our custom. But I grew so overpoweringly sleepy that I rose and went home and slept, regretting the splendid occasion which I was missing. Then I saw the Prophet, and he said to me : « What have you done about what I commanded you ? » I answered : « I have given up kalām and have adhered to the Book of God and to thy Sunna. » And he said to me : « I did not command you to give up kalām, but I commanded you to defend the doctrines related from me, for they are the truth ! » I said : « O Apostle of God, how can I leave a system after having thought about its questions and known its proofs for thirty years, because of a dream ? » And he said to me : « Were it not for my knowing that God will give you His special help, I should not leave you until I had given you a full explanation of those things. You seem to think that this my coming to you is a mere dream. Was my vision of Jibrīl a mere dream ? You will see me no more about this matter. So be earnest in it, for God will give you His special help ! »

41.17 Thus he spoke, and I awoke and said : « After truth there is only error ! » And I began to defend the traditions on the vision of God, the intercession of the Prophet, the lawfulness of speculation, and other points. And there used to come to me something which I swear I had never heard from an adversary nor read in any book, and I knew that it was due to the help of God which the Apostle of God had foretold to me.

---

(24) This is the *Lailat al-Qadar* (Night of Power). Cf., e.g., Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Muslim Institutions*, 104.

then exposes the defects of what he has abandoned and becomes the fiercest foe of the Ahl al-Dhimma (21). Just so did al-Ashʿarī become the fiercest foe of the Muʿtazila, who took to reviling and calumniating him.

3.— *An account from Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamrānī :*

40.6 Before we had noticed it, one Friday, al-Ashʿarī suddenly ascended the pulpit of the mosque in Baṣra after the Friday prayer. With him he had a palm rope which he tied around his middle. Then he cut it and said : « Be ye my witnesses that I have not been following the religion of Islām, and that I now embrace Islām, and that I repent of the Muʿtazilite views which I held. » Then he came down.

4.— *An account from Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusain b. Muḥammad, from « more than one of our Imāms » :*

40.15 Al-Ashʿarī said : While I was asleep, during the first decade of Ramaḍān (22), I saw Muṣṭafā (23), and he said : « O ʿAlī, defend the doctrines related from me, for they are the truth. » When I awoke I was considerably perturbed and gave much anxious thought to my vision and my preoccupation with elucidating the proofs concerning the contrary position. Then came the second decade, and I saw the Prophet in my sleep, and he said to me : « What have you done about what I commanded you ? » I replied : « O Apostle of God, what could I do in view of my having opposed the doctrines related from you in ways based on the interpretation of kalām and my having followed the sound proofs which are applicable to the

---

(21) Cf. art. *Dhimma* in EI or Hwb. These were the non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim country, particularly the Christians, who were allowed to retain their religion, but were bound to pay a certain tax (*jizya*).

(22) The Muslim month of fasting.

(23) « Elect » — another name for Muḥammad.

Apostle of God said: 'You must hold fast to my Sunna!' Then I awoke and I compared the theses of kalām with what I found in the Qurʾān and the Traditions. And I affirmed the latter and cast all else away. »

2.— *An account from Abū Bakr Ismāʿīl al-Qairawānī :*

39.10 Al-Ashʿarī, our Shaikh, Imām, and mainstay, held the Muʿtazilite views for forty years and was one of their Imāms. Then he withdrew fom the society of men into his own house for fifteen days. After that he went out to the mosque, ascended the pulpit, and said: « O men, I withdrew from you for a while simply because I had reflected and found the proofs equal in my mind, the true and the false being exactly balanced so far as I could see. So I sought guidance from God, Most Blessed and High, and He has guided me to the belief in what I have confided to these books of mine. And I strip myself of all that I used to believe just as I strip myself of this garment.» And he stripped himself of a robe that was upon him and cast it aside and handed over the books to the people. Among them were the *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*, and a book in which he exposed the shortcomings of the Muʿtazila, which he called *Kitāb Kashf al-Asrār wa Hatk al-Astār* ([19]), and others. When those books had been read by the traditionists and jurisprudents of the Ahl al-Sunna waʾl-Jamāʿa, they accepted and adopted what was in them and acknowledged al-Ashʿarī's excellence and chose him as Imām, so that their system of belief was named after him. Thus his relation to the Muʿtazila became like that of a scriptuary ([20]) who embraces Islām and

(19) « The Revealing of Secrets and Rending of Veils ». The title is not unconventional, but one wonders if this could be the work of al-Bāqillānī to which Goldziher refers, *Streitschrift des Gazālī gegen die Bāṭinijja-Sekte*, p. 15.

(20) One of the *ahl al-kitāb* (People of the Book), i.e. those who claimed to have a written revelation, especially the Jews and Christians.

When his father died, he was entrusted to the care of the Shāfiʿite jurisprudent, Zakariyyā b. Yaḥyā al-Sājī. The latter was the author of several books, among them the *Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahāʾ* (16), and from him al-Ashʿarī related many traditions in his own *Kitāb al-Tafsīr* (17).

35.10 (Ibn ʿAsākir:) Abū Bishr was really al-Ashʿarī's grandfather. The genealogical ascription of al-Ashʿarī's father to Abū Bishr is a refutation of al-Ahwāzī's pretense that al-Ashʿarī got his name through a genealogical error. A tradition from Muḥamad in which he condemns ignorant attacks on genealogies.

36.3 Further genealogical details regarding Abū Mūsa, in which the latters's descent is traced back to Adam.

AL-ASHʿARĪ'S CONVERSION

1.— *An account going back to Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusain :*

38.17 I heard one of our associates say: After the Shaikh Abuʾl-Ḥasan had gone deeply into Muʿtazilite kalām and mastered it, he used to propose questions to his masters. But when he got no satisfactory answer to his questions he became perplexed. And it is related of him that he said: « One night there occurred to my mind a dogmatic question which had been occupying me. So I rose and prayed two rakʿas (18), and, after asking God to guide me along the straight path, I fell asleep. While I slept I saw the Apostle of God, and I complained to him about the matter which was perplexing me. And the

---

Ḥadīthī is a relative adjective from *ḥadīth* — tradition; here it signifies one who accepts the sound traditions which have been handed down.

(16) The Disagreement of the Jurisprudents.

(17) i.e. his Commentary on the Qurʾān.

(18) A *rakʿa* is a division, or cycle, comprising certain acts and utterances. An interesting book on Muslim worship is E.E. Calverley's *Worship in Islam*, India, 1925.

TWO HEINOUS OFFENSES

29.7 Those who calumniate the learned are guilty of an enormous crime. Moreover, God does not give knowledge to a man in order that he may conceal it. Proof of these assertions: nine traditions from Muḥammad, e.g.

30.12 « If later members of this Community should curse its earlier members, then let him who has knowledge manifest it; for on that day he who conceals knowledge will be like one who conceals what has been sent down to Muḥammad. »

31.20 « He who conceals knowledge will be bridled by God with a bridle of fire. »

33.9 « Whoso eats his brother's flesh in this world will be offered his flesh in the next, and it will be said to him: Eat it dead as you ate it living! And he will eat it, grimacing and shrieking. »

34.6 « Revile not the dead, for they have arrived unto that which they forwarded. » (14)

NAME AND ANCESTRY

34.11 Abū Bakr Aḥmad al-Baihaqī said that he saw the name as follows in « the books of our associates »: Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl b. Isḥāq b. Sālim b. Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbdallāh b. Mūsā b. Bilāl b. Abī Burda b. Abī Mūsā al-Ashʿarī.

34.18 The Khaṭīb: as in Appendix I, down to «... in the Mosque of al-Manṣūr.» (p.p. 139-40, supra)

35.5 Ibn Fūrak: al-Ashʿari's father was Abū Bishr Ismāʿīl b. Isḥāq. Al-Ashʿarī himself was a *sunnī jamāʿī ḥadīthī* (15).

---

(14) i. e. their works, and particularly, it would seem, their good works.

(15) *Sunnī* — Sunnite; *jamāʿī* — relative adjective from *jamāʿa*: the multitude, and probably also containing the implication of one who accepted *ijmāʿ* (consensus). The « orthodox » also styled themselves the « Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamāʿa »; cf. SDA, s.v. *jamāʿa*.

tioned, held fast to the Sunna (9) and restrained men from wading in the perilous waters of Kalām. The most redoubtable champion of the Muthbitūn was Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, who avoided the extremes of *taʿṭīl* (10)and *tashbīh*. Inspired by God to defend the Sunna by rational arguments, he became the rallying point and mainstay of the Muthbitūn. He divided created existing things into accidents, atoms, and bodies (11), and affirmed of God what God affirmed of Himself, and denied of God that which is unworthy of Him.

26.18 The envy of al-Ashʿarī's adversaries led them to calumniate him, but their criticisms only redounded to his credit. In every age the great men of religion have had their vilifiers. Were it not for the eminence of him who has requested this work (12), I should have refrained from mentioning the slanders with which it is concerned. But the Aṣḥāb al-Ḥaqq (13) overcome their detractors, for God is their stay and their support.

28.1 Al-Ashʿarī's worth and virtues and noble lineage and influence in the sphere of religion are beyond question. His works are well known to the learned and amply attest his eminence in learning and religion, e.g. his *Ibāna*, and his commentary on the Qur'ān composed to refute the falsehoods of those who erred. With God's help, therefore, I propose to mention what has come to my attention regarding al-Ashʿarī.

---

(9) Custom, or tradition, especially that of the Prophet. Cf. art., s.v., in EI or Hwb.

(10) i.e. « stripping », in this case, stripping God of His attributes, as the Muʿtazila did.

(11) Ashʿarī was not the first to do this.

(12) It seems impossible to say who this was.

(13) The Fellows of the Truth. Like « Ahl al-Ḥaqq » (the People of the Truth) it signifies the « orthodox », i.e. the Sunnites, and no doubt more specifically in the writer's mind, the Ashʿarites.

THE EXPOSURE OF THE CALUMNIATOR'S LYING CONCERNING WHAT HAS BEEN IMPUTED TO THE IMĀM ABU ʾL-ḤASAN AL-ASHʿARĪ

INTRODUCTION

24.1 In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Beneficent ! Praise be to God . . . (laudatory formulae and the customary literary amplification of the shahāda) (3).

25.1 AMMĀ BAʿD (4) : God singled out certain of His creatures to be His Prophets, among whom Muḥammad is preeminent. God also raised up learned men to be the Imāms (5) of Religion, i.e. to explain it and to defend it against heretics such as the Muʿtazila and the Ahl al-Tasbīh (6). The ʿulamāʾ (7) of the Muthbitūn (8), harried by the heretics just men-

(3) i.e. the Muslim « witnessing » — « There is no divinity at all save God and Muḥammad is the Apostle of God ! »

(4) « Now then » — This is the customary phrase which indicates that the writer has finished his formal introduction (often something of a literary *tour de force*) and is ready to attack his subject more directly.

(5) « Imām » means « leader ». The word is used of the Caliph, of the leader of the formal Prayer, and often of a distinguished teacher or outstanding savant.

(6) The Assimilators, or Anthropomorphists. The form « Mushabbiha » is also used. *Tashbīh* means « likening », in this case likening God to man. Cf. Halkin, *Moslem Schisms and Sects*, 31 ff.

(7) The plural of *ʿālim* — learned man, teacher. The usual English form is « ulema ».

(8) Also : Muthbita — the Affirmers. This seems to be a generic name for those who « affirmed » the divine attributes, as opposed to those who denied them (Muʿtazila) or made them too human (Anthropomorphists). And cf. *Watt*, Index, s.v. Ahl al-Ithbāt.

The ostensible motive of Ibn ʿAsākir in undertaking this apology was the refutation of the charges levelled against al-Ashʿarī by a certain al-Ahwāzī. But the latter had been dead for a least a hundred years when Ibn ʿAsākir decided to write the *Tabyīn*. Why, then, after so many years, did the author feel that it was incumbent on him to answer al-Ahwāzī? From various indications in the *Tabyīn* itself it seems to me that Ibn ʿAsākir's concern with the defense of the eponym of Ashʿarism was equalled, and perhaps even surpassed, by his concern with the defense of Ashʿarism itself. This suggestion gives added force to the words of al-Subkī, cited by al-Qudsī on the title page of the Damascus edition: « Every Sunnite who does not possess Ibn ʿAsākir's *Kitāb al-Tabyīn* is blind to his own interests. »

The *Tabyīn* is certainly an interesting example of a traditional type of Muslim scholarship. But the reader will be disappointed if he expects to get from it a detailed and clear-cut picture of al-Ashʿarī. The latter must, I think, always remain for us a somewhat legendary figure overshadowed by the thing which came to be called Ashʿarism.

In the summary I have let Ibn ʿAsākir do the speaking, usually in an abbreviated form. Any remarks or observations of mine have been relegated to the footnotes.

APPENDIX II

IBN ʿASĀKIR'S APOLOGY


The following pages contain a summary of an interesting work devoted to the vindication and glorification of al-Ashʿarī. This work is the *Tabyīn Kadhib al-Muftarī fī mā Nusiba ilaʾl-Imām Abiʾl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī* (1) by the famous historian of Damascus, Abuʾl-Qāsim ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan b. Hibatallāh Thiqataddīn IBN ʿASĀKIR (499/1106-571/1176). In the summary the numerical references are by page and line to the printed Damascus edition of 1347/1928-9, edited by Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Qudsī, with an introduction and notes by the well-known Muslim scholar, the Shaikh al-Kawtharī.

More than seventy years ago, the orientalist, M.A. Mehren, published an abridged text and summary translation of the *Tabyīn* under the title: *Exposé de la Réforme de l'Islamisme* (an extract from Vol. II of the Third Session of the International Congress of Orientalists, St. Petersburg, 1879). His work is useful, but not always easy to consult. So I have thought it worthwhile to include the following rather detailed summary, which is fuller than that of M. Mehren. Since so much of the original is taken up with long isnāds (2) which the average reader finds very tiresome, and with a collection of biographies of distinguished « Ashʿarites », I think I may claim to have omitted nothing of real pertinence to the subject of the apology.

---

(1) This title is translated at the beginning of the summary.

(2) The chains of the names of those who have handed down the tradition or report.



II. IBN ʿASĀKIR'S APOLOGY

Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Yazīd say that he had heard Abū Bakr b. al-Ṣairafī say: « The Muʿtazila held their heads very high until God Most High manifested al-Ashʿarī, who then forced them into the cups (10) of sesame seeds. »

---

10) Arabic: *aqmāʿ*. The word *gumaʿ* (colloquial for qamaʿ) is still in use here in ʿIrāq. It is the name for the kind of little cup in which the date is set. It also means the little cup which holds the acorn. Presumably the sesame seed has something of the same sort, though I have been unable to verify this. However, the force of the figure is clear.

Khawārij ([6]), and the various other innovators.

He was a native of Baṣra, and lived in Baghdād until he died there. On Fridays he used to sit in the circle of the jurisprudent, Abū Isḥāq of Merv, in the Mosque of al-Manṣūr. A man of Baṣra declared that Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī was born in the year 260/873-4, and died a little after 330/941-2. But I have been told by Abu'l-Qāsim 'Abd al-Wāḥid b. 'Alī al-Asadī that al-Ash'arī died in Baghdād after 320/932 and before 330/941-2, and that he was buried near the Wharf of the Water-jars ([7]) in some land adjoining a mosque and close to a bath. This would be on the left hand of one going from the Sūq to the Tigris. Abū Muḥammad 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Sa'īd b. Ḥazm, the Andalusian, mentioned that Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī died in the year 324/935-6, and said that his works numbered fifty-five.

We have it from the Qāḍī Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Iṣbahānī that he heard Abū 'Abdallāh b. Dāniyāl ([8]) say : I heard Bandār b. al-Ḥusain say — and he was the servant of Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl in Baṣra — « Abu'l-Ḥasan used to live on the income from an estate which had been bequeathed to his descendants by his grandfather, Bilāl b. Abī Burda b. Abī Mūsā al-As'harī. His yearly expenditure amounted to seventeen dirhams. »

I have it from Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Ṣūrī that he heard 'Abd al-Ghanī b. Sa'īd the ḥāfiẓ ([9]) say that he had heard

(6) Cf. EI or Hwb s.v. *Khāridjiten.*

(7) Cf. Le Strange, *Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate*, 181, and 85, n. 1. In the *Tabyīn* we are told that Ash'arī was buried in the « Street (?) of the Cells » — i.e. with the reading *zawāyā* for the *rawāyā* of the Khaṭīb, a difference of only one dot in the Arabic.

(8) The text has « Bāniyāl ». I prefer the reading « Dāniyāl », which is found in the *Tabyīn*, 145.5.

(9) A title given to those who had memorized (*ḥafiẓa*) the entire Qur'ān.

APPENDIX I

THE KHAṬĪB'S ACCOUNT OF AL-ASHʿARĪ

In his *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Thābit al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (392/1002 - 463/1071) has the following brief notice of al-Ashʿarī. It will be found in Vol. XI, pp. 346-7 (Nº 6189). To the best of my knowledge it is the earliest biography of Al-Ashʿarī which we possess. In view of the fact that it was written more than a century after the death of al-Ashʿarī its brevity and restraint are remarkable, and, perhaps, very significant.

ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl b. Abī Bishr — and the latter's name was Isḥāq — b. Sālim b. Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbdallāh b. Mūsā b. Bilāl b. Abī Burda b. Abī Mūsā: Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, the mutakallim, (1) author of books and works refuting the Mulḥida (2) and others, such as the Muʿtazila (3), Rāfiḍa (4), Jahmiyya (5),

(1) i.e. one who engages in *kalām*, or that polemic theology which makes considerable use of rational argument. The plural is: mutakallimūn.


(2) i.e. the Irreligious, the Atheists. This name often seems to be used in a rather generic sense.

(3) Cf. art., s.v., in EI or Hwb. They seem to have been the principal adversaries of Ashʿarī.

(4) i.e. the Rejecters, or Spurners. Cf. EI or Hwb s.v. *Rāfiḍiten*. They are also called the Rawāfiḍ. They refused to acknowledge the imāmates of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. Often enough the name seems to be used as a synonym for Shīʿa, though, strictly speaking, the names are not synonomous.

(5) Followers of Jahm b. Ṣafwān — cf. Halkin, *Moslem Schisms and Sects*, 199 ff.

I. THE KHAṬĪB'S ACCOUNT



THE APPENDICES

Part Two

THE APPENDICES

wanted you to make! Why, then, do you hinder (men from engaging in) kalām? You use it yourselves when you want to; but when you are silenced (in a discussion), you say: We are forbidden to engage in kalām. And when you want to, you blindly and unquestioningly follow your predecessors, without argument or explanation. This is willfulness and capriciousness!

28. Then one should say to them: The Prophet did not discuss vows and testamentary injunctions, or manumission, or the manner of reckoning the uninterrupted transmission of estates, nor did he compose a book about those things, as did Mālik, and al-Thawrī, and al-Shāfiʿī, and Abū Ḥanīfa (43). Hence you are forced to admit that they were deviating innovators, since they did what the Prophet had not done, and said what he had not said explicitly, and composed what the Prophet had not composed, and said that those who maintain that the Qurʾān is created are to be called unbelievers, though the Prophet had not said that.

What we have said contains enough to satisfy any intelligent man who is not perversely stubborn. The work is ended — praise be to God, and His blessing be on our Master, Muḥammad, and his household, and his Companions!

---

(43) Four renowned Jurisprudents and founders of legal schools. The reader will find articles on them in EI (al-Thawrī under Sufyān), and Hwb (except al-Thawrī).

For the Apostle of God never said: « If anyone should ask about any of those things, refuse to answer him, or, do not greet him, or, leave him. » Since he said nothing of the sort, you would be innovators if you did that.

26. Moreover, why have you not refused to answer him. who says that the Qur'ān is created ? [42] And why have you accused him of unbelief ? There is no sound tradition from the Prophet on denying its creation and accusing of unbelief him who says that it is created. They may say: Because Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal denied that it is created and held that he who says that it is created should be accused of unbelief. One should say to them: And why did not Aḥmad keep silent about that instead of discussing it ? They may say : Because ʿAbbās al-ʿAnbarī, and Wakīʿ, and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mahdī, and so-and-so, and so-and-so, said that the Qur'ān is uncreated, and that he who says that it is created is an unbeliever. One should say to them: And why did not they keep silent about what Muḥammad had not discussed ? They may say : Because ʿAmr b. Dīnār, and Sufyān b. ʿUyaina, and Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad, and so-and-so, and so-and-so, said that it is neither creating nor created. One should say to them: And why did not they refrain from saying this, since the Apostle of God did not say it ?

27. And if they refer that back to the Companions, this is sheer obstinacy. For one may say to them: And why did not they refrain from saying that, since the Prophet did not discuss it, and did not say: « Call him who says it an unbeliever. » They may say: The ʿulamā' simply must engage in kalām on a new question, so that the ignorant may know how to judge the matter. One should say: This is the admission which we

(42) On this question, and the names mentioned by the author, cf. the references given in n. (1), p. 20, supra.

held that. One should say to them: The Companion, or the Follower, is subject to the same constraint as you are, namely, that he is a deviating innovator for saying what the Apostle did not say. And another may say: I suspend my judgment on that, and I do not say created, nor do I say uncreated. To him one should say: Then you, in suspending your judgment on that, are a deviating innovator. For the Prophet did not say: « If this question should arise after my death, suspend your judgment on it, and say nothing. » Nor did he say: « Regard as deviating and unbelieving him who affirms that it is created, or, him who denies that it is created.»

24. Furthermore, tell us: If one were to say that God's knowledge is created, would you suspend your judgment on that, or not? If they say no, then say to them: Neither the Prophet nor his Companions said a word about that. And likewise, if someone were to say: Is this Lord of yours surfeited with food, or with drink, or is He clothed, or naked, or cold, or bilious, or damp, or a body, or an accident, or does He smell odors, or not smell them, or has He a nose, and a heart, and a liver, and a spleen, and does He make the pilgrimage every year, and does He ride horseback, or not, and is He grieved, or not — and other questions of that sort — you would have to refuse to answer him. For neither the Apostle of God nor his Companions ever discussed a single one of those points. Or you would not remain silent, and would explain by your kalām that none of those things can be predicated of God, etc. etc., because of this argument, and that, etc.

25. Someone may say: I should be silent and answer him not a word, or, I should shun him, or, I should leave him, or, I should not greet him, or, I should not visit him if he fell sick, or, I should show no respect to his corpse if he died. To him one should say: Then you would be bound to be, in all these ways which you have mentioned, a deviating innovator.

22. But even though there was no explicit instruction of the Apostle of God regarding each one of these questions, they referred and likened each to something which had been determined explicitly by the Book of God, and the Sunna, and their own ijtihād [39]. Such questions [40], then, which involved judgments on unprecedented secondary cases, they referred to those determinations of the Law which are derivative, and which are to be sought only along the line of revelation and apostolic tradition. But when new and specific questions pertaining to the basic dogmas arise, every intelligent Muslim ought to refer judgment on them to the sum of principles accepted on the grounds of reason, sense experience, intuition, etc. For judgment on legal questions which belong to the category of the traditional is to be based on reference to legal principles which likewise belong to the category of the traditional. And judgment on questions involving the data of reason and the senses should be a matter of referring every such instance to (something within) its own category, without confounding the rational with the traditional, or the traditional with the rational. So if kalām on the creation of the Qur'ān and on the atom and the leap, in these precise terms, had originated in the Prophet's time, he would have discussed and explained it, just as he explained and discussed all the specific questions which did originate in his time.

23. Then one should say: There is no sound tradition from the Prophet to the effect that the Qur'ān is uncreated or created. Why, then, do you hold that it is uncreated? They may say: Some [41] of the Companions and the Followers

(39) i.e. their own personal exertion — cf. art. *Idjtihād*, in EI or Hwb.

(40) I find the Arabic of this sentence (and of much of this number) rather difficult, though I think I have conveyed the thought of the author.

(41) Or: « One of... » The Arabic *baʿḍ* is sometimes ambiguous.

THIRD ANSWER

21. The third answer is that the Apostle of God did know these questions about which they have asked, and he was not ignorant of any detail involved in them. However, they did not occur in his time in such specific form that he should have, or should not have, discussed them — even though their basic principles were present in the Qurʾān and the Sunna. But whenever a question arose which was related to religion from the standpoint of the Law, men discussed it, and inquired into it, and disputed about it, and debated and argued. Such, for example, were the questions concerning the fraction of the inheritance ([35]) to which grandmothers are entitled — which is one of the questions involving obligations — and other questions touching on legal determinations. Such, too, were the questions pertaining to what is unlawful, and to the effects of irrevocable divorce ([36]), and to « *ḥabluki ʿalā ghāribiki* » ([37]), and the questions concerning ḥadd-punishments ([38]) and divorce. These questions, too numerous to mention, arose in their days, and in the case of each one of them there had come no explicit determination from the Prophet. For if he had given explicit instructions concerning all that, they would not have differed over those questions, and the difference would not have lasted until now.

---

(35) Arabic : *al-ʿawl* — cf. Santillana, *Istituzioni di diritto musulmano malachita,* II, 512-513.

(36) Arabic : *waʾl-bāʾin waʾl-batta* — cf. Santillana, *op. cit.*, Index B, under *Bāʾin* and *Battah.*

(37) Literally : Thy rope is upon thy withers. The phrase referred originally to a she-camel allowed to graze freely, and hence has here the meaning : You are free to do as you like. Cf. Lane, s.v. *ghārib.* The formula seems to have been used in connection with both divorce and manumission : cf. A. W. T. Juynboll, *Jus Shafiiticum* (ed. of *al-Tanbīh* of Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī), Leiden, 1879, 174.8 and 212.4.

(38) i.e. penalties determined by the Qurʾānic law.

from confusion or the lack of anything to say, but from astonishment at ʿAbdallāh's ignorance, because there is nothing in the verse which necessitates the entrance into it of Jesus and ʿUzair and the angels. For God said: « and what you worship »; but He did not say: « and everything which you worship, apart from God.» But Ibn al-Zibaʿrâ simply wanted to argue speciously against the Prophet, in order to make his people think that he had argued against Muḥammad successfully. So God sent down the verse: « Those, indeed, who have already received from us the best (reward)» — i.e. those of them who are worshiped — « are far removed from it (Gehenna)!» (21.101). The Prophet then recited that verse, and thereupon they raised a great outcry to mask their confusion and their error, and they said: « Are our divinities better, or is he ?» — i.e. Jesus. So God sent down the verses: « When the Son of Mary is proposed as an example, see how your people turn away from him. They ask: 'Are our divinities better, or is he ?' They have proposed this example to you only out of disputatiousness. Truly they are a contentious people » (43. 57/58). (33)

20. All the verses which we have mentioned, as well as many which we have not mentioned, are a basis and argument for us in our kalām on what we mention in detail. It is true that no question was particularized in the Book and the Sunna. But that was because the particularization of questions involving rational principles did not take place in the days of the Prophet. However, (he and) the Companions did engage in kalām of the sort which we have mentioned. (34)

---

(33) These verses seem to have been revealed on a different occasion from that of the encounter with al-Zibaʿrâ — cf. Blachère, II, 264, n. 57.

(34) This translation seems to me to convey the sense, though the Arabic itself seems rather awkward.

and said to him : « I conjure thee by God, do you find in what God has revealed of the Torah that God detests the fat rabbi ?» And the rabbi became angry at being thus reproached, and he said : « God has not sent down anything to a human being !» (6.91). Then God said [29] : « Say : Who sent down the Book which Moses brought as light and guidance for men ? etc. » (6.91). So he quickly refuted him, because the Torah is a thing, and Moses a human being, and the rabbi admitted that God had sent down the Torah to Moses. And in a similar way he refuted the men who claimed that God had enjoined upon them that they should not believe an apostle until he should come to them with a sacrifice which fire would consume (3.183/179). For God said : « Say : Apostles before me have already brought you evidences, and the very thing you have mentioned. Why, then, did you kill them, if you are truthful?» (3.183/180). And by means of that he refuted them and argued against them.

19. Our basis in correcting the sophistry of our adversaries is taken from the words of God : « You and what you worship, apart from God, will be fuel for Gehenna. You are drawing near to it ! If these false gods had been divinities, they would not have arrived at (Gehenna). All will be there eternally. There they will send forth groans, but they will not be [30] heard » (21.98/100). For when this verse came down [31], word of it reached ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zibaʿrā—a disputatious and contentious man — and he said : « I have as good as triumphed over Muḥammad and the Lord of the Kaʿba ! » Then the Apostle of God came to him, and ʿAbdallāh said : « O Muḥammad, do you not claim that Jesus and ʿUzair and the angels were worshiped ?» And the Prophet was silent [32], not

(29) Cf. Baiḍāwī on this verse.

(30) Cf. Blachère, II, 301, n. 100.

(31) Cf. Baiḍāwī on this verse.

(32) The Arabic text has a note here, citing Baiḍāwī, to the effect that Muḥammad was not silent, but answered straightway.

ther in all of its respects or in one of its respects. Now if He resembled it in all of its respects, He would of necessity be produced in all of His respects. And if He resembled it in one of its respects, He would of necessity be produced, like it, in that respect in which He resembled it. For every two like things are judged the same regarding that in which they are alike. But it is impossible for the produced to be eternal, and for the eternal to be produced. Indeed God has said : « There is nothing like Him » (42.11/9), and He has said : « There is no one equal to Him » (112.4).

16. The basis for declaring that the body has a limit, and that the atom cannot be divided (ad infinitum), is the statement of God : « And everything has been numbered by us in a clear archetype » (36.12/11). [27] Now one cannot number what has no limit, and the single thing cannot be divided (ad infinitum). For this would necessitate that they (endlessly) be two things — and God has declared that numbering applies to them both.

17. The basis for declaring that the act must be effected for the Producer of the world as He intends and chooses, and in the absence of any aversion for it on His part, is the utterance of God : « Do you not then see what you eject ? Is it you who create it ? Or are we the creators ? » (56.58/59). And they could not affirm with proof that they created (it). [28] Despite their desire to have a child, he would not come if God was unwilling that he should. Thus God called their attention to the fact the Creator is He from whom creatures proceed according to His intention.

18. The basis of our rational refutation of our adversary is taken from the Sunna of our Master, Muḥammad. I refer to the teaching he received from God when he met the fat rabbi

---

(27) And cf. 72.28.

(28) Cf. *Luma‘*, N° 5.

ad infinitum — we find the basis of that in the Sunna of God's Apostle. On a certain occasion he said: « There is no contagious disease and no bad omen. » (23) And a Bedouin said: « Then what is the matter with camels, flawless as gazelles, which mingle with scabby camels and become scabby? » And the Prophet said: « And who infected the first? » And the Bedouin was silent because of what he had made him understand by that rational argument. Likewise we say to him who claims that there is no motion not preceded by a motion: If that were the case, then not a single motion would ever have begun to be, because the (antecedently) limitless cannot begin to be.

14. Similarly, when a certain man said: (24) « O Prophet of God! My wife has borne a black male child » — and he hinted that he would repudiate it — the Prophet said: « Have you any camels? » He replied: « Yes » The Prophet said: « What color are they? » He said: « Red.» And the Apostle of God said: « Is there an ash-colored one among them?» He said: « Yes, there is an ash-colored one among them. » The Prophet said: « And whence came that?» He said: « Perhaps a sweat (25) spoiled it.» And the Prophet said: «And perhaps a sweat spoiled your son. » This, then, is the way in which God taught His Prophet to refer a thing to its kind and like, and it is our basis in all the judgments we make regarding the similar and the like.

15. We use that argument against him who holds that God resembles creatures and is a body by saying to him: (26) If God resembled anything, He would have to resemble it ei-

---

(23) I have not succeeded in finding any reference to this story.

(24) This story, too, is unknown to me from any other source.

(25) The word may have other meanings, and perhaps even a technical meaning here; but the point is not very important.

(26) Cf. *Lumaʿ*, N° 7.

This, then, was the argument which God ([21]) adduced against the group which admitted creation.

11. As for the group which denied both the first creation and the second, and maintained the eternity of the world, a doubt entered their minds simply because they said: « It is our experience that life is wet and hot, and death is cold and dry, akin to the nature of earth. How, then, can there be any amalgamation ([22]) of life and earth and decayed bones, resulting in a sound creation, since two contraries do not combine? » For this reason, then, they denied the resurrection.

12. It is certainly true that two contraries do not combine in one substrate, or in one direction, or in what exists (already) in the substrate. But they can exist in two substrates by way of propinquity. So God argued against them by saying: « He who makes fire for you from the green tree — for lo! you kindle fire from it » (36.80). In saying that, God referred them to their own knowledge and experience of the emergence of fire from green trees, notwithstanding the heat and dryness of the former and the coldness and wetness of the latter. Again, God made the possibility of the first production a proof of the possibility of the last production, because it is a proof of the possibility of the propinquity of life to earth and decayed bones and of making it a sound creation — for He said: « Just as we created man a first time, so we shall restore him» (21.104).

13. As for the discussion of the mutakallimūn involving (the principle) that (the series of) things which begin to exist has a first member, and their refutation of the Materialists who hold that there is no motion not preceded by a motion, and no day not preceded by a day, and the kalām against him who holds that there is no atom which cannot be halved

---

(21) Or, Muḥammad.

(22) Fusion, union, or combination would perhaps be better.

against their denial of the resurrection in two ways, according to the two groups of adversaries (17). For one group admitted the first creation, but denied the second, while the other group denied both (18) on the ground that the world is eternal.

10. So against him who admitted the first creation God (19) argued by saying: « Answer: He will quicken them who produced them a first time » (36.79), and by saying: « It is He who gives life by a first creation, then restores it; and it is very easy for Him » (30.27/26), and by His words: « As He first made you, you will return » (7.29/28). By these verses He called their attention to the fact that he who is able to effect something without reference to a preexisting exemplar is all the more able to effect something which has already been produced. Indeed, the latter is easier for him, as you know from your own axperience. But in the case of the Creator, it is not « easier » for Him to create one thing than to create another.

(20) It has been said that the objective pronominal suffix in *ʿalaihi* (for him) is an allusion to the capacity of creatures, the meaning being: It is easier and lighter for one of you to be raised and restored than to be created the first time. For his initial creation is always associated with parturition, rearing, severance of the umbilical cord, swaddling clothes, cutting the teeth, and other painful and distressing signs, whereas his restoration takes only a single instant in which there is none of that. Hence his restoration is easier on him than his initial creation.

---

(17) Lit. « according to two groups of them — a group which admitted... and a group which denied... ».

(18) i.e. both the first and the second creations.

(19) It is not perfectly clear whether God or Muḥammad is the subject. In any case it does not matter much, because the argument is that revealed by God and used by Muḥammad.

(20) This paragraph is an exegetical note which is almost independent of the text. Cf. Baiḍāwī on this verse.

brief reminder of the proof that God is unique and peerless ([14]), and the kalām of the mutakallimūn, in which they argue to the divine unicity from mutual hindrance and contention, simply goes back to this verse. God also ([15]) said: « God has taken for Himself no son, and there is no other divinity with Him — else each divinity would have taken away what he had created, and some would have been superior to others » (23.91/93). And so on until ([16]) He said: « Or have they appointed for God partners who have created even as He has, so that creation is a puzzle to them? » (13.16/17) The kalām of the mutakallimūn, in which they argue to the unicity of God, simply goes back to these verses which we have mentioned. And similarly, all the kalām which treats in detail of the questions deriving from the basic dogmas of God's oneness and justice is simply taken from the Qur'ān.

9. Such is also the case with the kalām on the possibility and the impossibility of the resurrecton (of the body). This question had been disputed by intelligent Arabs and by others before them until they were amazed at the possibility of that and said: « What! When we have died and become dust? That is an incredible return! » (50.3); and: « Never, never a hope of what you are promised! » (23.36/38); and: « Who will quicken bones when they have decayed? » (36.78); and God's words: « Does he promise you that when you shall have died and become dust and bones you will be brought forth? » (23.35/37) Apropos of such kalām of theirs God put into the Qur'ān argument designed to confirm, from the viewpoint of reason, the possibility of the resurrection after death. Moreover, He taught and instructed His Prophet how to argue

(14) Lit. « without a partner » (*sharīk*).

(15) Better perhaps: « to this verse, and to God's saying... ».

(16) Perhaps a *wāw* should be inserted before « *ilā qawlihi* », and then the translation would read: « superior to others..., and to God's saying... ».

innovator ». So you are constrained to regard yourselves as deviating innovators, since you have discussed something which the Prophet did not discuss, and you have accused of deviation him whom the Prophet did not so accuse.

SECOND ANSWER

6. The second answer is to say to them: Actually the Prophet was not ignorant of any item of the kalām which you have mentioned concerning body and accident, motion and rest, atom and leap. It is true [11] that he did not discuss every one of these points specifically; and the same is true of the jurisprudents [12] and learned men among the Companions. Nevertheless, the basic principles of these things which you have mentioned specifically are present in the Qurʾān and the Sunna in general terms, not in detail.

7. Take motion and rest and the kalām about them. Their basic principle is present in the Qurʾān, where they prove the affirmation of God's oneness; and so for union and separateness. In relating what His friend Abraham said in the story of the setting of the star and the sun and the moon and their being moved from place to place, [13] God said what proves that his (Abraham's) Lord cannot be subject to any of that, and that one who is subject to setting and translation from place to place is not a divinity.

8. The kalām on the basic principles of the profession of God's oneness is also taken from the Book. God said: « Were there divinities other than God in them, the heavens and the earth would be in disorder » (21.22). This kalām is a

---

(11) Lit. « leap, even though he did not... ».

(12) Strictly speaking, there were no « jurisprudents » among the Companions. Perhaps the old meaning of « fiqh » should be understood here, i.e. insight, especially into matters of religion.

(13) Cf. *Lumaʿ*, N° 11.

3. They assert that if that were a matter of guidance and rectitude, the Prophet and his Caliphs and his Companions would have discussed it. For, they say, the Prophet did not die until he had discussed and amply explained all needful religious matters. He left nothing to be said by anyone about the affairs of their religion needful to Muslims, and what brings them near to God and removes them far from His anger.

4. Since no kalām on any of the subjects which we have mentioned has been related from the Prophet, we know that such kalām is an innovation and such inquiry a deviation. For if it were good, the Prophet and his Companions would not have failed to discuss it. For the absence of such kalām on the part of the Prophet and his Companions can be explained in only two ways: either they knew it and were silent about it; or they did not know it, nay, were ignorant of it. Now if they knew it and did not discuss it, then we also may be silent about it, as they were, and we may abstain from plunging into it, as they abstained. For if it were a part of religion, they could not have been silent about it. On the other hand, if they did not know it, then we may have the same ignorance of it. For if it were a part of religion, they would not have been ignorant of it. So according to both explanations such kalām is an innovation and plunging into it is a deviation.

This is the summary of their argument for abstaining from reasoning about the basic dogmas of religion.

FIRST ANSWER

5. There are three ways of answering that argument. The first is to turn the question against them by saying: It is also true that the Prophet never said: « If anyone should inquire into that and discuss it [10], regard him as a deviating

(10) i.e. kalām on such subjects as those mentioned in N° 2.

told (4) by the Shaikh, Abuʾl-Faḍl Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Nātilī in his house in Māzandarān, when I read it to him: *I have it* from Abū Naṣr ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad b. Hārūn of Shīrāz: *who had it* from ʿAlī b. Rustam: *who related* that ʿAlī b. Mahdī (5) said: *I heard* that peerless Shaikh, the Shaikh of Shaikhs, Abuʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī, say:

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds! And God's blessing be upon Muḥammad the Prophet, and his goodly familiars, and his Companions, the elect Imāms!

THE OBJECTION TO KALAM

2. A certain group of men (6) have made ignorance their capital. Finding reasoning and inquiry into religious belief too burdensome, they incline towards the easy way of servile sectarianism (7). They calumniate him who scrutinizes the basic dogmas of religion and accuse him of deviation. It is innovation and deviation, they claim, to engage in kalām about motion and rest, body and accident, accidental modes and states (8), the atom and the leap (9), and the attributes of the Creator.

---

(4) Lit. — « The Shaikh.... told us... »

(5) This *isnād*, or chain of names, does not seem long enough to go back directly to Ashʿarī himself, who died in 324. Perhaps, if it is authentic, some names have been dropped.

(6) Representatives of a rigid traditionism — some of the Ḥanbalites ?

(7) Arabic: *al-taqlīd* — unquestioning acceptance of the authority of another. Cf. art. *Taḳlīd*, III, in EI or Hwb.

(8) Arabic: *al-alwān waʾl-akwān*. According to ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl al-Dīn*, 40 ff.) these are the two main divisions of accidents. The phrase, therefore, might be translated simply by « the various kinds of accidents ».

(9) Arabic: *al-ṭafra*. This seems to refer to al-Naẓẓām's theory of the « leap » — cf. *Tritton*, 93, and *Madhhab al-Dhurra ʿindaʾl-Muslimīn* (Arabic trans. of Pines, *Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomenlehre*) 12, and 141.

IN THE NAME OF GOD,

THE MERCIFUL, THE BENEFICENT!

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds! His blessing be upon our Master, Muḥammad, and his household, and his Companions! God's peace to them all!

1. *We have it* from the Shaikh, the Imām, Jamāl al-Dīn Abu'l-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbdallāh the Quraishite, with a licence written in his own hand, that he said: *We have it* from the jurisprudent, the learned Imām, Fakhru'l-Dīn Abu'l-Maʿālī Muḥammad b. Abī'l-Faraj b. Muḥammad b. Baraka of Mosul, when it was read to him — and I heard it in his masjid ([1]) in the Sultan's Market in Baghdad, on Tuesday, the eighth of Shawwāl, in the year 600 (June 9, 1204) — and it was said to him: You read (it) to the Shaikh, the most trustworthy Imām, Abū Manṣūr al-Mubārak b. ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad of Baghdad the day that he made you recite (it) in his Ribāṭ ([2]), known as « Ribāṭ al-Barbahīriyya », to the east of the City of Peace (Baghdad), in the year 573/1177-8 » — and he acknowledged it.

We were informed by the Shaikh, the Imām, the Ḥāfiẓ, Jamāl al-Dīn Abu'l-Faḍl ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad (b.) Ibrāhīm b. Khālid, who was known as Ibnu'l-Ikhwa ([3]), in the year 542/1147-8: *I was*

---

(1) i.e. his mosque, probably called « his » because he was accustomed to lecture there, or to pray there.

(2) A kind of « religious » house — cf. art. *Ribāṭ*, in EI or Hwb.

(3) Or — Ukhuwwa.

A VINDICATION OF THE SCIENCE OF KALAM

A TRANSLATION OF THE

RISĀLA (FĪ) ISTIḤSĀN AL-KHAWḌ FĪ ʿILM AL-KALĀM

OF

Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl AL-ASHʿARĪ

of him who holds that the Prophet explicitly designated the Imāmate of another is false. For the Imāmate of a certain individual would be impossible if the Apostle had explicitly designated the Imāmate of someone else. And this necessitates the falsity of the assertion of him who maintains that the Prophet appointed ʿAlī to be Imām after him.

199. The view of him who holds that Abū Bakr was explicitly designated to be Imām (9) is refuted by the fact that on the Day of the Porch (10) Abū Bakr said to ʿUmar: « Stretch forth thy hand that I may swear allegiance to thee! » For if the Apostle of God had designated Abū Bakr's Imāmate, the latter could not have said: «Stretch forth thy hand that I may swear allegiance to thee! »

200. We have now spoken briefly about the subjects on which we have discoursed. The book is finished. Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds! God bless Muḥammad and his household!

---

(9) Ashʿarī saw the danger in this view, though it must have had a certain attractiveness.

(10) This was the day on which Muḥammad died. For an account of the events that took place in the « Porch », cf. the first chapter of Muir, *The Caliphate*.

call upon you to fight them — « as you turned away before » — i.e. as you refused before — « He will punish you with a grievous punishment » (48.16).

196. Now we know that the one who called upon them was not the Prophet, because God had said to His Prophet: « Say: You shall never again go out with me » (9.83/84), and He said in the Sura of Victory: « wishing to change what God has said » (48.15). So God denied that they would go out with His Prophet, and characterized their going out with him as a changing of His word. Hence the one who called upon them, and whom they were ordered to follow, must have been someone who would call upon them after the Apostle.

197. Men have maintained two opinions. Some said that the people of great valor were the Persians and the Byzantines; and others said that they were the Yamāmites. Now Abū Bakr fought the Byzantines and the Yamāmites, and the Persians were fought during his lifetime, and were conquered after his death. Hence, if the people of great valor were the Yamāmites or the Byzantines, Abū Bakr fought them — which necessitates his Imāmate. And if they were the Persians, they were fought in his lifetime and were later finished off by ʿUmar — which necessitates the Imāmate of ʿUmar. But if ʿUmar's Imāmate be certain, then the Imāmate of Abū Bakr must also be certain: because Abū Bakr invested ʿUmar with the office. So if the text means him who fought the Persians and finished them off, then, if ʿUmar's Imāmate be certain, Abū Bakr's Imāmate must also be certain — because Abū Bakr was the one who invested ʿUmar with the Imāmate.

198. Thus what we have cited from the Qurʾān proves the Imāmate of al-Ṣiddīq and of al-Fārūq. And if Abū Bakr's Imāmate be certain because of the proofs which we have mentioned — from the ostensible meaning of the Qurʾān and the consensus of the Muslims of his time on it — then the view

the investiture of those Muslims who invested him with it, and the oath of allegiance of the Refugees and Helpers who swore allegiance to him, and the agreement of the Muslims of his time on him — especially since ʿAlī and al-ʿAbbās tendered their allegiance to him of their own accord and acknowledged his Imāmate and succession to the Apostle. Therefore, if, by consensus, the Imāmate concerned only these three, and if ʿAlī and al-ʿAbbās swore allegiance to Abū Bakr in company with all the Muslims, Abū Bakr must have been the Imām to whom obedience was due.

195. The Qurʾān has pronounced on the Imāmate of al-Ṣiddīq and of al-Fārūq. (8) For God said, in the Sura of Quittance, to those who refrained from helping His Prophet and stayed back from fighting with him: « Say: You shall never again go out with me, and you shall never fight with me against an enemy! You were pleased to stay at home a first time: then stay at home with those who remain behind!» (9.83/84). And in another Sura He said: « Those left behind will say, when you set out in quest of booty, 'Let us follow you.' — wishing to change what God has said » (48.15) — i. e. His words: « You shall never again go out with me, and you shall never fight with me against an enemy! » Then God said: « Thus did God speak to you on a previous occasion. And they will say: 'But you are envious of us'. Nay, but they have very little understanding » (48.15). Then He said: « Say to those desert Arabs who were left behind: You will be called upon to fight against a people of great valor until they shall surrender; and if you obey, God will give you a fine recompense » — i.e. if you obey him who will call upon you to fight them, God will give you a fine recompense — « but if you turn away » — i.e. if you refuse to answer the call of him who will

(8) « The Trusting » and « The Discerner » — complimentary epithets applied respectively to Abū Bakr and ʿUmar.

the Apostle (3); 2) those who hold the Imâmate of al-ʿAbbās (4); 3) those who hold the Imāmate of Abū Bakr. Now we see that ʿAlī and al-ʿAbbās swore allegiance to Abū Bakr and submitted to his command in company with all the Muslims (5). Even though some put off swearing allegiance for a time, they finally agreed to swear allegiance to him, and to be guided by his leadership, and to rally under his banner, and to obey his orders. Moreover, they addressed him with the words: « O Caliph of the Apostle of God! » And it is impossible for the Community to agree on an error (6).

194. No one has any right to claim that the interior sentiments of ʿAlī and al-ʿAbbās were the contrary of those which they displayed (7). For if that were possible, we should be unable to conclude to the soundness of any consensus of the Community on anything. For we should never be sure but that the interior sentiments of some of the Community might be the contrary of those manifested exteriorly by them. Therefore, since the manifest agreement of the Community gives us certain knowledge of the consensus, we should ignore what anyone may claim regarding interior sentiments. One making such claims would be like a Khārijite who affirms that ʿAlī's interior sentiments were the contrary of those which he actually displayed. Hence, since this would do away with all consensus, one must conclude to the Imâmate of Abū Bakr from

---

(3) The Shīʿa, i.e. the party of ʿAlī, who married Fāṭima, the daughter of Muḥammad. Cf. Donaldson, *The Shiʿite Religion*, London, 1933. They split up into many sects — cf. *Tritton*, 206-7.

(4) The uncle of Muḥammad. Cf. *Tritton*, 29 (the Hurairiya).

(5) The traditional orthodox view of early Islamic history is for the most part that set forth in Muir's *The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline and Fall*, Revised Ed. 1924.

(6) Muḥammad is related to have said: « My Community will not agree on an error ». Cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 48 A.

(7) i. e. that they only pretended to swear allegiance to Abū Bakr.

CHAPTER TEN

DISCUSSION OF THE IMAMATE [1]

193. Q. What is the proof of Abū Bakr's Imāmate ? [2].

A. The proof of that is that we find men divided into three classes : 1) those who hold the Imāmate of ʿAlī after

---

(1) i.e. the Caliphate. A caliph (*khalīfa*) is a vicar, or vicegerent. An *imām* is a leader, leader of the prayer, leader of the Community, or of some section of it, etc. The earlier Muslim writers prefer the terms « *Imāma* » and « *Imām* » to « Caliphate » and « Caliph ». The reader may consult Arnold's *The Caliphate*, or his article, Khalīfa, in EI or Hwb. A modern work which is of interest in view of Kemal Atatürk's abolition of the Caliphate is *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rashīd Riḍā*, Beyrouth, 1938 (H. Laoust's annotated translation of Rashīd Riḍā's *al-Khilāfa, aw al-Imāmat al-ʿUẓmā*, Cairo, 1341/1922-3). There is also much valuable material in the text and notes of Laoust's *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taki-d-dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīya.*

Other discussions : *Ibāna*, 133-136 ; *Tamhīd*, 160-239 ; *Irshād*, 344-363 ; *Justo Medio*, 348-364 ; *Ḥillī*, 62-81 ; *Fyzee*, 89-100.

(2) Abū Bakr was de facto the first Caliph. Was he also such de jure ? This is the basic question which has caused so much shedding of Muslim blood, and of Muslim ink. Though it is not strictly a dogmatic question, it certainly had a great deal of influence on the development of dogma in Islam. The primary question is the one which Ashʿarī discusses briefly in this chapter : Did the Prophet Muḥammad explicitly designate his successor (*naṣṣ*) before he died, or was the choice of a successor a matter to be settled by election (*ikhtiyār*). The Shīʿa held, and hold, the former ; the Sunnīs champion the latter view.

book in his left hand will say: 'Would that I had not been given my book!' He was indeed wont not to believe in God the Mighty and not to urge the feeding of the poor» (69.25-34) ([5]).

---

(5) Ashʿarī also seems to have held the orthodox doctrine on the intercession of Muḥammad, though it is not mentioned in this work. Cf. *Ibāna*, 130-131. So even though a Muslim grave sinner were to be consigned to hell, he would certainly come forth ultimately and enter paradise.

belies and turns away » (92.14-16), one could conclude that all who endure the Fire are such. And from the ostensible meaning of God's words: Who judge not by what God has sent down, they, they are the profligate ! » (5.47/51), one could conclude that only the profligate man refrains from judging by what God has sent down. Since, then, these verses do not compel one to conclude that only the unbeliever enters the Fire, the previously cited verses do not compel one to conclude that every profligate man will be in hell, and that everyone who consumes the wealth of orphans wrongfully and everyone who consumes the wealth of men wastefully will be in the Fire. And the answer to every verse which they use as an argument regarding the threat is like the answer to these verses.

191. God's words, « Who does that unjustly and wrongfully » (4.30/34), are to be interpreted as meaning: « Who does that while declaring it licit ». So they apply to all who are such. And His words, « while the profligate will certainly be in a burning fire » (82.14), are to be interpreted as meaning « some of them », i.e. the unbelievers among them. So they apply to all who are such. One should reply in the same way respecting every verse urged in proof of the universality of the threat.

192. Moreover, the Muʿtazila are constrained to admit that all « those of the Left » are unbelievers because of the ostensible meaning of God's words: « The Companions of the Left! What are the Companions of the Left? They are in burning wind and boiling water and pall of smoke, neither refreshing nor rain-bearing. Once, indeed, they used to live delicately while they persisted in the Great Sin. And they were wont to say: 'When we shall have died and become dust and bones, shall we indeed be raised again?' » (56.41-47/40-47), and from His words: « But he who will be given his

Prayer » who profess God's unicity will be in the Garden from the ostensible meaning of God's words: « Those who will come with a good work will have something better than it; and on that day they will be safe from any fear » (27.89/91). And from the ostensible meaning of God's words: « Reckon not those as dead who are killed while fighting for God. On the contrary they are alive, and with their Lord have sustenance » (3.169/163), one would have to conclude that everyone killed while fighting for God is in the Gardens and there has sustenance. And from the ostensible meaning of God's words: « God indeed forgives sins, all of them! » (39.53/54), one would have to conclude that every sin can be forgiven, except [3] the sin of which God informed the Apostle, and the Muslims are agreed, that it is unforgivable, i.e. the sin of polytheism and unbelief. So one has no more right to say that the threat-verses are universal and the others particular than one has to reverse the statement and to say that the threat-verses are particular and the others universal.

190. Moreover, if one had to conclude from the ostensible meanings of the verses that every profligate man and everyone who consumes the wealth of orphans wrongfully will be in hell, then one could conclude (mendaciously) [4] from God's words: « Each time a group is cast into it its guardians ask them: 'Did no one come to warn you?' They reply: 'Yes, one came to warn us, but we belied and said: God has sent down nothing!' » (67.8-9), that only the unbeliever enters the Fire. And from the ostensible meaning of God's words: « Therefore have I warned you of a fiercely blazing Fire which only the most impious must endure, who

(3) So the text seems to read, though we should have expected something like « even that sin... ».

(4) The « *mukadhdhiban* » of the original seems awkwardly placed, or even superfluous.

187. Likewise, one cannot conclude that God's words, « while the profligate will certainly be in a burning fire » and « those who consume », refer to « some » or « all », since those expressions sometimes refer to « all », and again to « some ». If one could claim that the form means only « all » until it is proved to mean « some », he would have no more right to make this claim than another would have to say that this expression compels one to conclude that it means « some » until it is proved to mean « all ». So since both claimants would have the same right of assertion, both assertions must be excluded.

188. The poet Zuhair (2) said: « Who is not profuse in flattery will be rent by fangs and trodden underfoot ». But that is not true of everyone who does not use flattery. He also said: « Who does not wrong men will himself be wronged ». But not everyone who does not wrong men is himself wronged. Moreover, a speaker says: « There came to me whom I loved » — meaning only one person. And one says: « The merchants came to me » — although all of them did not come to him. And one says: « My neighbors came to me » — although all of them did not come to him. And one says: « The profligate cursed me abominably » — without meaning all of them. Hence, since these expressions occur at times meaning « all », and at other times meaning « some », one cannot conclude that they mean « all » rather than « some », or « some » rather than « all », unless one has some positive indication.

189. Moreover, if one had to conclude from the form of these verses to the punishment of every profligate man, and of everyone who consumes the wealth of orphans wrongfully, and of everyone who consumes the wealth of men wastefully, then one would have to conclude that all those « People of the

---

(2) A famous pre-Islamic poet. The citations are from his « *muʿallaqa* » — a special prize-winning poem.

CHAPTER NINE

DISCUSSION OF THE PARTICULAR AND THE UNIVERSAL, AND OF THE PROMISE AND THE THREAT(1)

186. Q. Tell us about God's words: « while the profligate will certainly be in a burning fire » (82.14); and: « Who does that unjustly and wrongfully, we shall roast him with fire » (4.30/34); and: « Truly those who consume the wealth of orphans wrongfully are only consuming fire in their bellies, and they shall endure the blazing fire » (4.10/11).

A. God's words, « Who does that unjustly », may be interpreted as applying to *all* who do that, or as applying to *some*. For the word « who » in our language applies sometimes to all, and sometimes to some. Hence, since the form of the word occurs now with the meaning of « some », and again with the meaning of « all », one cannot affirm positively, from its form alone, that it means « all » or « some ».

---

(1) The real question in this chapter is: Will any believer (Muslim) be condemned to hell *forever* ? Ashʿarī's answer, briefly, is : No— unless he commit the unforgivable sin of *shirk* (polytheism, associating others with God). But since, in such a case, he would cease to be a Muslim, we may say that his answer is simply: No. It is not that God could not, but that He will not. Difficulties arise from certain Qurʾānic texts which seem to consign to hell those who commit other sins, and it is these texts which Ashʿarī must explain.

be either a believer or an unbeliever — one must conclude that Wāṣil's view is false.

185. Besides, if one could say that he who has faith and commits a grave sin is neither believer nor unbeliever, one could also say: Nay, but he is a believer by reason of his faith, and it should not be said that he is a sinner by reason of his sin. Since this cannot be said, because there can be no sin which does not belong to a sinner, their assertion is also impossible, for there can be no faith which does not belong to a believer.

---

kills is a killer, and he who disbelieves is a disbeliever, and he who sins is a sinner, and he who believes [2] is a believer. Likewise, then, he who has faith is a believer.

182. If the sinner were neither believer nor unbeliever, he would neither disbelieve nor believe, and consequently would neither profess God's unicity nor deny it, would be neither friend nor enemy of God. Since that cannot be, it is impossible that the sinner be, as the Muʿtazila claim, neither believer nor unbeliever.

183. Moreover, if the sinner was a believer before he sinned, by reason of his profession of God's unicity, then adultery occurring after such profession does not annul the name which issues from the faith which he has not forsaken.

184. Furthermore, before the advent of Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ [3], the chief of the Muʿtazila, men followed two opinions. The Khawārij [4] among them regarded grave sinners as unbelievers, whereas the « People of Rectitude » maintained that the grave sinner was a believer by reason of his faith and a sinner by reason of his grave sin. But no one said that he was neither believer nor unbeliever before the advent of Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ. The latter withdrew from the Community and departed from its view, and because of his divergence from the consensus he was called a « withdrawer » (Muʿtazilī) [5]. So from the absence of consensus on his view — for the Muslims were agreed that the disobedient member of the « People of the Prayer » must

---

(2) Here the verb is *ṣaddaqa*, and in the next phrase *āmana*; but it is difficult to bring this out in the translation.

(3) Cf. *Tritton*, 60; *Watt*, 63; and art. Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā', in EI or Hwb.

(4) *Tritton*, 35 ff.; *Watt*, 32 ff.; MC, Index, s.v. Khāridjites; art. Khāridjiten, EI or Hwb.

(5) Or : seceder, Cf. Nallino, *Sull'origine del nome dei Muʿtaziliti*, in Rivista degli Studi Orientali, VII (1916-18), 429-454. (Reprinted in *Raccolta di scritti etc.*, II, 170 ff.)

CHAPTER EIGHT

DISCUSSION OF FAITH

180. Q. What, in your opinion, is faith in God? ([1])

A. It is belief in God. On that there is a consensus of those who speak the language in which the Qurʾān was revealed. God said: « We have sent no Apostle to teach, save in the language of his people » (14.4). He also said: « in plain Arabic speech » (26.195). Now faith, in the language in which God sent down the Qurʾān, is belief. God Himself said: « You do not have faith in us even though we are truthful » (12.17)— i.e. you do not believe us. And everybody says: « So-and-so has faith in the punishment of the grave and intercession », meaning that he believes in that. So faith must be that which is faith according to those who speak the language, i.e. it must be belief.

181. Q. What about the sinner who belongs to the People of the Qibla ([1 bis]): is he a believer?

A. Yes — a believer by reason of his faith, a sinner by reason of his sin and grave fault. Those who speak the language are agreed that he who strikes is a striker, and he who

---

(1) The reader may consult with profit *Tritton* and MC, Indices, s.v. Faith. He will note that in this chapter Ashʿarī passes very quickly from the discussion of faith as such to the famous question: Is the grave Muslim sinner a believer?

(1 bis) i.e. those who turn to the same direction (Mecca) when they pray.

They : Yes. *We* : Likewise, then, if He commanded us to lie, He could cause us to be lying.

178. Furthermore, do you not claim that prayer, when it exists, consists of motions, and that the man who moves is moving because motion inheres in him, and that the man who prays is praying because prayer inheres in him ? If they reply affirmatively, one should say to them : Then, if a man obeys by effecting a motion which God has commanded him to effect, he must be obeying because obedience inheres in him, just as he is moving because motion inheres in him. If they agree, one should say to them : Then part of the man is obedient and part of him is disobedient when disobedience inheres in him. They must admit this. Then one should say to them : Why, therefore, do you deny that part of the man may be speaking, I mean his tongue, and part of him knowing and willing, I mean his heart ? They may say : When the motion is obedience, then the man who moves is moving because the motion inheres in him ; but the obedient man is not obedient because obedience inheres in him, but rather because he effects the obedience. One should reply : Then why do you deny, when the motions are prayer, — and the man who moves is moving because motion inheres in him — that the man who prays is praying because he effects the prayer, and not because the prayer inheres in him ?

179. If they agree with that, one should say to them : Then if God can command us to pray, but cannot Himself pray, it must be admitted that, if He commanded us to lie, He could not Himself lie, but rather could effect lying for us, just as He can effect prayer for us without being able to pray Himself. So say the same of lying! Moreover, when God commands us to move, He makes for us the motions by which we move. Likewise, then, if He commanded us to lie, why would it be impossible for Him to make for us a lie by which we should be lying ?

is praying because he effects the prayer in himself, and that the man who moves is moving because he effects the motion in himself ?

O. One of us may move without effecting the motion.

A. And one may will and speak who does not effect willing or speech, e.g. the passionate lover who loves his beloved with an uncontrollable love, and the sleeper, or epileptic, who utters insuppressible speech.

O. The love of the passionate lover is not really love, nor is his willing really willing.

A. Neither is the speech of the epileptic and of the sleeper really speech ! Nor is the speech of a man who is awake really speech ! Nor is the willing of the passionate lover really willing ! This is nonsense which anyone can refute !

177. Moreover, if the man who prays is praying because prayer inheres in him, then is not the submissive man submissive, according to you, because submissiveness inheres in him? For submissiveness is in the heart, whereas the whole man is submissive. If they claim that the heart is submissive and lowly, we force them to admit that it is the tongue which is really speaking and the heart which is really willing. *They* : The man who is submissive is not submissive because submissiveness inheres in him. *We* : Then if God commands us to be submissive, according to your reasoning He must Himself be submissive. *They* : No, but He effects submissiveness for another. *We* : And just so, if He commanded us to lie He could effect lying for another. *They* : The man who lies is lying because he himself effects the lying. *We*: Then the same is true of the man who is submissive. *They* : The submissive man is submissive neither because submissiveness inheres in him nor because he effects it. *We* : The same is true of the liar. Moreover, if God commanded us to move, could He not cause us to be moving ?

174. A. The argument by which they constrain us to admit that the Creator can lie — far exalted He above that! — is that He can command lying; for He must be able to be qualified by everything which He can command (9). If that be so, then, if God can command that the motions by which we move and the prayer by which we pray inhere (10) in us, it must be possible for motions by which He would move and prayer by which He would pray to inhere in Him! Unless, indeed, they mean to say: If God can command another to lie, why can He not effect a lie by which that other will be lying, just as, if He commands another to pray, He can effect for that other a prayer by which he will be praying? If they ask the question in this form, it is something undeniable.

175. However, if the man who prays is praying because prayer inheres in him, just as the man who moves is moving because motion inheres in him, then every atom (11) of the man, when prayer inheres in him, must be praying, just as every atom of the man, when motion inheres in him, must be moving. Moreover, in our language « prayer » is « invocation ». So if the man who prays is praying because prayer inheres in him, then he must also be invoking because invocation inheres in him. But they hold this to be false.

176. Furthermore, if the Creator can effect for another a prayer by which He Himself will be praying, why can He not effect for another a volition by which He will be willing, and a speech by which He will be speaking?

O. The man who speaks and wills is speaking and willing because he effects the speech and the willing.

A. Then why do you deny that the man who prays

---

(9) This seems to be an evasion, for the adversaries have not really made such a sweeping claim, as is clear from N° 173.

(10) This is the verb « *ḥalla* » — cf. n. 12 to Chapter Five.

(11) Arabic: *juz'*.

171. O. Then lying is evil only because God has declared it to be evil.

A. Certainly. And if He declared it to be good, it would be good; and if He commanded it, no one could gainsay Him.

172. O. Then allow that God can lie, just as you allow that He can command lying!

A. Not everything which God can command can be predicated of Him. Do you not see that He has commanded us to pray and to be submissive and to move, yet He cannot pray and be submissive and move, because that is impossible for Him? Likewise, He cannot lie, not because it is evil, but because it is impossible for Him to lie. So He cannot be qualified by the power to lie, just as He cannot be qualified by the power to move and to be ignorant. For it one could claim that the Creator can be qualified by the power to lie but not by the power to be ignorant, without introducing any distinction, then another could reverse the statement and claim that the Creator can be qualified by the power to be ignorant but not by the power to lie. Since that is impossible, what they say is false ([8]).

173. O. When God commands us to pray our prayer consists of the motions by which we move when we pray; and the man who moves is moving because motion inheres in him. But he who curses and lies is cursing and lying only because he effects cursing and lying, and not because they inhere in him.

---

(8) Ashʿarī does not seem to have reached the heart of the difficulty. His abhorrence of predicating lying of God may ostensibly have been dictated by his reading of revelation and tradition, but it is hard to escape the feeling that it was also the result of an instinctive aversion found in all normal men and based on the objective evil of lying.

QUESTION

169. Q. Is God free to inflict pain on infants in the next life (4) ?

A. God is free to do that, and in doing it He would be just. Likewise, whenever He inflicts an infinite (5) punishment for a finite sin, and subordinates some living beings (6) to others, and is gracious to some and not to others, and creates men knowing well that they will disbelieve — all that is justice on His part. And it would not be evil on the part of God to create them in the painful punishment and to make it perpetual. Nor would it be evil on His part to punish the believers and to introduce the unbelievers into the Gardens. Our only reason for saying that He will not do that is that He has informed us that He will punish the unbelievers — and He cannot lie when He gives information.

170. The proof that He is free to do whatever He does is that He is the Supreme Monarch, subject to no one, with no superior over Him who can permit, or command, or chide, or forbid, or prescribe what He shall do and fix bounds for Him. This being so, nothing can be evil on the part of God. For a thing is evil on our part only because we transgress the limit and bound set for us and do what we have no right to do. But since the Creator is subject to no one and bound by no command, nothing can be evil on His part (7).

---

(4) Cf. *Ibāna*, 112. (The passage in the middle of that page apparently should read : « The Banū Ismāʿīl (or : Isrāʾīl ?), their little ones (reading *ṣighāruhum*) are in hell ».)

(5) Arabic : *lā yatanāhā* — which will never end.

(6) Arabic : *al-ḥayawān*. The context seems to require « men », though other rational creatures (angels and jinn) may be included.

(7) This is the doctrine which Averroes finds so distasteful. As he points out, and as the next number makes clear, there can be nothing good or bad *in se*.

166. Q. Then since God has not effected in unbelievers what would ensure their belief, He has been miserly towards them.

A. Miserliness consists in the agent's not doing what he ought to do. But when something is a matter of generosity, he who is generous is free to be generous with that or not to be generous. And in such a case no miserliness attaches to the agent if he does not do the thing (2).

167. Q. Since God has not effected in unbelievers what would ensure their belief, has He, then, willed their folly and unbelief ?

A. Yes — and we have explained that in the course of an earlier discussion (3).

QUESTION

168. Then one should say to them : If, since God has not effected in unbelievers what would ensure their belief, He must will their perversity, why do you deny that, since He created them while knowing that they would disbelieve, He must have willed their unbelief ? They may say that he who wills folly is foolish. One should ask them : Is it not true that the Creator of him who He knows will disbelieve is not foolish because He creates him, and that His creating him is not folly? Why, then, do you deny that the Creator was not foolish when He willed their folly ? But we have already discussed this question in an earlier section.

---

(2) Cf. N° 41, supra.
(3) Cf. N° 63-4, supra.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION OF THE IMPUTATION OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE TO GOD[1]

165. Q. Is God able to grant a favor such that, had He effected it in the unbelievers they would have believed ?

A. Yes — and the proof of that is the fact that God can effect in the believers and in His servants that which, had He effected it in them, they would surely have done mischiet in the earth. For God has said : « And had God given more ample sustenance to His servants they would surely have done mischief in the earth » (42.27/26) ; and « Were it not that men would have formed one community » — i.e. in unbelief — « we would surely have appointed, for those who are ungrateful to the Benefactor, roofs of silver for their houses and stairs of silver on which they might mount » (43.33/32). Hence, since God can effect in creatures that which, had He effected it in them, they would have all disbelieved, He can also effect in them that which, had He effected it in them, they would have all believed. Moreover, we have already proved that the existence of the capacity entails the existence of the act. So if God can empower men to believe, He can also effect that which, had He effected it in them, they would have all believed.

---

(1) *Irshād*, 233-265. Averroes strongly criticizes the main principle underlying this section. *Teologia*, 334 ff.

God » (63.1); and God said: « And God knows that you are indeed His Apostle, and God testifies that the Hypocrites are indeed liars » (*ibid.*).

164. Q. What about God's words: « God wills for you ease; and He does not will for you hardship » (2.185/181)?

A. God meant that they would not be guilty or culpable because of omitting to fast when travelling or sick, and that they would not be in hardship because of their breaking the fast.

A. They mean: I did not enjoin that upon them, nor did I command them that, but they lied against me and fabricated a lie in what they said, i.e. that I had commanded them that.

161. The Qurʾānic proof that God can enjoin what cannot be done is His remark to the angels: « Tell me the names of these » (2.31/29) — i.e. the names of creatures — when they did not know that and were unable to do it. God also said that the impious « will be called upon to prostrate themselves and will be unable to do it » (68.42). So if God can enjoin upon men in the next life what they will be unable to do, that is also possible in this life. Moreover, God has commanded justice; yet He said: « You will never be able to treat your wives justly, even though you be eager to do so » (4.129/128).

162. Q. What about God's words: « God wills no injustice for creatures » (40.31/33), and: « God wills no injustice for the Worlds » (3.108/104)?

A. They mean that God Himself has not willed to wrong them, although He has willed that they should wrong one another.

163. Q. What about God's words: « Those who have become polytheists will say: 'Had God willed, we should not have become polytheists, nor our fathers' » — to His words [32] — « Thus did those who preceded them give the lie » (6.148/149)?

A. They said that mockingly and not by way of belief. So God called them liars for saying what they did not believe, just as He called the Hypocrites liars for saying mockingly: « We testify that you are indeed the Apostle of

(32) This phrase indicates that Ashʿarī has abbreviated his citation of the verse.

of what preceded the act, when that was manifest to her only after he had done it? So it is certain, according to us, and certain too the argument against our adversaries, that his capacity for that must have coexisted with his very doing of it.

158. The rational proof of that is the fact that, if we were to see a man actually praying, we should not know precisely when his capacity had begun to exist for him. However, we should know from the act itself that his capacity was evidently for the act, i.e. the prayer which he was performing. And our argument against our adversary, in all the questions which he may propose on the subject of the capacity, is just like what we have sketched in the foregoing exposition and explanation. And in God is help!

QUESTION

159. Q. What about God's words: « I created jinn and men only that they might adore me » (51.56)?

A. By those words God meant some of the jinn and men, i.e. those of them who do adore God. For He said in another place: « And we have created for hell many jinn and men » (7.179/178) — and the Qurʾān does not contradict itself. So God must have created many for hell, because of the verse which we have just cited; and He must have created some of them to adore Him, because of His words « I created jinn and men only that they might adore me ». And those whom He has created to adore Him are those who He has willed should adore Him and who end by adoring Him.

160. Q. What about God's words: « God did not institute any Baḥīra, or Sāʾiba, or Waṣīla, or Ḥāmi [31]; but those who disbelieve fabricate a lie against God » (5.103/102)?

---

(31) Different kinds of camels, named from certain practices of the pagan Arabs.

instances in the Book of God; but what we have used as proof suffices. Another instance is found in the words of God: « except the people of Jonah when they believed » (10.98) ([29]).

QUESTION

157. Someone may ask about what the daughter of Shuʿaib said to her father: « O father, engage him. The best of those whom you have engaged is this strong and faithful man » (28.26). Al-Jubbāʾī claimed that this verse means that she declared Moses to be strong enough for the work of which her father stood in need. And he argued from that, as he claimed, that the capacity is prior to the act. How impossible for him to deduce this conclusion from this verse in any way at all! For she did not know Moses before he removed the stones and drew the bucket, but only after she had seen his power and strength and fidelity. And that was because, when she returned to him the second time and said to him « My father summons you » (28.25), Moses said to her: « Walk behind me and direct me along the way ». For the wind was describing her to him, and fear overtook Moses, and therefore he said to her: « Walk behind me and make known to me the way, right, left, and ahead, by your tongue », and she did that ([30]). Then when she came to her father and told him that Moses was strong and faithful, her father was very angry with her and said to her: « My daughter, you know his strength from what you have seen of him. But how do you know his fidelity? » Then she told him what she had seen him do. How, then, could she have known that he was capable because

---

(29) Ashʿarī's point seems to be that the people of Jonah were not able to believe until God enabled them to do so.

(30) The Qurʾānic text is quite economical and contains none of the details mentioned by Ashʿarī — least of all the indignant question of Shuʿaib.

opened it. So this proves that they had no capacity before the act, but only with the act and for the act precisely because God willed that.

154. Then there are the words of God about the companion of Joseph: « But the devil made him forget to mention Joseph to his master; so Joseph remained in prison for several years » (12.42). The devil caused the man who was released to forget to mention Joseph to the king. So the man who was released had no capacity to mention the affair of Joseph to the king, although he had promised Joseph, before he came out of prison, that he would mention him to his master. This was in order that the will of God respecting Joseph might be accomplished at the time known to God, i.e. when the king saw the vision.

155. Moreover, there are God's words to His Prophet: « On no account say of anything 'I shall do that tomorrow' without adding 'God willing' » (18.23). Thus God commanded His Prophet not to venture to do anything which might occur to him without using the exceptive phrase [28] in his speech. So God told His Prophet that « you should not say 'This will be' before you do it, save if I will that. » And the Prophet submitted to the command of God.

156. And Moses said: « Our Lord! Blot out every trace of their wealth, and straiten their hearts, and let them not believe, even when they see the painful chastisement » (10.88). So they were unable to believe when they saw the chastisement compelling them to believe, for if they had been able to do that they would have believed when they saw the chastisement beginning to descend on them. There are many such

---

(28) Arabic: *al-istithnāʾ*. An interesting discussion of the use of this phrase, still so common on the lips of the Arabic-speaking Muslim, will be found in *al-Rawḍat al-Bahiyya*, 6-8.

contains no argument against the religion of the Lord of the worlds.

151. The Muʿtazila claim that Solomon, who was one of God's Prophets, did not call the ʿifrīt a liar when he said: « I shall bring it to you before you can rise from your place. Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful ». And they say that no one can lie in the presence of a Prophet, for he knows that God will refute any lie of his by the tongue of the Prophet. Thus God said to His Prophet: « When the Hypocrites come to you they say: 'We testify that you are indeed the Apostle of God'. And God knows that you are indeed His Apostle, and God testifies that the Hypocrites are indeed liars » (63.1). So God Himself made it known that they were lying. And there are many similar instances in the Qurʾān. The Muʿtazila argue, therefore, from the ʿifrīt's words, that the capacity is prior to the act. Wretched their thought and opinion! Nay, but their own souls have enticed them into vanities!

152. We reply to him who thus argues against us: In this verse related by God of the ʿifrīt, by his words « Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful » the ʿifrīt must have meant either « If I am able to do that and undertake it and will it », or, « Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful, *God willing* ». If Solomon had not known that the ʿifrīt was suppressing some such phrase, he would certainly have called him a liar and refuted what he had said.

153. That is proved by God's words: « And they were unable to surmount it, nor could they breach it » (18.97/96). The explanation of this — and it is not disputed by anyone who professes the unicity of God — is that they were hoping every day to find that they had opened it without having said « God willing ». But if it had been determined, they would have said « God willing », and would have found that they had

mentioned spending : « And let him whose sustenance has been determined for him spend of what God has given him. God demands of a soul only what He has given it. »

149. Q. What about God's words : « God enjoins upon a soul only what it can do » (2.286) ?

A. They mean that God does not enjoin upon a soul anything that would afflict it too severely, such as banishing from one's soul thoughts which invite to evil ; for God may overlook that and be generous to Muslims regarding the disobedience to which their souls invite them, if they do not commit it after its having been such an affliction for them ([25]). So the meaning of « God enjoins upon a soul only what it can do » is « only what He makes possible for it. » For what God commands His creatures to do is not too difficult for them, and they are not unable to effect it ([26]). And some of our associates have said that « God enjoins upon a soul only what it can do » means « only what it can do *lawfully*. »

150. Q. What about the words which God related of the ʿifrīt : « Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful » (27.39) ([27]) ?

A. If the ʿifrīt was telling the truth, his words « Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful » mean : « If I undertake that and will it. » And if he was one for whom, when he willed that, God would produce the power to do it, then he did not lie. But if he did not say these words in that sense, then he did lie. However, the speech of ʿifrīts and devils

---

(25) This seems to be sense of the Arabic ; but if Ashʿarī is consistent it is hard to see how they could thus acquire any merit for not doing what they could not do.

(26) Nor are they able to effect in unless God supplies the *istiṭāʿa*, according to Ashʿarī. Otherwise they can only « omit to do » the thing, and are somehow responsible.

(27) The reader should consult the context in order to appreciate the difficulty. (And so for the texts which follow).

they swore to the Apostle of God that they had no means and no mounts on which to go with the Prophet of God. So God gave them the lie respecting their oath, because they did have the means. But the dispute between them and the Apostle of God was not about whether the capacity is with or prior to the act; it was simply a quarrel about wealth and mounts. Such is what has been mentioned by the commentators, the transmitters of traditions, and the relaters of the same. If this be the case, we do not deny that material means must precede the act; we simply deny that the bodily capacity is prior to the act.

QUESTION

146. Q What about God's words: « So fear God as well as you can » (64.16)?

A. These words may be interpreted in the sense that God meant « Fear God, in so far as you are able to do so ». So if they are able to fear God, they are bound to do so; and if they are able to omit doing so, they are still bound to fear God, because the fear of God is binding on them only if they are able to effect it or able to omit it. The words may also be interpreted as « Fear God in whatever you are able to do so. »

QUESTION

147. Q. What about God's words: « and he who cannot must feed sixty poor people » (58.4/5)?

A. These words mean: « He who cannot, because of an inability, must feed sixty poor people. »

148. Q. What about God's words: « God demands of a soul only what He has given it » (65.7)?

A. They mean that God enjoins the spending only of what He has given the soul. For He said that after having

given them » (7.190). The Muʿtazila claim that the « them » of « had given them » does not refer to something mentioned previously, but to the polytheists among the children of Adam and Eve (22). Thus they contradict their view that the « it » of «able to do it» refers only to an antecedent already mentioned. Moreover one of the Companions read the text (23)...and interpreted it as meaning that they are obliged by it but are unable to do it (24).

QUESTION

144. Q. What about God's words: « And pilgrimage to the House is a duty towards God incumbent on those who can find a way to accomplish it » (3.97/91) ?

A. God meant material means, i.e. provisions and a mount, and not bodily capacity, the existence of which entails the existence of the object of its power. The proof from reason that the capacity is with the act confirms our interpretation and refutes that of our adversaries.

QUESTION

145. Q. What is the meaning of God's words: « And they will swear by God: 'Were we able, we would certainly go out with you' » (9.42) ? Must they not mean that they were able to go out but did not, and that even though they were able to go out, they did not?

A. By ability they meant wealth and means, and

---

(22) On the face of it the « them » seems to refer to Adam and Eve. Yet what Ashʿarī says seems to be the view of the commentator Zamakhsharī — II, 187.

(23) Ashʿarī here repeats the text, but since there are no vowels in the manuscript it is difficult to say just what the difference in the reading was.

(24) This seems to be the sense, but the uncertainty of the reading also affects the understanding of the interpretation.

A, They may be interpreted as signifying that God meant those who are able to feed a poor man and who are unable to fast; for them there is a ransom if they break the fast. They may also be interpreted as signifying that God meant those who are able to fast, i.e. if they undertake it and will it (19). This second interpretation accords with the view of those who refer the « it » (20) of « able to do it » to an antecedent already mentioned, i.e. the fast.

142. The Muʿtazila maintain that the « it » can refer only to an antecedent already mentioned, i.e. the fast. Our answer to them is that the first interpretation which we mentioned is the interpretation of some of the ancients (21), and that the grammarians are no argument against the Companions and the Followers. Nevertheless, many grammarians do allow that the « it » does not refer to an antecedent already mentioned.

143. Then we counterattack the Muʿtazila and say to them: Tell us about God's words: « He it is who created you from one soul, and from that soul He made its consort that the man might trust in her » — i.e. Adam and Eve. « And after he had covered her she carried a light burden, and she passed her days with it. Then when she became heavy » — i.e. Eve — « they both prayed to God their Lord : If Thou wilt give us a virtuous son, we shall surely be among the grateful » — i.e. Adam and Eve (7.189); and his words: « Then when He had

---

Baiḍāwī, 39 and Zamakhsharī, I, 226, for other possible readings. The force of the objection seems to be: The Qurʾān (i.e. God) says that those who *are able* to fast may nevertheless adopt an alternative, i.e. feeding a poor man.

(19) This meaning also seems to be allowed by the commentators.

(20) This is the objective pronominal suffix, i.e. the « hu » (it) of *yuṭīqūnahu*. The question is: does it refer to *al-ṣiyām* (the fast), mentioned in the previous verse, or to the alternative of the ransom, mention of which follows.

(21) Cf. Baiḍāwī, l.c.

particular thing is distinct from the inability to do every other thing. And in God is help !

QUESTION

140. Q. Tell us about a man who divorced his wife and freed his slave: when was he able to divorce the one and to free the other ?

A. He was able to free his slave at the moment of the manumission, and to divorce his wife at the moment of the divorce.

O. Then he was able to divorce her who was not his wife, and to free him who was not his slave (17) !

A. He was able to divorce her who was not his wife at the moment of the divorce, but who had been his wife prior to that, and to free him who was not his slave at the moment of the manumission, but who had been his slave prior to that — just as he divorced her who was not his wife at the moment of the divorce, but who had been his wife prior to that. The same answer should be given to queries about throwing down a staff, and passing from the sun to the shade, and breaking what is broken.

QUESTION

141. Q. Tell us about the words of God: « and for those who are able to do it (18) there is a ransom » (2.184/180).

(17) The point of the objector seems to be that a man is never in a position *actually* to divorce his wife, since, the moment he is *able* to do so, she is divorced. Ashʿarī, on the other hand, would seem to mean that he is never able to divorce her until he actually divorces her.

(18) Arabic : *yuṭīqūnahu*. Bell : « those who are in a position to fast » — which seems to be the obvious meaning. However, see

an absence that entails the absence of all power — or that He should command when inability exists — an existence which does not entail the nonexistence of the power.

138. The Shaikh Abu'l-Ḥasan said: And every question concerning the enjoining of what cannot be done — such as commanding the payment of the Zakāt ([15]) when a man has no wealth, and so forth — is to be answered as I have answered their question about commanding when the limb is inexistent, and enjoining an obligation when inability exists.

139. Q. Why do you deny that the thing and its contrary may be inexistent because of the existence of two inabilities ?

A. Because there is a limit to what cannot be done by the impotent man who has no power at all. But if the inability to do each particular thing were distinct from the inability to do every other thing, such a man would have unlimited inabilities — which is absurd. Moreover, death is the greatest of inabilities, since all acts are impossible when it is present. Now if the inability to do each particular thing were distinct from the inability to do every other thing, then the nonexistence of acts, in the case of a dead man, would be due to the existence of all inabilities. This would necessitate the presence in one atom ([16]) of two inabilities and two deaths. But if this were possible, one of the two could be supplanted by life with the result that the same atom would be simultaneously living and dead — which is absurd. Since this is impossible, we know that it is absurd for one to say that the inability to do each

---

(15) A religious tax legally binding on Muslims. Cf. art. Zakāt, in EI or Hwb.

(16) Arabic : *juz'*. Here perhaps « individual » would be better. But death and inability were both classified among the accidents — cf. al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, 43.8 ff. and 44.11 ; and Bāqillānī seems to say that it is the atom which receives the accident — *Tamhīd*, 41.21 ff.

same would have to be true of the power. The existence of the latter, as a power over the thing and its contrary, would therefore require that the thing and its contrary coexist with it. For one's judgment regarding the coexistence of the two contraries with the existence of the power must be the opposite of one's judgment regarding the inability. And in the case of the inability one judges that both the object of the inability and its contrary must be inexistent when the inability exists. So if such a comparison be impossible, their allegation is vain and their objection collapses, and there is no necessity of comparing the power with the inability, since there is no reason which brings them together [13], and since power does not belong to the genus of inability.

137. O. Then God can enjoin a thing when the limb does not exist and the inability exists.

A. No, because a man is commanded only to accept or omit, and when the limb does not exist there can be neither acceptance nor omission. Likewise, when inability exists, neither acceptance nor omission can coexist with it, because it is inability to do either the thing or its contrary. Moreover, if, in the case of God's commanding a man to do a thing when the man's limb did not exist, God would have to command the thing in the absence of all power, then, in the case of God's commanding a man when the latter lacked certain knowledge — knowledge of God, and knowledge that He was commanding — God would have to command him to act in the absence of all knowledge [14]. So if this be not necessary, neither is it necessary, when God commands a man in the absence of the power to do what He commands him to do, that He should command in the absence of the limb —

(13) i.e. nothing common to them both.

(14) I believe the translation is correct, but the precise meaning of the argument eludes me.

If you mean by your words that he is incapable of believing because of his impotence to do so — no. But if you mean that he is incapable of believing because he omits to do so and is preoccupied with the contrary of belief — yes.

Q. Then why do you deny that God enjoins on the unbeliever an obligation which he is unable to fulfil because he omits to fulfil it?

A. Inability to do a thing is had when both the thing and its contrary are beyond one's power ([12]). Hence it is impossible for one who is unable to do a thing to be unable simply because he omits to do it.

136. Q. Why do you deny that one who is able to do a thing is also able to do its contrary, just as one who is unable to do a thing is also unable to do its contrary?

A. If the power to do a thing were also a power to do its contrary, by analogy with inability, then help to do a thing would have to be help also to do its contrary, by analogy with the fact that inability to do a thing is also inability to do its contrary. Moreover, if the power to do a thing were also a power to do its contrary, by analogy with inability, (because inability to do a thing is also inability to do its contrary), then the same necessity would apply to both inability and power, namely that both the thing and its contrary should result from the power, just as both the thing and its contrary are rendered impossible by the inability. And if, when the inability exists, both the thing and its contrary (which are the objects of the inability) are inexistent, and the man who has the inability acquires neither of them, then the

(12) This may seem to be a rather odd notion of «inability». But it is also accepted and used by Bāqillānī in his treatise on the apologetic miracle. Bear in mind that for Ashʿarī the existence of an ability, or power, entailed the simultaneous existence of the object of the power. In the light of this notion this and the following number may be more intelligible.

133. Another proof that the capacity is with the act is to be found in the words of al-Khiḍr to Moses: « You will certainly be unable to have patience with me » (18.67/66). So we know that, since Moses was not patient, he was not capable of being patient. This shows that when there is no capacity, no act takes place, and that when there is a capacity, the act indubitably takes place.

134. Another proof of that is the fact that God has said: « They were unable to understand » (11.20/22), and: « and who were unable to understand » (18.101) — although they had been commanded and ordered to understand the truth. That also proves that God can enjoin what cannot be done ([11]), and that he who does not accept the truth and does not readily listen to it is unable to do so.

Q. Are they not able to accept it ?

A. What is the difference between you and him who says that they are unable to accept the truth because they are preoccupied with omitting to accept it ?

QUESTION

135. Q. Has not God charged the unbeliever with the duty of believing ?

A. Yes.

O. Then the unbeliever is capable of believing.

A. If he were capable of believing, he would believe.

O. Then God enjoins on him an obligation which he cannot fulfil.

A. This is a statement which involves two matters.

(11) A reference to the famous question : Can God enjoin upon man what the latter cannot do ? Cf. *Watt*, 69 ; *Irshād*, 206-8 ; *Justo Medio*, 269-274 ; *al-Rawḍat al-Bahiyya*, 53-7.

A. The weaving is inexistent because of the nonexistence of the power to do it, not because of the nonexistence of the knowledge of how to do it. If the weaving were inexistent because of the nonexistence of the knowledge of how to do it, it would exist when such knowledge existed. Since that is not the case, and since knowledge of how to do it may be accompanied by impotence, we know that the nonexistence of the weaving is due only to the nonexistence of the power to do it, and that, were God to make it a custom to create the power to do it along with the nonexistence of the knowledge of how to do it, the weaving would indubitably take place.

132. Q. If the nonexistence of allowing (8) and freedom from restraint entails the nonexistence of the act, then their existence entails the existence of the act.

A. So we say (9).

Q. If the nonexistence of a constitution capable of supporting the act entails the nonexistence of the act, why does not the existence of such a constitution entail the existence of the act ?

A. That is just what we say, because the constitution supports only what subsists in it (10). And every objection they urge concerning this point is to be answered as we answered the objections regarding the limb and life, because the nonexistence of the acquisition is not due to the nonexistence of such things.

---

doctrine held by various individuals, cf. *Tritton*, Index, s.v. « capacity ».

(8) Arabic : *al-takhliya* — i.e. putting no obstacle or hindrance in the way.

(9) Presumably because God's « allowing » would have to include the creation of the power.

(10) Presumably because the constitution *(binya)* would have to include the power.

129. Q. Is it not true that the nonexistence of the limb entails the nonexistence of the act ? (7)

A. The nonexistence of the limb entails the nonexistence of the power, and the nonexistence of the power entails the nonexistence of the acquisition. For if the limb does not exist, the power will not exist. But it is because of the nonexistence of the power that the acquisition is impossible — when the limb does not exist — and not because of the nonexistence of the limb. If the limb were inexistent, and the power existed, the acquisition would take place. Furthermore, if the acquisition were impossible only because of the nonexistence of the limb, then when the limb existed the acquisition would exist. But since the limb can exist in conjunction with impotence, whereas, when the power is inexistent there is no acquisition, we know that the acquisition does not take place, because of the nonexistence of the capacity, and not because of the nonexistence of the limb.

130. Q. Is it not true that the nonexistence of life entails the nonexistence of the acquisition ?

A. Yes, because when life does not exist the power does not exist ; and it is because of the nonexistence of the power that the acquisition is impossible, not because of the nonexistence of life. Do you not see that life can exist along with impotence, so that a man does not acquire ? We know, therefore, that the acquisition is not inexistent because of the nonexistence of life, and that it does not exist simply because life exists. So the answer respecting life is like that respecting the limb.

131. Q. If the nonexistence of knowledge of how to weave entails the nonexistence of weaving, why does not the existence of such knowledge entail the existence of weaving ?

---

(7) The Muʿtazila in general seem to have held that the capacity consisted in soundness of body, freedom from ailments, etc. For the

a condition of man's power that its existence include the existence of its object. Since that is so, it is impossible for a man to have power over both the thing and its contrary. For if he had power over both, both would have to exist; and that cannot be.

127. Q. Why do you deny that there may be one power over two volitions, or over two motions, or over two like things?

A. We deny that because a power is a power only over what exists with it in its locus (6). So if there were one power over two motions, it would have to be a power either over two motions such that they would exist with it at the moment that it began to exist, or over two motions that would exist one after the other. Now if it were a power over two motions which would exist simultaneously, two motions would exist in one place at the same time. If this were possible, one of the two motions could be supplanted by its contrary, i.e. quiescence, so that the substance would be simultaneously moving from and quiescent in its place; but this impossible. On the other hand, if it were a power over two motions which would exist one after the other — and it has already been proved and demonstrated that the power does not endure — this would necessitate the existence of the act in virtue of an inexistent power; but we have already shown the falsity of this.

128. Another proof that the capacity is with the act and for the act is the fact that he for whom God does not create a capacity cannot acquire anything. Hence, since he cannot acquire the act if there be no capacity, it is certain that the acquisition exists only because the capacity exists. And this is equivalently an affirmation that the capacity exists with the act and for the act.

---

(6) Arabic: *maḥall* — locus, or subject, or substrate.

were to endure of itself, it would have to be its own duration, and it could not exist save as enduring. But this would necessitate that it be enduring at the very moment that it begins to be. On the other hand, if it were to endure because of a duration subsisting in it — and duration is a quality — a quality would subsist in a quality, and an accident in an accident; and that is false. For if a quality could subsist in a quality, then a power could subsist in a power, and a life in a life, and a knowledge in a knowledge; and that is false.

126. Q. Why do you deny that the power over a thing is a power over both it and its contrary ?

A. It is a condition of created power that its existence include the existence of the object of the power (5). For if that were not so, and if it could exist for one unit of time without an object, then it could exist for two or more units of time without an object, since there is no difference between one unit of time and two or more units. And if that were so, it could exist perpetually, the creature possessing it being all the while an agent in no wise acting. Do you not see that, since it is not a condition of the Eternal's power that its existence include the existence of its object, and since it can exist without any act, it is not impossible for it to exist eternally without any sort of act? But since it is impossible for a man's power to exist perpetually without the existence of an act of his, use or abstention, obedience or disobedience, so long as the command and prohibition remain in force, the same impossibility is true of even one unit of time. And if it be impossible for his power to exist without an object for even one unit of time, it must be

---

al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, 42.12-18; and 50.10 ff. on the impossibility of the duration of accidents.

(5) This seems to beg the question. But presumably Ash'arī feels that he has sufficiently established the simultaneity of the power and the act.

A. We claim that because the act must begin to exist either with the capacity at the very moment that the latter begins to be, or after it. If the former is the case, then it is true and certain that the capacity exists with the act and for the act. But if the existence of the act is posterior to that of the capacity — and there is solid proof that the capacity does not endure (3) — then the act must begin to exist in virtue of an inexistent power. If that were possible, impotence could begin to exist after the capacity had ceased to exist so that the act would take place in virtue of an inexistent power. And if a man could act, at a time when he was impotent, in virtue of an inexistent power, then he could act a hundred years after the power had begun to be, even though he would have been impotent during all those hundred years, and that in virtue of a power which would have been inexistent for a hundred years. This is false.

124. Moreover, if the act could begin to exist, despite the nonexistence of the power, and if the act could take place in virtue of an inexistent power, then burning could be effected by the heat of an inexistent fire after God had turned the fire into cold, and cutting could be effected by an inexistent sword after God had turned the sword into a reed, and the cutting could be done by an inexistent limb — all of which is impossible. So if that be impossible, the act must begin to exist with the capacity at the very moment that the latter begins to exist.

125. Q. Why do you claim that the power does not endure ?

A. If it were to endure, it would endure either of itself or because of a duration (4) subsisting in it. Now if it

---

(3) N° 125, infra.

(4) Arabic : *baqā'*. The question of baqā' gave rise to many subtleties. For a definition, and reference to disputes, cf. 'Abd al-Qāhir

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION OF THE CAPACITY (1)

122. Q. Why do you say that man is capable in virtue of a capacity which is distinct from him ?

A. He is sometimes capable and sometimes impotent, just as he knows at one time and does not know at another, and now moves and again does not move. Therefore he must be capable in virtue of something distinct from him, just as he must be knowing in virtue of something distinct from him, and as he must be moving in virtue of something distinct from him. For if he were capable of himself, or in virtue of something inseparable from him, he would not exist save as capable. But since he is sometimes capable and sometimes incapable, it is true and certain that his capacity is something distinct from him (2).

123. Q. You affirm of man a capacity which is distinct from him; but why do you claim that it cannot precede the act ?

---

(1) Arabic : *Istiṭāʿa.* The usual translation seems to be «capacity». Cf. *Tritton,* 68, and n. 2. Wensinck uses « faculty » in MC. The word means « ability », or « power ». Ashʿarī himself uses *qudra* and *quwwa* as synonyms — cf. the following paragraphs, and *Watt,* 90, n. 37. For a Muʿtazilite distinction between *qudra* and *istiṭāʿa,* cf. *Nādir,* II, 61. But of course Ashʿarī denied that distinction.

(2) It should be remembered that the chief concern is with human acts.

Qadariyya, because we say that God makes our acts as determined for us, they would be Qadariyya because they say that God makes all His acts as determined for Him. And if we were Qadariyya because we say that God determines acts of disobedience, they would be Qadariyya because they say that God determines acts of obedience. Since that is not the case, what they say is false.

to say that God lied to him therein, because lying cannot be predicated of the Creator, since it is impossible for Him to lie. But when God creates lying for another, or creates a lie in the heart of another, it is not necessary that He be lying, just as, when He creates a power, or a volition, or a motion in another, it is not necessary that He be thereby powerful, or willing, or moving.

QUESTION

120. Q. Why have you named us Qadariyya ? (41)

A. Because you claim that *you* determine your acquisitions and effect them as something determined by you and not by your Creator. The Qadarī is he who ascribes that to himself, just as the goldsmith is he who acknowledges that he himself does goldsmith's work and not he who claims that it is done for him, and as the carpenter is he who claims that he himself does carpentering and not he who acknowledges that it is done for him, without his doing any of it himself. Likewise, the Qadarī is he who claims that he himself makes his acts to be determined, and not his Lord, and who claims that his Lord effects nothing of his acquisition.

121. O. You are constrained to admit that *you* are Qadariyya, because you affirm the Qadar of God.

A. We affirm that God determines our works and creates them as determined for us, but we do not affirm that of ourselves. But he who affirms the Qadar of God and claims that the acts are determined by his Lord is not a Qadarī, just as he who affirms goldsmith's work and carpentering of another is himself neither goldsmith nor carpenter. If we were

---

(41) *Ibāna*, 113 ; *Watt*, 48-50, and the article of Nallino to which he refers, in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, VII (1916-18) 461-6 — reprinted in *Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti*, II, 176 ff.

words « quit of the polytheists » proved that He had not created their polytheism, they would also prove that He had not created the polytheists themselves, because He would be quit both of the polytheists and of their polytheism. And if His words «quit of the polytheists» entailed His not having created their polytheism, the Qadariyya would be forced to admit, since God has said that He is « the Patron of the believers » (3.68/61), that God creates the faith of the believers. Since they do not hold this to be so, what they say is vain.

QUESTION

119. The following difficulty may be raised : There were twins in a desert, and it occurred to the heart of one of them that God is one : who cast that into his heart ? God. Was what God cast into his heart true ? Yes. Did God tell him the truth in what He cast into his heart ? God's veracity is simply His speech. But what occurred to the man's heart was not God's speech in such wise that one should say that God told him the truth therein ([39]). Now for the other twin : It occurred to his heart that God is the third of three ([40]) : who cast that into his heart ? God. Was what God cast into his heart false ? Yes. Did God tell him the truth in what He cast into his heart, or did He lie to him ? It is wrong to say of God that He told him the truth therein, because the Creator's veracity is one of His essential attributes, and is in fact His speech. And it is wrong

(39) I think that Ashʿarī means that what actually occurred to the man's heart was not God's speech, which is a divine attribute, but something created. In the first case this created something was true ; in the second case it was a lie, but imputable to God only as His creation, and not as His utterance.

(40) A common phrase to indicate the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. One might have expected that Ashʿarī would have refused to take this rather fantastic objection seriously. But he accepts it soberly and painstakingly answers it.

they agree, they should then be asked: Why, then, do you deny that God's words « over everything Powerful » (2.20/19) prove that there is nothing which can be done over which God has not power? And that His words « the Creator of everything » (13.16/17) prove that there is nothing produced or made of which God is not Producer, Maker, and Creator?

QUESTION

117. Q. What is the meaning of God's words: « that God is quit of the polytheists ([38]), and His Apostle, too » (9.3)?

A. This verse was revealed concerning the treaties that existed between the polytheists and the Apostle of God. For God said: «A quittance from God and His Apostle directed to those polytheists with whom you convenanted: Travel in the earth for four months, and know that you cannot thwart God, but that God confounds the unbelievers » (9.1-2). Thus God granted them four months of immunity. Then He said: «And a notice from God and His Apostle» — i.e. an announcement from God and His Apostle — « to men on the day of the Greater Pilgrimage, that God is quit of the polytheists, and His Apostle, too » — i.e. released from the treaties that existed between the Apostle of God and them, once the four months should have elapsed. Then he excepted a group of the polytheists — it is said that they were of Banū Kināna — and said: « excepting those with whom you covenanted at the Masjid al-Ḥarām; as long as they are straightforward with you, be you straightforward with them » (9.7) — i.e. until their time elapses.

118. Moreover, God explicitly mentioned the polytheists, and He did not say «quit of their polytheism». So if His

(38) The objector wants this phrase to mean that God has nothing to do with polytheists as such. Hence, by implication, their polytheism is entirely their own doing.

the vain, and yet not conclude from the other that God created the acts of angels and others which were between them at that time ?

114. One should also say to them : If God's words concerning the polytheists — « They twist their tongues in the Book so that you may think that what they say is from the Book : but it is not from the Book ! And they say : It is from God. But it is not from God ! » (3.78/72) — mean that God did not create what they said, then why are not acts of obedience created by God, since you maintain that they are from God ? And if unbelief and acts of disobedience are not created by God because they contain faults [36], then why are not acts of obedience created by God, since you hold that they do not contain faults ? And if God's words « Who has executed perfectly all that He has created » (32.7/6) apply universally to everything which God created, then why do not His words « the Creator of everything » (13.16/17) apply to everything distinct from Himself ?

115. Q. Then what is the meaning of God's words: « And we created not the heavens and the earth and what is between them save with [37] truth » (15.85) ?

A. God created all that. So if He said to it « Be ! », the truth was His saying to both of them « Be ! » and they were.

QUESTION

116. The champions of the Qadar should be asked : Do not God's words « the Knower of everything » (2.29/27) prove that there is nothing knowable which God does not know ? If

---

(36) A reference to the text in N° 109.

(37) Blachère : « avec sérieux ».

« I shall not reward him who obeys me, nor shall I punish him who disobeys me and disbelieves in me ». For the unbelievers thought that they would neither be quickened nor raised from the dead in order to be punished. So God explained that He had created creatures only that some of them might come to a reward and others return to punishment, and that the unbelievers thought otherwise. He made it clear that it was a question of reward and punishment, because He went on to say: « Shall we treat those who will have believed and done pious works like the fomenters of evil on the earth? Or shall we treat the pious like the profligate? » (38.28/27) Thus He announced that it was the opinion of the polytheists, of whom He disapproved, that there would be no punishment which would cause a separation between believers and unbelievers.

112. The Shaikh Abu'l-Ḥasan said: One may also interpret « We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in vain » as meaning: « I did not create *all of that* as vain », because the vain is only a part of God's creation. And it may be interpreted as: « I did not create that *as vain* » — i.e. « I did not make it vain when I created both of them, because the vain began to exist after I had created them » (34).

113. Moreover, God has said: « He who, in six days, created the heavens and the earth and what is between them » (25.59/60). The universality of these words proves that He created the creatures between them who began to exist, such as the angels who were between them, and the acts of living beings which He created at that time (35). Why, then, do they conclude from one of the two verses that God did not create

(34) These interpretations are ingenious, but apparently unnecessary.

(35) This last point seems to be a rather partisan interpretation of the text.

of the Benefactor, no irregularity » — i.e. in the heavens. For God said: « Look again! » — after He had mentioned the heavens — « Do you see any fissures? » (67.3) — i.e. any cracks; but unbelief does not have cracks in it. Then God said: « Then look again, twice over! » — i.e. at the heavens and the earth; « Your sight will come back to you weakened » — i.e. hurt, « and worn out » — i.e. overcome. (67.4) But God made no mention of unbelief or of the acts of creatures in this verse, and therefore it contains no argument for the Qadariyya.

QUESTION

110. Q. Then what is the meaning of God's words: « Who has executed perfectly (32) all that He has created » (32.7/6)?

A. They mean that He is proficient in creating, just as one says that so-and-so is proficient in the goldsmith's craft, meaning that he knows how to do goldsmith's work. So God declared that He knows how to create things.

QUESTION

111. Q. Then what is the meaning of God's words: « And we did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in (33) vain » (38.27/26)?

A. God said: « That is the supposition of those who disbelieve » (*ibid.*). That proves that the verse means: « He created them both and what is between them », and not:

---

(32) Blachère: « qui a excellé en tout... » The objector wants it to mean « who has made good » rather than « who has made well ».

(33) Arabic: *bāṭilan*. Blachère: « à la légère »; Bell: « to no purpose ». The objector wants the verse to mean that God creates no « *bāṭil* », i.e. nothing false or vain.

belong to God, without saying, in detail, that wife or child belong to God. Or it is like our saying, in globo, that what is inferior to God is weak, without saying, in detail, that the religion of God is weak. The Shaikh Abu'l-Ḥasan said : But I maintain that evil is from God in the sense that He creates it as evil for another, not for Himself.

QUESTION

108. Q. Then what is the meaning of God's words : « They twist their tongues in the Book so that you may think that what they say is from the Book : but it is not from the Book ! And they say : It is from God. But it is not from God ! » (3.78/72) ? (30)

A. These words mean that they perverted the description of the Apostle of God and led the foolish among them to imagine that it was from their Book. God said : « But it is not from the Book ! And they say : It is from God » — i.e. God has revealed it — and God said : « But it is not from God ! » — i.e. I did not reveal that to them, as they pretend.

QUESTION

109. Q. Then what is the meaning of God's words : « You see, in the creation of the Benefactor, no irregularity » (31). (67.3) ?

A. God said : « Who has created seven heavens in layers » — i.e. one above the other ; « You see, in the creation

(30) The real force of the objection — and Ashʿarī does not meet it directly — seems to be that the text proves that those men did something evil which was not from God.

(31) Cf. Blachère's note on this word, II, 272. Bell has « oversight ». Presumably the point of the objection is that God does not create anything bad.

one to imagine that the argument of God has no truth. Similarly, then, our being pleased applies to the decree and the determination, but not to the unbelief. This is the answer of those associates of ours whose reply we mentioned above.

105. Other associates of ours reply to the question by saying that we are pleased with the decree and determination of God with which He has commanded us to be pleased, thus following the order of Him Who cannot be contravened or gainsaid. This is like our being pleased with the survival of the Prophets and our dislike of their deaths, and our dislike of the continued existence of the devils — but everything is by the decree of the Lord of the Worlds!

QUESTION

106. Q. Which is better: the good, or he from whom the good proceeds?

A. He from whom the good proceeds, and to whom it is united ([28]), is better than the good.

Q. And which is worse: the evil, or he from whom the evil proceeds?

A. He from whom the evil proceeds in such wise that he is thereby unjust is worse than the evil ([29]).

QUESTION

107. Q. Do you hold that evil is from God?

A. Some of our associates say that all things are from God, in globo, without saying of evil specifically that it is from God. This is like one's saying that all things, in globo,

---

(28) i.e. so that it can be said to be *his* good.

(29) Recall Ashʿarī's dictum that God creates evil as evil for another, not for Himself. Cf. next paragraph.

103. Some of our associates answer by saying: « God's decree of disobedience and unbelief... » — and they say of disobedience and unbelief: « They are false. » But they do not say of the decree that it is false. For one's saying: « The decree of God is false » is like his saying, when he sees a broken piece of wood, that the wood is broken, but is, nevertheless, an argument of God. But he does not say of the argument that it is broken, because this would lead one to imagine that the argument of God has no truth. Likewise, unbelief is false, yet unbelief is the decree of God in the sense that it is the creation of God. But we do not say: « The decree of God is false », because this would lead one to suppose that God's decree has no truth. It is like our saying: « The unbeliever believes in the idol and the image ». But we do not say: « The unbeliever believes... » and then remain silent, because that would be ambiguous. And we say: « The Prophet disbelieves in the idol and the image ». But we do not say: « The Prophet disbelieves... » and then remain silent, because that would be ambiguous.

QUESTION

104. Q. Are you pleased with ([27]) God's decree and determination of unbelief?

A. We are pleased that God has decreed unbelief as bad and determined it as false, but we are not pleased that the unbeliever is thereby unbelieving, because God has forbidden us that. When we speak of being pleased with the decree we are not obliged to say the same of unbelief, just as, when we say that the piece of wood is an argument of God, and that the piece of wood is broken, we are not obliged to say that the argument of God is broken; for this would lead

(27) i.e. Do you approve of...

those which must not be endured patiently, such as unbelief and all other acts of disobedience ([24]).

QUESTION

101. Q. Has God decreed ([25]) and determined acts of disobedience ?

A. Yes, in the sense that He has created them, and has written ([26]) them down, and has announced that they will be. Thus He said : « And we decreed for the Children of Israel in the Book » (17.4) — i. e. we told them and informed them. And He said : « save his wife ; we had determined that she would be among those remaining behind » (27.57/58) — i. e. we wrote her down and announced that she would be among those remaining behind. But we do not say that God has decreed and determined acts of disobedience in the sense that He has commanded them.

102. Q. Is the decree of God right ?

A. The decree of God which is a creation includes what is right, such as acts of obedience and what God has not prohibited, and it also includes what is wrong, such as unbelief and acts of disobedience. For creation includes what is right and what is vain. But the decree of God which is a command, and the decree which is an informing, and an announcing, and a writing, is right, because it is distinct from what is decreed.

---

(24) This statement seems to imply that, practically at least, Ash'arī felt the need of allowing to man some measure of self-determination.

(25) The verb *qaḍa* (and the noun *qaḍā'*) I translate by « decree ». They might also be translated by « decide » and « decision ». Bāqillānī enumerates various meanings of *qaḍā'* in his *Inṣāf*, 147.

(26) Cf. Qur. 9.51. The idea of God's writing down what will happen to every man is common in discussions of the qadar. Cf. A. de Vlieger, *Kitāb al-Qadar*, Leiden, 1903.

by the speech of another. We simply said that He creates injustice for another, not for Himself, and is not thereby unjust Himself. So the parallel to this is that He creates speech for another, not for Himself, and is not thereby speaking Himself. Moreover, if this objection were compelling, He would have to utter the lie who does not lie, just as He makes the injustice who is not unjust, and He makes the willing who is not thereby willing, and He makes the motion who is not thereby moving. So if this be not compelling, neither is what they have said. Besides, we have already proved in the beginning of this book of ours that God's speech is one of His essential attributes. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be speaking by the speech of another, just as, since knowledge is one of His essential attributes, it is impossible for the knowledge of another to be a knowledge of His, and for the Lord of the Worlds to be knowing by a temporally produced knowledge.

QUESTION

100. Q. Is the creature ever free from being either the recipient of a favor for which he must give thanks, or the object of a trial which he must endure patiently ? (23)

A. The creature is never free from favor and trial. Among trials are those which must be endured patiently, such as misfortunes of sickness and disease, those which affect one's goods and children, and the like. And among them are

---

(23) This particular question may have had a special historical background. Possibly the adversary merely wanted to underline the futility of any kind of human reaction to the visitations of God. It is unfortunate that we have so few reliable sources of information regarding the « other side ». Muʿtazilite texts seem to have disappeared almost completely. Perhaps the Shiʿite libraries will some day help us to a fuller reconstruction of Muʿtazilite views and arguments.

97. Q. Has not God, then, created the injustice of creatures ?

A. He created it as their injustice, not as His [21].

Q. Then why do you deny that He is unjust ?

A. One who is unjust is not unjust because he makes injustice as another's injustice and not as his. If he were unjust for this reason, no creature would be unjust. Hence, since one who is unjust is not unjust because he makes injustice as another's injustice, God is not necessarily unjust because He creates injustice as another's injustice and not as His [22]. Moreover, if what they say were compelling, then, if God were to make a volition and a desire and a motion for another and not for Himself, He Himself would have to be willing, desiring, and moving. Since this is not necessary, neither is what they have said.

98. O. Then God may create a motion which no one would acquire without being moving Himself.

A. And likewise, were God to create an injustice which no one would acquire, He would not thereby be unjust, but it would be injustice for him for whom He created it as injustice, and by it that one would be unjust.

99. Q. Then why does not God speak the speech of another just as He creates the injustice of another ?

A. We did not say that He is unjust by the injustice of another in such wise that we must say that He speaks

(21) This is the basic distinction to which Ash'arī returns again and again. It is hard to see how it leaves any room for human responsibility or merit, or how reward and punishment can be anything but pure arbitrariness on the part of God.

(22) Recall that injustice, according to Ash'arī, depends solely on the divine will. Yet it seems fair to ask : How does anyone become really unjust if his injustice is handed to him, so to speak, ready-made ?

95. Furthermore, impotency does not prove that God creates its object more forcibly than the power which God creates proves that God creates the object of the power. For that over which God creates in us power is a fortiori the object of His power, just as His knowledge of a thing is superior to that which He creates in us, and His hearing of a thing is superior to that which He creates in us. So if that be equally true of God's power, then when God empowers us over acquired motion it must be He who creates it in us as our acquisition [20]. For when He can effect something in us, but does not effect it in us as an acquisition, He refrains from effecting it in us as an acquisition. And when He refrains from making it to be an acquisition of ours, it is impossible for us to acquire it. So what we have said proves that we acquire a thing only after God has created it as an acquisition of ours.

QUESTION

96. Q. If man's acquisition be a creation, then why do you deny that he is its creator ?

A. I did not say that my acquisition is a creation of mine in such wise that I am compelled to say that I am its creator. I said only that it is another's creation. How, then, if it be the creation of another, am I compelled to say that I am its creator ? If I were the creator of my acquisition, when it is really a creation of God, then God Himself would be moving by the necessary motion which He creates in one who moves thereby. Since that is impossible, because God creates it as the motion of another, we are not constrained by what they say, because our acquisition is a creation of another.

---

(20) How, then, is it « our acquisition » any more than one of our necessary motions is « our acquisition » ? This fundamental question is never really answered.

94. Q. Why do you deny that what proves that one of the two motions is created by God is the fact that necessary motion takes place as something regarding which the creature is impotent? So if the other takes place as something over which the creature has power, it transcends ([18]) the necessity of being created by God.

A. If what takes place as an object of the power of someone other than God transcended the necessity of being created by God, there would be no guarantee that the motions of a man shaking from palsy or shivering from fever are not effected in the one moving necessarily by one of the angels empowered by God over that. For it is not impossible, according to our adversaries, for a creature possessing power to be able to effect something in another ([19]). Thus necessary motion would cease to prove that God made it as it is. Moreover, the same would have to be said of the motions of the celestial spheres and of the union and composition of the parts of the heavens. And if this were so, these things would cease to prove that God made them as they are, and one could not be sure but that the parts of the heavens have a uniter who is not God, and the celestial spheres an arranger, and the stars a mover who is not God. So if that cannot be, what they say is false, namely, that if a thing be the object of the power of someone other than God, it transcends the necessity of being created by God.

---

between an act of man and a human act simply, in the last analysis, a matter of extrinsic denomination? It would seem that Ashʿarī would have to say yes.

(18) Arabic: *kharajat min an* — lit. goes beyond, is outside of. Perhaps « transcends » is a little too strong.

(19) Ashʿarī is in basic opposition to this. God is the unique Creator of everything, and, vice versa, everything (which begins to be) is created. This is not a mere philosophical premise with Ashʿarī, but an imperious dogma which he derived from his reading of revelation and tradition.

motion must be an acquisition — because the true meaning of acquisition is that the thing proceeds from its acquirer in virtue of a created power. Now since the two states differ, in the two motions, and since one of them fulfils the notion of necessity, this one must be a necessary motion; and since the other fulfils the notion of acquisition, it must be an acquisition. But the proof of creation is the same with respect both to necessary and to acquired motion. Therefore, if one of the two motions be a creation, the other must also be a creation.

93. Surely it is clear that their differing with respect to necessity and acquisition does not necessitate their differing with respect to beginning to be and existing after having not existed. Likewise, then, their differing with respect to necessity and acquisition does not necessitate their differing with respect to creation. Do you not see that if a body be not prior to temporally produced things, it must itself be temporally produced, because it falls under the notion of beginning to be? But its falling under the notion of beginning to be, because it shares that notion with temporally produced things, does not mean, if one of the temporally produced things be a motion, that the body must be motion, or, if one of them be a body, that the motion must be a body. For they are equal, not with respect to the notions of body and motion, but with respect to the notion of temporal production. Similarly, then, since acquisition and necessity are alike with respect to the notion of creation and beginning to be, if one of them be a creation of God, the other must also be such. Hence their differing with respect to necessity and acquisition does not entail that the two motions differ with respect to creation (17).

---

(17) What is it, then, that specifically differentiates the two types of motion? Ashʿarī's answer would doubtless be that the acquired motion proceeds from its acquirer in virtue of a created power (cf. Nº 92, supra). But this motion necessarily takes place concomitantly with that created power. Is, therefore, the difference

The creation of necessary motion is also proved by its need of a place and a time — and the same is true of acquired motion. Hence, since every proof by which one infers that necessary motion is created by God compels one to judge that acquired motion is also created by God. the creation of acquired motion is necessary for the same reasons that necessitate the creation of necessary motion.

92. O. Then if one of the two motions be necessary, the other must also be necessary. And if one of the two be an acquisition, the other must also be an acquisition.

A. There is no necessity of that, because the two differ with respect to necessity and acquisition. For necessity means that to which the thing is constrained and compelled and forced, and from which it can find no way to get free or to escape, even though it strive to be freed from it and want to escape from it and exhaust its endeavors to do so. So if one of the two motions be of this description, i. e. the description of necessity, as in the case of one shaking from palsy or shivering from fever, it is necessary motion; and if the other motion be of a contrary description, it is not necessary motion. For the man who goes and comes, and approaches and recedes, is quite different from one who shakes from palsy or shivers from fever. One knows how to distinguish between the two states, in himself and in others, by a necessary knowledge which leaves no room for doubt ([16]). So if there be impotence in one of the two states, power, which is its contrary, must exist in the other. For if impotence existed in both states together, the man's way of acting would be the same in both. Since this is not so, and since there is power in one of the motions, this

(16) This is certainly true, and it is the basis of the proof from consciousness of the freedom of the will. But Ashʿarī's further interpretation of the data of consciousness scarcely seems to touch the real difficulty. For his « acquired » motion seems to be quite as ineluctable and inevitable as his « necessary » motion.

is is also the agent who makes it as it really is. For the acquirer acquires a thing because it takes place in virtue of his created power over it. But the Lord of the Worlds cannot be one able to do a thing in virtue of a created power, and therefore cannot acquire the acquisition, although He is the agent who really makes it.

90. Q. Does a man, then, acquire the thing as it really is, i.e. as vain unbelief and good faith ?

A. This is an error. « He acquires unbelief » means only that he disbelieves in virtue of a created power. Likewise our saying « He acquires faith » means only that he believes in virtue of a created power, without his having acquired the thing as it really is (13). But he who makes it as it really is is the Lord of the Worlds. The question of lying, and that it has an agent who makes it as it really is, and one who is thereby lying, who is not the one who makes it as it really is, is to be treated as was the question of the agent who makes the motion as it really is, and the one who really moves thereby, who is not the one who makes the motion as it really is. We have already explained that above (14).

91. Another rational proof of the creation of men's acts is that the proof which proves that God creates necessary motion also proves that He creates acquired motion. For that which proves that God creates necessary motion is the latter's beginning to be — and the same is true of acquired motion (15).

---

(13) If the text is not faulty, he probably meant: without his having produced the thing as it really is, either entitatively or specifically. Otherwise it is not difficult to understand how the Ashʿarite « *kasb* » became a proverbial symbol of subtlety.

(14) It is hard to escape the conclusion that the liar, according to Ashʿarī, is under the same compulsion to lie as he is in any of his involuntary acts.

(15) Recall that for Ashʿarī there was no such thing as secondary causation. Hence any kind of motion — and anything outside God — must be due to the direct creation of God.

it really is, does not prove that it really has no acquirer save God ?

A. Acts must have an agent who makes them as they really are, because an act cannot dispense [10] with an agent. So if the agent who makes the act as it really is be not the body, God must be the agent who makes it as it really is. But the act does not need an acquirer who acquires it as it really is in the same way that it must have an agent who makes it as it really is [11], so that, if the act be an acquisition, God must be its acquirer.

89. Do you not see that necessary motion is itself proof that God is the agent who makes it as it really is, but not that the one moving thereby is really God — when the motion exists — just as He is the agent who really makes it ? Nor must the one who moves of necessity be the agent of the motion as it really is — when he really moves thereby. For « the one moving » means that the motion finds its locus [12] in him — which is impossible respecting our Lord Most High. Similarly, if the acquisition is itself proof of an agent who makes it as it really is, it does not necessarily prove that the agent who makes it as it really is is also the one who acquires it ; nor does it prove that the one who acquires it as it really

---

(10) Or : be independent of, get along without.

(11) This does not seem to be true, if the act is a human act, though it is obvious that God cannot be the subject of acquisitions. It may well be doubted that Ashʿarī's contribution to the vexed problem of the relation of God to human acts is anything more than terminological.

(12) I have usually translated the verb « *ḥalla* » by « find a locus in ». If I am not mistaken, Ashʿarī uses the word only of accidents, and so we might translate it by « find a subject of inhesion in », or simply, « find a subject in ». Many writers have emphasized the « atomism » of Ashʿarism. While I do not deny its importance, it seems to me that a very fruitful study could be made of the Ashʿarite notion and use of « accident » (*ʿaraḍ*).

And its producer can never be the unbeliever, who desires that unbelief be good, right, and true, whereas it is the contrary of that. Likewise faith must have a producer who produces it as it really is, toilsome, painful, and vexatious, and who is not the believer, who, though he strive that faith be contrary to its actual painfulness, toilsomeness, and vexatiousness, has no way to effect that. So if the one who produces unbelief as it really is cannot be the unbeliever, and if the one who produces faith as it really is cannot be the believer, then the intentional producer of both must be God Most High, Lord of the Worlds (6). For no body can produce them, since bodies can effect nothing in things distinct from themselves (7).

87. Q. Why is it that the occurrence of the act which is an acquisition does not prove that it has no agent (8) save God, just as it proves that it has no creator save God?

A. That is exactly what we say.

Q. Then why does it not prove that there is no one with power over it save God?

A. It has no agent who makes it as it really is save God, and no one with power over it so that it will be as it really is, in the sense that he creates it, save God (9).

88. Q. Then why is it that its being an acquisition, as

---

issue. The full extent of the position to which Ashʿarī is committed may be better realized if we substitute disobedience and obedience, or sin and good act, for unbelief and belief. Later on Ashʿarī will have to deal with these.

(6) There is a hint here of another doctrine held by Ashʿarī, viz. the sole determinant of goodness and badness is the will of God ; hence there is no such thing as an act good or bad *in se*.

(7) Another Ashʿarite thesis : God is the unique efficient cause of everything. This is emphasized in the following paragraph.

(8) Arabic : *fāʿil* — agent, maker, doer.

(9) The creature's power over it is a created power, and once God creates this power the act *must* take place concomitantly — cf. the next chapter, on the « capacity ».

referred to works in His words « as a reward for what they once did ». So if one could claim that God's words « has created you and what you make » mean something other than their works, just as His words « their deceiving » mean something other than their deception, another could claim that God's words « as a reward for what they once did » mean something other than their works, just as His words « has created you and what you make » mean something other than their works, and as His words « their deceiving » mean something other than their deception. Since this cannot be, the questioner's assertion is impossible.

85. The rational proof of the creation of men's acts is our experience that unbelief is bad, false, vain, inconsistent, and of a certain contrariness, whereas faith is good, toilsome, and painful. And it is our experience that even though the unbeliever deliberately exert himself to make unbelief good and right, it will be contrary to his intention; and even though the believer wish that faith be not toilsome, painful, and vexatious, it will not be according to his wish and desire. Now we know that an act does not come to be as it really is unless someone produces it as such. For if it could come to be as it really is without a producer who produces it as such, then a thing could come to be as act without a producer who would have produced it is an act. Since that is impossible, it is certain that it comes to be as it really is only because someone intentionally produces it as such. For if an act could come to be as it really is without someone who intends that, one could not be sure but that all acts are like that, just as, if an act could come to be without an agent, one could not be sure but that all acts are like that.

86. Such being the case, unbelief must have a producer who intentionally produces it as unbelief, vain and bad (5).

(5) The examples of unbelief and belief may tend to obscure the

Since the reward attaches to their works, God is the creator of their works.

83. Q. Has God not said: « Do you adore what you carve? » (37.95/93), meaning the idols which they had carved? Why, then, do you deny that His words « has created you and what you make » mean the idols which they had made?

A. Your supposition is wrong, because the idols really were carved by them, and hence God's words « Do you adore what you carve? » do refer to the idols. But the wood was not really made by them in such wise that God's words « has created you and what you make » must refer to it.

84. Q. Has God not said: « it catches up their deceiving » (7.117/114) (4)? But He did not mean their deception. Why, then, do you deny that His words « has created you and what you make » do not refer to their works?

A. Their deceiving was the likenesses which they pretended to men were moving serpents, and their deception was their pretending. So by His words « their deceiving » God meant their pretending to men that the likenesses were moving serpents, and their deception was their inducing men to imagine that the thing was contrary to what it really was. The likenesses were the subject of their deceiving and their pretending to men that they were really moving, and it was these which the staff of Moses caught up. But they could not really have made the wood. Hence, by His words « has created you and what you make » God could not have meant the wood, but must have been referring to their works, just as He

(4) It is impossible to give in these notes the context and background of every text mentioned by Ashʿarī. The reader may consult the translations, such as those of Bell (English) and of Blachère (French). The reader who knows Arabic will often find it instructive (and sometimes surprising) to consult such commentaries as those of Ṭabarī, Zamakhsharī, and Baiḍāwī.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF THE QADAR [1]

82. Q. Why do you claim that the acquisitions [2] of creatures are created by God?

A. We say that because God has said: « When it is God who has created you and what you make? » [3] (37.96/94); and: « as a reward for that they once did » (46.14/13).

---

(1) I refer the reader in a general way to Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* (and to Prof. Thomson's extended commentary on the same in *The Muslim World*, XL (1950) 207 ff. and 276 ff.), and to Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*. For a later Ashʿarite discussion: *Irshād*, 173-232. Averroes has some interesting things to say: *Teología*, 321-334. The Muʿtazila: *Nādir*, I, 77-79, and II, 58-73.

I have retained the Arabic word *« qadar »*, which is so intimately bound up with the whole discussion. It conveys the idea « determination ». The main question is: Who determines human acts, God or man? We have already seen that Ashʿarī held that God wills all such acts. The present chapter involves not only His determination, but also His creation of such acts *(khalq al-aʿmāl)*.

(2) Arabic: *aksāb*, plural of the famous term « *kasb* ». Cf. *Watt*, Index, s. v. *kasb (iktisāb)*; also his article, *The Origin of the Islamic Doctrine of Acquisition*, in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, (1943) 234-247. The words (noun and verb) are used in the Qurʾān, where they seem to be a borrowing from the vocabulary of commerce and are applied to those actions of man for which he deserves reward or punishment, i.e. what we would call his human acts, or free acts.

(3) This seems to be the obvious meaning of the verse, despite Ashʿarī's argument. Blachère translates: « ce que vous avez façonné ». However, the Arabic word « *taʿmalūn* » contains the ideas of « make » and « do ».

not so, one must not apply that judgment to the invisible. We likewise have no experience of an agent who is not a body, or of a thing which is neither substance nor accident, or of one knowing, powerful, and living who is not such by reason of temporally produced knowledge and life and power. Yet we must not apply that judgment to the invisible ([15]). For the agent is not an agent because he is a body, nor is the thing a thing because it is a substance or an accident.

---

(15) Yet, omitting the notion « temporally produced », is not this precisely what he has done in his rational proof of the existence of the divine attributes ?

knowledge; but seeing is not a defect which finds a locus in what is seen, and therefore seeing need not be denied for the same reason which compels the denial of sleep.

QUESTION

80. Q. If the Eternal could be seen, although He is not like other things which are seen, then He could be touched and tasted and smelled, although He is not like other things which are tasted and touched and smelled.

A. What is the difference between you and him who says: And if the Eternal could be seeing, knowing, powerful, and living, although He is not like others who are seeing, knowing, powerful, and living, then He could be touching, tasting, and smelling, although He is not like others who are touching, tasting, and smelling? ([13]) If there be no compulsion to say this, why do you deny that there is no compulsion to say what you have said?

QUESTION

81. Q. Have you, then, ever seen anything visible which was not a substance or an accident, limited or inhering in something limited?

A. No. But what is visible is not seen because it is limited, or because it inheres in something limited, or because it is a substance, or because it is an accident ([14]). Since that is

---

(13) Presumably Ashʿarī would deny that God can be touching, tasting, and smelling. But his grounds would be more traditionist than rational. Recall what he said in No. 74.

(14) The adversary would say that what is visible is not such qua accident, but because it is an accident which is color. Ashʿarī does not really meet this objection. Indeed, given his basic principle of the utter transcendence of God, it is hard to see how he could do more than take refuge in a kind of nominalistic agnosticism.

another verse that eyes will look at Him, we know that the time of which He says that eyes do not attain to Him is different from the time in which He has revealed to us that they will be looking at Him.

78. [11] Q. Why do you deny that His words « looking at their Lord » mean « looking at the reward of their Lord » ?

A. The reward of God is something distinct from Him, and one may not turn from the literal to the figurative meaning of speech without a convincing reason or proof. Do you not see that when God said « Pray to Me and worship Me », [12] one could not say that He meant some one distinct from Him ? And if one could claim that His words « do not attain to Him » mean that eyes do not attain to something distinct from Him, one could also claim that His words « Pray to Me and worship Me » mean someone distinct from Him. If this be false, so is what they say.

79. Q. If His words « Eyes do not attain to Him » refer to one time rather than another, then why do you deny that His words « Slumber lays not hold of Him, nor sleep » (2.255/256) refer to one time rather than another ?

A. The difference between the two is that He told us in one verse that eyes do not attain to Him, and He said in another verse that faces will look at Him. So we use both verses and say that the meaning therein is that they look at Him at one time and do not attain to Him at another. But He did not tell us in one verse that slumber and sleep lay hold of Him, and in another that they do not lay hold of Him, so that we must apply the verses to different times. Moreover, sleep is a defect which subsists in the sleeper and deprives him of

(11) Compare this paragraph with the discussion in the *Ibāna*, 57-58. There seems to be some confusion of texts, but the general argument is clear.

(12) « Worship Me » occurs several times in the Qurʾān, but I do not find there the phrase « Pray to Me ».

76. Q. Has not God said: «And on that day other faces will be frowning, thinking (8) that a misfortune is to be visited upon them» (75.24-25)? But thinking is not done with the face. Similarly, then, His words «On that day some faces will be bright, looking at their Lord» mean the «look» of the heart.

A. Your objection has no force, because thinking is not done with the face, but only with the heart (9). Hence, since He coupled thinking with the mention of the face, it means the thinking of the heart, because thinking is done only with the heart. And if «look» were restricted to the heart, His mentioning it in connection with the face would have to refer to the heart. But since «looking» may be done by the face and in other ways, in coupling it with the mention of the face He must mean by it the «look» of the face, just as, in coupling it with the mention of the heart He would have to mean by it the «look» of the heart.

QUESTION

77. Q. Then what is the meaning of His words: «Eyes do not attain to Him, but He attains to eyes» (6.103)? (10)

A. They refer to this life and not the next, for the Qurʾān does not contradict itself. Hence, since He says in

---

(8) So Blachère. Bell: «One would think»; Palmer: «Thou wilt think»; Baiḍāwī (Cairo ed. 1344), 580, refers it to the owners of the faces — they will be awaiting.

(9) Arabic: *qalb* — the heart. It is used frequently where we should use «mind».

(10) Bāqillānī has no less than eight answers to this favorite objection of the Muʿtazila — *Inṣāf*, 161-163. It is interesting to note that one of the answers he suggests is that in the next life man will receive a new «sight» *(baṣar)*, enduring and imperishable, so that the Enduring (God) will be seen by the enduring. He also remarks that it has been said that the doctrine cannot be defended save on the score of God's creating a sixth sense for His friends by which they will see Him. One feels that he went further than Ashʿarī.

hear Him speaking, since He has already caused Moses to hear Him speaking (6).

75. The proof that God will be seen by eyes is His declaration: « On that day faces will be bright, looking at their Lord.» (75.22-23) (7).

1) His words « looking at their Lord » cannot mean « considering as an example », as in the case of His words : « Will they not consider how the camels were created ? » (88.17), because the world to come is not the place for considering examples.

2) Nor can His words mean « feeling sympathy for » or « having mercy on », as in His words: « God will have no regard for them » (3.77/71) — i.e. will not have mercy on them or fe el sympathy for them — because the Creator cannot be the object of sympathy.

3) Nor can His words mean « expecting ». For when « look » is coupled with the mention of faces, it does not mean the «look» of the heart, which is expectation, just as, if «look» be coupled with the mention of the heart, it does not mean the « look » of the eye. For when a man says « Look with thy heart at this matter » he means the « look » of the heart. Likewise, if he couples « look » with the face, he means only the « look » of the face; and the «look» of the face is the « look » of seeing, which is done by the eye which is in the face.

So it is certain that His words « looking at their Lord » mean « seeing », since they cannot mean any of the other kinds of « look ». For if «look» is limited to four kinds, and three are impossible in the present case, the fourth kind must be certain, namely, the «look» of the seeing of the eye which is in the face.

---

(6) Various places in the Qurʾān. To Moses is applied the epithet « *kalīm Allāh* » — cf. Qur. 4.164/162.

(7) This is the classic proof-text. It is also used in *Ibāna*, 56-58, along with other texts.

is not impossible [4]. And if it be not impossible, it is predicable of God.

73. O. Touching and tasting and smelling involve no affirmation of temporal production or of the temporal production of a quality in the Creator.

A. Some of our associates maintain that touching is one of the kinds of contiguities; and likewise tasting, which is the union of the tongue and uvula with the body which has the taste; and that smelling is the union of the nasal cartilage with what is smelled, at which union the perception of it takes place. And they say that two things which are contiguous are such only because of the temporal production of two contiguities in them. So the affirmation of that would involve the affirmation of the temporal production of a quality in the Creator.

74. And some of our associates say: By his mention of touching and tasting the objector must mean that God produces a perception of Him in these members [5] without producing any quality in Himself, or he must mean the temporal production of a quality in God. If he means the temporal production of a quality in God — why that is something impossible. But if he means the temporal production of a perception in us, that is possible. But the commanding of denomination belongs to God. If He commands us to call it touching and tasting and smelling, we do so; and if He forbids us we forbear. As for hearing, our associates do not differ over it, but all allow its possibility and maintain that the Creator can cause us to

---

(4) Ashʿarī here ignores the obvious argument which the Muʿtazila used: what is visible is such because it has color, shape, etc., i.e. has accidents; for only accidents, and not substances, are visible. He does, however, touch on this point in No. 81.

(5) i.e. the organs of touch and taste (and smell).

every temporally produced thing is seen — and they hold that to be false. Furthermore, if what is seen were seen because of its temporal production, the seer would be a producer of the seen, since it would be seen because of its temporal production.

70. 2) The Vision involves no affirmation of the temporal production of a quality in what is seen, because colors are seen, though there can be no temporal production of a quality in them (2). Moreover, if what is seen were seen because of the temporal production of a quality in it, that quality would have to be the seeing itself. But this would entail that our seeing a dead man would result in the temporal production of seeing in him, and thus seeing would be united with death; and our seeing the blind man's eye would result in the temporal production of seeing in his eye, and thus seeing would be united with blindness. Since that is impossible, what they say is false.

71. 3) The affirmation of the Vision of God involves no likening the Creator to creatures, and no classing Him under a genus (3), and no essential alteration in Him. For we see black and white without their becoming homogeneous or alike because sight falls on them, and without there being any essential change of black to white, or of white to black, because sight falls on them.

72. 4) The Vision involves no charging God with injustice or oppression or lying. For we see the unjust and the oppressor and the liar, and we see him who is not unjust, not an oppressor, and not a liar.

Therefore, since the affirmation of the Vision involves nothing which cannot be predicated of the Creator, the Vision

---

(2) Because they are accidents, and an accident cannot itself be the subject of another accident.

(3) So that He would be «like» visible creatures. Recall that Ashʿarī denied that God can in any way resemble creatures.

CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION OF THE VISION

68. Q. Why do you say that the Vision of God [1] with the eyes is possible from the standpoint of reason?

A. We say that because what cannot be predicated of the Creator and cannot be true of Him is such because allowing it would involve: 1) the affirmation of His temporal production; 2) or the affirmation of the temporal production of a quality in Him; 3) or likening Him to creatures, or classing Him under a genus, or making some essential alteration in Him; 4) or charging Him with injustice or oppression or lying.

69. 1) The allowability of the Vision involves no affirmation of God's temporal production, for what is seen is not seen because it is temporally produced. If that were the reason why it is seen, our opponents would have to hold that

---

(1) *Ibāna*, 56-65; *Inṣāf*, 156-171 (a much more developed exposition); *Irshād*, 156-172; *Justo Medio*, 110-126; *Ḥillī*, 35-37; *Nādir*, I, 112-118. The remarks of Wensinck, MC, 65-66, need some qualification. The Christian « visio beatifica » seems to be *essentially* different from the Ashʿarite vision of God. In the former there is no question of any *ocular* vision of God. In Wensinck's quotation from the *Catholic Encyclopedia* the dropping of a few lines has given a meaning quite contrary to that intended. A fine article on the subject is that of Michel, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, VII, cc. 2351-2394 — « Intuitive (Vision) ».

A. Why do you not take the verse literally and say: No matter how He wished that the fight should not take place, it would not have taken place? And the same query should be addressed to them regarding God's words: « And had thy Lord willed, all on earth would have believed, all of them! » They may say: Had God wished to force them to believe, they would have believed. One should reply: Could they, then, not disbelieve, despite the forcing, just as they were able to believe? How, then, by reason of the forcing, would they have had to believe, since they would have been able to withhold their belief, despite the forcing, just as they were able to believe previously when there was no forcing?

67. Q. The existence of what God does not will entails no weakness, just as the existence of what He has not commanded entails no weakness.

A. His own acts existed, according to you, without His having commanded them, and weakness did not overtake Him; but had they existed without His having willed them, weakness would have overtaken Him. Similarly, then, the existence of what He did not command from another would not entail His weakness; but the existence of what He did not will from another would prove weakness. Moreover, the existence of what He has not commanded, but has forbidden, and yet He has willed its taking place, does not mean that weakness overtakes Him ([19]).

---

(19) Apparently it also means the denial of human freedom and responsibility. Would Ashʿarī really have admitted this? The question will occur in more pointed form in connection with the doctrine contained in Chapters 5-7.

despite his having previously forbidden them to fornicate — such a man is foolish. So judge the same of God; otherwise you are inconsistent.

64. Q. If one who is not foolish could will folly, one who is not a liar could lie.

A. What is the difference between you and one who says: If one who is not a mere wisher could will what he knows will not be, and one who is not foolish could allow his maidservants and menservants to fornicate one with another, despite his abhorrence of fornication, according to you, and despite his power to prevent it and to separate them, then he who is not a liar could lie. They will find no difference in this! And one should also say to them: Just as one of us who wills folly is foolish, so one of us who wills obedience is obedient. Judge the same, then, regarding the invisible world!

65. That God wills everything which can be willed is also shown by His words: « But you shall not will unless God will». (76.30) Thus He declared that we will only what He wills that we should will. God has also said: « And had thy Lord willed, all on earth would have believed, all of them!» (10.99) And: « And had we willed, we would have given every soul its guidance». (32.13) And: « And had thy Lord willed, they would not have done it». (6.112) And: « And had God willed, they would not have fought; but God does what He will». (2.253/254) Thus He declared that, had He not willed the fight, it would not have taken place, and that what He willed of that, He effected ([18]).

66. Q. The meaning of « had God willed, they would not have fought » is: Had He wished to prevent their fighting, the fight would not have taken place.

---

(18) The appeal to the Qur'ān in this (and in the closely related question of the *qadar*, Chapter Five) is not in itself conclusive — cf. MC, 51.

respecting the acts of His creatures is not His commanding them, one should say to him: If the denial that God wills the acts of His creatures entails His abhorrence of them, then tell us: Does God will the existence of those acts which are neither acts of disobedience nor acts of obedience? If he replies affirmatively, one should say to him: You must say that they are acts of obedience, for you hold that obedience is obedience to the one obeyed simply because he wills it. But if he answers that God does not will them, one should say to him: Then you must say that God abhors their existence. But this necessitates their being acts of disobedience, because what God abhors is disobedience, just as you hold that what He forbids is disobedience. And one should also say to them: If the denial of willing entails the affirmation of abhorrence, then, if God eternally willed nothing at all, you must maintain that He was eternally abhorrent, since the denial of willing entails the affirmation of abhorrence.

QUESTION

63. One should also say to the Muʿtazila: Why do you claim that only one who is foolish wills folly? They may say: Because among us the willer of folly is foolish. One should reply: And likewise among us one who wills what he knows will not be, or thinks it likely that it will not be, is a mere wisher. So judge the same of God, since you claim that He wills the existence of what He knows will not be ([17]). And one should also say to them: Likewise one who allows his men-servants and maidservants to fornicate one with another in his presence when he is not unable to separate them, despite his abhorrence of fornication, according to your principles, and

ciated while he was himself a Muʿtazilite. A summary of his doctrine will be found in *Tritton*, 141-149.

(17) Since, according to the adversaries, He commands obedience though He knows that some men will disobey.

weakness and feebleness. For when something occurs, to the existence of which God was averse, there exists something the existence of which He refused. And if there exists something the existence of which He refused, then it exists regardless of whether God willed it or refused it. This enforces the conclusion that the thing is, regardless of whether God willed it or refused it — which is the very description of weakness.

61. Moreover, the Muʿtazila entertain two opinions. Some maintain that God's will respecting the acts of His creatures is His commanding them. Others hold that God's will respecting the acts of His creatures imposes no obligation and is not His commanding them. Now he who maintains that God's will is His command is bound, since the Creator does not command the acts of infants and madmen, to maintain that God abhors those acts — if the denial of the willing of creatures' acts entails abhorrence of them. But God abhors only disobedience, just as He forbids only disobedience. So if these Muʿtazila do not hold this to be true of the acts of infants and madmen, what they say is false. Besides, if God's not commanding what can be commanded must mean that He abhors it, those who were contemporaries of the Apostle — since it was possible in his time for God to reveal the prohibition of something "permitted" ([15]) which is not an act of obedience — would have had to conclude, in the absence of an explicit command of God, that God abhorred the "permitted". But this would enforce the conclusion that everything "permitted" is disobedience.

62. As for him who follows the second opinion — and it is the opinion of al-Jubbāʾī ([16]) — namely, that God's will

---

(15) Arabic: *al-mubāḥ* — the permitted, or indifferent; one of the five legal categories. Cf., for example, M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Muslim Institutions*, 69, or, Schacht, art. Sharīʿa, in EI or Hwb.

(16) The elder Jubbāʾī, with whom Ashʿarī was so long asso-

the result of unmindfulness, it must be the result of weakness and failure to attain his desire. That is so because the reason which enforces the man's weakness and failure to attain his desire, when he knows what proceeds from him but does not will it, is that what he wills does not take place and that he did not will what does take place. For if what he wills takes place, he is not overtaken by weakness or feebleness; but if it does not take place, he is overtaken by feebleness and failure to attain his desire, because it proceeds from him while he knows it but does not will it. So if the reason be what we have mentioned, the same must also be true concerning what proceeds from a second man when the first does not will it. For if the reason why A must be qualified by the contrary of the knowledge of what proceeds from himself is that it proceeds from him without his knowing it, the same must be true of A in relation to what proceeds from B without A's knowing it, since the same reason applies. And the same must be said of willing. Moreover, if something proceeds from B which A does not will, then A has already disapproved of it (14); and if A has dissapproved of its existence, then he has refused it. This necessitates that the thing was, regardless of whether A willed it or refused it — which is the very description of weakness and feebleness.

60. Q. Why do you deny that all that is required of God in connection with acts of His creatures which He does not will is that He be averse to them, and that this entails neither weakness nor feebleness ?

A. On the contrary the occurrence of those acts of theirs when God was averse to them would undoubtedly entail

---

(14) Ashʿarī apparently ignores the possibility that A's « not willing » may not be quite the same as « disapproving ». I do not know what the full position of the Qadariyya was, but the verbal manœuvring of Ashʿarī seems to leave much to be desired.

Creator does not possess the power to do that which, were He to effect it, creatures would undoubtedly believe. ([13]) For according to the Qadariyya creatures can disbelieve even when signs come down which compel belief, just as they can believe before that happens. And when a man can disbelieve, even when a sign comes down, there is no guarantee that he will not do so. Furthermore, if an act of man could take place, unwilled by the Creator, without the Creator's being thereby overtaken by feebleness or weakness, because He can force the man to do it, then an unwilled act of the Creator Himself could take place without His being thereby overtaken by weakness or failure to attain His desire, because He can make it take place and can create it. If this cannot be, and if the taking place of an unwilled act of God would necessitate His being weak and feeble, the same must be true regarding the acts of His creatures.

59. Q. Why do you deny that, although the taking place of an unwilled act of a man must be attributed to the man's unmindfulness or to his weakness and feebleness, that is not necessarily so regarding the taking place of the act of a second man which the first does not will — and that the same must be true of the Eternal ?

A. The matter is not as you suppose, but the story regarding the man's own act and that of another is the same. For when an unwilled act of a man takes place, it must be the result of unmindfulness, or weakness and feebleness, or failure to attain his desire. And the same must be said of a second man's act which the first does not will, for if it is not

---

with Muʿtazila, since they are called by the latter name in N° 61. There is a splendid article on the Muʿtazila (s.v.) by Nyberg in EI and and Hwb. The reader may also consult the works mentioned in my Introduction.

(13) Ashʿarī of course held the contrary. Cf. Chapter Seven, infra.

and is powerful by a power — for such, among us, do we find him to be who is proved by works of wisdom to be knowing and powerful. Why, then, do you deny that, according to your argument, the works must not prove that the Creator is powerful and knowing? Thus they should be opposed by the argument that the works of wisdom prove that he from whom they proceed is knowing and powerful because he is one who has a knowledge and a power — for that is so among us. (10)

57. Q. Why do you deny that the Creator would not be overtaken by weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire, because He can force His creatures to do what He wants them to do?

A. According to your principle the Creator wills that creatures should believe only in virtue of an obedience for which they will deserve to be rewarded. (11) But if He forced them to believe, according to you they would be neither obedient nor deserving of reward. And just as the taking place of what He did not will would entail weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire, if He did not possess the power to force them to it, so He would have to be qualified by weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire, if He willed its taking place in a way which it would be beyond the scope of His power to effect.

58. Moreover, if he who could believe could also disbelieve, the Qadariyya (12) would be bound to hold that the

---

(10) This use of the retort is a feature of Ashʿarī's dialectic which is often apt to disconcert the reader. But its inconclusiveness did not seem to bother him.

(11) It is clear that the main issue in this chapter is the relation between the divine will and human acts. I use the phrase « human acts » in opposition to « acts of man » (actus humani— actus hominis). The former are voluntary, or those which we commonly regard as free; the latter are involuntary.

(12) This is the first time that Ashʿarī names his adversaries. Cf. art. Ḳadarīya, in EI or Hwb. Here the name is doubtless synonomous

Lord of the Worlds is not to be described save in the way which best accords with the attribute « having power ».

55. O. If one wills a thing and it is, and wills it not and it is not, his « having power » (8) is due only to those who follow and help him, and his weakness is due to the fewness of his helpers and followers. But the Lord of the Worlds cannot be numerically increased by the addition of anyone.

A. If what you claim be true, why do you deny that one who wills the being of an act of his which in fact will not be and the not-being of one which in fact will be is worthier of the description « having power » than one who wills the being of what will be and the not-being of what will not be ? For the former can be described as « having power » only because he is one who can be helped by others in his act. So his « having power » must be due to him who helps him, and his weakness to him who refrains from helping him. (9)

56. One should also say to them: Why do you claim that one who wills from us the being of what in fact will be can be described as « having power » only because he is strong by reason of the many who help him, and weak because of the many who refrain from helping him ? They may say: Because this is so among us. We reply: Then in like manner the work of wisdom proves that he from whom it proceeds is knowing and powerful only because he is one who knows by a knowledge

---

(8) Arabic : *iqtidār*. It may mean « having power », or « being enabled ». It would seem that the objector has the latter meaning in mind. The objection itself appears to be rather fatuous, but we must not be hasty in judging cases like this, where the terms used may have a background (and even a meaning) which we cannot fully appreciate.

(9) This answer is not crystal clear. If the text and my translation are accurate, I suggest that « having power » must be understood in the second sense mentioned in the previous note, i.e. having power because one is enabled, or helped, by another or others.

53. Moreover, if there were in the world something unwilled by God, it would be something to the existence of which He would be averse. (6). And if there were something to the existence of which He was averse, it would be something the existence of which He would refuse. This would necessitate the conclusion that sins exist, God willing or God refusing. But this is the description of one who is weak and dominated — and our Lord is very far above that!

54. O. Tell us about the case of a king of this world who passes by a blind and paralyzed cripple and is cursed by him, though the king does not will that the man should curse him: do you hold that in this case the king is overtaken by weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain his desire, since he wills that the man should not curse him, and yet he does curse him?

A. Certainly. And if the paralytic's will to curse had not been realized and the king's desire for praise had been fulfilled, that would have all the more forcibly diverted any suspicion of weakness and feebleness on the king's part. But if the king did not will to be cursed by the blind cripple, and if he had warned the latter not to curse him and had refused to allow it (7), and yet the man cursed the king without regard for the king's desire or disapproval — why this is the very description of weakness and feebleness. Moreover, when someone wills something from us and it is, and when he does not will it, it is not, he deserves to be described as « having power » much more than one who wills the being of what will not be, and the not-being of what will be. And the

(6) The completeness of this disjunction is questionable. Ashʿarī himself allows that « willing » may have other contraries besides « aversion ». Here he is probably influenced by his concept of God as sole Creator.

(7) This is an addition to the original objection.

we are agreed are His actions. If one who claims that there is some action of God which He does not know is bound to attribute to God ignorance or one of the contraries of knowledge, do you not see that the same obligation constrains one who claims that there is some action of another which God does not know ? Likewise, if one who claims that God announces that there will be some act of His which in fact will not be is bound to attribute lying to God, then one who claims that God announces that there will be some act of another which in fact will not be is also bound to attribute lying to God. In this respect there is no difference between what we are agreed is God's act and that which proceeds from another. Similarly, then, if the taking place of an act of His which the Creator does not will would necessitate His weakness and failure to attain His desire or His unmindfulness and neglect, the same would be necessitated by the taking place of another's act unwilled by Him.

52. Furthermore, it has already been proved that all temporally produced things are created by God. (5) Hence, if the Creator cannot do what He does not will, there cannot proceed from another what He does not will — since all the things which proceed from others are acts of God.

---

(5) Strictly speaking Ash'arī has not proved this in this work. He holds, of course, that God is the Creator of everything outside Himself, and, as he goes on to say, that exerything which proceeds from creatures is an act of God, i.e. God's doing. For an explicit discussion of God as *sole* Creator, cf. *Inṣāf*, 127-139. We must remember that the *Luma'* is not intended as a thorough discussion of every single point of dogma. It is also worth remarking that Ash'arī's adversaries may not always have had precisely the same understanding of a given term as he had. An example of this is the term « creation » (*khalq*), particularly as applied to human acts — cf. *Watt*, 84, and n. 113. One also thinks of the rather absurd verbal rigidity involved in the Ash'arite rejection of the Christians' predicating « substance » of God — cf. *Tamhīd*, 78.21-81.7.

create what He does not will. God Himself has said: «Effective doer of what He wills» (85.16 and 11.107/109). Furthermore, there cannot be in God's dominion anything which He does not will. For if there were in God's dominion something not willed by Him, one of two things would have to follow: either the affirmation of unmindfulness and neglect, or the affirmation of weakness, impotence, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire. Since such things cannot be said of God, there cannot be in His dominion anything which He does not will.

50. Q. And why do you claim that?

A. If what is willed takes place, he whose desire (4) takes place is not overtaken by weakness or by failure to attain his desire because of the occurrence of the thing willed. But if what a man wills does not take place, he must be overtaken by weakness and failure to attain his desire. Do you not see that when what a man knows takes place he is not overtaken by ignorance or by one of the contraries of the knowledge of that thing, since it takes place and he knows it? This proves that if the thing does not take place, and he does not know it, he must be ignorant or qualified by some contrary of knowledge. Similarly. if what he wills takes place, he must not be qualified by unmindfulness, or weakness, or feebleness, or failure to attain his desire; but if something which he does not will takes place, he must be qualified by unmindfulness, or weakness, or feebleness, or failure to attain his desire.

51. Moreover, if the taking place of what God does not will of those actions of His which we are agreed are His actions would necessitate unmindfulness, neglect, weaknesss, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire, then, when there takes place some action of another which He does not will, He must be bound by the same necessity as that which would arise from the unwilled taking place of one of those actions which

(4) Arabic: *murād* — i.e. «willed», or «the thing willed».

CHAPTER THREE

DISCUSSION OF THE DIVINE WILLING AND ITS EMBRACING ALL TEMPORALLY PRODUCED THINGS (1)

49. Q. Why do you maintain that God wills everything which can be willed ? (2)

A. We maintain this because the divine willing, being one of God's essential attributes, as we have already proved, must embrace everything which can truly be willed, just as the divine knowledge, being one of God's essential attributes, must embrace everything which can truly be known. (3) Moreover, it has already been proved that God is the creator of everything which begins to be — and He cannot

---

(1) *Ibāna,* (Klein) 100-106 ; *Inṣāf,* 139-149 ; *Irshād,* 216-232 ; *Fyzee,* 33-35. This question of the divine will is bound up with the questions to be discussed in Chapters 5-7 of the *Lumaʿ*. The adversaries (Muʿtazila) denied that God could will evil or folly.

(2) The question must be understood as referring, not to everything which can be willed, but to those things which can be and de facto are willed.

(3) The parallel must be understood in the sense indicated in the previous note. While God actually knows everything knowable, He does not actually will everything which He can will ; but everything that is willed, is willed by Him Perhaps it is this distinction which Ashʿarī means to express by the phrase *ʿalā ḥaqīqa* — which I have translated by « truly » ; it could also be « really », « in reality », or even « as it really is », if *ʿalā ḥaqīqatihi* is the better reading.

of such a comparison, i. e. that God produces His speech in another just as He produces His act, favor, bounty and benefit in another.

47. Q. May not God produce writing in another, and yet the thing in which the writing subsists will not be writing ? (22)

A. If God produces in another a necessary writing, that other is writing of necessity ; and similarly, if the writing be an acquisition, that other is writing by acquisition. So if God were to produce His speech in another, that other would have to be speaking by the speech of God.

48. This proof of the eternity of God's speech is also the proof of the eternity of God's willing. For if His willing were temporally produced, it would have to be produced by God either in Himself, or in another, or as self-subsistent. But God cannot produce it in Himself, because He is not a substrate for produced things ; and He cannot produce it as self-subsistent, because it is an attribute, and an attribute cannot subsist in itself — just as God cannot produce a knowledge and a power subsisting in themselves ; and He cannot produce it in another, because this would make it necessary for that other to be willing by God's willing. Therefore, since it is impossible to allow these alternatives of which one would have to be realized if God's willing were temporally produced, it is certain that God's willing is eternal, and that by it God has ever been willing.

---

not therefore bountiful, but powerful. Another suggestion : read « when God created His speech (*kalāmahu*) in another ».

(22) There seems to be some confusion here between writing as an act and writing as something written.

quality were its being « prohibition », that body would have to be « prohibiting ». Hence, since another cannot speak by God's speech, or command by His commanding, or prohibit by His prohibiting, God cannot produce speech in another in such wise that He Himself would be speaking thereby. Therefore, since it is impossible to allow the alternatives of which one would have to be realized if God's speech were temporally produced, it is certain that God's speech is eternal, and that by it God has ever been speaking.

46. Q. May not God produce in another an act, a favor, a bounty, a benefit, and a sustenance, so that He Himself is thereby acting, generous, bountiful, benefiting, and sustaining ? Why, then, do you deny that He may produce in another a speech by which He Himself would be speaking ?

A. If this were binding, then God would have to know and be powerful by the knowledge and power which He produces in another, just as He is generous and gracious and bountiful by what He produces in another as favor and bounty and benefit and sustenance. So if this be not binding, neither is your assertion. Moreover, when God produces in another a favor, bounty, act, benefit, and sustenance, that body is qualified by the most distinctive quality of the act, generosity, sustenance, bounty, and benefit. For if the favor, bounty, benefit, and act be «power», that body must be « powerful » ; and the same would be true if it were knowledge, or life, or willing, or hearing, or seeing. So when God created speech in another, that other would have to derive a name from the most distinctive quality of the speech. But since that is impossible, ([21]) it is false for you to make speech the object

(21) What is impossible ? Not what he has just said, though the text seems to give that impression. If the text is to be retained as it is, I presume that Ashʿarī really has in mind the impossibility of the comparison instituted by the objector. God is called bountiful when He bestows a bounty, e.g. power. But the recipient of the bounty is

its contrary. We reply: Then say that one who has power over speech and its contrary may be devoid of both, but not devoid of another speech or its contrary over which he has no power!

45. Another proof that God has been eternally speaking is that speech must be either eternal or temporally produced. So if God's speech be temporally produced, then God produces it either in Himself, or as self-subsistent, ([18]), or in another. But God cannot produce it in Himself, because He is not a substrate ([19]) for produced things. And He cannot produce it as self-subsistent, because it is an attribute, and an attribute cannot subsist in itself. And He cannot produce it in another, for if He were to produce it in another, the body containing the speech would have to derive from the most distinctive quality of the speech a name for the speech itself and a name for the whole to which the locus ([20]) of the speech would belong. So if the most distinctive quality of the speech were its being «speech», that body would have to be «speaking»; and if its most distinctive quality were its being «command», that body would have to be «commanding», and similarly, if its most distinctive

(18) Arabic: *qā'iman binafsihi*, which seems to be the equivalent of the scholastic « per se stans ». The disjunction is complete, if one assumes that God is speaking. From the rational standpoint the conclusion is that God has no « speech », unless Ashʿarī is prepared to explain more precisely the nature of a divine attribute, and the nature of the distinction between God's essence and His attributes. If the latter is a mystery to be accepted on faith, it must be shown that the mystery has been revealed and is not a mere yielding to the demands of a questionable analogy.

(19) Arabic: *maḥall*. Perhaps « substrate » is too technical a translation. The ordinary meaning « place » might do, or, even better, « subject ». Literally *maḥall* is a place where a person, or thing, *descends*.

(20) Also *maḥall*. The argument may seem a bit involved, but is simply this: If speech is found in A, then only A can be said to be « speaking » by that speech, and one cannot say that God is speaking thereby.

A. When you say that if He has not been moving something He has been keeping something at rest you must mean one of two things. Either you mean : If He has not been eternally moving Himself, He has been eternally keeping Himself at rest. Or you mean : If He has not been keeping some body in motion, He has been keeping it at rest. Now if you mean : If He has not been keeping Himself in motion, He has been keeping Himself at rest — why this is an error, because God cannot move Himself. And we did not say that if one does not speak who cannot speak, he is qualified by some contrary of speech. On the other hand, if you mean : If he has not been eternally keeping some body in motion, He has been eternally keeping it at rest — why no bodies eternally coexisted with God so that, if He were not keeping them in motion, He must have been keeping them at rest. What did not exist could not move. So if He did not move what could not move, He did not have to be keeping it at rest.

QUESTION

44. O. One of us who has the power to speak may be devoid both of speech and of its contraries even while he has the power to speak.

A. This is something with wich we cannot agree. For one of us who has the power to speak, at the very moment that he has this power, *is* speaking, no doubt about it ! We shall prove that further on in this book ([17]). However, we now say to this objector : Why do you deny that one who has the power to know may be devoid both of knowledge and of its contraries ? He may say : One who has the power to know may be devoid of the knowledge and the contrary over which he has power, and still not be devoid of another knowledge or

(17) He refers to the discussion of the « capacity » in Chapter Six.

A. Generosity is something which the generous one is free to exercise or not. But miserliness is had only when the miser denies a claim which he ought to acknowledge. (16) The Creator, however, is not bound to do anything.

42. O. Then the denial that God has been ever just necessitates His having been ever unjust or impotent.

A. The denial of justice does not necessitate a contrary which is impotence or injustice; for there is no genus of justice which God cannot effect in us along with impotence. So the denial of justice does not necessitate the affirmation of a contrary which is impotence. Nor does it necessitate the affirmation of injustice, because a man may not be just, when there proceeds from him no justice acquired or effected by him, and yet not be unjust. Hence, of him of whom we deny justice we do not affirm a contrary which is injustice or impotence—since we may deny it of ourselves without affirming a contrary which is impotence or injustice. But if one who is living, among us or others, is not knowing, he is qualified by some contrary of knowledge. Moreover, a man may not be just, and yet not be unjust by reason of some injustice belonging to the genus of the justice. So the denial of justice does not necessitate a contrary which is injustice with the same necessity that is present in the case of speech and willing. For a man may be just by being in a place, if God has commanded him to be in it; and at another time he may be unjust by being in that place, if God has forbidden him to be there. In such a case the justice would belong to the genus of the injustice, because being in a place belongs to the genus of being in it.

43. Q. If the Creator has not been eternally moving something, why do you deny that He has been eternally keeping something at rest?

---

(16) The Arabic word usually translated by « miserliness » also means « refusing something to another », cf. SDA, s.v. *bakhala*.

motion to take place in my body. (14) Do you not see that, if it be impossible for me to effect knowledge in myself when I am dead, it is also impossible for my Lord to effect knowledge in me when I am dead? Hence, since impotence is not contrary to acting, but only to power, and since omitting a thing is doing its contrary, (15) even though the Creator was not ever effecting anything in any way, the denial of His having been ever acting does not necessitate His having been ever impotent or omitting to act.

39. Moreover, if one who is living be not-speaking and not-willing, he must be qualified by some contrary of willing and speech; but if he be not-acting, it is not necessary to affirm a contrary which is impotence or omitting to act, since the man's impotence is not contrary to his acting. So the denial that God has been ever acting does not necessitate the affirmation of an omitting to act or an impotence in the same way that the denial of His having been ever speaking and willing necessitates the affirmation of their contraries.

40. O. Then the denial that God has been ever moving necessitates His having been ever quiescent.

A. If God were one capable of moving, the denial of His motion would certainly necessitate His being quiescent just as the denial of His having been ever speaking and willing necessitates the affirmation of their contraries — since He is one for whom speech and willing are not impossible.

41. O. Then the denial that God has been ever generous necessitates His having been ever miserly.

---

(14) i.e. so long as I am impotent with respect to motion. But in thus dealing with accidents it would seem that Ashʿarī lays himself open to the charge that God's « acting » is also an accident.

(15) This definition of « omitting a thing » seems rather arbitrary. It would be verified in the world of accidents — e.g. if a body is not moving it is quiescent, and if it is not white it is some other color, etc. But there is no place in God for accidents.

trary which is not willing ([11]). So if the Creator were living, but not-speaking and not-willing, He would have to be qualified by the contrary of speech and willing. But acting has no contrary which is not-acting, so that the denial of the agent's being acting would necessitate the existing of its contrary. For if something existing is not temporally produced, it is eternal; and the eternal is not contrary to produced things ([12]). Hence since acting has no contrary which is not-acting, the denial of God's having been ever acting does not necessitate the affirmation of a contrary. But since speech has a contrary which is not speech, the denial of God's having been ever speaking does undoubtedly necessitate affirming that contrary of Him.

38. O. If the Eternal had been ever not-acting, He must have been either impotent or omitting to act.

A. Impotence is not contrary to acting. For there is no genus of acting — be it motion, rest, or some other accident — which God cannot create along with impotence. ([13]) By that, therefore, we know that impotence is not contrary to acting, because bodies and atoms are among the things produced by the acts of God. We know, then, that impotence is not contrary to acting; for if my impotence were contrary to my effecting motion, it would be contrary to my Lord's causing

---

(11) e. g. aversion, inadvertence, etc.

(12) Perhaps the point here is that God's « acting » is the production of something in time, i.e. something *muḥdath* (cf. n. 5, Ch. 1). Since the *muḥdath* is temporal, God's « acting » is also temporal, and so can have no contrary in God, who is eternal. Ashʿarī seems to have held that God's active attributes (those concerned with His operations ad extra, like creation, sustenance, etc.) were entitatively temporal, but denominatively eternal. Thus, God was eternally « creator », but not eternally « creating », just as a weaver is a weaver even when he is not actually weaving. Cf. *al-Rawḍat al-Bahiyya*, Hyderabad, 1322, pp. 39 ff.

(13) Not, of course, with regard to the same accident — i.e. a body could not be simultaneously moving and unable to move. The pertinence of this is open to question.

allows one of the two things in the invisible world must be like one who allows the other.

36. This is also the proof that God has ever been willing. For if one who is living wills nothing whatever, he must be qualified by one of the contraries of willing, namely such defects as unmindfulness, aversion, and so forth, just as, if one who is living knows nothing at all, he must be qualified by one of the contraries of knowledge, namely such defects as ignorance, unmindfulness, neglect, death, and similar defects. Now it is impossible for the Creator to have ever been qualified by some contrary of willing, because this would have necessitated His never willing anything in any way whatever. This is so because, had the Creator ever been qualified by some contrary of willing, the latter would have had to be eternal — and it is impossible for the eternal to cease to exist, just as it is impossible for it to begin to exist. So the impossibility of the contrary's non-existence would have necessitated the Creator's never willing or intending to make anything in any way whatever — which is false. And if that be false, it is true and certain that the Creator has ever been willing.

37. (9) Q. Why do you say that one who has ever been not-speaking and not-willing must be qualified by some contrary of willing and speech, provided he be one for whom speech and willing are not impossible ? And why, then, do you deny that one who has ever been not-acting must be qualified by the contrary of acting and must ever have been omitting to act ?

A. Your objection is not compelling. For speech has a contrary which is not speech, (10) and willing has a con-

(9) In N^{os} 37-44 Ashʿarī answers various objections which claim to be based on his own principle : the absence of a perfection in a subject capable of that perfection necessitates the presence of some contrary of that perfection.

(10) e. g. silence, dumbness, etc.

nor qualified by some contrary of knowledge; and that a man cannot be living and neither speaking nor qualified by some contrary of speech; and that there is no sound proof of that in the invisible world. So if one of the two were possible, namely a living man who is neither speaking nor qualified by some contrary of speech, then the other would be possible, namely a living man who is neither knowing nor qualified by some contrary of knowledge.

35. Moreover it is impossible for a human knower to be qualified by a contrary of knowledge so long as he knows, or for a human speaker to be qualified by a contrary of speech so long as he speaks. Since both these cases are equally impossible, he who allows, in the invisible world, a speaker qualified by some contrary of speech at the same time that he is speaking must be like one who allows, in the invisible world, a knower qualified by some contrary of knowledge at the same time that he knows. Similarly, then, since the impossibility of there being a living man who is neither knowing nor qualified by some contrary of knowledge compels us to acknowledge the impossibility of there being a living man who is neither speaking nor qualified by some contrary of speech, the same impossibility must apply to the invisible world. (8) So one who

---

(8) The obvious retort is that a living man has the organs of speech, tongue, mouth, larynx, etc., whereas God has none of these material things. But the matter is not as simple as that. Ashʿarī held firmly that God has two hands, two eyes, and a face — but *bilā kaifa*, without asking how (Maqālāt Creed, 8-10). So he might have applied the same formula to the present case. Or his answer might have been based on his concept of « speech ». Al-Juwainī says that Ashʿarī defined speech as « that which entails that its subject (*maḥall*) be speaking » — *Irshād*, 101. Al-Juwainī himself prefers the definition: « the saying (*al-qawl*) residing in the soul... which is indicated by means of expressions and conventional signs ». This is almost the same as Bāqillānī's definition, *Inṣāf*, 94. 11 ff. It is possible that Ashʿarī himself had some such notion of *kalām nafsī*.

33. Here is an analogical [6] proof that God has ever been speaking. Had God ever been not-speaking — and He is one for whom speech is not impossible — He would have been qualified by one of the contraries of speech, such as silence or some ailment. And if He had ever been qualified by a contrary of speech, that contrary of speech would have been eternal. And if that contrary of speech had been eternal, it would have been impossible for it to cease to exist and for the Creator to speak; for the eternal cannot cease to exist, just as it cannot begin to exist. So the Creator would have had to be not-speaking, not-commanding, and not-prohibiting in any way whatever. Now both they and we hold this to be false. So if this be false, it is true and certain that the Creator has ever been speaking and saying.

34. Q. And why do you claim that if the Creator had ever been not-speaking He would have been qualified by some contrary of speech?

A. One who is living, if he be not qualified by speech, is qualified by its contrary, just as, if he be not qualified by knowledge, he is qualified by its contrary. That is so because among us one who is living is always such, and there is no sound proof that the invisible world [7] contains anyone who is living and at the same time devoid both of speech and of its contraries, just as there is no sound proof of anyone living who is devoid both of knowledge and of its contraries so that he can be described neither as knowing nor by some contrary of knowledge. The same features are common to both cases: that a man cannot be living and neither knowing

---

(6) Arabic: *min al-qiyās*. *Qiyās* means: comparison, or analogy, then reasoning, and syllogism. In Ashʿarī it is still a « raisonnement à deux termes » — cf. GAI, 358-363, and 365-7.

(7) Arabic: *al-ghā'ib* — the absent, remote, hidden, i.e. what does not fall under our direct experience and perception. It is opposed to: *fīmā bainanā*, and to *al-shāhid wa'l-wujūd*.

Q. Then why do you deny that the words « that we say to it 'Be!' » mean « that we create it, and it is » ?

A. The difference therein is that an inert thing cannot will so long as it retains its inertness, whereas it is not impossible for the Creator really to will or to speak. Therefore His words « that we say to it 'Be!' and it is » do not mean that He creates it. Moreover, if His words « that we say to it » did not mean the affirmation of His speaking to the thing but signified only that He creates it, just as His words « a wall threatening to collapse » mean that it was about to collapse, then it could be claimed that God's words « we will a thing » mean « we make it » and that He does not really will its making, just as His words « a wall threatening to collapse » mean that it was about to collapse. In fact this accords even better with the real meaning of the comparison. So if this be not necessary, neither is what you have said.

31. One should also say to them: Let us suppose that God's willing the making of a thing means that He makes it, and that His willing the movement of a thing means that He moves it. Why, then, do you deny that the inert thing really wills it own movement in the sense that it is moving ? And why deny that the Creator is not superior to the inert thing in willing, and that He is not superior to one whose act takes place without his willing it ? For the latter acquires the quality of « acting » just as the Creator does.

32. Q. What, then, is the meaning of God's words : « They replied : We are coming obediently » (41.11/10) ?

A. They mean that the two of them really said: « We are coming obediently. » [5]

---

(5) This seems to contradict the principle which he follows in N° 30. But there may have been some special reason for this devotion to the letter in what seems clearly to be a figurative expression.

created. Moreover, if God could speak to His own speech, He could also will His own willing — a thing which both we and they hold to be false. And if this be false, it cannot be that the Qurʾān is created.

28. Q. Why do you deny that God's words « that we say to it 'Be!', and it is » mean that He creates the thing and it is, and not that He actually says anything to it?

A. God said: « When we will a thing our only utterance is that we say to it 'Be!', and it is.» Now if one could maintain that God does not really say to a thing « Be! », and that His words mean only that He creates the thing, and it is, then another could claim that God does not really will a thing, and that « we will a thing » means only « we make a thing » without any implication of real willing.

29. O. The meaning of God's willing the thing is that He makes it. (3) Thus He really wills it in the sense that He makes it.

A. If the speaker may say this, then someone else may claim that God really says « Be! » to the thing and that this means that He creates it. Thus he would affirm of God a real speech which would be the « spoken to », just as you claim that God has a real willing which is the thing He wills. And if one may claim this, another may say that God's knowledge of the thing is His making of it.

30. O. Has God not said: « a wall threatening (4) to collapse » (18.77/76)? Now the wall really had no will, but God said « threatening » in a wide sense, the meaning being that the wall was about to collapse.

A. That is so.

---

(3) *Nādir*, II, 91.

(4) Arabic: *yurīdu* — which verb means « to will ».

CHAPTER TWO

DISCUSSION OF THE QURʾAN AND THE DIVINE WILL

27. Q. Why do you hold that God has been ever speaking and that the speech of God is uncreated? (1)

A. We hold that because God has said: « When we will a thing our only utterance is that we say to it 'Be!', and it is » (16.40/42). So if the Qurʾān had been created, God wonld have said to it « Be! » But the Qurʾān in His speech, and it is impossible that His speech be spoken to. For this would necessitate a second speech, and we should have to say of this second speech and its relation to a third speech what we say of the first speech and its relation to a second speech. But this would necessitate speeches without end — which is false. (2) And if this be false, it is false that the Qurʾán is

(1) This chapter is chiefly concerned with the famous question: Is the Qurʾān the created or the uncreated speech of God? Here are a few references: *Irshād*, 98-129; *Justo Medio*, 182-199; *Teologia*, 245-7; *Ḥillī*, 25-8; *Nādir*, I, 103-111; Watt, *Early Discussions about the Qurʾān*, The Muslim World, XL (1950) 27-40, and 96-105; Patton, *Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna*, Leyden, 1897.

(2) The impossibility of such an antecedently eternal series seems to have been accepted by Ashʿarī on Qurʾānic grounds: cf. *Risāla*, N° 16. But there is a suggestion of a more philosophical reason at the end of N° 13 of the *Risāla*. It does not seem to have occurred to Ashʿarī that one might distinguish (rationally) between an antecedently infinite series of finite causes with no Uncreated Cause, and an antecedently infinite series of created beings.

knowing by Himself, He Himself would have to be knowledge. For if one said that God is knowing by a quality distinct from Him, he would have to say that this quality is knowledge. But knowledge cannot be knowing, nor can the knower be knowledge, nor can God be identified with His attributes. Do you not see that the way in which one knows that knowledge is knowledge is that by it the knower knows ? For the power of man, by which he does not know, cannot be knowledge. Hence, since the Creator cannot be knowledge, He cannot be knowing by Himself. And if that be impossible, it is certain that He is knowing by a knowledge which cannot be Himself.

26. Q. Why do you deny that the Creator is knowing neither by Himself nor by a quality which cannot be Himself ? ([22])

A. If this were possible, it would be possible for our saying « knowing » to refer neither to Himself nor to a quality, and by it there would be no affirmation either of Himself or of a quality which cannot be Himself. Since this is impossible, what they say is false.

This proof also proves the affirmation of all God's essential attributes, such as life, power, hearing, sight, and the other essential attributes.

---

(22) This question may involve the distinction mentioned in *Nādir*, I, 58-9. Abu'l-Hudhail (and the Mu'tazila) were careful to say : « God is knowing by His essence, not by a knowledge », and not : « God is knowing by a knowledge which is His essence ». Otherwise it would seem to represent the view of anti-kalāmists (Ḥanbalites ?) who were ready to cry a pox on both houses, Ash'arism and Mu'tazilism.

of knowledge and not because of « otherness » or temporal production. So the proof that the knower is knowing must also be a proof of knowledge. (18) Knowledge is not knowledge because it is distinct from the knower or because it is temporally produced by reason of the existence of something distinct which is not knowledge and of a producer who is not knowledge. Hence the proof that knowledge is knowledge need not be a proof that it is temporally produced or that it is distinct from the knower. (19) Moreover, if one may claim that the proof that knowledge is knowledge is also a proof of its temporal production, or a proof that it is distinct from the knower, then another may claim that the proof that the knower is knowing is also a proof of his temporal production and of his being distinct in his essence. (20)

23. The proof that God has a power and a life is like the proof that God has a knowledge.

24. God has said: « He has sent it down with His (21) knowledge » (4.166/164); and: « No female conceives or bears save with His knowledge » (35.11/12). Thus God affirmed knowledge of Himself. And God has said : « Did they then not see that God, Who created them, is far more powerful than them ? » (41.15/14) Thus He affirmed power of Himself.

25. Among the proofs that God is knowing by a knowledge is the fact that He must be knowing either by Himself or by a knowledge wich cannot be Himself. Now if He were

---

(18) Ashʿarī seems to beg the question here. Surely the Muʿtazila would distinguish : proof of knowledge which is not the one knowing — in the case of man, yes ; in the case of God, no.

(19) We must remember that Ashʿarī is trying to maintain the two elements of his doctrine — which seemingly are contradictory.

(20) This last phrase is not very clear to me. Perhaps it is only a dialectical exaggeration.

(21) The phrase may also be translated : « with knowledge of Himself ». So Bell.

things can be somehow separate from the other. Hence, since there is solid proof of the eternity both of the Creator and of His knowledge, it is impossible for them to be two distinct things. Furthermore, if one could claim that the work of wisdom proves that the knower is knowing and his knowledge is known subsequently, another could claim that the work of wisdom proves that the knowledge is knowledge and it is known to belong to a knower subsequently. If this be impossible — and the two assertions are equal — the proof that the knower is knowing must also be a proof of knowledge.

21. Objection : The work of wisdom proves the knowledge of the knower only because he is one subject to death and ignorance. (17)

A. If one may say this, then one may also claim that the work of wisdom proves that the knower is knowing because he is one who may die and be ignorant.

22. The assertion that the work of wisdom's proof of the knowledge of a human knower is a proof that the knowledge is distinct from the knower and that it is temporally produced is also refuted by the fact that the knower is knowing because

---

doctrine on the divine attributes was summed up : « They are not God, and they are not other than God ». Cf. *Irshād*, 137 — (And among God's names are some which are not to be identified with Him, and yet are not distinct from Him, viz. every designation which indicates an eternal attribute, e.g. the Knowing and the Powerful). Averroes found this doctrine as distasteful as that of the Trinity — *Teologia*, 249 ; and *Tafsīr mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*, ed. Bouyges, 1620, 4 ff.

(17) The Mu'tazila held that to predicate knowledge of God is simply to deny that He is ignorant. This objection, then, seems to mean that a work of wisdom proves that its agent has a knowledge only in the case of an agent subject to accidents such as death and (acquired) knowledge. But since God is His own knowledge and life, His wise works cannot be a proof of His having a knowledge which is distinct from Him. If this be the real meaning of the difficulty, Ash'arī's retort is not very convincing.

way that they prove him to be knowing? For the meaning of his being knowing is not that he has knowledge — because the knowing man may be known to be knowing by one who does not know that he has knowledge.

A. If you may make this claim, then another may claim that works of wisdom prove that I have knowledge of of them, but do not prove that I am knowing. For the meaning of knowing is not that one has knowledge, since a man may be known to have knowledge by one who does not know him to be knowing. Tit for tat! However I hold the questioner's allegation to be false because I hold that one's being knowing means that he has knowledge. Thus one who does not know that Zaid has knowledge does not know that Zaid is knowing.

20. Q. Why do you deny that the work of wisdom proves that a man has a knowledge which is distinct from him, inasmuch as you maintain that it proves a knowledge?

A. Granted that the work of wisdom proves that a man has knowledge, it does not therefore prove that the knowledge is distinct from him, just as, though it proves that the man is knowing, it does not prove that he is in any way distinct. (16) Moreover « otherness » means that one of two

---

(16) This seems to be a correct translation, though the reader may ask: Distinct from what? The answer, I think, is: Distinct from everything, i.e. a separate entity in himself. The argument is a bit involved, but all that Ashʿarī seems to mean is: The evidence of wisdom in a work is proof that he who made the work has knowledge; but it is not, in itself, a proof that his knowledge is distinct from him. The latter is a further inference. In the case of God, according to Ashʿarī, such an inference is simply impossible, since it would destroy the divine unity. In man knowledge is an accident, but God's knowledge cannot be an accident. On the other hand — and this creates the real difficulty — Ashʿarī did not hold that the divine knowledge is identified with the divine essence, that God *is* His knowledge. This is explicitly denied in N° 25. In the *Lumaʿ*, then, we find both elements of the classic phrase in which Ashʿarī's

been eternal, it would have been impossible for Him ever to be powerful and for acts to proceed from Him. Likewise, had God been ever living, but not hearing and seeing, He would have been ever qualified by some contrary of hearing such as deafness and other ailments, and by some contrary of sight such as blindness and other ailments. But it is impossible for the Creator to be subject to ailments because they are among the characteristics of temporal production. So what we have said proves that God has always been knowing, powerful, seeing and hearing.

QUESTION

18. Q. Why do you say that the Creator has a knowledge by which He knows ? ([15])

A. Just as works of wisdom do not proceed from one of us unless he be knowing, so also they do not proceed from one of us unless he have knowledge. If the works did not prove the knowledge of the man from whom they proceed, then they would not prove that the man from whom they proceed is knowing. Consequently, if works proved that the Creator is knowing by analogy with their proving that we are knowing, but did not prove that the Creator has knowledge by analogy with their proving that we have knowledge, it would be allowable for someone to claim that works prove our knowledge, but do not prove that we are knowing. If this be impossible, the assertion of this speaker is also impossible.

19. Q. Why do you deny that works of wisdom do not prove the knowledge of the man who is knowing in the same

(15) In this number and the rest of the chapter Ashʿarī seeks to prove that God has a knowledge, a power, a life, a hearing, and a sight, i.e. that He is not only knowing, but knowing by a knowledge, etc. The necessity of such proof seems to be dictated by such texts as are quoted in N° 24.

QUESTION

16. Q. Do you maintain that God has always been knowing, powerful, hearing and seeing? (14)

A. So we maintain.

Q. What is the proof of that?

A. The proof of that is that one who is living, if he be not knowing, is qualified by some contrary of knowledge such as ignorance, doubt or other defects. So if the Creator had been ever living, but unknowing, He would have been qualified by some contrary of knowledge such as ignorance, doubt or other defects. But if He had been ever qualified by some contrary of knowledge, it would have been impossible for Him ever to know. For if the contrary of knowledge had been eternal, it would have been impossible for it to cease to be; and if it had been impossible for it to cease to be, it would have been impossible for Him to have made works of wisdom. Hence, since God has made such works, and since they prove that He is knowing, it is true and certain that God has always been knowing, since it is clearly impossible for Him to have been ever qualified by some contrary of knowledge.

17. Similarly, had God been ever living, but not powerful, He would necessarily have been ever impotent, ever qualified by some contrary of power. And had His impotence

---

and the different kinds of predication. It is also noteworthy that, even though he is opposed in principle to the application to God of conclusions based on human experience, when Ashʿarī seeks to rationalize his own dogmatic position he falls back on just such conclusions. This will be clearer in Nos 34-5, where he proves the principle on which his argument for the existence of the divine attributes is based.

(14) In this and the following number Ashʿarī sets himself to prove the antecedent eternity of the five divine attributes under discussion. He has not proved explicitly that God Himself is eternal. But we must remember that this work is not a detailed examination of all the points involved in Ashʿarī's dogmatic position.

the life arranged in him by God, and his hearing and sight, and the ways in which food and drink are distributed in him, and his perfection and completeness, and when we behold the firmament with its sun, its moon, its stars, and their courses, we see in that proof that the maker of what we have mentioned could not have made it without knowing its mode and nature. Besides, if works of wisdom could be produced by one who is not knowing, we could not know but that perhaps all the determinations, dispositions and works which proceed from living beings proceed from them while they are unknowing. The impossibility of that proves that well-made works can be produced only by one who is knowing.

14. It is likewise true that works can be produced only by one who is powerful and living. For if they could be produced by one who is not powerful and not living, we should not know but that perhaps all the things which proceed from men proceed from them while they are powerless and dead. Since that is impossible, the works prove that God is living and powerful.

QUESTION

15. Q. Why do you say that God is hearing and seeing ?

A. One who is living, if he be not qualified by some defect which prevents his perceiving audible and visible things when these exist, must be hearing and seeing. Therefore, since God is living, and since He cannot be subject to such ailments as deafness, blindness, and so forth — for ailments prove the temporal production of him who is subject to them — it is certain that God is hearing and seeing. (13)

---

(13) Ash‘arī's acceptance of the epithets applied to God in the Qur’ān seems to be very literal indeed. There is no suggestion, as I have already mentioned, of an awareness of the analogy of being

Why do you deny that God is long, broad, and united ? — or he must mean calling God a body, even though He be not long, broad, united, and deep. [11] Now if he means: Why do you deny that He is long, broad, and united ? — as that is said of the bodies of which we have experience — why this is impossible, because the united is not one thing. For the numerically least of unions is that of two things, since the thing which is one cannot be united to itself. But we have shown above that God is *one* thing. Hence it would be false to say that He is united. On the other hand if the speaker means: Why do you not call God a body, even though He be not long, broad, and united ? — why it is not for us to assign names, and we may not call God by a name which He has not applied to Himself and which has not been applied to Him by His Apostle and on which, and the meaning of which, there is no consensus of the Muslims.

QUESTION

13. Q. Why do you say that God is knowing ? [12]

A. Well-made works can be wisely ordered only by one who is knowing. That is clear from the fact that a man who lacks skill and knowledge cannot weave patterned brocade or execute fine points of craftsmanship. So when we behold in man an embodiment of wise organization, such as

(11) The minimum number of atoms required to constitute a body was disputed; but the essential note of « body » was union, or composition (*taʾlīf*) — cf. *Tamhīd*, 41.16 ff. On « atomism » the reader may consult: S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, Berlin, 1936. (Arabic translation by Abū Rīdah, Cairo, 1365/1946).

(12) In this and the following numbers of this chapter five of God's essential attributes are discussed. The other two of the classic seven, speech and will, are considered in more detail in the next two chapters. In Nos 13-15 Ashʿarī is concerned with proving that God is knowing, powerful, living, hearing, and seeing. It is clear that these epithets are taken from the Qurʾān.

despite the latter's being moist and damp, a proof of the possibility of His creating life in decayed and crumbling bones and of His power to create its like. Then He said: « Is He then who created the heavens and the earth unable to create men like them ? » (36.81) This is the passage on which we rely in arguing about the possibility of the restoration of creatures.

10. This is also the proof of the validity of argumentation and reasoning. (10) For God Most High applied the same judgment to the thing and its like and made the way and course of one term of comparison the course of its like, because He has said: « God gives life by an initial creation, then restores it. » (30.11/10). And He said: « And it is He who gives life by an initial creation, then restores it: and that is very easy for Him » (30.27/26) — meaning: it is easy for Him. Thus He likened the initial creation to the restoration.

11. Q. Enlighten me further about the validity of reasoning.

A. God most High has related what Abraham said when he saw the star: « He (Abraham) said: This is my Lord. Then when it set he said: I like not those who set. Then when he saw the moon rising he said: This is my Lord. Then when it set he said: Unless my Lord guide me I shall certainly be one of the people who err! » (6.76-77). Thus Abraham joined the moon and the star in the judgment that one of them cannot possibly be God and Lord since setting is common to both. Now this is the reasoning and inference which some repudiate and eschew.

QUESTION

12. Q. Why do you deny that God Most High is a body ?

A. We deny it because the speaker must mean :

---

(10) This theme, briefly discussed here, is the subject of the *Risāla.*

— and the impotent can be neither God nor eternal. And if the will of only one be accomplished, impotence necessarily attaches to the one whose will is not accomplished — and the impotent can be neither God nor eternal. Thus what we have said proves that the Maker of things is one. And God Most High has said: «Were there gods other than God in them, the heavens and the earth would be in disorder» (21.22). This is the meaning of the argument which we have just presented. (8)

QUESTION

9. Q. What is the proof that the restoration of creatures (9) is possible ?

A. The proof of that is the fact that God did not create them initially according to an antecedent exemplar. So if their initial creation was due solely to Him, He is not incapable of creating them anew. God Himsef has said: « He has propounded to Us a parable, forgetting the while the fact of his own creation. He asks: Who will quicken bones when they have decayed ? Answer: He will quicken them who produced them a first time, for His omniscience encompasses every creature » (36.78-79). Thus He made the first creation a proof of the possibility of the last creation, because the same concept is realized in both. Then He continued: «He who makes fire for you from the green tree — for lo! you kindle fire from it» (36.80). Thus He made the appearance of fire, notwithstanding its heat and dryness, from the green tree,

---

(8) The unicity of God is the chief dogma of Islam — *Lā ilāha illallāh* ! (There is no other divinity at all save God !) The argument given here is the classic argument from *tamānuʿ* (mutual hindrance), inspired, as is evident, by the Qurʾān itself. Cf. *Risāla*, N° 8. Averroes criticized this proof: *Teologia*, 238-240. Algazel's proof is more « philosophical »: *Justo Medio*, 127-134.

(9) The dogma in question here is that of the resurrection of the body. Cf. *Risāla*, N°s 9-11. The reader may consult EI or Hwb, s.v. Ḳiyāma, for details on Muslim eschatology.

QUESTION

7. Q. Why do you claim that the Creator is unlike creatures ?

A. If He were like them, His relation to temporal production would be the same as theirs. And if He were like them, He would have to be like them either in all respects or in some one respect. So if He were like them in all respects, He would be temporally produced, as they are, in all respects. And if He were like them in some one respect, He would be temporally produced in that respect in which He was like them. But it is impossible for the temporally produced to have preexisted eternally. And God Most High has said : « There is nothing like unto Him » (42.11/9) ; and, « No one is His equal » (112.4). (7)

QUESTION

8. Q. Why do you say that the Maker of things is one?

A. The government of two will be neither harmonious nor consistently effective, but impotence will inevitably attach to one or to both of them. For if one of the two wills a man's life and the other wills his death, one of three things must ensue : the will of both together will be accomplished, or the will of neither will be accomplished, or the will of only one will be accomplished. Now it is impossible that the will of both together be accomplished, for the body cannot be simultaneously living and dead. So if the will of both together be not accomplished one must conclude to the impotence of both

---

(7) The argument of this paragraph is used also in the *Risāla*, N° 15. The two texts cited from the Qur'ān seem to have provided Ash'arism with a theological cornerstone which was also a touchstone. Logically Ash'arī seems to have no room in his thought for the analogy of being. But whether or not, in practice, he really subscribed to an agnostic fideism is another question.

they created what they ejected. Despite their desire to have a child, he would not come; and despite their unwillingness to have him, he would come. And God Most High has said, reminding His creatures of His unicity, « And in yourselves (there are also signs). Well then, do you not see ? » (51.21). He thus declares to them their impotence and their pressing need of a maker who made them and a governor who governs them wisely.

6. Q. What makes you sure that the semen did not preexist eternally ?

A. If your assumption were true, the semen could never have become operative and effective, nor could it ever have undergone change and mutation. For the eternal cannot be translated and changed, nor can it be subject to the characteristics of temporal production. (5) For what is so subject, and also inseparable from lowliness, can never be free from the characteristics of temporal production; and what is not prior to the temporally produced is itself temporally produced and made. (6) Therefore it is false to affirm the eternal preexistence of the semen or of any other bodies.

---

(5) Usually I use « temporal production » and « temporally produced » to translate *ḥadath (ḥudūth)* and *muḥdath*. The Arabic root *ḥ-d-th* seems to convey the general idea of « happening » or « being new ». The essential note of a being which is *muḥdath* (subject to *ḥadath*) is that its existence had a beginning. Cf. Bāqillānī, *Tamhīd*, 41.10 ff. and 73.5 ff. Since the existence of such a being has a beginning, it must be produced in time. Thus the contrary of *qidam al-ʿālam* (the eternity of the world) is *ḥadath al-ʿālam*. Cf. also the words and meaning given by Gauthier in his *Hayy ben Yaqdhān*, Beyrouth, 1936, p. 164 (of the Arabic part). Others (and occasionally myself) prefer such translations as: contingent, produced, created, etc. No doubt Ashʿarī and Bāqillānī looked upon *muḥdith* (agent form of *aḥdatha*) as a synonym of « creator ».

(6) This principle is used again in N° 93.

can do a thing when he is imperfect, a fortiori he can do it when he is mature; and if he cannot do a thing when he is mature, a fortiori he is incapable of it when he is imperfect. From seeing him a baby, then a youth, then a man in the prime of life, then an old man, we know very well that he does not translate himself from youth to old age and decrepitude. For even though a man strain to rid himself of old age and decrepitude and to restore himself to his youthful condition, he cannot do it. So what we have said proves that it is not he who translates himself through these states, and that he has a translator who translates him from state to state and governs his every condition: for his translation from state to state without a translator and governor is impossible. (4)

4. An example which makes that clear is the fact that cotton cannot change into spun thread and woven cloth without weaver or craftsman or supervisor. If a man selected some cotton and then waited for it to become spun thread and woven cloth without craftsman or weaver, he would be beyond the pale of reason and abysmally ignorant. Likewise if a man went to a waste land and found there no castle already built, and waited for the clay to change into bricks which would join together without workman or builder, he would be witless. Now if the change of semen to clot, then little lump, then flesh and blood and bone be an even greater marvel, it proves all the more forcibly that there is a maker who made the semen and translated it from state to state.

5. God Most High has said: « Do you not then see what you eject? Is it you who create it? Or are We the creators? (56.58-59). And they could not affirm with proof that

---

(4) This argument, though rational, is essentially Qur'ānic in inspiration. Later Ashʿarites, such as Bāqillānī, Juwainī, and Ghazālī, give proofs which are more strictly philosophical. Ashʿarī himself may have done so in other works.

CHAPTER ONE

DISCUSSION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES [1]

QUESTION

3. Q.[2] What is the proof that creation has a maker who made it and a governor who wisely ordered it?

A. The proof of that is that the completely mature man was originally semen, then a clot, then a small lump, then flesh and bone and blood [3]. Now we know very well that he did not translate himself from state to state. For we see that at the peak of his physical and mental maturity he is unable to produce hearing and sight for himself, or to create a bodily member for himself. That proves that he is even more incapable of doing that when he is weak and imperfect. For if he

---

(1) *Irshād*, 36 ff.; *Justo Medio*, 59 ff.; for Mu'tazilite views, *Nādir*, I, 37 ff.; for a Shi'ite presentation, *Ḥillī*, 9 ff.; for a philosopher's view, *Teologia*, 207 ff. I would remind the reader that the references which I give here, and on other questions, are merely a few suggestions taken from the many which could be given.

(2) I have chosen to use the symbols « Q », « O », and « A » (Question, Objection, Answer) rather than to weary the reader with the constant repetition of translations of the full Arabic phrases, such as: If someone asks; Someone may say; If they say; One should say to him; etc. This catechetical form of presentation indicates that this work, like so many others, was intended as a kind of practical handbook of polemics.

(3) Cf. Qur. 22.5 and 23.14.

INTRODUCTION

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Beneficent ! On Him I call for help !

1. Praise be to God, munificent and praiseworthy, all glorious and supreme, Lord of splendor and magnificence ! I praise Him for His copious bounty and generous largess ! And I testify that there is no god at all save God alone ! No partner has He ! With Him will the encounter be ! And I testify that Muḥammad is His servant and His Apostle, the Seal of the Prophets !

2. You [1] have asked me to compose for you a compendious book which will contain a summary exposition of of the arguments which elucidate what is true and refute what is vain and empty assertion. And I have thought it good to help you by doing that — may God direct you aright, grant you abundant graces, and aid you to acquire a full knowledge of all that you seek !

---

(1) There seems to be no clue to the identity of the person addressed.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE POLEMIC AGAINST DEVIATORS AND INNOVATORS

A TRANSLATION OF THE

KITĀB AL-LUMAʿ FI'L-RADD ʿALĀ AHL AL-ZAIGH WA'L-BIDAʿ

OF

Abu'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl
AL-ASHʿARI

Part One

THE TRANSLATIONS

CORRIGENDA

1. The reader's attention is called to a mistranslation which occurs on p. 201, at the beginning of paragraph 176. The translation should read: «Furthermore, if the Creator can effect by another a motive by which the other will be [illegible], why can He not effect by another a [illegible] by which that other will be willing, and a motive by which he will be speaking?» Text and context seem to require this interpretation, although the Arabic is a little ambiguous.

2. Note (3) on p. 159: Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi gives [illegible] [illegible] not as the [illegible] main divisions of accidents, but as the first two divisions of accidents. The others are [illegible] and [illegible] motion, rest and composition, according to [illegible] (Badr ed. [illegible], p. 17) the others are motion and rest, [illegible] and composition. So my translation, p. 159, l. 17, should not be [illegible] motion and rest, but «(accidents) motion and colour». I may add here that the notion of accident seems to me to be a very important element of the Ash'arite metaphysics and that it deserves more attention and study than it has hitherto received.

3. Typographical errors are practically inevitable. On p. 83, l. 16 one should read «experience» for «experiment»; and on p. 143, l. 18 one should read «Abd al-Latif» for «Abd al-Lanif»; and on p. 223, ll. 3-4, read De Caelo et Mundo for De Coelo and De Mundo. Any other slips will be readily corrected by the reader. Technically I feel deeply grateful to the technical staff of the Imprimerie Catholique for the care and patience they have shown in their work.

CORRIGENDA

1. The reader's attention is called to a mistranslation which occurs on p. 101, at the beginning of paragraph 176. The translation should read: « Furthermore, if the Creator can effect for another a prayer by which that other will be praying, why can He not effect for another a volition by which that other will be willing, and a speech by which he will be speaking? » Text and context seem to require this translation, although the Arabic is a little ambiguous.

2. Note (8) on p. 120: ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī gives *al-alwān wa'l-akwān*, not as « the two main divisions of accidents », but as the first two divisions of accidents. The *akwān* are mentioned first and include motion, rest and composition. According to al-Juwainī (*Irshād*, ed. Luciani p. 10, Cairo ed. p. 17) the *akwān* are motion and rest, union and separation. So my translation, p. 120, l. 17, should not be « accidental modes and states », but « (accidental) modes and colors ». I may add here that the notion of accident seems to me to be a very important element of the Ashʿarite « metaphysics » and that it deserves more attention and study than it has hitherto received.

3. Typographical errors are practically inevitable. On p. 124, l. 15, one should read « experience » for « axperience »; and on p. 147; l. 12, one should read « Ahl al-Tashbīh » for « Ahl al-Tasbīh »; and on p. 226, ll. 2-3, read *De Coelo et Mundo* for *De Coelo and De Mundo*. Any other slips will be readily corrected by the reader. Personally I feel deeply grateful to the excellent staff of the Imprimerie Catholique for the care and patience they have shown in their work.

الغزالي قدس الله روحه ونور ضريحه. قول القايل ما منها يقول حجة الاسلام فيمن يدعي معرفة الله تعالى والاحاطة بكنه ذاته وصفاته هل هي متصورة في ذاتها وهل مدعيها صادق ام لا مع ان الجسمانيات والروحانيات لا تحاط بها ولا تتحقق ماهيّاتها وهل الاحاطة بذاته وصفاته توجب حدا له وحصرا ام لا. الجواب ينبغي ان يتحقق قبل كل شي. انه لا يعرف الله حق معرفته الا الله ولا يحيط بكنه جلاله سواه......

Ending : وهذا القدر كافٍ في جواب هذه الاسولة والذي أوصي به هذا السايل ان ينظر لنفسه ودينه ويتقي ربه ويطلب عالمًا مليًا يعلم العقل والشرع ليهديه الى طريق الحق......... والله تعالى ولي الكفاية والهداية وهو حسبنا ونعم الوكيل والحمد لله رب العالمين وصلواته على خير خلقه محمد وآله الاكرمين واصحابه المنتخبين.

B. Inside title page of M.

وقف
كتاب اللمع تاليف
الشيخ ابي الحسن على بن اسمعيل
بن اسحق بن سالم بن اسحق
بن عبد الله بن موسى بن بلال
بن ابي برده بن ابي موسى
الاشعري صاحب رسول الله صلى

(stuck to page one from here down)

In the left margin there seem to be some details concerning the *waqf* of the manuscript.

C. The Risālat al-Laduniyya

Beginning : بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وبه نستعين

الحمد لله الذي نيّر قلوب خواص عبيده بنور الولاية وربّى ارواحهم بحسن العناية وفتح باب التوحيد على العلماء العارفين بمفتاح الدراية واصلى على محمد سيد المرسلين صاحب الدعوة والرعاية ودليل الامة الى الهداية وعلى آله سكان حرم الحماية. اعلم ان واحداً من اصدقائنا حكى عن بعض العلماء انه انكر العلم الغيبي اللدني......

Ending : والان نختم هذه الرسالة فان في هذه الكلمات كفاية لاهلها ومن لم يجعل الله له نوراً فما له من نور والله ولي التوفيق وعليه التُكلان . تمت الرسالة والحمد لله وحده وصلواته على سيدنا محمد النبي وآله الاخيار وسلام قابلته (crossed out) (or : قوبلت) قوبل

D. Masāʾil suʾila ʿanhā

Beginning : بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وبه نستعين

مسايل سيل عنها حبر الانام حجة الاسلام ابو حامد محمد بن محمد بن محمد

referred to by al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwainī, and the author of the *Fihrist*. And, so far as I can see, no argument against his authorship can be drawn from anything in the text itself.

---

2. *THE TEXT OF THE RISĀLA*

I need say very little about this text, since I have simply reprinted the Hyderabad edition of 1344/1925. I have changed the paragraphing a little, and have numbered the paragraphs. Whether or not the list of authorities cited in Nº 1 is a sufficient guarantee of the authenticity of the text, I cannot say. I believe it has been suggested that the work was probably composed by a later Ashʿarite. On the other hand some of the doctrine of the *Risāla* is certainly contained in the *Lumaʿ*, as I have indicated in the notes. And I see no reason for denying that the rest of the doctrine is also that of al-Ashʿarī. At present, therefore, I am inclined to accept the *Risāla* as an authentic exposition of al-Ashʿarī's thought on the subject, largely, if not entirely, in his own words.

A. Outside title page of M.

كتاب اللمع للشيخ ابي الحسن الاشعري
وكتاب الرسالة اللدنية في العلم
اللدني لحجة الاسلام ابي
حامد الغزّالي رضى الله عنهما
ونفع بعلميهما امين
وايضاً فيه مسايل في معرفة الله تعالى
واجوبتها لحجة الاسلام ايضاً رضى الله عنه
قال في طبقات الصوفية من ذل في نفسه رفع الله قدره
ومن عز في نفسه اذلّه الله في اعين عباده

evidence » — viz. agreement with the terminology and ideas found in others of Ibn ʿArabī's works — is balanced by the remark of Margaret Smith : « the theory of Knowledge set forth here and the psychological doctrine are almost identical with those of the *Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn* » (*Al-Risālat al-Laduniyya*, JRAS, 1938 (April), p. 177, n. 1). But I leave this discussion to the experts. It is good to know that we now have another manuscript of the *Risālat al-Laduniyya*. And if, as I believe, this manuscript antedates Ibn ʿArabī (560/1165-638/1240), we have another reason for believing that it is an authentic work of al-Ghazālī.

I undertook the translation of the *Lumaʿ* with a good deal of diffidence. An even greater diffidence has marked my editing of the manuscript. There were many obvious mistakes of the copyist which I have corrected, in some of the most obvious cases, tacitly. In some places I have made suggestions, but I have let the reader know what the manuscript contains. In general, I am responsible for anything enclosed in square brackets. The paragraphing is mine, and the paragraph numbers correspond to those of the translation. The page numbers of the manuscript have been indicated, and I have numbered the lines to make reference easier. In the notes M means the A.U.B. manuscript. The manuscript has a period now and then, and I have added a few more. The logic of my periods (and my paragraphing) may be open to question occasionally, but I have simply tried to make the text a little more readable and manageable.

The only title which occurs in the manuscript is: *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*. From the list of al-Ashʿarī's works in the *Tabyīn* I have borrowed the rest : *fīʾl-radd ʿalā ahl al-zaigh waʾl-bidaʿ*.

There seems to be no reason for doubting that the *Lumaʿ* is an authentic work of al-Ashʿarī. It seems to be the work

same hand, at about the same time, in the same ink, and on the same kind of paper. These works are:

1. The *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*, pp. 1-117.

2. The *Risālat al-Laduniyya*, title page, and pp. 1-37. The title page reads: *al-risālat al-laduniyya fīʾl-ʿilm al-ladunī taṣnīf al-shaikh al-imām ḥujjat al-Islām Abī Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī raḥimahuʾllāh.*

   Underneath this title something else was written, but it is now illegible because of three small holes and large black blots. In the upper left hand corner there is a name which seems to be: Maḥfūẓ b. al-Burūrī (?) al-Baghdādī. At the side of the title and at the foot of the page there seem to be other names, on the whole rather illegible. The beginning and the end of this work are given below under C.

3. *Masāʾil suʾila ʿanhā ..... al-Ghazālī*, p. 37 (of the previous work), and pp. 1-24. The beginning and the end of this work are given below under D.

How old is the manuscript? There is no explicit mention of a date, so far as I can see, but I venture to suggest that the character of the writing indicates that it was written not later than the seventh century A.H. (thirteenth century A.D.), and that it may well have been written in the sixth century A.H. (twelfth century A.D.). Al-Ghazālī died in 505/1111, and the manuscript as a whole seems to have been written after his death.

Asin Palacios did not believe that the *Risālat al-Laduniyya* is an authentic work of al-Ghazālī — cf. his *La Espiritualidad de Algazel y su Sentido Christiano*, IV, p. 388. To me his argument is not entirely convincing, since it seems to me that Ibn ʿArabī may very well have taken the passages in question from al-Ghazālī. His argument from « internal

A NOTE ON THE ARABIC TEXTS

1. THE TEXT OF THE LUMA'

My first text of the *Luma'* was that in the Library of the British Museum. Since this manuscript (Or. 3091) is simply a rather imperfect copy of the text contained in a manuscript of the Library of the American University of Beirut, I need say no more about it. However, the reader will want to know something about the A.U.B. manuscript.

This manuscript has the shelfmark: MS 297.3 A81 lA. It is bound in a fairly modern board binding. The manuscript itself measures 13 × 19 cm. (page), and 10 × 16.5 cm. (text). For the most part there are 17 lines to the page, written in an old naskhī, in very black ink, on paper somewhat yellowish with age. There are very few vowels, and many of the dots which serve to distinguish various letters have been omitted. The inside title page (back of p. 1) is partially stuck to the back of the outside title page. There are many worm holes in the manuscript, and a few larger holes in p. 1 and the title page of the *Risālat al-Laduniyya*, but, on the whole, the manuscript is quite legible.

The contents of the outside title page, and of the inside title page so far as it is legible, are given below under A and B. The pages are numbered (by a later hand) 1, 2, 3, etc., the numbering starting over again for each of the other two works contained in the manuscript.

The manuscript contains the three works mentioned on the outside title page. Evidently all three were written by the

There is a summary translation of al-Ashʿarī's *Risāla* in M. Horten, *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam*, Bonn, 1912, 623 ff. And a translation of the third chapter of the *Lumaʿ* will be found in J. Hell, *Von Mohammed bis Ghazâlî*, Jena, 1915, 51-59. Neither of these was available when I was making my own translations.

---

24. Sauvaget, J. — *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Orient Musulman : Éléments de bibliographie*, Paris, (corrections et supplément), 1946.

This is a splendid guide to the literature on many subjects pertaining to Islam.

25. Schacht, J. — *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1950.

26. SDA — Dozy, R. — *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*², 2 vols., Leiden-Paris, 1927.

27. Sweetman, J. W. — *Islam and Christian Theology*, Part One, Vol. I, London, 1945; Vol. II, London, 1947.

28. *Tamhīd* — al-Bāqillānī's *al-Tamhīd fī'l-Radd ʿalā'l-Mulḥida* etc., ed. by Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Khuḍairī and M. ʿAbd al-Hādī Abū Rīdah, Cairo, 1366/1947.

29. *Teologia* — Alonso, M. (S. J.) — *Teología de Averroes, Estudios y Documentos*, Madrid-Granada, 1947.

Spanish translations of Ibn Rushd's (Averroes) *Faṣl al-Maqāl, Kashf al-Manāhij*, and *Ḍamīma*, with much useful material in the Prólogo.

30. *Tritton* — Tritton, A. S. — *Muslim Theology*, London, 1947.

Enormously useful because of its mass of documented information.

31. *Watt* — Watt, W. M. — *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*, London, 1948.

Another book which the student of Muslim theology must read. It deals particularly with the problems to which so much of the *Lumaʿ* is devoted.

This is the famous work of the Imām al-Ḥaramain (al-Juwainī). My references are by page to the French translation. Another edition of the Arabic text has been published by Dr. M. Yūsuf Mūsā and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Ḥamīd, Cairo, 1369/1950.

18. *Justo Medio* — Asin Palacios, M. — *El Justo Medio en la Creencia* (trans. of al-Ghazālī's *al-Iqtiṣād fī'l-Iʿtiqād*, and summary translations of others of al-Ghazālī's works), Madrid, 1929.

    The reader will also find much to interest him in the same author's *Abenhazam de Cordoba* (A study and fairly full translation of Ibn Ḥazm's *al-Fiṣal fī'l-Milal*), 5 vols., Madrid, 1927-32.

19. Macdonald, D. B. — *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, N. Y., 1903.

    Antiquated now, but still very readable.

20. Maimonides — *The Guide for the Perplexed*[2], trans. by M. Friedländer, (7th impr.) London, 1947.

    Contains some interesting animadversions on kalām, pp. 107-144.

21. MC — Wensinck, A. J. — *The Muslim Creed*, Cambridge, 1932.

    This is another standard work which every student of Muslim theology must read.

22. *Nādir* — Nādir, A. N. — *Falsafat al-Muʿtazila*, 2 vols., Alexandria, 1950, and Maṭbaʿat al-Rābiṭa, 1951.

    Those who read Arabic will find these books a mine of information on the Muʿtazila.

23. Pines, S. — *Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomenlehre*, Berlin, 1936. (Arabic trans. by M. ʿAbd al-Hādī Abū Rīdah, *Madhhab al-Dhurra ʿind al-Muslimīn*, Cairo, 1365/1946).

This is a good translation, with excellent notes, of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī's *al-Farq bain al-Firaq*. The translation of the first part (by Kate Chambers Seelye, N.Y., 1919) contains many defects.

11. *Handbook* — Wensinck, A.J. — *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition*, Leiden, 1927.

12. *Ḥillī* — Miller, W. M. — *Al-Bābuʾl-Ḥādī ʿAshar* (an English trans. of part of the work of the two « al-Ḥillī », ʿAllāma and Miqdād), London, 1928.
    This is another Shiʿite work.

13. Hughes — *Dictionary of Islam*, London, 1885.
    I have not referred explicitly to this work, but, despite its age, the reader will find much interesting information in it. It was reprinted again a few years ago.

14. Hwb — *Handwörterbuch des Islam*, Leiden 1941.
    This is really the essence of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*. The English edition should be out by the time the reader sees this.

15. *Ibāna* — *Kitāb al-Ibāna ʿan Uṣūl al-Diyāna*, Hyderabad, 1321; Cairo, 1348.
    English translation by W.C. Klein, *The Elucidation of Islām's Foundation*, (American Oriental Series, 19), New Haven, 1940. One should read the extended review by Prof. Thomson in *The Moslem World*, XXXII (1942) 242-260. For the reader's convenience I have usually referred to this translation.

16. *Inṣāf* — An Arabic edition (for the first time) of al-Bāqillānī's *Kitāb al-Inṣāf fī Asbāb al-Khilāf* by the Shaikh al-Kawtharī, Cairo, 1369/1950.

17. *Irshād* — Luciani, J.D. — *El-Irchad*, édité et traduit, Paris, 1938.

and will give the reader the Shiʿite viewpoint on many dogmatic questions.

6. GAI — Gardet, L. and Anawati, M. M. — *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris, 1948.

   This is a « must » work for the reader who would like a good general introduction to the subject. It has been criticized for having too Thomistic a bias and preoccupation. The reader may form his own judgment on that, but the work is certainly very valuable for the great amount of information and references which it contains and for its stimulating suggestions.

7. GAL — Brockelmann, C. — *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, 5 vols., Leiden, 1937-49.

8. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, M. — *Muslim Institutions* (trans. of *Les Institutions Musulmanes*), London, 1950.

   This is one of the standard general manuals. Others to which I would also call the reader's attention are: Lammens, H. (S. J.) — *Islam, Beliefs and Institutions*, London, 1929 (Sir E. D. Ross's trans. of the original *L'Islam, croyances et institutions*); Gibb, H. A. R. — *Mohammedanism*, HUL, O.U.P., 1949; Moreno, M.M. — *La dottrina dell'Islam*², Bologna, 1940; Pareja, F.M. — *Islamologia*, Rome, 1951: a very complete handbook.

9. Goldziher, I. — *Vorlesungen über den Islam*², Heidelberg, 1925; and the excellent French translation by Arin, *Le dogme et la loi de l'Islam* (made from the first edition), Paris, 1920.

   Of course all of Goldziher's works can be recommended, but this is the one which will most interest the reader of this book.

10. Halkin, A.S. — *Moslem Schisms and Sects, Part II*, Tel-Aviv, 1935.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I have not added any formal bibliography to this work, since the reader will find all he may need in the bibliographies attached to many of the works mentioned below. This little list, for the most part quite arbitrary, is intended primarily for the reader who has little knowledge of things Islamic. It also explains the brief titles and abbreviations used in the notes.

1. Bell — Bell, R. — *The Qurʾān, Translated, with a critical arrangement of the Surahs*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1937-9.

2. Blachère — Blachère, R. — I. *Introduction au Coran.* II-III. *Le Coran, traduction nouvelle.* Paris, 1947-50.

   The arrangement of the Suras in this fine translation is chronological, and the volumes contain much material that will help the reader to understand the book so sacred to Islam.

3. EI — *The Encyclopedia of Islam.*

   A standard work, though the articles differ greatly in merit. Work has been begun on the preparation of a new and thoroughly revised edition.

4. Elder, E. E. — *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, New York, 1950.

   This is an annotated English translation of al-Taftāzānī's commentary on the creed of al-Nasafī.

5. *Fyzee* — Fyzee, A.A.A. — *A Shīʿite Creed*, O.U.P. Calcutta, 1942.

   This is a translation of al-Qummī's *Risālat al-Iʿtiqādāt*,

contribution to the sum of human knowledge has within itself some justification. Moreover, this work of mine has had the added impetus of natural and supernatural interest in the thought and belief of the Muslims among whom I live. Of all the various aspects of their Islamic culture and way of life, their religious and theological thought has the greatest attraction for me from what I may call my professional point of view. Controversy and polemic, once so much the fashion, have yielded in our time to the more eirenic study of comparative theology. A splendid example of this is the excellent *Introduction à la théologie musulmane* of Père Anawati and Louis Gardet. Naturally I believe myself to be the grateful heir of a living theological tradition wider and deeper than that of my Muslim friends. By training, and by conviction, my personal attitude is that of the Catholic theologian. Part of that attitude is a profound respect for what Muslim theologians have attempted in fields difficult and perilous. Philosophy is good and useful and necessary; but, in this economy, it is to theology that we must turn for the best and most authoritative guidance in our journeying from God to God.

languages, though in neither case is the number of references complete. A few notes try to elucidate the meaning of a passage, and some are mildly critical of the author. I hope that some of the notes will be helpful, and that the others will not be too irritating. At any rate they have been kept almost to the minimum.

No detailed note on the transliteration which I have used seems necessary. The reader who does not know Arabic may simply ignore all the signs, and the reader who knows Arabic will easily recognize the significance of any particular transliteration. In the many instances where Arabic names have been transliterated I cannot always vouch for the accuracy of the transliteration. Where it has been possible I have tried to check the transliteration by consulting Samʿānī, Yāqūt, etc., but these works were not always available when I needed them.

In the manuscript of al-Juwainī's *Shāmil* there is a section in which the author defends al-Ashʿarī against certain attacks which had been made on his *Lumaʿ*. I had intended to include this section in the present work, but I could not find the time in which to prepare it. However, there is one thing which the author says which the reader ought to bear in mind. He complains of the unfairness of those who attack the *Lumaʿ*, a relatively simple work, and ignore the larger and more detailed works in which al-Ashʿarī treated more fully and more profoundly the questions discussed in the *Lumaʿ*. Unfortunately we have not those larger works to which he refers. Nevertheless, I think we should do well to avoid being too dogmatic in conclusions based solely on the *Lumaʿ*. Of course we may, and should, draw some conclusions, but always with some reserve. There are still so many gaps in our knowledge of the early Muslim theologians.

I should like to think that this book will help, in a small way, to fill one of those gaps. I should also like to think that it may be a slight contribution to something else. Almost any

also made my own translations of Qurʾānic texts. If these should occasion any doubt, the reader can always consult the many translations of the Qurʾān which have been made. My own preference is for those of Bell, in English, and of Blachère, in French. In giving verse references I have put first the number of the Cairo edition of 1342/1923, adding, after a virgule, the number of the verse in Flügel's edition when the latter is different. The year of the Christian era which corresponds to that of the Muslim reckoning (beginning from the Hegira) has been added after a virgule — as in the sentence just before this one.

A literal translation of the title of the *Risāla* will be found under No 101 of Appendix III. The translation of *Lumaʿ* by « Highlights » was suggested by the meaning listed in Dozy, *Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes* — « ce qu'il y a de plus saillant dans quelque chose ». The reading *Lumaʿ*, and not *Lamʿ*, seems to be the correct one, especially in view of the rhyming *Bidaʿ* in the full title. The word *kalām* occurs in the title of the *Risāla*, in the chapter headings of the *Lumaʿ* (where it is translated by « discussion »), and many times in the Appendices. The reader may consult the article « Kalām » in the *Encyclopedia of Islam* for the various meanings. In the present work it might well be translated by « polemic theology ». Most Muslim theology is polemic, and *kalām* seems to mean the kind of polemic which makes considerable use of rational argument.

It was not easy to determine the quantity and the quality of the notes. The specialist reader would need none, or very few. But I had to think of the non-specialist reader, and it is for his sake that most of the notes have been added. Often enough they are merely references, since detailed explanations would have taken too much space. Other notes have been added as suggestions for comparison with later texts, both those available in Arabic and those available in other

was usually credited with having been the main force in organizing and diffusing Ashʿarism. My researches led me to the manuscript of the *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ* in the Library of the British Museum. A note in C. Rieu's *Supplement to the Catalogue of the Arabic Mss. in the British Museum* (p. 104) states that this manuscript was transcribed « by a young Christian scribe, from a very old MS. in the American College, Beirut ». It was obvious that this copy contained many mistakes, and, through the good offices of the Rev. Joseph P. Connell, S. J., Principal of Baghdad College, I was able to secure a microfilm of the original manuscript in the Library of the American University of Beirut. This manuscript was very helpful to me in my study of al-Bāqillānī, and its interest and importance, along with certain other circumstances, have impelled me to publish it even before I publish my study of al-Bāqillānī. Since I had certain other material on al-Ashʿarī at hand, I decided that it would be of some advantage to include this material in this book.

The student of theology who is unacquainted with the history or development of Islamic thought will, I hope, find in this book much that will interest him. Many of the terms and turns of thought will be strange to him, but I think that, with a little effort, he will understand and appreciate just what al-Ashʿarī was trying to do. He may approach the translations directly, but perhaps he would be better advised to start with the Appendices or with some of the more general works mentioned in the bibliographical note.

Anyone who has had occasion to translate Arabic knows how difficult it is to produce a translation which satisfies oneself and others. In some ways, however, it was easier to translate the Arabic of al-Ashʿarī than it would have been if his work were more literary and less technical. On the whole I think that my translation is fairly accurate and that little violence has been done to the thought of the author. I have

INTRODUCTION

The most important thing in this book is the Arabic text of the *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*. The presentation of this work for the first time in print will certainly be welcomed by those students of Muslim theology who are able to read Arabic. They will turn at once to the text after a glance at the more or less technical details mentioned in this little introduction. To them I need say nothing more. But I hope that this book will also be read by students of theology who have no special knowledge of Muslim theology. Such readers will feel the need of some introductory remarks of a general nature. Those which I shall make must be brief, but interested readers will be able to supplement them by consulting some of the works mentioned in the bibliographical note.

For centuries the largest school of Muslim theology has been that called « Ashʿarite ». However, it is only in comparatively recent years that scholars have come to know much about al-Ashʿarī, the eponym of this school. Even now our knowledge of him is far from being satisfactory, and it seems unlikely that we shall ever know in full, sharp detail either the man or his thought. Recent years have seen the publication of two of his few known extant works, one a kind of heresiography of great value to scholars (in Arabic only), and the other a polemic exposé of certain points of doctrine (in Arabic and in an English translation). A few smaller treatises have also been printed.

While preparing my doctoral dissertation on al-Bāqillānī I naturally became much interested in al-Ashʿarī. The former

II. The Translation of the *Risāla*

PART TWO: THE APPENDICES

PART THREE: THE ARABIC TEXTS

CONTENTS

PREFACE

It is my pleasant duty to thank Dr. Nabih Faris and the Library of the American University of Beirut for graciously allowing me to print the text of the Lumaʿ. I am also indebted to the Dairatu-l-Maʿarif-l-Osmania, and its Director, Dr. M. Nizamuddin, for permission to reprint their text of the Risāla.

I must also acknowledge here the inspiration I have received from my friend Père Anawati, O.P., and the generous and most helpful guidance given to me by Dr. J. Schacht while I was studying under his direction at Oxford University. Mr. [illegible] of Baghdad helped me considerably with the reading of the manuscript, and the Rev. J. J. Houben, S.J., Professor of Arabic and Islamics in the Catholic University of Nijmegen, made valuable suggestions after carefully reading the entire manuscript. Those with whom I have lived during the past year helped me much more than they realized. So it is to them particularly that I offer these primitiae of my study of Muslim theology — to those of my household, the sons of my Mother. [illegible]

[illegible]

PREFACE

It is my pleasant duty to thank Dr. Nabih Faris and the Library of the American University of Beirut for graciously allowing me to print the text of the *Lumaʿ*. I am also indebted to the Dairatul-Maarif-il-Osmania, and its Director, Dr. M. Nizamuddin, for permission to reprint their text of the *Risāla*.

I must also acknowledge here the inspiration I have received from my friend Père Anawati, O.P., and the generous and most helpful guidance given to me by Dr. J. Schacht while I was studying under his direction at Oxford University. Muʿallim Bechir Khoudary of Baghdad helped me considerably with the reading of the manuscript, and the Rev. J. J. Houben, S.J., Professor of Arabic and Islamics in the Catholic University of Nymegen, made valuable suggestions after carefully reading the entire manuscript. Those with whom I have lived during this past year helped me much more than they realized. So it is to them particularly that I offer these primitiæ of my study of Muslim theology — to those of my household, the sons of my Mother. *Quam bonum et quam jucundum...*

Cum permissu Superiorum

Philip K Hitti.

THE THEOLOGY OF AL-ASHʿARĪ


The Arabic texts of al-Ashʿarī's *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ* and *Risālat Istiḥsān al-Khawḍ fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*, with briefly annotated translations, and Appendices containing material pertinent to the study of al-Ashʿari


---

RICHARD J. McCARTHY, S.J.
M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.)

IMPRIMERIE CATHOLIQUE
BEYROUTH
1953

THE
THEOLOGY OF AL-ASHʿARĪ




DATE DUE
JAFFT LIB.
30 SEP 2017
Circulation Dept.

